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ABSTRACT
Jordan is one of many political states which was created after 
the First World War and which achieved political independence after 
the Second World War. However, despite its similarities with other 
such states, Jordan has had, and continues to have, several features 
which set it apart. This case-study attempts to outline these features 
within the context of an examination of the trade pattern and develop­
ment profile of the economy in its post-colonial period.
This study shows why the export sector made a strictly limited 
contribution to overall economic development and the growth of GDP. 
Analysis of the interactions, on the one hand, between imports, 
financed largely by foreign aid, and, somewhat unusually, a surplus 
on the invisible account, and, on the other hand, the creation of a 
service-oriented economy, demonstrates how the promotion of a persistent 
chronic trade deficit and certain structural industrial imbalances 
resulted within the economy and severely constrained its development 
potential. Moreover, particular attention is given to the importance 
and implications of emigrant flows and remittances, which have created 
further resource allocation biasses that are argued to be detrimental 
to the long-run interests of the economy.
A critical review is given of three main areas of domestic economic 
policy that, rather than correcting, have contributed to the above- 
mentioned imbalances - trade policy; foreign reserves policy and its 
excessive holdings; credit expansion policies and their adverse effect 
on resource allocation. Alternative policy solutions are suggested to 
correct both the trade imbalance and to break the structural development 
constraint outlined.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND THE 0RI6INS OF THE TRADE
PATTERN
As a political entity, Jordan did not achieve independent nation 
statehood until 1946.^ Prior to that date, as a colony it experienced 
a succession of administrations subject to different centres of foreign 
control. Such a hybrid colonial parentage inevitably conditioned the 
economy's achievements and development potential subsequent to the achieve­
ment of internal autonomous control over its economic system. Furthermore, 
its territorial integrity and resource base was thereafter subject to 
radical redefinition with, firstly, the annexation of the eastern part 
of Palestine after the Arab/Israeli war of 1948, and secondly, the loss 
of the same area to Israel following the June 1967 war. Thus, uncertain­
ties arising from political conflict have additionally disturbed the 
momentum and direction of economic change during the period of this study.
This introductory chapter will attempt to outline the industrial 
structure of the country that has emerged since independence and up to 
the year 1976. The central theme developed is that both the national 
characteristics of the country and the lack of an articulate development 
planning programme have resulted in the creation of a disproportionately 
large services sector in what is, after all, a small economy.
1. The official proclamation of Jordan in its present form tool* place in 
April 1950 when the West Bank was annexed to Jordan.
2. From 1849 until the end of the First World War, Jordan formed a part 
of the Province of Syria, which was administered by the Turkish Empire. 
After the First World War, on March 2, 1921, the Emirate of Transjordan 
was established, and on May 25, 1923 Britain's formal recognition of the 
State was proclaimed. The new state was to exercise its authority in 
domestic affairs only, and it was not until May 25, 1946 that a kind of 
full political independence was officially proclaimed. See Kingdom of 
Jordan, Ministry of Culture and Information, Jordan (1973): A Brief 
Survey, Amman, p. 3.
3. Throughout this thesis the analysis covered the period up to 1975. 
However, it was carried further to include, when possible, data pertaining 
to 1976.
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It will be argued that while the balance of payments problem was 
an inevitable consequence of this industrial bias, it has, in turn 
reinforced the services-orientation of the economy so that, despite 
positive real economic growth, the basic characteristic features of 
the economy at the time of independence have nevertheless remained 
substantially unchanged. Prior to this discussion, it is important 
to outline briefly some of the main natural and geo-political factors 
and parameters within which the economy has had to promote progress.
Jordan today consists of the small West Bank of the River Jordan, 
an area of 2,165 square miles at present occupied by Israel and a 
territory of 34,550 square miles on the East Bank of the Jordan. It 
is bordered to the north by Syria, to the east by Iraq, to the south 
by Saudi Arabia and to the west by Israel. It therefore occupies 
a central geo-political position in the Middle East (see Map 1).
However, unlike those countries surrounding her which are generously 
endowed with both mineral and water resources,^ Jordan has only phosphate 
deposits.
Within its borders extreme regional variations in aggregate annual 
rainfall occur, which crucially circumscribe the level and distribution 
of economic activity. Approximately 87% of the total area has less than 
200 millimetres of rain per annum, decreasing to near zero in the eastern 
part of the country, whilst in the western hills the range is between
1. As is well known, Saudi Arabia has the largest oil reserves in the 
world, Iraq and Syria have in addition to water resources a larqe 
commercial amount of oil while Israel possesses the most fertile land 
in the Middle East.
2a
Maps of Jordan
Source: Kingdom of Jordan, 'Jordan: Land and People' Ministry of 
Culture and Information, Amman (1974).
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600 and 800 mm. The Dead Sea area and the Jordan valley are semi-
tropical, and the River Jordan and its tributories the Yarmouk and the 
Zerka are used for irrigation on a limited basis.
As a result of the rainfall level and this distribution 
only some 8 to 10% of Jordan's total area is suitable for agriculture, 
only approximately one tenth of which is under irrigation, the remaining 
area being used for dry farming with wheat, barley and olives as the 
principal products. Dependence on rainfall inevitably leads to prod­
uction volatility. This is demonstrated in the case of wheat where total 
production fell from 220,000 tons in 1957 to only 66,000 tons in 1958 
and 104,000 tons in 1959 (see Table 1). Although such wide fluctuations
Table 1.1 Production of wheat and average rainfall in Jordan, 1957-1975
Year Average Rainfall (mm.) Wheat Production
(000 tons) "
1957 427.0 220.0
1958 322.0 66.0
1959 300.0 104.0
1960 193.0 44.0
1961 365.0 138.0
1962 353.0 112.0
1963 233.0 76.0
1964 461.0 295.0
1965 476.0 278.0
1966 293.0 101.0
1967 442.0 196.1
1968* 267.0 95.1
1969* 324.0 144.3
1970* 255.0 54.1
1971* 255.0 168.1
1972* 217.7 211.4
1973* 330.1 50.4
1974* 174.0 244.0
1975* n.a. 50.0
* East Bank only - 1967-1975.
Source: (1) Hadad, M.: 'The Agricultural Sector in Jordan', R.S.S., 
Amman (1976) Table 10.
(2) Dept, of Statistics, Statistical Year Boo, Amman (1975).
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in agricultural output are a fact of economic life for most under­
developed countries, Jordan is quite exceptional in this respect as 
a U.N. study has shownJ
While lack of water has shaped the development of Jordan's agri­
culture, lack of mineral resources has also greatly affected Jordan's 
development potential. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development noted in its report on the Jordanian economy for 1957 that
'up to the present no metallic minerals capable of 
economic exploitation have been discovered. The most 
important metallic mineral deposits are phosphates; 
which is being mined near Amman at a rapidly increasing 
rate. Potash and other salts contained in the^water 
of the Dead Sea are not at present recovered.'
However, building stones as well as marble are readily available and 
some of them are exported to neighbouring Arab centres. As for undis­
covered resources, due to the fact that Jordan's borders have been 
arbitrarily drawn, and almost all the surrounding countries are oil 
producing ones, there is a widespread belief, and indeed hope, that 
oil deposits must exist in Jordan. However, all attempts so far to
establish the existence of this important mineral in commercial quantities
3
have been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the large quantities of iron ore,
1. A study made by the United Nations of the year to year fluctuations 
in 72 countries, showed that Jordan had one of• the widest variations.
See U.N. World Economic Survey, 1954-1970 (1971) p. 118.
2. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: The Economic 
Development of Jordan, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1957 p. 4TI
3. Up to 1975, oil and natural gas exploitation was almost totally
dependent on foreign companies' finance, which resulted in a lack of 
continuity. The Five Year Plan, 1976-1981, allocated a certain sum for 
exploitation. See, National Planning Counc-vl, The Five Year Development 
Plan, 1976-198T, Amman, p. 177. '---------------
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copper, and tin recently discovered in south Jordan have not so far 
been exploited,^ but there is a good world supply of these minerals.
In addition to limited mineral and water resources economic 
development has been hindered by a restricted transport system. The 
1948 war resulted in a change in Jordan's trade route from its 
traditional outlet, Palestine, to the Lebanon through Syria. Accord­
ingly the transport cost of both imports and exports has increased 
sharply. This is in addition to requiring new investment in transport. 
Furthermore, while the majority of the population are settled in the 
northern part of the country (see Table 2), the only outlet to the sea 
is the port of Aqaba on the Red Sea, over 300 kilometres to the south of
Table 1.2 Estimated population of the East Bank in each Governorate as 
at the Census of population and housing, 18 November 1961 
(in thousands)
Governorate Total Percentage share
North and Middle 788 87
Amman 435 48
Balga 79 9
Irbid 274 30
South 114 13
Karak 67 7
Maan 47 6
Grand Total 902 100
Source: Statistical Year Book, 1975, Dept, of Statistics, Amman, Table 1,
1. National Planning Council, The Five Year Development Plan, 1976-1981
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the centre of population. In the early 'fifties Aqaba was a small
fishing harbour, lacking all the basic facilities of a commercial port
and not linked by modern transport systems to the rest of the country.
With the help of German and British aid in the sixties, Aqaba was
developed into a modern port with good communications. The development
of this port is illustrated by the fact that by 1966 it was handling
1.2 million tons of goods, or about two-thirds of Jordan's exports and
imports, compared with only 92,000 tons in 1954. This figure had
increased further by 1976 to over 3.0 million tonsJ
Lastly, further problems have been caused to Jordan's economy by
population adjustments resulting from the aforementioned territorial
changes. Alternate expansion and contraction has at times more than
trebled the effective population of Jordan and then turned a majority
2
of these inhabitants into dispossessed refugees.
This unprecedented movement of population accentuated the young 
age bias usually found in less developed countries, indicated by
3
the 1961 census. The detailed breakdown of the age structure indicated 
that nearly one half of the population was under the age of 15 (see 
figure 1). This phenomenon has had an effect on the economic and 
social needs of the country as a result of the consequent requirements in
1. Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1968 and Central 
Bank Monthly Bulletin,(March 1977).
2. Analysis of Jordan's population is made difficult by the lack of 
consistent information and the absence of time series data. The last 
complete census was in 1961 and no correct information is available after 
that. However, at the end of 19/7 the population of Jordan was approx­
imately 375,000 (see IBRD: op. cit., 1957, p. 41) and the population
of the West-Bank was 460,000. This is in addition to 350,000 Palestinian 
refugees who entered Jordan after the 1948 war. Thus, total population 
in 1948 was about 1,165,000. In contrast the 1967 war has resulted in 
the loss of 950,000 inhabitants of the West Bank.
3. For a brief discussion on the youthful ness of the Middle East pop­
ulation see United Nationas Economic and Social Office in Beirut: Studies 
on Social Development in the Middle East, 1971. United Nations. New York“.
(J973> pp.“ 3^T
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Fig/I
AGE DISTRIBUTION IN JORDAN 1961
under15 60& o ver1 5 -5 9  
Age groups
Source: Dem ographic Y ear Book U.N. 1970
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education and welfare facilities.
As regards manpower use, the 1961 census indicated that only 23% 
of total population was gainfully employed. This low ratio may be 
explained by the fact that the census underestimated the female working 
population.^ However, out of the total labour force, over one third 
was engaged in agriculture and only one tenth were employed in mining 
and industry. The rest were involved in various service industries. 
(See Table 3.)
Table 1.3 Labour force and employment by economic sector, 1961
Economic Sector Males Females Total Percentage
Agriculture 130,579 7,078 137,657 35
Mining 9,181 5 9,186 2
Manufacturing 27,567 5,179 34,746 8
Construction 40,123 36 40,159 10
Electricity 1,558 14 1,572 1
Commerce 30,960 396 31,356 8
Transport 11,763 136 11,891 3
Services 45,439 8,176 53,525 14
Other 70,746 1,031 71,778 19
All activities • 367,926 22,052 389,978 100
Total population 867,597 838,629 1,706,226
Labour Force Participation 42% 0 .2% 23% 23%
Source: Department of/Statistics, Some Economic Indicators Amman, 
December, (1968) p. 3.
1. For example, ! the census estimated the number of females working in 
agriculture as only 7,078 . J is probable that actual figures were much 
higher.
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Given that when Jordan was established as a separate independent 
political entity, its economy was considered to be one of the most 
backward in the Middle East, with limited mineral and natural resources 
and subsequently varying human resources, what industrial structure 
emerged once independence was established?
During the years 1954-1956 agriculture was the largest individual 
sector in the economy, although wholesale/retail trade, ownership and 
dwellings, public administration and other services combined accounted 
for over half of the GDP during this early period. On the other hand, 
as shown in Table 4, mining and manufacturing was only just over one 
tenth of the GDP.
Table 1.4 Industrial origin of c[ross domestic product, 1954/56 at 
factor cost, in JD million
1954 1955 1956 Average % Share
1 Agriculture and forestry 14.2 6.2 19.0 13.1 . 25.8
2 Mining, manufacturing and electricity 4.2 5.2 6.3 5.2 10.3
3- Construction • 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.5 2.9
4 Transport 4.4 5.5 6 .8 5.5 10.8
5 Trade and banking 9.3 9.3 10.5 9.7 19.2
6 Ownership and dwelling 2.3 2.3 2.9 2.5 5.0
7 Public administration and defence 9.1 9.7 11.5 10.1 20.0
8 Services 3.0 3.3 2.7 3.0 6.0
Total GDP 47.7 43.0 61.4 50.6 100.0
Source: R. S. Pprter: Economic Trendsin Jordan, 1954-1959, Middle East 
Development Division, Beirut, Juiy^iybl), p. 2.
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This unusually oriented industrial structure, coupled with the
aforementioned development constraints clearly limited the prospects
for industrial growth and change. In fact, a visiting IBRD Mission
remarked that despite the high rate of growth of 10 percent per annum
during the 1952/1954 period a 4 percent annual increase would be very
difficult to achieve even with a special effortJ
Despite this assessment, the following years showed a rate of
growth of 10 percent per annum which has rarely been matched in the
experience of either developing or developed countries. Furthermore,
this high rate of growth was accompanied by an increase in real
income. This is not easily quantifiable, as all published estimates of
GDP have been produced on a current price basis. However, some
indication,of the direction of the price trend can be observed in
Table 1.5 (on page 11), which reproduces the available published
2
statistics for wholesale prices during this period.
These trends, however, were interrupted by the June war of 1967 
which imposed further difficulties on the Jordanian economy. The impact of
1. IBRD: op. cit., (1957), p. 67.
2. See the following studies for a full discussion of this point:-' 
United Nations, Industrial Development in the Arab countries, New 
York (1967), p. 83; National Planning Council: The Seven Year Program 
for Economic Development, p. 2; The Three Year Plan, p. 2.
- n  -
Table 1.5 Indices of GDP and wholesale prices - 1954 = 100
GDP
Wholesale prices 
GDP
Wholesale prices
1954 1955 1955 1957 1958 1959 1960
100 91 127 131
100 114 108 106
149 162 170
113 116 126
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
211
109
207
105
224
116
258
114
289
104
285
n.a.
Source: (1) See Appendices 1 and 2.
(2)" Department bf Statistics, Statistical Year Book, Amman, (1966)
this war is illustrated in Table 6 which compares certain key indicators 
in the last seven months of 1967 with the corresponding period of 1966. 
More important, however, is the fact that although the West Bank repres­
ented only 6 percent of Jordan's total territory, it had constituted 
some 25 percent of Jordan's cultivable land, including 80 percent of 
land planted with vegetables, 25 percent of the land planted with cereals 
and 35 percent of the live-stock. Therefore, the overall loss in terms 
of agricultural production was estimated to be over 30 percent of the 
GDp J  Further, the 1967 budget had to meet the cost of the war, and 
only a large inflow of Arab aid (JD 37 million annually) under the 
Khartoum Summit Conference Agreement, prevented an extremely difficult 
budgeting and balance of payments position from becoming critical. In 
this context many commentators argued after the war about the economic
1. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review (September 
1967) p. 9.
Tablel.6 Impact of June 1967 war on the economy of Jordan (in OP million)
Sector January - May June - December
1966 1967 % Change 1966 1967 % Change
Domestic revenues JD million 12.5 13.4 6 .8 18.5 12.6 -32.0
Imports I I 26.1 29.0 11.0 42.1 26.4 -37.2
Income from tourism I I 4.5 5.0 12.3 6 .8 ' 1.6 -76.9
Remittances from abroad I I 3.2 3.8 20.3 7.4 2.7 -63.3
Cement 000 tons 140.0 137.0 -2.0 .235.0 152.0 -35.3
Petroleum products I I 165.0 198.0 20.0 265.0 195.0 -26.4
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, Amman (1967).
viability of Jordan as an independent state if the loss of the West 
Bank became permanent.^
Another important consequence of the 1967 war was the emergence
of the Palestinian Organization movements and their confrontation with
the government in 1970. The resulting disturbances brought almost all
2
economic activity to a sudden halt, creating uncertainty and pessimistic 
business expectations. Exports and imports were further affected by 
the closure of the border with Syria during the second half of 1970 and 
the first half of 1971.
The economic performance of the East Bank after the 1967 war was, 
therefore, characterized by an immediate recession which continued until 
the end of 1968. This was followed by a period of recovery until the end 
of 1969, that was in turn followed by severe recession until signs of 
revival became apparent in 1972.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the GDP annual average rate 
of growth for the period 1967-1972 as a whole was only 4.2 percent, 
which when adjusted per capita for the influx of population and for the 
increase in prices which occurred for the first time in Jordan, was in 
fact a fall of 4 percent (see Table 7).
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Table 1.7 GDP and cost of living indices, 1967-1972
1967 1968 1969 19f0 1971 1972
Cost of living 100 99.8 107.5 114.8 119.7 129.4
GDP 100 95.1 112.0 106.0 114.3 125.2
Source: m  Central Bank of Jordan Monthly Bulletin, December 
1972 (2). GDP based on National Account figures, Department
of Statistics. See Appendix 2.
1. The Economist Intel1iginee Unit, Quarterly Economic Review (Sept. 1967)
2.. Central. Bank of Jordan, The Adverse Effect of Ic m o U  nmm , * '  * .. 
West Bank on Jordan's econwiyT Septeniber.l u (..nrf f S '
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While political events were the main determinant of Jordan's economic 
performance during 1967-1972, fiscal and monetary expansion appears to be 
the most important factor that influenced growth and development during 
1973-1975. These new developments can best be explained by the sharp increase 
in government expenditure and the consequent increase in money supply and 
prices which certainly absorbed all the increase in total GDP. Table 1.8 
shows how these variables interacted on each other during the last period 
1973-1975. Government expenditure which stood at an average of JD 81.30 
million during the period 1967-1972, rose to an estimated JD 209.43 in 1975
Table 1.8 Government expenditure and money supply (in JD 000)
Year Government Money Prices GDP
expenditure supply W 7 = 1 0 0
1967 68.15 83.50 100 177.11
1968 80.51 108.82 107 168.50
1969 88.50 118.83 115 198.30
1970 .80.70 129.13 120 189.60
1971 83.14 135.71 129 202.60
1972 105.87 146.47 142 224.20
1973 119.52 176.07 148 239.31
1974 151.50 216.74 171 308.60
1975 209.43 277.74 192 239.31
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletins, December 1972, 
December 1975 and January 1978.
(or an annual average rate of increase of 21.6 percent). Consequently the 
average annual rate of growth of the money supply, broadly defined, 
accelerated from only 11.9 percent during 1967-1972 to over 25 percent 
during the period 1973-1975. This was directly reflected in prices which 
rose by 18.0 percent during the same period, compared with 7 percent 
during 1967-1972 and only 2 percent during the pre 1967 war period. Thus, 
the rate of decline in real income which began in the second period con­
tinued to accelerate after 1972.
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The inflationary pressures of recent years, although not much 
higher than that experienced by other countries, made a big impact on 
the economy, following as they did a long period of relatively stable 
prices. This impact was intensified as prices of foodstuffs, between 1972 and 
1976 rose by an annual average rate of 23% compared with the 
overall price increase of 18% (see Table 9).
Table! .9 The Amman cost of living index, 1967-1976
Year All items
1967 100.0
1968 99.7
1969 107.5
1970 114.8
1971 119.7
1972 129.4
1973 142.9
1974 171.5
1975 192.1
1976 220.9
Source:
Food Housing
100.0 100.0
97.8 100.9
118.8 101.2
128.1 107.3
136.1 111.3
151.2 120.3
179.7 125.0
242.3 135.0
279.9 141.4
341.4 151.4
Clothing Other
100.0 100.0
99.6 101.1
101.3 101.4
107.2 108.5
112.4 109.9
119.5 112.3
133.1 114.1
150.4 120.7
160.5 140.4
172.9 153.1
Percentage change
-0.3
7.8
6.7
4.2
8.1
10.4
20.1
12.1
15.0
Central Bank of Jordan, statistics Pertaining to some Aspects 
of the Jordan!an_Economy (October, 1974) and Central Bank of 
Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
These inflationary pressures may be regarded as both a cause and a
consequence of Jordanian monetary expansion during this period, for when 
prices rise at a high rate, individuals tend to revise their cash 
holdings portfolio and substitute durable goods. There is clear evidence 
of this behaviour in Jordan between 1973 and 1976 when a tendency to 
build up stocks of inventories reflecting widespread speculation was 
witnessed. This created an excess demand for commodities and increased
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. credit and the money supply.
This condition of disequilibrium, both in the money market and 
in the commodity market, was accompanied by a new phenomenon - speculation 
in land. ' The peak of this form of speculation was reached in
1975 and 1976 when land prices increased rapidly and at a rate which 
far exceeded expectations.^ The reason for this boom, however, dates 
back to 1971 when prices started to rise as a result of the large 
increase in government expenditure after the civil war of 1970. Further, 
the 1972 three years development plan gave priority to house building 
and by 1974 the Housing Bank was established. This, in addition to 
the increase in remittances of workers abroad which were mainly dir­
ected into this speculation. Economic and monetary consequences of 
this phenomenon are discussed in chapter 8 .
Having outlined the main economic indicators during the period 
1954-1975, and their underlying economic causes, attention must now 
be paid to the principal sectoral developments and how they were 
affected by Jordan's foreign trade movements during 1954-197 5.
(a) Agriculture
While GDP increased at an annual rate of growth of 8% during 1952-1975, 
agriculture (including livestock) increased by only 3.1%. However, the 
agricultural sector, being dependent on rainfall, was subject to wide
1. Figures for land prices are not readily available. Estimates for 
the increase during this period, however, range between 50% and 30%. 
Using the increase in flat rents as a proxy the rent of a 2 bedroomed 
flat increased from an average of JD 800 a year during 1973-1974 to at 
least JD 1800 in the summer of 1976. Bassam Asfour: Amman, Royal 
Scientific Society (March 1977) p. 16.
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fluctuations in output which affected its GDP ratio.
For example, while agriculture constituted almost 30% of GDP in 
1954 the harvest was particularly poor in the following year and the 
ratio dropped down to only 14%. In 1955, there was a bumper harvest 
and agriculture accounted for over 30% of GDP. The same cycle repeated 
itself in subsequent years. The general trend of this ratio, how­
ever, has been a declining one and as Table 10 shows, by 1975 the 
GDP/agriculture ratio declined to only 10.8%. This indicates, that 
Jordanian agriculture, unlike that of most other developing countries 
is no more the .dominant sector of the economy. A fact which may 
be considered as an indicator of structural transformation during the 
course of development. However, the growth of this sector should be 
able to meet the growing domestic demand created by the overall increase 
in per capita income.
Jordanian agriculture has so far fallen short of satisfying 
domestic demand. This is shown in the continuous increase in imported 
agricultural and food products presented in figure 2. The graph shows 
clearly that it was only during the early sixties that the agricultural 
sector was able to meet domestic demand and food imports declined.
Despite the fact that this sector accounted for over 30% of the 
labour force and over 55% of the population, no identifiable agricultural 
policy in Jordan was brought to bear on the situation.
Although resource allocation within all economic sectors is 
essentially private enterprise oriented, government assistance neverthe­
less played a crucial role in the provision of an essential industrial 
infrastructure.
In the agricultural sector support and assistance is diffused
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Table 1.10 Agriculture/GDP ratio in 1954-1976. value in JD mi 11 ion
Year Value of
agricultural
output
GDP Agriculture/GDP
ratio
1954 14.20 47.70 29.7
1955 6.20 43.00 14.4
1956 19.00 61.40 30.9
1957 12.80 61.90 20.0
1958 12.90 69.10 18.6
1959 15.08 85.17 17.7
1960 14.62 89.44 16.4
1961 25.30 110.87 23.0
1962 20.90 108.62 19.3
1963 22.08 117.67 18.9
1964 34.14 135.52 25.3
1965 34.11 150.95 22.7
1966 27.65 149.74 18.5
1967 38.74 177.11 21 .8
1968 27.53 168.49 16.4
1969 36.34 198.34 18.3
1970 28.66 189.56 15.16
1971 37.81 202.58 18.7
1972 42.45 224.16 18.5
1973 31.12 233.74 13.3
1974 , 54.48 308.60 17.7
1975 34.60 . 319.90 10.8
1976 33.45 331.95 10.1
Source: See Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 
Tables 40-43. See also Appendices 1-and 2.
among several government agencies. In addition to the National Planning 
Council, which is responsible for overall national economic development 
including the agricultural sector, there is also the Ministry of
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Fig.2
Indices of A gricu ltu re  GDP & 
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i
i
Source: Appendices 1 2.
- 20 -
Agriculture which has its own budget and undertakes its own projects.
This dual system of control has been extended to include several other 
agencies responsible for particular agriculture related projects, as for 
example, those administering irrigation, water resources and electricity.1 
However, lack of co-ordination between these various institutions has 
rendered government policy ineffective. In fact, it is argued here 
that, despite the attention given to this sector in successive develop­
ment plans, there is still no clear agricultural policy for the country. 
This is reflected in the decreasing emphasis on the agricultural sector 
in successive development plans. As can be seen in Table 11, 
while agricultural investment accounted for 32.11% of total investment 
projected in the first Five Year Development Programme (1962-1967), the 
proportion allocated to this sector declined to 14.6% in the 1976-1981 
Plan.
Table 1.11 The ratio of capital formation in agriculture to the overall 
planned investment in the various development plans in Jordan
Item 5 Year Program 7 Year Proqram 3 Year Plan 5 Year Plan
1962-1971 ---1964-1971 1973-1975 1976-1981
Public investment 43.08 41.53 23.16 23.5
Private investment 19.95 . 12.59 5.14
r—LO
Total 32.11 27.15 15.45 14.6
Source: Computed from: (1) Jordan Development Board, The Five Year
Program for Economic Development, n.d .; (2) .Jordan Development 
Board, The Seven Year Program for. Economic Development, n.d.;
(3) National Planning Council, The Three Year Plan, n.d. & 5 Year Plan.
1. All agricultural area on both banks of the River Jordan is the res­
ponsibility of the Jordan River and Tributories Corporation. Further, 
the Jordan Electricity Authority is responsible for power problems 
related to the irrigation projects. More recently, in 1973, a new 
agricultural organization was created specially to undertake develop­
ment in the Jordan valley.
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In all agricultural development schemes, irrigation projects
have accounted for a large proportion of the total investment. The
East Ghor Canal Project in the Jordan valley can be singled out as the
most important project.^ The scheme diverted the Yarrmouk river into
a 70 km canal running alongside the river Jordan and provided irrigation
2
to over 120,000 donums.
In addition, the National Resources Authority, established in the 
early sixties, tried to utilise flood water by building earth-filled 
dams across valleys, which though dry in summer are flooded 
during the rainy season. Table 12 shows some details about these dams.
Table 1.12 Dams constructed in Jordan
3
Dam Capacity (m )
Kufrain 4.30 
Shuieb 2.30 
Zi gl ab 4.30 
Sultani 1.25 
Qutrani 4.20 
Sama Sdud 1.70 
King Tulal 52.00 
Um Jimal 1.80
Total 71.85.
Source: Natural Resources Authority. Cited1 in M. Ha.ddad: The Agri­
cultural Sector of Jordan.(July 1975) Table 12.
1. This project is the first stage of an overall American project which 
is concerned with the development of water resources in the whole of 
the Jordan valley.
2: ^ ee Ha(jad: J.h_e Agricultural Sector of Jordan. Amman (July 1976), 
P; ,^ef a p° Awwad, A. J.: Agricultural Production and Income in 
the East Ghor Project, Amman, UAbAU/Jordan (1367), p'. 36.----- ■ -  — ■ '
- 22 -
Despite the amount of investment in irrigation, over 84.5% of 
the cultivated land in Jordan remains solely dependent on rainfall 
As rainfall varies greatly from one year to another, arable land area 
also varies so that the amount of land available for agriculture is 
unpredictable from one year to another.^ However, over and above 
the fluctuation of agricultural produce due to the unreliable water 
resources, the rapid increase in population and urbanization has res­
ulted in a net decrease per person in the cultivated land area (see 
Table 13).
Table 1.13 Cultivated area (per capita)
1954-1956 1964-1966 1971-1972
Cultivated area (donum per capita) 4.2 2.9 2.2
Source: M. Hadad: The Agricultural Sector of Jordan, Amman (July 1976).
In addition to the decrease of land utilisation, the agricultural sector
has been continuously hampered by the low productivity of both land
and labour. This can be attributed to soil deterioration and the lack
2
of capital expenditure on fertilisers and machinery. Early in 1972 
the total consumption of fertiliser per hectare was on average about 
9 kgs, compared with 208 kgs in the U.K., 343 kgs in West Germany and 
575 kgs in the Netherlands.
1. According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture for 
the year 1964/65, the total agricultural land is about 2.5 million 
(Ministry of Agriculture Annual Report, Amman, 1965, p. 9). The agric­
ultural sample survey for 1966 gives the figure of 1.75 million acres 
(see the Department of Statistics Report on the results of the agric­
ultural sample survey, 1966, in arabic, p. 36).
2. National Planning Council, Three Year Development Plan, n.d., p. 61.
t-
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As far as machinery is concerned, although there was a con­
siderable increase in the use of tractors during the period 1954-1975 
the amount of cultivated land per tractor was very high, especially 
when compared with the advanced countries.^
Apart from the lack of technical knowledge concerning the use of 
fertilisers and of modern technology, lack of financial resources can 
be considered to be the most important factor impeding Jordan's util­
isation of modern techniques. Further, the organisation of the land 
into small and scattered.holdings makes the application of modern 
methods rather uneconomical for the individual farmers.
Thus, with the exception of a number of irrigation projects
financed and promoted by the government, no clear agricultural policy
has been pursued and Jordan continues to import an increasing proportion
of its food requirements. Had more emphasis been given to this sector,
most of the limitations which face the agricultural sector could have
been overcome and Jordan would not only become agriculturally self-supporting
2
but also gaining from the export of . /agricultural surplus. Not all 
agricultural areas in Jordan are under cultivation; for example, only a 
small part of the most fertile land in Jordan (the Jordan Valley) is,at 
present utilised. The Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea area are part of 
the same
1. The number of tractors in Jordan increased from only 305 in 1954 to 
over 2923 in 1975 (see Statistical Year Book, 1975). However, cultivated 
land per tractor is about 135 hectares compared with 11 hectares, for the 
U.K. and 15 for the U.S.A. See :M. Hadad: op. cit., p. 55. J
2. For more detailed discussion regarding agricultural policy in Jordan
see Jered E. Hazel ton: A Wheat Policy for Jordan, Royal Scientific 
Society, Amman, 0973), pp. 50-51. ” !
i
<4
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geological structure which straddles Western Asia and Africa. The 
importance of this area lies in the fact that on average it is between 
250-300 metres below sea level, which gives it a sub-tropical climate 
in a region which is temperate and arid. The Valley itself is free 
from frost and is protected from winds by the hills bordering it.
Thus, with proper planning and the building of an irrigation system, it 
could become a rich source of vegetables and fruit; not only for 
Jordan but also for surrounding countries. The government has made a 
start in this direction by building irrigation systems and providing 
agricultural extension services.^
(b) Industry
While the importance of the agricultural sector underwent a dramatic 
decline during the period 1954-1975, the industrial sector enjoyed the 
largest relative expansion in the economy. Gross Domestic Product 
increased at a rate of 8% per annum and the value added in manufacturing 
and mining increased by an annual average rate of 13.5%, so that by 1974 
it had increased to ten times its 1954 level. This was reflected in the 
contribution of this sector to the GDP which almost doubled during the 
period under consideration, as Table 14 demonstrates.
The explanation for this unprecedented industrial development 
arises from Jordan's relatively small resource base. When the country 
was established, neither the East Bank nor the West Bank had a developed 
manufacturing industry. Both Banks were considered as agricultural
1. Of these the most important projects are (a) The East Ghor Canal 
project, completed in 1965. The project provides an irrigation and drainage 
systems for a total area of 120,000 donums, (b) The two earth-filled 
dams completed in 1968 on the side wadis of Shuieb and Kafrain, pro­
viding irrigation systems for a total area of over 13,000 donums'. See, 
Oddvar Aresvik: The Agricultural Development of Jordan, Praeqer. New 
York, (1976) p. ITT. -----
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Table 1.14Value added in manufacturing industry, 1954-1976 (in JD OOP)
Year Value added 
in industry
GDP Industry/GDP
1954 4.2 47.7 8.8
1955 5.2 43.0 12.1
1956 6.3 61.4 10.4
1957 6.8 61.9 10.9
1958 7.6 69.1 10.9
1959 6.8 82.2 7.5
1960 6.8 89.4 7.5
1961 8.8 110.8 7.9
1962 8.1 108.6 7.4
1963 18.6 117.7 15.9
1964 12.5 135.5 9.2
1965 16.2 150.9 10.7
1966 17.2 149.7 9.7
1967 17.5 177.1 9.8
1968 20.1 168.5 11.9
1969 23.1 198.3 11.6
1970 19.8 - 189.5 7.8
1971 20.5 202.6 10.1
•1972 25.2 224.2 11.3
1973 28.6 239.3 11.9.
1974 49.1 308.6 15.9
1975* 48.8 269.5 18.0
1976* 61.0 331.95 18.3
* Figures for the East Bank only.
Source: Appendices 1 and 2. Dept, of Statistics, National Account 
Statistics and Central Bank of Jordan, Month'I y'-Bui Jetin 
(January 1978) Tables'40-43.
centres, while the remaining part of Palestine was the centre for trade 
and industry. Thus, the economies of Palestine and Jordan were closely 
linked through interdependent trade, Jordan exporting its excess
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agricultural produce to Palestine in return for imported manufactured 
goods. Furthermore, Palestine was not merely a source of manufactured 
goods, but by providing free access to its port of Haifa provided 
Jordan with a crucial sea link with the rest of the world. This free 
access had been guaranteed since the 1928 trade agreement with Palestine, 
there being neither import duties nor custom barriers between the two 
countries.^ The existence of this important transportation facility 
and the free trade area itself reinforced the tendency for Jordan to 
specialise in agriculture and thereby minimised the importance of 
expanding the industrial sector.
Thus, the 1948 war and the loss of Palestine, deprived Jordan (East 
and West Bank) of its traditional source of manufactured godds. Two 
important consequences followed from this. First, transport became a 
new constraint on economic development and on the trade flow of commodities, 
and secondly, the establishment and expansion of a manufacturing capability 
that might otherwise have been met by Palestine became imperative. More­
over, this expansion was made easier by the influx of Palestinians, who 
brought with them both the capital and skills* 2 that Jordan lacked. The 
immigrant entrepreneurs, encouraged by the high cost of imports, enabled 
the new situation to be exploited and industry to expand. At the same 
time, the domestic market was expanding not only because of the influx 
of 350,000 refugees from Palestine but also from the addition of the 
460,000 West Bank inhabitants, which together more than trebled the
1 • International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: op. eft., (1957)
2. The IBRD mission estimated that approximately 10 million Palestinian 
lira which was redeemed for Jordanian currency, representlthe amoiJ? 
that was brought with the Palestinian refugees! Ibid!! p 46?
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population of Jordan. This fact, together with the increase in per 
capita income, stimulated domestic demand for consumer goods which 
could only be met by imports as the domestic supply was inadequate.
The continuous increase in imported consumer goods has played, 
however, a creative role in the expansion of Jordan's industry. These 
imports increased in value from about JD 5 million in 1950-1951 to 
about JD 13 million in 1958.^ This trend demonstrated that markets 
existed for such commodities and provided numerous opportunities for 
setting up import substitution industries.
Since these commodities were essential and therefore had to be 
either imported or domestically produced, and as Jordan suffered from 
a chronic trade deficit which limited its capacity to import, there 
was then a prima facie case for industrial protection to encourage 
import substitution. In the event the government provided protection 
and also participated in shareholding.
Government promotion of industrial development, which began in
the mid 1950s, has sponsored the establishment of modern manufacturing
projects. The most notable of these are petroleum refining, cement,
leather tanning, pharmaceuticals and clothing. These industries were
established and aided by the government on the basis of feasibility
2
studies and contributions of capital,. Furthermore, the Encouragement 
and Guidance of Industry law no. 27, 1955 and the subsequent amendment 
to it provided financial incentives to industrial establishments by 12
1. Department of Statistics: Foreign Trade in 
1950-1956, Amman, (l967), Table the Jordanian Economy,
2. Ministry_ of Trade and Industry .Law 
Industry, Amman, Law no. 27 (1955). of.Encouragement and Guidance of
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exempting their imported machinery from import duties and additionally 
providing these industries with a crucial domestic monopoly.^ Different 
types of protection were extended to industry. Petroleum refining, 
cement and tanning being given full protection from imports and the 
establishment of competing firms being prohibited. Other industries, such 
as clothing enjoyed the protection provided by the high import tariffs.
So far industrial development has been considered within the 
framework of domestic demand. Inevitably, however, industrial devel­
opment has also made an.impression on the role and structure of exports 
and imports, which in turn added a new stimulus to industrial development.
In the early stages of Jordan's economic life exports primarily 
consisted of agricultural products with industrial goods playing a 
relatively small role. In fact, olive oil was the only manufactured 
product to be exported in substantial amounts. Even the export of 
phosphate, which now constitutes the most important single item of total 
exported products, was at that time insignificant. On average, mining 
and industrial products constituted only 20% of total exports during 
the period 1951-1954. This contribution, however, increased to over 
50% in the early sixties and almost reached 50% during 1967-1972 and 
71$ during 1973-1975, as Table 15 demonstrates.
With the exception of phsophates, all exports of industrial 
produce were directed to neighbouring Arab countries. The origin of 
this particular export market orientation can be understood from the 
fact that the period which saw the beginnings of the development of
1. M. Mazur: 'Economic Development of Jordan' in Economic Development 
and Population Growth in the Middle East, Charles Cooper and s.  Alexander 
(eds), Elsevier (1972), p. 277
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Table 1.15 Jordanian exports, 1954-1975 (in JD million)
Yearly
Averages
Agricultural
Products
Food
Industrial
Phosphate
Products
Other Total
Total
Exports
1951-1954 1.38 0.45 0.04 - 0.49 1.87
1958-1960 1.70 0.21 1.10 0.23 1.54 3.24
1961-1966 3.09 0.41 2.18 0.68 3.28 6.37
1967-1972 4.45 0.61 3.20 2.54 6.35 10.80
1973-1975 8.14 - 14.38 7.82 22.20 31.17
Source: m  Dept, of Statistics, Foreign Trade in the Jordanian Economy 
967) (2) For 1967-1972, Dipt. ^Statistics unpublished
data. *(3) For 1973-1975, Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly 
Bulletin (January 1978).
industrialisation in Jordan was also a period of transformation for a 
number of its neighbouring economies. The rapid growth of the oil 
industry in Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia led to a general and sharp 
rise in the level of income and consequently generated an increased 
demand for consumer goods. Eventually the increasing demand from these 
markets absorbed not only the products of export oriented industries, 
cigarettes, plastic and batteries, but also the products of some of 
the import substitution industries. Cement, for example, which was 
originally a major import substitution industry has been exported to 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In addition to its impact on the balance of 
payments, the long range impact of this new foreign demand was reflected 
in the capacity of production which has shown a continuous increase ^
It should be noted, however, that this expansion in the export of manufactured 1
1. Production capacity for the cement industry increased from 200 tons 
per day in the 1950s to 1700 tons per day in 1968. See,The Arab 
Economist, Monthly Survey of Arab Economies, Beirut, Lebanon, no. 57, 
October 1973, p. 34.
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goods, although high, was limited when compared with the huge increase 
in demand in the oil producing countries.
In contrast to manufactured goods, phosphates, the best known and 
most widely used of Jordan's mineral resources, are entirely directed 
to the non-Arab world (with the exception of a small amount exported 
to Lebanon), mainly to the Far East and Europe. Due to the importance 
of phosphate production to the Jordanian economy and strong' competition 
from other countries on the international market, e'.g. Morocco,.the government } 
played a particularly prominent role in the promotion of its exports 
and production. ‘ One example of.this was • the con­
clusion of bilateral trade agreements with India and Yugoslavia. It was 
also the government which carried through the plans for the expansion 
of production capacity and the improvement of quality, to meet ' ' 
the specifications required by the importing countries. In 1966 the 
government merged the two phosphate companies - Russifa and El Hassa - 
into one company, to be solely responsible for all mining and marketing 
of the product. This larger firm enabled production to increase and 
industrial costs to fall. Stiff competition from Morocco and the U.S. 
in the fifties and the sixties stimulated the government to take 
further measures to reduce transport costs, the main problem of the 
Jordanian phosphate industry. Consequently, the construction of a new 
railway connecting the mining region in Allhusa with the port of Aqaba 
was started in 1973. This increased the haulage capacity and decreased 
the cost of inland transportation.2
1. Jordan National Planning Council: 
1973-1975, Amman, n.d., p. 106. The Three Year Development Plan.
2. Ibid., p. 160.
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As a result of these factors, the period prior to 1966 saw a 
vigorous growth of industry. Phosphate production increased nearly 
five fold between 1956 and 1966 and cement showed only a slightly 
smaller expansion over the same period. The petroleum refinery which 
started production in 1960 had doubled its output by 1966. Further, 
vegetable and alcoholic beverages have also shown a rapid growth in 
production. Electricity production grew rapidly in order to meet the 
increased power demands and plans were prepared for the creation of a 
national grid system.
These favourable trends suffered severe disruption at the outbreak 
of the war with Israel in 1967. The disruption was not simply evident 
in the loss of the West Bank, which in itself made the 1967 war a 
catastrophic economic event for Jordan, but also in the loss of the 
market which the West Bank had constituted for East Bank industriesJ 
Thus, the events of 1967 particularly affected those industries which 
were geared to the home market. Additionally, due to the closure of 
the Suez Canal, phosphate exports declined sharply causing another 
difficulty to Jordan's export industries. Output of the principal ind- 
dustries did not regain’their 1966 level until late 1968 and early 1969. 
A post-war construction boom closely related to revitalised industrial 
production was further stimulated, especially in the Amman area, by 
the large influx of refugees from the West Bank, about half of whom 1
1. The loss of the West Bank markets contributed to a sharp decline 
in production of 50* upper leather, 47% sole leather, 35% in cement and 
26% in petroleum refining. See, Central Bank of Johdan, The effort nf 
Israeli Occupation of the West Bank (September, ,1975), p.~TT.— p"' f
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settled there.1 As a consequence, cement production in 1968 recovered 
to its 1966 level, and by 1969 had increased by over 20%.2 3
The rising trend was maintained until September 1970, when clashes 
between the.government forces and the Palestinian movements broke out. 
Most of the industrial enterprises suffered direct physical damage, in 
consequence of which production of the principal industries declined 
considerably compared with 1969. Nevertheless, as Table 16 indicates 
the upward trend of industrial production before 1966 was re-established 
during 1972-1976, so that by 1976 the index for industrial production 
stood at 219.3 compared with 100 in 1966 and 96 in 1970. This notable 
performance was mainly due to the phosphate industry which during this 
period recorded the highest expansion, and also to the expansion of 
production in most of the essential products such as cigarettes, iron 
and petrol products. This expansion was a result of the increase in 
capacity utilisation in manufacturing.
1. During 1968 the number of building penults issued by the Amman 
municipality Increased by 66« compared with 1967 (Central Bank of Jordan. 
Annual Report, 1968, Amman, p. 10). *
2. The unexpectedly rapid recovery of Jordanian Industry was a source of 
surprise even to the Jordanian economists, as can be seen in an extract 
from the Central Bank Report for the first quarter of 1969: ‘The overall 
quarterly level of industrial production recorded a remarkable 27* Increas, 
when compared with the corresponding quarter 1968. Most of the Industrial 
institutions have contributed in this impressive stride that k L , S  j a 
trial production fairly close to normal ir-l-llr qrowih' (2en?rai
Bank of Jordan, Quarterly Bulletin,(November 1969), p. 20.) 1
3. Capacity utilisation in Jo» 
remarkably during 1970-1975 as shown in the
1970
1971
1973
1974
1975
1976
Capacity utilisation
70%
78%
88%
90%
95%
n.a.
Source:
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Table 1.16 Industrial Production Index
Year Index of principal industri es
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
100.0
91.0 
92.2
111.0
96.0
113.0
139.1 
152.9 
163.0' 
175.0 
219.3
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Monthly Bulletin (Januarv. 19701 and 
(January 1978).
Despite the achievements of the Jordanian manufacturing and mining 
industries, the economy is still beset by problems which are familiar in 
most developing countries, particularly the fact that the typical 
industrial firm operates on a small scale and usually within a consumer 
industry.1 The implication of this has been reflected in the high cost 
of production, the lack of inter-industry linkages and the high depend­
ency on imported raw materials. With the exception of cement and phosphates 
the majority of the other industrial establishments rely almost exclusively 
on imported raw materials. As Table 17 indicates, 60% of the imported 
raw materials during 1961-1968 were consumed by manufacturing industry.
One of the consequences of the high correlation between the two variables
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Table 1.17 Imports of raw materials, 1961-1968 (in JD million)
Year Total imported Raw materials Total value of
raw materials used by industry output (industry)
1961 9.9 5.7 20.9
1963 14.9 9.0 25.7
1964 14.7 9.5 28.5
1965 17.7 10.5 34.9
1966 20.3 12.2 38.4
1967 20.0 11.5 36.1
1968 23.3 13.7 40.3
Source: Department of Statistics: Flow of Goods in the Jordanian 
Economy, /\mman (April, 1970), table II, p. 17.
(r = 0.97) is that linkages between the manufacturing sector and other 
sectors are weak, so that heavy industrial investment can only result 
in a substantial increase in imports.
It is clear therefore, that despite the rapid expansion in manu­
facturing and mining, the services bias: has remained 
essentially the same. This is seen in the continuously large share of 
the service sector in GDP. Table 18 shows that, although there has been 
an increase in the share of the industrial sector and a corresponding
Table 1.18 Percentage contribution in the Gross Domestic Product 
during 1954-1975 '
Year Agriculture Industry Services
1954-1956 26.6 11.4 62.0
1957-1960 19.6 12.6 67.8
1961-1966 21.2 15.3 63.5
1967-1972 18.1 17.2. 64.7
1973-1975 12.0 24.0 64.0
Source: Computed from Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix.
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decrease in the agricultural sector the contribution of services 
remained constant over the whole period of 1954-1975.
Given that Jordan is a small developing country with a relatively 
low per capita income, this predominant role of the service sector in 
the economy is rather unusualJ
_  When Jordan's industrial structure is compared with that of other
developing countries, it appears to have the largest services sector.
The United Nations survey of the growth in tangible producing sectors
of selected developing countries ranked Jordan the lowest among the
34 countries discussed in the survey. Only the Lebanon and Israel had
2
a similar proportionate share.
While lack of natural resources may offer a reasonable explanation 
for the emergence of this services oriented structure, the development 
of Jordanian foreign trade provides the explanation for the continuously 
dominant role played by this sector. Further, it could be argued that 
this services orientation has, in turn, had the result of determining 
the pattern and magnitude of Jordan's international trade.
As will be demonstrated in chapter three, basic commodities
constitute a high proportion of consumption expenditure in Jordan relative
•/
to the expenditure patterns of higher income countries, where luxuries 
account for a steadily higher share, in accordance with the level of per
■i
capita income. As per capita income increases the demand for basic, as
T. M. P. Mazur, estimated a ratio of for the share of the service 
sector in a less developed country, similar to Jordan. See, Mazur: 
op cit., (1972), p. 278.
2 * UN,'World Economic Survey 1968-70, Part II:The Developing Countries 
in the l9b(Js, New York, (19/u; p. Id. ~
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well as durable consumer goods, also increases. Given that the demand 
was increasing at a rate beyond that which could be met by domestic
ft
production, the inevitable result is an increase in imports. On the 
other hand, the continuous inflow of aid allows these imports to increase 
above the level they might have achieved otherwise. This has led
in practice to an expansion of the tertiary activities in order to 
absorb this relatively large inflow of goods.
The impact of foreign aid on the expansion of the services sector 
was further magnified by the fact that this aid has been financing current 
government expenditure. Thus, it has allowed the government sector to 
expand above the level it would have reached, and thereby increase
the share of the service sector in the economy. Therefore, the expected 
result would be an increase in money income and a consequent rise in the 
level of demand for imports, creating a further expansion in the services 
sector.
While the large inflow of imports financed by foreign aid seems to 
indicate one possible cause of concentration in the services sector, one 
should not ignore the fact that there was a positive invisible trade 
balance which contributed to the expansion of the services sector. The 
role of the invisible export surplus in the balance of payments will be 
discussed in chapter four, but it is mentioned here to emphasise its 
rfrle in shaping the services orientation of the economy.
The growth of earnings from tourism and remittances from Jordanians 
working abroad was the cause of the increasing export surplus of invisibles. 
As can be seen in Table 19, between 1954 and 1967 net invisible exports 
not only increased six fold but their ratio to GDP nearly trebled, from 
an average of about 5% in 1954 to 14.3% in 1963. However, the services
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surplus was eliminated during the 1967 war and showed a deficit for 
the following two years. By 1970, a surplus was again in evidence and 
since then, the trend has been one of the continuing growth so that by 
1975 its contribution to GDP had reached 20.6%. This particular export 
surplus indicates another cause for the predominance of the service 
activities in the economy.
Table 1.19 Exports and imports of services during 1954-1976 (in OP million)
Year Exports Imports Balance Net balance 
to GDP - %
1954 4.51 1.85 2.66 5.0
1961 15.28 5.15 10.13 9.1
1962 17.97 7.24 10.73 9.8
1963 18.61 7.72 10.89 9.2
1964 23.90 7.70 16.20 11.9
1965 27.30 8.30 21.00 14.3
1966 31.20 9.80 ' 21.40 14.1
1967 25.50 10.33 15.17 8.5
1968 22.90 24.30 -1.40 0.1
1969 31.30 42.10 -6.20 5.4
1970 31.30 25.10 5.50 2.7
1971 25.70 20.20 6.80 3.1
1972 30.00 23.20 6.80 3.1
1973 57.84 29.82 22.85 9.5
1974 64.61 42.48 22.13 7.2
1975 136.96 71.23 65.73 20.6
1976 163.63 92.81 .70.82 21.3
Source: Appendix 3 and Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, 
Amman (January 1978).
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To return to the central theme of the predominance of the services 
sector in the economy, this feature is reflected in both its share of 
national income and in total employment. In 1961, as mentioned earlier, 
over 55% of Jordan's labour force was employed in services,a ratio that 
had increased even further to 63% by 1975. An important question now 
remains, namely, has this bias been harmful to the long term economic 
development of an under-developed economy such as Jordan's?
The contention that, in general, manufacturing is preferable to 
services, or vice-versa, is a crude oversimplification as it ignores 
any special circumstances of the economy involved and the composition 
of services or manufacturing sectors.^ In Jordan, the major components 
of the service sector are government activities (including the army), 
and the trade and finance sectors. As manufacturing industry and 
agricultural are in private hands, the government sector only produces 
non-tangibles: according to one estimate by the National Planning 
Council the government sector alone employs over 45% of the total 
employed labour force (73% of employment in the services sector).
The second largest employer in the services sector is the trade sector, 
which in 1975 absorbed over 10% of the labour force employed in tertiary 
activities (see Table 20). Given this composition of the services 
sector in Jordan, it now becomes clear, at least in general terms, why 
it is not economically beneficial for the Jordanian economy to have such 
a large services sector.
Conventional wisdom assumes that an increase in services employment 
adds further pressure to the balance of payments and the production
iV J?!' ^1*SCTuS'1*en ^ n's see R* Bacon and W. Eltis?How We
Went Wrong,' The Sunday Times, (November 2, 1.975), p. 16.
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Table 1.20 Employment in the services industries in 1975
Number Rati o
Electricity and water 8,000 3.4
Construction 2,000 0.8
Trade 25,000 10.7
Transport 14,000 _ 6.0
Finance 3,000 1.2
Government 171,000 73.7
Others .9,000 .3.8
Total 232,000 100.0
Source: M. Sowan et al.: The population and manpower and development in 
Jordan, unpublished report prepared for the National Planning 
Counci 1, Amman (April 1977), Table 6.
sector, unless these services are net foreign exchange earners, due to
the fact that the service sector like the manufacturing and agricultural
sectors generates incomes, but unlike them, in the case of Jordan, does
not directly generate export earnings. Therefore, expansion of the
services sector increases both the demand for imported goods and demand for
domestically produced goods which might otherwise be exported. In either case,
such an expansion puts pressure on the balance of payments in Jordan;
both manufacturing and agricultural industries are not well developed and
thus their respective supply elasticities are low. Thus, in general
terms, a large services sector has a built-in bias in favour of high
imports and low exports.
How this came about in Jordan is not difficult to understand. Since 
the early years of independence the government found it necessary, forl
political reasons, to employ labour within government services including 
the army. Since there is no manufacturing industry in the public sector,i
government employment necessarily means employment in the services sector.
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This expansion of the government sector of course was made economically 
possible by the large inflow of foreign aid which the government 
regarded as part of its revenues. This foreign aid has performed two 
functions: a) it enabled the government to finance its budget deficit, 
and b) it enabled the Jordanian economy to run a large balance of 
payments deficit. The relationships between aid, government expenditure 
and the balance of payments has been described earlier in this chapter 
as an important factor in the origin of the services sector. In recent 
years earnings repatriated by Jordanians working abroad were another 
important source of finance.
The argument against a large services sector in Jordan can be put 
in a slightly different way which is similar to the ohe used by Bacon 
and Eltis in their discussion of the British economy. Obviously the 
British economy differs from the Jordanian economy, but the 
argument used by them can as well be applied to the Jordanian economy. 
Bacon and Eltis^ distinguish between 'marketed output' and 'non- 
marketed output'. The first is defined to include all manufacturing 
and services that are sold. Conversely in the case of non-marketed 
services their main argument is that 'The marketed output of industry 
and services taken together must supply the total private consumption, 
investment and exports needs of the whole nation'.^ Thus, it is not 
important whether the economy is services oriented or manufacturing 
oriented, what is important is that the output should be marketed. As long 
as services can be sold and enable the economy to satisfy its need 
there is no harmful effect on economic growth.
1. Bacon and El tis , op. cit., p. 16.
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Since independence, Jordan has been faced with a large trade 
deficit, resulting mainly from the continuous reduction of the country's 
•labour force producing 'marketed output' in the agricultural and 
manufacturing industries. Even when the 'marketed services' in the 
form of the favourable invisible trade balance is taken into consideration, 
the argument still remains that the services orientation of the economy is 
harmful for economic development. First, although invisible earnings 
have been growing in recent years, they have never been sufficient to 
pay for the trade deficit so that the large volume of imports has been 
largely financed by foreign aid. Secondly, invisible earnings are not 
predictable because they consist mainly of remittances from Jordanians 
working abroad and net income from tourism, both vulnerable to changes 
in political and economic circumstances. Remittances have been shown 
to depend on income in the oil-producing countries and the general 
political situation in the area. This dependence became clear during the 
1967 war and the civil disturbances of 1970, when remittances fell to 
their lowest level, and in 1973-1976 when they showed a large increase 
as a result of the rise in income of the oil-producing, and largely 
'host' countries. Furthermore, assessment of the migration costs to 
the economic development of Jordan should not only include the oppor­
tunity cost resulting from the migration of the labour force, but also the 
lack of any guarantee that this source of income is going to continue 
in the future.
Similar arguments can be made about income from tourism. Chapter 
four will show how the role of tourist income in the economic development 
of Jordan has been over-estimated. Two additional points need to be 
mentioned here; first, that tourist expenditure in Jordan has a high 
import content and secondly, that tourist income is by nature, highly
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volatile and particularly sensitive to political disturbances that 
have been endemic in the post 1948 period, in the Middle East in 
general and in Jordan in particular.
One further consideration regarding services orientation of the 
type developed in Jordan may be made in relation to Kaldor's^analysis 
of the U.K., where he argues that 'It is the rate of growth of manu­
facturing production which is likely to exert a dominating influence 
on the overall rate of economic growth'. Here the leading role of the 
manufacturing sector was due to the fact that the rate of labour product 
ivity is one of the main determinants of the rate of growth in the 
long run. Since labour productivity in the manufacturing sector is 
higher than in the service sector, manufacturing is preferable from 
the long term economic development point of view. Further, increases 
in the manufacturing sector spill over into other economic sectors.
In addition, Kaldor found that slow-growing countries tend to have
largershares of their labour force employed in the tertiary sector
2than in the fast growing ones. This may be explained by the low prod­
uctivity in the services sector compared with manufacturing and its
3
little secondary impact on other economic sectors.
1. N. Kaldor: Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth of thp n k
Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 18. ~-------------“— -L-‘*
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 20.
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Accordingly, in the long run, the rate of growth of per capita 
income in an economy depends on the rate of growth in labour product­
ivity. Consequently from the point of view of growth potential, the 
larger the manufacturing sector, the higher the potential for increasing 
per capita income tends to be. This is important for Jordan because 
as the government is the largest employer in the country, the 
.possibilities for increasing productivity are low.
Summary
Since the creation of Jordan in 1946, its economic development has 
been inhibited by political events. The 1948 war brought massive dis­
location to the economic and social life of Jordan, as well as some 
unexpected benefits - the skill and capital made available by the inflow 
of refugees for example. Nineteen years later the economy was further 
disrupted by the 1967 war with Israel, and the subsequent confrontation 
with the Palestinian Liberation movements. Despite this, from 1954 
onwards the economy achieved a high rate of growth which was maintained 
until the decline after the 1967 war. Throughout this period a trans­
formation of the economy occurred, as the share of the agricultural
sector in the GDP progressively declined and that of the manufacturing
0
sector increased. Structural transformation is usually a sine
cjuia non of development, with the share of the manufacturing sector 
growing faster than the other sectors in the economy. This chapter has 
shown clearly that structural change in this form has indeed
occurred, but the share of the tertiary sector in GDP has maintained its 
high level throughout the period 1954-1976. Further, the high share 
of GDP is concentrated in services of the non-marketable type; chiefly 
in the government services including the army.
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The sustained predominance of the services sector has been
\
complimented by the pattern and structure of Jordan's international 
trade, which has concentrated on a high level of imports to satisfy 
demand generated in the services sector. The industrial structure 
thereby created has given rise to problems for the economy which have 
manifested themselves in a chronic trade deficit, coupled with a con­
tinued dependence on foreign aid to maintain the level of income and 
expenditure.
Having established the relationship between foreign trade and the 
industrial structure of the country, a detailed evaluation of the 
various aspects of foreign trade and its rftle in the economic development 
in Jordan, is necessary. For this purpose this study concentrates on 
two themes: the export and import of goods and services (chapter two to 
five); and the evaluation of Jordan's foreign reserve and monetary 
policies (chapters six and seven).
In chapter two, an examination will be made of the problem of 
exports, and how their small size and high level of concentration have 
prevented this sector from playing a leading role in Jordan's economic 
development. Economic development is further constrained by the high 
level of imports which is largely financed by aid and is biassed towards 
consumption rather than investment (chapter three). This will be followed 
by an analysis of invisible earnings, and their impact on 
the expansion of the services orientation of the economy will be 
emphasised (Chapter 4). Special attention will be given to remittances 
of Jordanians working abroad and to the question of the impact of 
labour migration in chapter five.
The discussion of the above-mentioned first theme will involve an 
outline of the salient characteristics of Jordan's trade problem, and
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its bias towards imports. This will necessitate an analysis of the 
second theme, which relates to foreign reserves and monetary policies. 
In chapter six an attempt will be made to show how and why Jordan 
maintains a high level of foreign reserves. In addition, an estimate 
is made in this chapter of the economic and financial cost of holding 
excessive reserves. The money supply, and its relation to Jordan's 
trade problem is examined in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHY VISIBLE EXPORTS HAVE BEEN OF LIMITED SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY
Jordan shares a common characteristic with many other 'small' 
economies namely a high ratio of trade to GNP. However, a close 
examination of its trade accounts reveals that it is quite an atypical 
country both in the level of importance of trade and in the trade 
structure usually belonging to such economies. These features will 
now be given separate consideration, in the following sequence:
(a) The relative importance of trade for the Jordanian economy;
(•b) The high visible export concentration problem;
(c) The export instability problem and its economic importance;
(d) The limited secondary impact of exports;
(e) Development plans and the role of exports; and
(f) The importance of phosphates. .........
(a) The relative importance of trade for the Jordanian economy 
Over the period 1954-1975 the ratio ot trade' (as measured by
exports plus imports of goods and services) to GDP averaged 90% (see
Table 2.1). Within this figure a substantial proportion, 58%, is
accounted for by visible trade. Invisible trade accounted for over
38.5% of total trade during this period, and reflects the growing
importance to the Jordanian economy of tourism and remittances from
Jordanians working aborad. These two factors have between them created
an invisible surplus that is unique for a developing country, equivalent
to 11.5% of GDP. (The significance of this invisible surplus will be
dealt with fully in chapters four.and five). A study of data for 62
other countries revealed only one similar high ratioJ
1. i l . N. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Contribution 
of Invisibles to the Foreign Exchange, paper prepared by the IBRD. TD/B/C 
Geneva, (January iy67), p. 1Û.
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Table 2.1: Percentage of foreign trade to GDP, 1954-1975
1954/60 1961/66 1967/72 1973/75 1954/75
Exports of goods 5.8 6.1 6.8 13.5 9.8
Exports of invisibles 10.2 17.5 14.8 29.9 22.0
Total exports 16.0 23.6 21.6 43.4 31 .8
Imports of goods 43.3 40.4 36.3 57.2 48.5
Imports of invisibles 5.0 6.0 1.2 16.4 10.5
Total imports 38.3 46.4 37.8 73.7 59.0
Trade deficit 32.0 21 .9 26.0 30.3 27.2
Total trade 64.3 70.0 59.1 117.1 90.8
Invisible trade 15.2 23.5 16.0 46.4 32.5
Commodity trade 49.1 46.5 43.1 70.7 58.3
Source: Based on Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendi x .
Visible imports however, remain Jordan's most important sector and
play the dominant role in determining the pattern of the country's
international trade. Table 2.2 compares commodity trade ratios in
Jordan (X + M, X , M , X - M) with other developed and developing 
“GDP" GDF GDP GDP
countries during the period 1954-1970. The table clearly reveals that in
the context of under-development, no general relationship between trade
and the stage of development can be established. There are both rich
countries with low trade ratios (U.S.A.) and rich countries with high
trade ratios (Switzerland and U.K.). On the other hand, there are poor countries
with low foreign trade ratios (India, Pakistan) and those with high
foreign trade ratios (Cyprus, Israel, Jordan). Nevertheless, as
Table 2.2 reveals, it is clearly the case that the smaller the country,
the more important the foreign trade sector is to its economy, as Kindleberger
points out in Trade and the National Economy,Jordan is no exception to
this rule. What is exceptional in Jordan's case, however, is the unique
Table 2.2: Trade ratio for various countries
Country 1954 1966 1970
Exports Imports Total Trade
Balance
Exports Imports Total Trade
Balance
Exports Imports Total Trade
Balance
Switzerland 21.0 23.0 45.0 ' -1.0 22.0 26.7 48.7 -4.7 25.0 52.2 75.2 -7.2
U.S.A. 4.2 - 3.1 6.3 +1.1 4.1 3.1 7.2 +1.0 4.5 4.4 8.9 +0.1
U.K. 15.8 19.2 35.0 -3.4 13.9 15.7 29.6 -1.8 16.1 18.0 34.1 -1.9
Brazil 12.2* 9.2 21.4 +3.0 13.5* 10.7 24.2 +2.8 15.4 12.2 27.6 +3.2
Cyprus 24.9 34.9 59.8 -10.0 19.8 38.4 58.2 -18.6 20.8 45.7 66.5 -24.4
Israel 8.7 28.3 37.0 -19.6 13.0 33.4 46.4 -20.4 14.5 30.9 45.4 -16.4
Egypt na na na na 11.0 16.9 27.9 -5.9. 11.1 11.5 22.6 -0.4
India 4.2 8.0 12.2 -3.8 3.6** 6.6 10.2 -3.0 3.7 4.5 8.2 -0.8
Pakistan 5.7 8.0 13.7 -2.3 5.4** 10.3 15.7 -4.9 4.5 7.1 11.6 -4.5
Sudan 22.3 15.1 37.4 +7.2 14.2 15.6 45.4 -1.4 14.7 15.3 30.0 -0.6
Syria na na na na 14.1 23.5 37.6 -9.4 11.8 20.9 32.7 -11.8
Jordan 5.8 43.3 49.1 +37.5 6.1 40.0 46.1 -33.9 5.7 30.9 36.6 +25.2_
Source: IMF (1972), IFS Supplement, n.d., Wash.ington.DC.- 
* 1959; ** 1960.
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pattern of its visible trade transactions which can be seen clearly
when comparing its X - M with that of eleven other countries included
~WF~
in the study. Jordan has the highest trade deficit ratio among the 
countries presented, no other country of a similar size having such a 
high ratio.
Thus, despite the favourable balance in Jordan's invisible trade,
the large visible trade deficit has resulted in a trade gap, which
poses a fundamental financial problem - viz. a proclivity towards a
high dependency on foreign aid for its solution in the short term,
which becomes a continuing feature. Mazure in his study of Jordan's
economic development^ noted that the amount of foreign aid per capita
received is above the average of other developing countries.
During the last twenty-five years, this aid inflow has accounted
2
for more than 30# of GDP , implying that the trade deficit (27.2% of 
GDP) was more than offset and a surplus in the balance of payments 
created. Consequently it has been argued that without foreign aid, 
Jordan could neither have afforded nor achieved its relatively high rate 
of growth which was evident during this period.. Despite this, however, 
the trade ratio continued to increase. An analysis of the factors 
underlying this must now be attempted.
1. m . Mazure: 'Economic Development of Jordan' in Economir *
anj_P_op_uMipn Growth In the M i d V  East. Cooper,'
Sydney, American Elsevier, New York (1972), p. 221. anaer
0976)!'p!a25o! ■F°re- 9n Aili t0 Jordan* Ph-D- Thes1s, University of Keele,
3. Ibid., p. 261. See also, N. Falkhoury, AnalvHrai c+1 a
Payroents- , 9 5 0 - , 9 6 8 >
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Economic theory provides no simple conventional explanation of
the forces that determine the trend of a country's trade ratio. There
is some evidence to suppose that the spread of industrialisation tends
to reduce the importance of foreign trade by narrowing the differences
in comparative advantage which are themselves mainly determined by the
availability of natural resources. In this respect, data presented by
Deutsch and Eckstein indicate that foreign trade ratios have historically
increased during the early stages of development, reached a plateau and
subsequently declined.^ Kuznets, on the other hand, found no clear
pattern in the change of the ratio of foreign trade to national income 
2
over time. However, the level of development of a country's industrial 
structure can be considered to be the factor which influences the rate 
of increase of foreign trade more than any other. In other words, the 
spread of industry at a faster rate than the services sector, together 
with a sharp Increase in production and in the productivity of the 
agricultural sector may result in an increase in foreign trade relative 
to GDP. Thus, when an increasing share of GDP is moving into the services 
sector, the trade ratio may decline.
Neither the growth of manufacturing industry, indicated by Deutsch, 
nor the spread of the services suggested by Kuznets have had the 
expected negative impact on Jordan's trade ratio. As can be seen in 
Table 2.3 below, the increase in the share of manufacturing industry and 
in the share of services was accompanied by an increase and not a
1. Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein: 'National Industrialization
and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector' World 
Politics, Vol. 13,(1950/1961), p. 268. . -----
2. Simon Kuznets: Modern Economic Growth, Yale University Press, New
Haven and London (1966), p. 317. ~  . .
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Tabi e 2.3: Ratio of services, manufacturing and trade to GDP
Year Services Manufacturing Trade
1954 58.9 8.8 41
1955 70.0 12.1 61
1956 56.0 10.3 48
1957 65.0 11.0 51
1958 66.9 11.0 49
1959 70.0 8.1 51
1960 71.1 8.5 51
1961 64.6 8.6 41
1962 67.2 8.1 47
1963 66.2 9.8 48
1964 60.8 10.0 43
1965 60.3 11.5 41
1966 62.3 12.6 51
1967 62.3 10.4 38
1968 64.6 12.9 44
1969 63.5 13.0 41
1970 68.9 11.6 40
1971 66.2 11.4 53
1972 64.3 12.4 50
1973 73.0 13.4 57
1974 66.0 17.0 65
1975 71.5 18.2 74
Source: Based on Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the Appendix.
decrease in the foreign trade ratio. In the previous chapter, it was 
shown that the growth of the services sector in Jordan was the inevitable 
result of an increase in imports, financed by the inflow of foreign 
aid. Further, the growth in the manufacturing sector would not have 
been achieved without the import of necessary capital goods and raw 
materials, thus increasing the import ratio.
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More important than this increase in the inflow of capital goods 
and raw materials, however, has been the increase in consumption 
resulting from the rise in money incomes. Given the high propensity 
to consume in Jordan coupled with a lack of domestic resources and a 
liberal trade policy, it is to be expected that a part of the increase 
in money income will be directed toward imports. The impact of the 
increase in the level of imports on the trade ratio was not matched, 
however, by a similar impact from the rising of the export ratio. This 
is evidenced in figure 2.1 which clearly reveals how the trend of the trade 
ratio paralleled the movement of imports.
In addition to the industrial structure, political events have 
had an important influence on the import and trade ratio trends. In 
1967, for instance, the import ratio declined to its lowest level ever. 
Consequently the trade ratio declined also, despite an increase in 
the export ratio, which remained unaffected by the 1967 war and its 
consequences. Imports fell in that year for two main reasons. First, 
there was a massive inflow of aid in kind, which went unrecorded in 
Jordan's official trade statistics. Secondly, the war brought about 
a sharp decline in demand. Another political event which influenced 
the trade ratio was the internal disturbances of 1970, which were 
accompanied by the closing of Jordan's borders by Syria and Iraq. As 
a result, both export and import ratios declined. After 1972, however, 
the trade ratio continued to rise, reaching 74% of GDP in 1975 its 
highest ever level. This increase, which became apparent in the closing 
period of this study, may be attributed to a number of new factors, the 
most important of which was the high rate of inflation, which had the 
effect of increasing the import bill from the already high level of 
45% in 1972 to 74% in 1975. Speculation in the land and commodity 
markets stimulated yet more imports. In the latter case, as land 
became the most profitable form of investment during this period, a class
Fig.2.1
Foreign T ra d e  Ratio to G.D.P 1955-75
Source: Appendices 1, 2 and 3.
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of newly rich land owners was created whose wealth was directed to 
the acquisition of largely imported consumer durables, with a con­
sequent demand-led increase in the nation's import bill. This effect 
was magnified by a large inflow of funds from Jordanians working 
abroad who, lost confidence in international currencies through 
repeated monetary crises, and who redirected their savings to land 
purchase at home.
The successive crises in international currencies had a somewhat 
different effect, however, on Jordan's exports by forcing up the inter­
national prfce of phosphates. Phosphate is Jordan's largest single 
export item, and proceeds increased from JD 4.02 million in 1973 to 
JD 19.53 million in 1974, causing the overall figure for Jordanian 
exports to rise from JO 14.01 million in 1973 to JD 39.437 in 1974.
This increased the ratio of exports from 8% of the GDP in 1973 to over 
16% in 1974, and added a new factor in the increase in Jordan's trade 
ratio.
Apart from the above increases in exports, the foreign trade ratio 
in Jordan was mainly influenced by the import ratio. The role of 
imports will be examined more fully in chapter three. Here, however, it 
is intended only to examine commodity exports. An attempt will be 
made to examine how the exports grew during the period under consid­
eration and to determine the impact of their growth on Jordan's 
economic development.
Table 2.4 shows the value of Jordanian exports for the period 
1954-1975. From the table it is evident that exports have shown a 
relatively high rate of growth (17.9% per annum) when compared with 
the rate of growth in both imports and GDP. Consequently the share of
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Table 2.4: Exportsand GDP during the period 1954-1975
Year GDP Exports
Value Percentage Value Percentage
(JD million) Change (JD million) Change
1954 51.3 2.4
1955 47.3 7.8 2.6 .0.8
1956 66.6 40.8 4.4 69.0
1957 67.4 1.2 4.3 -2.0
1958 75.2 11.5 3.2 -20.0
1959 93.5 24.3 3.1 -0.3
1960 98.3 5.1 3.4 9.6
1961 120.1 22.1 4.2 23.5
1962 118.9 -1.0 5.0 19.0
1963 129.1 8.5 5.5 11.0
1964 148.9 14.7 7.0 27.2
1965 167.6 12.8 7.7 11.0
1966 170.6 17.9 8.6 12.9
1967 194.7 14.1 9.9 13.7
1968 186.9 -4.1 12.2 23.2
1969 219.6 17.5 11.9 -3.2
1970 209.8 -5.0 9.3 -22.0
1971 223.4 5.4 8.8 -6.0
1972 249.0 11.7 12.6 43.0
1973 268.5 7.5 14.0 11.1
1974 341.9 ,27.-3 39.4 181.4
1975 356.9 4.3 40.1 1.8
Source: Statistical Appendices .1, 2,and 3. —  •
-
commodity exports in the GDP rose from only 5.8% in 1954 to 15% in
1975. Orthodox economic theory suggests that a high rate of growth
in exports may lead to a high rate of growth in GDP. 1 This is evidenced
1. Robert F. Emery:'The Relation of Exports and Economic Growth', Kyklos, 
Vol. XX, 1967, pp. 470-84. ; - 7 —
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by the high correlation (0.76) between these two variables and by the 
regression coefficient which shows that between 1954 and 1975 an 
increase in exports of 17% increased GDP by 1%.
(b) The High Visible Export Concentration Problem
Exports have in fact played a relatively minor part in Jordan's 
economic development, and this may be seen from an examination of the 
composition of these exports and the way in which they grew.
Jordan's exports are concentrated in a small range of essentially 
primary commodities. Table 2.5 shows that despite the high rate of 
growth in exports, they are still concentrated in mining and in 
agricultural products. During the period 1958-1975, agricultural 
produce and mining accounted for more than 79% of all exports, while 
manufacturing exports accounted for less than 20%. Nevertheless, man­
ufacturing exports witnessed a relatively large increase from the low 
level in the fifties (4.3%) to over 23% in 1975. The high concentration 
of Jordan's exports in a few commodities is mirrored in most developing 
countries. The problem however, is that in the Jordanian case, despite 
the large increase in manufacturing, there seems to be a tendency 
towards an even higher degree of concentration in the range of commodities 
exported. The share of total exports taken by mining, for example, 
increased to over 50% in 1975, compared with only 32.8% in 1958. This 
increase in the share of mining, however, which chiefly represents
Ji
phosphate exports, reflects the increase in world commodity prices 
between 1973 and 1975. -
A comparison of the distribution by commodities of Jordan's exports
with those of other developing countries may be achieved using the
*
!
1
Table 2.5: Composition of Jordan's exports by group (in JD 000)
Year Manufactured Food Mining Other Manufactureng Agricultural Total
Value % Value % Value ........% Value ■ % Value %
1958 223 7.1 1028 32.8
1959 228 7.4 1051 33.9
1960 193 5.5 1346 38.6
1961 237 5.6 1660 39.0
1962 320 6.5 1568 31.8
1963 580: 10.7 1537 27.8
1964 395 5.6 2470 35.2
1965 452 5.8 2547 32.9
1966 483 5.5 3258 37.2
1967 557 5.6 3512 35.0
1968 589 4.8 4258 35.1
1969 755 6.3 4108 34.5
1970 436 4.9 2580 27.6
1971 799 9.1 2733 30.9
1972 533 4.2 5443 43.2
1973 266 1.8 5496 26.0
1974 1115 2.8 23775 60.2
1975 959 2.3 21453 53.3
136 4.3 1752 55.8 3139 100.0
206 6.6 1613 52.8 3098 100.0
206 5.9 1736 52.1 3481 100.0
246 5,8 2109 49.6 4252 100.0
272 5.5 2769 56.2 4929 100.0
618 11.2 2778 41.3 5522 100.0
1022 14.6 3125 44.6 7012 100.0
982 12.7 3771 48.6 7752 100.0
1026 11.7 3991 45.6 8759 100.0
1547 15.7 4368 43.7 9984 100.0
2063 17.1 5262 43.0 • 12122 100.0
1910 16.1 5134 43.1 11907 100.0
1952 20.9 4352 46.6 9320 100.0
2045 23.2 3240 36.8 8817 100.0
2297 18.2 4330 35.0 12606 100.0
3340 23.0 4508 32.2 14010 100.0
5532 14.0 9015 22.0 39433 100.0
8054 20.0 9609 23.0 40075 100.0
Source:1.Department of Statistics, Flow of imports in Jordanian Economy, 1958-1968, Amman (April 1970). 
2.Department of Statistics, Amman, unpublished data.
Gi ni -coeff i ci ent :
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where is the exports of 1, 2, 3
The higher the value of R, the greater the level of concentration in 
exports. The main deficiency of the measurement is that the value 
of R depends mainly on the way the classification of exports is made.
The larger the number of categories, the smaller the coefficient. To 
avoid misleading results, two different kinds of classification were 
used for this study: i) the international trade classification (SITC); 
and ii) classification by commodities. Two years were chosen for the 
purposes of comparison, 1954 and 1966. In 1954 the main exports were 
still in their infancy and therefore, provide a good base-line for 
comparison. 1966 was a 'normal' year in which no political disturbances 
occurred which might have influenced the export of any item from Jordan. 
The results of this computation are presented in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Measure of export concentration in Jordan compared with 
some other developing coantries
Country 1954 1966 1975
Ghana 0.835 0.677 na
Colombia 0.840 . 0.664 na
Burma 0.744 0.627 na
UAR 0.842 0.518 na
Thailand 0.683 0.372 na
Brazil 0.612 0.471 na
Tanganyika 0.446 0.358 na
Jordan (a) 0.504 0.626 0.574
Jordan (b) 0.424 0.448 -
Source.: G. K. Helleiner, International Trade Arid Economic Development, 
Penguin (1972), p. 86.
(a) From.SITC classification.
(h) From commodity classification.
1.. B. F. Massell: 'Export Concentration and Fluctuations', American Economic 
Review, Vol. 54, (1964), pp. 47-63. See also Michaely, M, Contributions to 
Economic Analysis in International Trade, (1962), p. 8. ----------------
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From the above table, it is evident that although the SlTC classification 
shows a higher level of concentration than that of the commodity class­
ification, both classifications show a high concentration coefficient. 
Further, the table indicates clearly that other developing countries 
reduced the degree of concentration of their exports, while Jordan was 
showing an upward trend in its concentration ratio.
Further, Jordan's high degree of commodity concentration was 
accompanied by a relatively high degree of geographical concentration. 
While phosphate is mainly exported to the Far East and the European 
countries, all other exports are concentrated in the neighbouring 
Arab countries. Except for the years 1973-1976 when phosphate prices 
created an imbalance in the usual pattern of export earnings, exports 
to Arab countries constituted on the average over 67% of the total 
(see Table 2.7). This relatively high degree of concentration in 
the destination of exports is exceptional, especially by Middle Eastern 
standards, where the degree of economic interdependence is still low 
and efforts towards economic integration are still in the early stages.
It is however, Jordan's extremely favourable geographical location and 
the small size of its domestic market which has directed Jordan's 
exports, both manufactured and agricultural towards the neighbouring 
Arab countries. Among these are the Arab oil producing countries which 
have enjoyed a large increase in oil revenues and have consequently 
substantially increased their imports. The increase in demand in these 
countries played an important role in stimulating the export of fruit, 
vegetables and of other agricultural products. The increase in the 
demand for Jordanian exports was also stimulated by a subsidiary factor, 
namely the demand for Jordanian produce such as olive oil created by the
I!
Teble 2.7: Destination of Jordan's exports (In JO pillion)
1959 1960/53 1964/6» 1969
Value I Value I Value X Value X
Arab league States 2.03 16 3.03 67 S.S1 66 1.5 71.3
a) Arab Connon Market 1.30 42 1.83 41 31.5 38 5.24 43.9
b) Other Arab States 0.73 24 1.20 26 2.36 28 3.26 27,4
ICC 0.03 1 0.03 1 0.45 5 6 -
Convaunlst Bloc 0.33 1 0.36 8 0.37’ 12 0.38 3.2
Yugoslavia 0.63 20 0.64 14 0.63 8 1.02 8.6
India 0.06 2 0.39 8.6 6.71 11,5 1.4» 12.5
Japan - - 0.04 0.4 0.08 0.5 0.03 0.3
Other countries 0.02 - 0.04 1 0.31 4 0.48 4.1
Total eaports 3.10 100 4.51 100 8.37 100 11.92 100
Sourer: (1) Department of Statistics, Statistical Tear Book, Amun, (1966), n.4.
(?) Department oT Statistics, laternel Trade Statistics, Am»an (1968), n.4. ,
3) Central Bank of Jordan. Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (March 1970) and (February 1978)
1970 1971 1972 1973 197« 1975
Value X Value X Value X Value X Value X Value X
7.17 76.9 6.68 75.8 9.16 72.6 10.07 72.1 18.43 46.7 16.89 41.
4.32 46.3 4.09 46.4 5.36 42.5 5.90 42 8.71 22 9.42 23
2.85 30.6 2.59 29.4 3.80 30.1 4.7 30.1 9.72 24.6 7.47 18
- - - - 0.05 0.4 0.02 2.1 0.06 - 1.98 4.'
0.42 4.5 0.12 1.4 0.21 1.7 0.1 0.7 0.83 2.3 5.88 14
0.79 8.4 0.46 5.2 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.4 1.2 3.0 0.5 12
0.25 2.7 0.96 10.9 . 1.4 11.1 1.1 13.5 6.57 16.7 1.97 4.
0.02 0.2 0.17 1.9 0.62 4.9 0.7 0.4 3.79 9.6 1.91 4.
0.67 7.2 0.43 4.8 0.96 7.6 1.8 11.4 8.54 21.6 10.92 27
9.32 100 8.82 100 12.61 100 14.01 100 39.47 100 40.07 10
Table 2.7: Destination of Jordan's erports (In JO million)
1959 1960/63 1964/68 1969
Value 1 Value X Value X Value X
Arab league States 2.03 16 3.03 67 5.51 66 8.5 71.3
a) Arab Comon Market 1.30 42 1.83 41 31.5 38 5.24 43.9
bj Other Arab States 0.73 24 1.20 26 2.36 28 3.26 27.4
e t c 0.03 1 0.03 T 0.45 5 6 -
Comnunlst Bloc 0.33 1 0.36 8 0.37 12 0.38 3.2
Yugoslavia 0.63 20 0.64 14 0.68 8 1.02 8.6
India 0.06 2 0.39 8.6 6.71 11.5 1.48 12.5
Japan - - 0.04 0.4 0.08 0.5 0.03 0.3
Other countries 0.02 * 0.04 1 0.31 4 0.48 4.1
Total exports 3.10 100 4.SI 100 8.37 100 11.92 100
Source: (1) Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, Arman, (1966), n.d.
(2) Department of Statistics, Eaternal Trade Statistics, Arman (1968), n.d. ,
(3 Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, (March 1920) and (February 1928).
I
1970 1921 1972 1973 1974 1975
Value X Value X Value X Value X Value X Value X
7.17 76.9 6.68 75.8 9.16 72.6 10.07 72.1 18.43 46.7 16.89 41.5
4.32 46.3 4.09 46.4 5.36 42.5 5.90 42 8.71 22 9.42 23.1
2.8S 30.6 2.59 29.4 3.80 30.1 4.7 30.1 9.72 24.6 7.47 18.4
- - - - 0.05 0.4 0.02 2.1 0.06 - 1.98 4.9
0.42 4.5 0.12 1.4 0.21 1,7 0.1 0.7 0.83 2.3 S.88 14.(
0.79 8.4 0.46 5.2 0.2 1.2 0.2 1.4 1.2 3.0 0.5 12.'
0.25 2.7 0.96 10.9 11.1 1.1 13.5 6.57 16.7 1.97 4.9
0.02 0.2 0.17 1.9 0.62 4.9 0.7 0.4 3.79 9.6 1.91 4.7
0.67 7.2 0.43 4.8 0.96 7.6 1.8 11.4 8.54 21.6 10.92 27.
9.32 100 8.82 100 12.61 100 14.01 100 39.47 100 40.07 100
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demand from Jordanians working in these countries.
Despite its exporting record to oil producing countries, Jordan's 
goods constitute only a small proportion of the total imports of these 
countries. Further, as Table 2.8 indicates this small proportion 
represents a declining share of the vastly increased demand that oil 
revenue has generated in these countries.
(c) The Export Instability Problem and Its Economic Importance
One of the consequences of the high commodity and geographical 
concentration in exports has been wide fluctuations both in price and 
value of goods, and consequently in export earnings. Total earnings 
from exports, despite their high rate of growth, have ranged from a 
decline of 25% (in 1958) to an increase of 181.1% (in 1974). (See 
Table 2.5). In general, however, export proceeds declined in the 
early period, followed by a fluctuating but generally rising trend in 
the early sixties, which again was in decline by the late sixties.
From 1972 onwards, however, they show a continuous increase, so that 
the average rate of growth for 1972-1975 was 55% compared with only 2.5% 
for the period 1967-1971.
Although these fluctuations are high both in absolute and percentage 
terms, they are no higher than 'those prevailing in other developing 
countries. Data presented by Coppock's study of export instability 
in 89 developing countries ranks Jordan among the first 20 countries, 
with a high export instability indexJ
Changes and fluctuations in the trend of exports, in the absence of
1. Joseph D. Ccppock: International Economic Instability, McGraw Hill 
New York and London, 1962, p. 65. ~  ~ L
Table 2.8: Imports from Jordan compared with total imports of various oil producing countries (in $US million)
Country 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
------ '
Total Imports Ratio 
imports from 2/1 
Jordan
Total
imports
Imports Ratio 
from 2/1 
Jordan
Total Imports Ratio 
imports from 2/1 
Jordan
Total
imports
Imports Ratio 
from 2/1 
Jordan
Total
imports
Imports Ratio 
from 2/1 
Jordan
S. Arabia 734 14 0.019 692 10 0.014 805 9 0.011 1125 12 0.01 1981 13 0.006
Iraq 493 3 0.006 508 2 0.004 694 4 0.006 713 4 0.005 898 3 0.003
Kuwai t 554 5 0.009 626 5 0.008 651 5 0.008 797 7 0.008 1041 7 0.006
Total 1781 22 0.01 1826 17 0.009 2150 18 0.008 2638 23 0.008 3903 23 0.005
Source: (1) U.N., Year. Book of International Trade Statistics, 1974, Vol. 1, New York (1975).
(2) U.N., Year- Book of International Trade Statistics, 1976, Vol. 1, New York (1977).
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stable political circumstances have been shaped by market forces.
Seasonal fluctuations on the supply side may affect exports of agric­
ultural produce which may be reflected in fluctuations in export trends. 
In the long run however, the fact that exports are concentrated in 
agriculture and raw materials determines overall trends and con­
sequent fluctuations. As can be seen in Table 2.9, although exports 
of manufactured produce have shown a continuous and steady growth, 
their impact on overall export revenues has been very limited. Fluc­
tuations in exports proceeds are mainly determined by fluctuations in the 
export of agricultural and mining goods.
"’"’In 1959, for example, although exports of manufactured goods 
showed an increase of 51.4%, the decline in agricultural exports of 
8% resulted in a decline overall in export proceeds by 2.2% Further, 
in 1965, exports of manufactured goods show a decline while export 
earnings increased by 3.1%, indicating that phosphate and agricultural 
exports play the dominant role in determining the level of Jordan's 
exports.
The importance to the Jordanian economy as a whole of the fluc­
tuations in export performance mentioned above, will of course depend 
on whether they occur in prices,’or in the volume of goods exported. 
Although the main impact of fluctuations in prices and volume of 
exports can be clearly seen through its contribution to the instability 
of overall earnings, the distinction is important from the point of view 
of allocation of resources for investment. Excessive investment in 
the boom period may tend to involve high cost in the recession period.
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Table 2.9: Annual percentage change in exports 1959-1975
Year Manufacturinq Agriculture Mining
1959 51.4 -8.0 -0.3
1960 0.0 7.6 9.6
1961 19.4 21.4 23.5
1962 10.5 31.2 19.0
1963 127.2 0.3 11.0
1964 165.3 12.4 27.2
1965 -3.4 20.6 n.o
1966 4.4 5.8 12.9
1967 150.7 9.4 13.7
1968 33.3 20.4 __ 23.2
1969 -8.2 -2.3 -3.2
1970 2.1 -15.3 -22.0
1971 4.7 -26.0 -6.0
1972 12.3 23.6 40.0
1973 62.0 4.1 11.0
1974 47.0 99.0 281.0
1975 45.0 6.5 1.6
Source: Based on Table 2.5
Total exports
2.2
28.0
23.3
- 6 . 0
- 2 . 0
60.0
3.0 i
27.9 
7.7
21.2
-4.0 i
-37.1
5.9
99.1 -
6 .0
332.5
10.0
Export indices published by the Department of Statistics reveal a phenomenon 
which occurs in the export performance of most developing countries: 
that the increase in export earnings is the result of volume rather 
than of prices. Only in 1974 was the increase in volume matched by a 
similar proportionate increase in prices. The index of quantities 
shows large scale fluctuations from the 1961 base year, increasing in 
all these years except for a notable decline during 1969-1971, Although, 
it may be argued that political disturbances may have played an important 
role in influencing the trend of exports during 1969-1971, the fact
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remains that it was mainly the decline in exports of phosphates and 
agricultural commodities which was behind the overall decline in index.
In these two years, the quantity index number of chemicals, manu­
factured goods, transport equipment, showed a notable increase. Yet 
because of their insignificance in Jordan's overall export pattern 
they have had little impact on the overall index.
Similarly, the overall price index has had an unstable performance. 
Figure 2.2 shows these fluctuations clearly. . Fruit, and vegetables 
show a declining trend in the early period (1957-1961), yet they 
increased notably during 1962-1968. However, the impact of these high 
fluctuations on the overall index prices was reduced because of the 
almost fixed prices of phosphates, indicating that concentration in 
exports may influence the price index. The impact of concentration is 
demonstrated even more clearly in the figures for 1974 when the price 
of phosphate increased by more than 300%, causing an increase in the 
overall index from 113 in 1973 to 243 in 1974. However, it should be 
noted here that the inflationary pressure witnessed in Jordan during these 
two years was clearly reflected in the price index of almost every item 
in Jordan's exports, except for agricultural goods, which alone showed 
a decline.
The above discussion shows clearly how concentration on a few 
export commodities has affected the overall pattern of Jordan's export 
earnings, prices and quantities. It is now necessary to consider the 
extent to which this factor has influenced the overall development of 
the Jordanian economy.
Despite the fact that Jordan is a developing country and its 
exports are mainly confined to a small range of commodities, fluctuations 
in exports have not received much official attention in Jordan. This
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Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book (1975).
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may be due to the fact that commodity exports are not yet a major 
source of foreign exchange and thus fluctuations in the earnings of 
these exports have a less disruptive effect on the economy than is the 
case in most other developing countries. However, fluctuation in 
export revenue does seem to have a significant influence on GDP. This 
is evidenced by the high value of (R) between these two variables 
(0.8757). Furthermore, small and unstable exports were an important 
factor in directing the attention of policy makers to the accumulation 
of large amounts of foreign reserves as a precaution against unforeseen 
circumstances. Chapter five will show the high cost to Jordan that 
resulted from this policy.
Apart from the direct impact of unstable earnings on commodity 
exports, fluctuations in export prices have had implications for 
indirect costs. This was evidenced by the increase in the quantity 
index in order to offset the decrease in the price index. Consequently, 
except for 1974 the rise in volume was matched by a decline in prices.
It can thus be argued that fluctuation in earnings was to some extent 
stabilized, but at the cost of an increase in quantities.
Fluctuations in export earnings can disrupt government revenues 
in developing countries and make it difficult for governments to pursue 
investment programmes.V Given that the whole export sector is 
privately owned and lacks any government involvement, most of the costs 
of volatile exports are born by the private sector. Further, although 
government revenues in Jordan are similar to those of other developing 
countries, in being mainly derived from taxes on foreign trade, in
1. G. K. Helleiner: International Trade and Economic Development, 
Penguin, (1972), p. 87.
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Jordan's case the revenue is almost exclusively derived from imports. 
This would seem to indicate that there is no direct impact from volatile 
exports on the government budget. There is, however, reason to believe 
that volatile exports have an indirect impact both on government 
revenues and expenditure.
On the revenue side, income tax may be affected by fluctuations 
in export revenues, although the effect of this may not appear in a 
statistical test because of the small proportion of income-tax to total 
revenue. There is evidence that any decline in exports results in a 
decline in profits and a consequent decline in income-tax collected by 
the government. One example of this can be seen in the income tax paid 
by the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company to the government during the 
period 1966-1975. Table 2.10 shows how these taxes were paralleling 
the fluctuations in export proceeds. Another indirect result of export 
instability on government revenues, are the fluctuations in profits 
from government investment in the export sector. As has been mentioned 
in chapter one, the Jordanian government in order to encourage the 
private sector to invest in manufacturing and mining, has provided 
capital investment in most of the manufacturing and mining industries.
In 1972, out of a total of JD 27.982 million of paid up capital for 
26 industries, the government share accounted for over 33% J  Apart 
from phosphate however, these industries were directed towards import 
substitution: cement, pharmaceuticals, tanning, etc. The impact of 
export fluctuations on the profit on capital invested by the government
1. Ministry of Economy, Companies Division, unpublished reports, 
Amman, Jordan.
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Table 2.10: Phosr)hate exports, income tax, and profits transfprrpd
to trle government (in JD thousands!
Year Phosphate
Exports
Income Tax paid by 
Phosphate Company
Profits Transferred 
to Government
1966 3127 275 154
1967 3476 92 123
1968 4222 - 154
1969 3565 41 -
1970 2237 128 -
1971 2239 - -
1972 3497 44 -
1973 4020 81 -
1974 19531 2122 9808
1975 19585 728 1068
Source: Jordan Phosphate Company, unpubl ished data, Amman.
was therefore relatively small. However, this impact may be seen 
clearly in the case of phosphate, where profits paid to the government 
have shown fluctuations similar to those of phosphate exports. See 
Table 2.10 above.
In addition to the disruption of investment, these fluctuations 
caused an increase in the government's expenditure through its financial 
support for some of the sectors severely affected. For example, in 
order to compensate for the losses resulting from the decline in exports 
of phosphate the government paid the phosphate company JD 0.27 million 
in 1971.
In the private sector, unstable exports involve high social and 
economic costs. These were particularly prevalent in the agricultural 
sector. The reasons for this can be summed up as follows: i) agricultural
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exports account for about half of Jordan's exports; ii) agricultural 
exports have shown a high degree of fluctuation; and iii) given that 
exports are not the most important foreign exchange earners for Jordan, 
fluctuations in export earnings are not likely to affect the ability of 
manufacturing industry to import its necessary capital and raw materials. 
Over half of Jordan's agricultural holdings are in units of less than 
30 dunams.1 The agricultural survey of 1965 indicated that the 
average size of holdings in approximately 60 dunams. This simply means 
that agricultural production in Jordan is based on small farms, which 
operate within narrow economic margins. Consequently any fluctuation 
in agricultural exports has a significant impact on income and invest­
ments in this sector. This situation is aggravated by the fact that 
farmers, despite the existence of a government marketing body, tend to 
sell and export their produce through agents working on commission.2 
In addition, although these agents charge farmers excessive commission 
rates, they also provide farmers with seeds, fertilisers and more 
importantly, short term loans. Farmers are thus forced to direct their 
marketing through commission agents despite the excessive interest 
rates they charge. These factors, coupled with instability and uncer­
tainty, may influence overall investment in agriculture and this is 
evidenced by the low and unstable level of production expenses in the 
industry. On average, these expenses amounted to 13.6% of total 
agricultural output during 1959-1974 (compared with about 77% in the 
U.S.A. and 68% in Canada (1967)).3 Given the uncertain climate coupled
1. Department of Statistics: 'Report on Agricultural Census, 1965', 
Amman, June,^1967j, p. 85. One dunam = 0.1 hectare.
2. M. Hadad: The Agricultural Sector of Jordan. Royal Scientific
Society, Amman, (.1976), p. 78. —
3. ibid., p. 51.
- 71 -
with unstable marketing conditions, as well as the low level of per 
capita income in a developing country like Jordan, this low ratio is 
not surprising. Further, the ratio fluctuated inversely with the level 
of exports and production (as Table 2.11 demonstrates).
Another interesting characteristic of Jordan's agriculture can 
be— seen in this table, namely that unpredictable levels of production 
may mean that in some years investment will be stimulated, whereas in 
others expectations of poor returns will reduce investment. In 1969 
production and exports showed a notable increase, which led to a 28% 
increase in investment in agriculture, by the end of 1970. But 
political disturbances, slack production and low exports in that year 
forced farmers to reduce their investment for 1972. Needless to say, 
such investment allocation involves a high element of wastage of scarce 
capital.
The previous paragraphs have shown that instability in export 
performance has played an important role in influencing investment 
in both the public and private sectors. This was clear in the agric­
ultural sector which is subject to wide fluctuations in both quantities 
and prices. In addition, there is evidence that these proceeds have 
also had some impact on the structure of production and employment in 
this sector. There has been a marked swing towards more reliable crops."'
i
There has also been a notable decline in the agricultural labour force.
In .fact (as it will become clear in chapter five) this sector has recently 
experienced a shortage of labour. In terms of the theory of economicI ............
1. Although a high percentage of cultivated area is still field crops, 
the¡percentage of vegetables increased from 3% in 1956 to 10% in 1972
^resvi'k* The Agricultural Development of Jordan, Praeger, London,
(1976)].
Table 2.11: Main economic indicators in the agricultural sector, 1959-1974 (in JD million)
Item 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974'
Gross income 17.59 17.15 28.32 24.09 25.37 37.86 38.72 32.66 45.07 31.32 41.47 35.26 43.95 48.46 40.50 64.91
Production expenses 2.51 2.53 3.02 3.19 3.29 3.72 4.61 5.01 6.33 3.79 5.13 6.60 6.14 6.01 8.58 10.43
Net income 15.08 14.62 25.30 20.90 22.80 34.14 34.11 27.65 38.74 27.53 36.34 28.66 37.81 42.45 31.92 54.48
Production expenses as 
percentage of gross 
i ncome
14.37 14.87 10.77
i
13.27 13.07 9.17 11.97 15.37 12.27 12.17 12.47 15.87 14.07 13.17 21.17 16.00
Exports 1.70 1.80 2.30 2.80 3.40 3.80 4.30 4.40 5.40 6.20 6.40 5.20 4.30 5.40 5.50 10.80
Source:1.Jordan Department of Statistics: The Statistics of National Accounts, 1959-1966, Amman, n.d.
2. Jordan Department of Statistics: The Statistics of National Accounts, 1967-1972, Amman, n.d.
3. Jordan Department of Statistics: The Statistics of National Accounts, 1974, Amman, n.d.
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development, such decline is desirable on the grounds that it is 
part of the transformation process. In the particular case of Jordan, 
however, this decline does not reflect increas^in productivity. The 
agricultural labour force did move to more secure jobs and incomes, 
but these were available within the service sector (namely the govern­
ment sector) rather than manufacturing industry. In fact, latest 
employment figures indicate that the labour force in manufacturing 
industry is also declining, implying that this change favours the 
services sector. As can be seen from Table 2.12 below, the service 
industries' share of the total labour force increased from 44% in 
1961 to 63% in 1975. Moreover, as this increase was mainly concentrated 
in AmmanJ the socio-economic cost is very high indeed.
Table 2.12: Employment structure (percentages)
1961 1975
Agriculture 35 18
Mining and manufacturing 21 19
Services 44 63
Total 100 100
Source: National Planning Courrcil, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980, Amman, 
n.d., p. 25.
(d) The Limited Secondary Impact of Exports
While direct benefits from the high rate of growth in exports have 
bee disrupted by a high level of fluctuation in performance, the 1
1. In 1961 the population of Amman accounted for only 25% of the East 
Bank population, but this ratio had increased to over 40% by 1970.
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indirect benefits have been limited by the small stimulus that these 
exports provide elsewhere in the economy. It is conventional economic 
wisdom that the extent to which export growth can be a stimulus for 
development depends largely on the degree of the secondary impact 
created by exports on domestic economy.
The greater the domestic input required by exporting industries, 
the higher the impact that is expected. Further increases in demand 
for the domestic inputs necessary for export expansion may stimulate more 
investment in exporting activities elsewhere in the economy.1 The 
overall impact however, is to increase investment, consumption and the 
use of technology.
For Jordan's exports these backward linkages are very limited.
Using the only input/output tables published for Jordan 0966), the 
conclusion may be drawn that in general imports are the main ingredient 
of the export production function. As can be seen in Table 2.13, 
about 50% of total inputs into the production of the three main export 
commodities is accounted for by imports. Although the manufacturing 
sector seems to use more import inputs than the other export sectors, 
its impact on the other two seems larger than those of phosphate and 
agriculture.
The table clearly reveals the limited impact of the phosphate 
industry on other economic sectors. While this suggests that exports 
do not play a central role in Jordan's economic development, it does 
support the view that exports stimulate the production necessary for
1.
Vol
R. F. Emery: 'The Relation of Exports to Economic Growth', Kyklos, 
. 20, 2, (l967j, pp. 470-86. ----
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Table 2.13: Transactions in the main expanding sectors, 1966 (in JD 000)
Agriculture Phosphate Manufacturi ng Total
intermediate
Agriculture 1.359 - 2.838 4.197
Phosphate - - - -
Manufacturing 1.563 0.052 3.?11 4.826
Construction - 0.788 - .0.788
Services 0.150 0.055 472 0.677
Imports 2.017 0.291 7.748 10.056
Total inputs 5.089 1.166 14.269 20.544
Source: Derived from input-output tables in National Accounts, 1959- 
1965. Department of Statistics, Amman, n.d.
growth.1 Whatever the causes of the poor linkages, it is reasonable to
conclude from the above that diversification of exports may produce
more 'backward linkages', thus allowing for exports, to play an enlaraed role 
in economic development. '
It has already been demonstrated that concentration on phosphates 
and agricultural production has failed to stimulate more general 
development. This is not to deny their importance in export earnings 
but rather to emphasise the importance of the:changes that occur in 
the economy over and above initial increases in export production.
Foreign trade, as well as all other economic activities in Jordan, 
rests in the hands of the private sector. In some ways, however, exports 
and imports in Jordan are subject to minor conditions laid down by the
t
government. For instance, there are certain commodities whose export
1. GustavRanis: 'Trade, Aid and What?', Kyklos, vol. 17, (1964), p. 194,
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is prohibited by the government at certain times of the year, when 
there is a shortage of domestic supply. Apart from this, however, 
and for certain managerial requirements, exports from Jordan are 
relatively free of government controls.
The government has rather directed its attention, with the 
balance of payments deficit in view, towards imports and much of the 
government policy was from the beginning focussed on finding the means 
to stimulate an import substitution industry. Their policies took 
the form of quantitative and tariff restrictions, together with 
various administrative measures. Although these measures will be 
discussed in detail in chapter three they are mentioned here to show 
that the import bill was given priority over export promotion. Further, 
while there exists a special committee to deal with problems related 
to imports, there is no corresponding committee to deal with exports.1
As Jordan is a small developing country, with an exceptionally 
high trade deficit and low level of exports, it is to be expected 
that in the early stages of development emphasis will be put on 
import substitution policies. In fact, it is rare to find industrial 
development initially directed towards export marketing.^
Nevertheless, the small domestic market in Jordan means that it 
is difficult to ignore potential exports, especially to the neighbouring 
Arab oil-producing countries where the demand is rapidly increasing.
1. This committee is established annually and headed by the Minister 
of Economy.
2. M. Daniel Schydlonsky: 'From Import Substitution to Export Promotion' 
The Journal of Development Studies, (July 1967), pp. 405-11.
3. Isiah Frank: The Role of Trade in Economic Development: In The Global
Partnership, edited by Richard N. Gardner, rraeger, (T95^, p. 'ST.---------
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Several measures may be adopted to encourage exports. These include
tariffs, direct subsidies and foreign exchange control. In Jordan,
however, the government has specifically tried to promote exports
by means of trade agreements. Historically, these have been of two
sorts: those regarding phosphate exports, and those concluded for
general exports. In addition to such bilateral trade agreements,
there are multilateral trade agreements with the Arab Common Market
countries. Most of Jordan's bilateral trade agreements have been
concluded with Arab countries and cover, in addition to imports and
exports, the transit trade, labour and capital movement and economic
cooperation. They stipulate the products to be exchanged, the
exemptions from duty to be operated, and the licensing requirements.3
Similar conditions of trade are stipulated in other agreements with
4
non-Arab countries, which cover more than 50% of export trade and 
over 25% of imports. However, experience has fehown that apart from 
those concluded to promote the export of phosphates, these agreements 
have had little impact on the overall performance of Jordan's exports. 
Indeed, where an increase in goods exported has occurred, this has 
usually been due to a natural increase in demand in the target countries 
rather than the effect of a newly concluded agreement.
Table 2.14 shows how the trade deficit with these countries has 1
1. K. A. Dasgupta: Economic Theory and the DeveloDina Countries
Macmillan, (1974], p. ì 13. — 2------ -— — *
2. This includes Saudi Arabia (1962) with Lebanon, Iraq and Svria M9651
Sudan (1966), U.A.R. (1967), Lybia and Qutar (1968). y ( '
3. Ministry of Economy, Jordan Trade Agreements, fl97o).
4. This includes the agreement with Yugoslavia (1954), Cevlon and 
Ethiopia (1963), Pakistan (1965), India, Iran and Romania (1968)
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Table 2.14: Foreign trade with countries under bilattrai agreement
(in JD million)
Year Exports Imports Total Trade Trade Balance
Value %' Value % Value % Value %
1959 2.3 67 8.4 21 10.7 25 -6.1 16.0
1963 4.3 67 12.7 25 17.0 30 -8.4 19.3
1965 5.8 58 12.9 23 17.7 29 -7.1 15.0
1968 8.8 61 14.8 25 23.6 34 -6.0 14.1
1975 27.0 66 65.4 27 92.4 23 -38.4 13.1
Source: (1)
n.d.
Department, of Statistics, Jordan Foreign Trade.1966 , Amman,u . u .  — — — — —
(2) Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book. Amman (1975).
Increased despite a large increase in Jordan's exports. Further, imports
of total imports
from these countries increased from only 2l%A1n 1959 to over 27% 1n 1975. 
This indicates that the trade agreements have not been properly imple­
mented; especially those concluded with Arab countries. One example 
of this unsatisfactory implementation may be seen in the agreement 
with the United Arab Republic, concluded in 1967. This agreement aimed 
to export the equivalent of £0.5 million (sterling) in manufactured 
products, as well as an unlimited amount of agricultural products to 
the U.A.R. Jordan in turn undertook to import goods to the value of 
£1.25 millions. Figures for trade in 1968, however, show that total 
exports from Jordan equalled only £3,000, imports from Egypt amounted 
to £1.31 million. The limited impact of trade agreements on export 
performance may be related to the level of supply in Jordan. Never­
theless, the fact that most of the trade agreements come about as a 
result of political rather than economic efforts, may be the main factor 
behind the slow performance of export trade to these countries.
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The Arab Common Market agreement (1964) aimed at full economic 
integration through the free movement of labour and capital, and the 
free movement of national and foreign products. This agreement, 
however, was not followed by the implementation of the proper measures 
needed to reach the objectives. Trade barriers still exist between 
the exports and imports of the Arab Common Market countries.1 To date, 
although the total value of exports to the ACCs (Arab Common Market 
Countries) has increased to reach JD 9.42 million in 1975 compared with 
only JD 1.8 million in 1959, the share of these in Jordan's total 
exports has declined to 23.1$ in 1975 compared with 42.0% in 1959.
Although this decline may be explained by the phosphate exports which 
have increased considerably to non-Arab countries in 1974 and 1975, the 
conclusion remains that the ACC agreement did not actually promote 
Jordanian exports to this market. In fact exports to AAC countries 
accounted for the same share of total Jordanian exports .being about 42%; in 
1974 and 1975 although exports to the ACC increased, their ratio shows 
a decline to about 22% (see Table 2.7, page 60).
In 1975, a far-reaching bilateral agreement was concluded with
Syria, aiming at economic integration between the two countries. The
agreement involves the development of industrial coordination and co-
*
operation in the areas of transport, communications, electricity and 
trade, by the removal of all restrictions and other taxes on imports 
and exports between the two countries. Although the agreement does 
not establish an overall target level for trade between the two 
countries, it was announced that the public sector in Syria would
1. In practice each country has had a list of commodities which the 
tariff should be applied to. nicn tne
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import at least JD 2 million a year worth of products originating in 
Jordan. The 1976 figures for exports show that total exports to 
Syria amounted to JD 6.39 million, compared with 3.58 in 1975, and 2.87 
in 1974. This success was largely due to the sudden increase in demand 
in Syria, which traditionally pursued a restrictionist trade policy.
(e) Development Plans and the Role of Exports
Successive development plans in Jordan have given a high priority 
to reducing the trade deficit. To achieve this objective, planners 
have, until recently, preferred to concentrate on import substitution 
rather than export promotion policies. This was true both for the 
Seven' Year Programme for Economic Development, 1964-1970 and the Three 
Year Plan for 1973-1975. The Seven Year Plan was only implemented for 
three years prior to the disruption caused by the 1967 war. A comp­
arison of the actual figures with the estimates for 1963-1966 reveals 
that this target was largely fulfilled. In practice this came 
about because manufactured goods far exceeded the planners', expectations, 
whereas agricultural and mining exports fell short of the expected 
figures (see Table 2.15). The Three Year Development Plan of 1973 
did not distinguish between exports of different sectors. Although 
exports on the whole were expected to increase on average by 16.4% .
per annum up to 1975, the actual increase was as high as 65% per annum. This 
unexpectedly high increase arose mainly from the sharp increase in 
phosphate prices in 1975, rather than a general increase in the 
volume of exports.
Although the 1976 Five Year Plan still aimed at the reduction of 
the trade gap, there was a distinct shift of emphasis in the means by
which it was to be achieved. The plan makes clear that:
Table 2.15: Visible exports comparison between projected figures of the Seven Year Plan and actual figures 
(in JD million)
1964 1965 1966
Plan Actual Percentage Plan Actual Percentage Plan Actual Percentage
Agriculture 4.4 3.3 75 .4.8 3.5 72 5.2 4.2 78
Phosphate 2.5 2.3 92 3.2 2.4 75 4.0 3.1 79
Manufacturing^ 1.9 3.1 155 2.5 4.0 163 2.7 3.0 113
Total 8.8 8.7 99 10.5 9.9 95 11.9 10.3 88
1. Defined in the programme! to include item nos. 1, 4, 10, 12, 14, 41, 53, 55 in Jordan external trade statistics
Source: Jordan Development Board, The Seven Year Program, Table 6, p. 39. For actual amounts see
(1) Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics 1964, Arman, n.d.
(2) Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics 1965, Amman, n.d.
(3) Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics 1966, Amman, n.d.
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'To date, commodity exports have not played a major 
role in increasing the national product. The five 
year plan represents a conscious effort to effect a 
basic change in the structure of the national economy, 
whereby most of the investment in the mining and 
manufacturing sector will primarily lead to the 
production of export oriented goods.'
Further, the planners project an increase in the export of manufacturing 
and mining from JD 40 million in 1975 to JD 159 million in 1980. To 
achieve these objectives the plan proposed several organizational and 
policy changes. On the organization side: an increased effort in'market 
surveys, conclusion of more bilateral and multilateral trade agree­
ments, and a simplification of export procedures. In addition it was 
suggested that a special fund be set up with the purpose of insuring 
exports against price fluctuations. Further, the plan requires the
Central Bank to make the necessary arrangements with the commercial
2
banks to facilitate credit and services for exporters.
3
Although the first year of this plan did not achieve its objectives, 
the plan is important because for the first time a policy of export 
promotion was mentioned. It must be noted, however, that the plan 
continues to place emphasis on natural resources instead of focussing 
on the manufactured exports. This is evident in the fact that most of 
the mining and manufacturing investment proposed in the plan are con-
• 4
centrated on mining exploration and extraction. The plan allocates 
over 65% of the total investment programme in the industrial sector to
1. National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980, p. 228.
2. Ibid., pp. 230-231.
3- T!?e Plan eftimated exports in 1976 to reach JD 64 million Th* 
actual figure indicated that total exports reached only JD 49'mi 11 Ion
4. Ibid., p. 189.
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projects related to natural resources.. The extraction and export of 
phosphates and, as the plan proposes, copper and potash, is of course 
of great importance. The impact of these activities, however, may be 
confined as in the case of most natural resources, to the direct 
revenue from export proceeds. What is potentially more important are 
the indirect benefits which might accrue from backward linkages that 
the exports could create. In this connection exports like fertilisers 
would have a secondary effect on the economy and, apart from the fact 
that it is a capital intensive industry, have a direct and positive 
influence on export performance. Further, although there is an awareness 
of the need to increase manufactured exports in the plan, there is no 
recognition of potential export markets, or of policies that might be 
adopted to this end.
In this respect it is to be noted that over 80% of Jordan's 
exports (apart from phosphates) are directed to Arab countries. Given 
the fact that these countries are developing themselves, it is likely 
that they are producing for themselves similar manufactured products 
to those which Jordan is exporting. If this is the case, it is likely 
that exports to these countries will decline in the near future. Early 
warning of this can be seen from the decline of the share of overall 
exports to the Arab Common Market taken by basic manufactured goods.
Table 2.7 shows how these declined from 72% in 1972 to reach 41% in 
1975. This trend makes it necessary for trade policy to be directed 
towards finding new market potentials in the Arab world - especially 
among the oil producing countries. In these countries Jordan's manu­
factured exports are competing with those of both developed and other 
developing countries. Jordan, however, may have an advantage over
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other countries because of its geographical location, close to most 
of the Arab oil producing countries, making transport costs less 
than for its competitors in the developed West.
Had there been a special trade policy to promote exports to the 
oil producing countries, Jordan's performance might have been more 
successful.
It has been mentioned that in the Five Year Development Plan the 
creation of a special fund for exportswas suggested. It was not clear, 
however, how such a fund would be financed. In this connection, given 
the high imports and the need to promote exports, the use of multiple 
exchange rates differentiating between essential and luxury imports on 
the one hand and manufactured exports on the other should be considered-
Before concluding this chapter, and in view of the relative 
importance of phosphates to exports, some detailed discussion is 
required of this industry.
(f) The Importance of Phosphates
Phosphate deposits are believed to lie under a large area of the 
country, especially in the east as far as the border with Syria and Iraq, 
as well as the southern part. ‘In fact it is believed that these 
deposits occur beneath 60% of the total surface areaJ Although these 
deposits may cover such a huge area, the exploitation carried out so 
far, since the birth of the country,has been mainly concentrated on 
the region of Hijaz Railway, particularly at Russifa, north of Amman
1. British Sulphury Phosphate and Potassium, No. 65.(May-June 1973),
p. 26.
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and at El hassa between Amman and Aqaba (see Map 3). The reason is 
that phosphate deposits are concentrated in these two regions and 
are relatively easy to extract and are of sufficiently high grade to 
be acceptable to the international market.
Within these areas total resources are estimated to be over 1,000 
million tons. More recently, however, the United Nation Development 
Program (UNDP), in conjunction with the Natural Resources Authority in 
Jordan, initiated a project for the evaluation of the phosphate 
reserves between El hassa and Russifa. These investigations resulted 
in an estimated reserve value of 745 million tons, which in addition to 
those already identified raise the country's resources to over 1,000 million 
tons. It is evident, however, that total national resources are 
considerably higher.
The difficulties in estimating Jordan's reserves creates a
problem in assessing its share in the world reserves which áre also
difficult to estimate. Some sources estimate a world total of
150,000 million tons, while others are much lower, at 45,000 million 
2
tons.
Of total world production, over half is accounted for by the U.S. 
and the U.S.S.R. The remaining half is produced by the developing 
countries, among which Morocco isthe major producer, supplying almost 
one third of the world demand. However, Jordan's share, together with 
that of other developing countries such as Senegal, Togo, although still 
small, is growing in importance. As can be seen in Table 2.16, while
1. Ibid., p. 27.
2 . British Sulphur, Phosphate reserves and the ecolóaist t rmrinn
(March 1972), p. 3. ------------ ----------- Lonoon,

Table 2.16: Phosphate World Production
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Annual
Percentage Change Output 'OOP' tons
1955-1957
to
1964-1966
1964-1965 1967-1972 1956 1972
u.s. 7.9 13.0 0.7 15,998 37,741
U.S.S.R.* n.a. n.a. n.a. 422 20,023
Morocco 6.9 -3.0 . 8.3 5,400 14,461
Tunisia 4.0 11.0 2.5 2,104 3,296
Togo - 27.0 12.1 - 1,928
Senegal 34.0 • 31.2. 7.5 - .1,419
Jordan 16.1 47.5 -5.0 208 693
Egypt 0 . -3.0. -7.5 460 197
Israel 13.9 61.6 7.5 117 872
Others 3.0 5.0 - 3,518 9,355
Total 7.3 8 .0 3.5 28,223 90,185
* The U.S.S.R. until 1970 did not show statistics for phosphate 
production. The figure for 1956 onwards was derived from the importing 
countries as an indicator for production.
Source: (1) U.'N. Commodity Survey (1968), p. 94. .
(2) Phosphate ar\d Compound Manufacturers Association. PhosDhate 
Rock Statistics, London (1972). ' v
world output of phosphate during 1955-1966 was rising at an average 
rate of 7%, production by other developing small countries increased 
by a higher rate, among which Jordan recorded the second highest rate 
after Senegal. Nevertheless, the period 1967-1972 has shown a somewhat 
low rate of growth (only 3.5% compared with 7.3% for 1954-1966) and 
Jordan showed a rather declining rate equal to 5.0%
Although developed countries produce over half the world's
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phosphates, they consume over two thirds of the total world supply because
of their high level of industrial development. Only 5% of total
world fertilisers produced are manufactured in the developing countries. 1 2
While phosphate exports are of crucial importance to the Jordanian 
economy, its share in the world market is relatively small. The 
shares and trends of the main exporters are presented in Table 2.17.
Table 2.17:
Exporti ng 
Country
Exports of phosphates -(million tons)
1956 1966 1972 Percentage change per annum 
1956/66 1967/72
U.S.A. 2.7 8.4
U.S.S.R. 0.4 1.3
Morocco 5.6 9.2
Tunisia 1.8 2.3
Togo - 1.1
Senegal - 1.0
Jordan 0 .2 0.7
Egypt - 0.3
Israel 0.2 0.4
12.5 11.2 7.0
6.3 13.6 45.0
13.5 5.7 5.1
2.3
LO•CM m
1.8 n.a. 7.9
1.5 31.0 6 .2
0.9 15.8 3.5
0 .2 0.7 «
0.6 - 6 .0
Totals
Source:
14.0 26.1 43.5 7.7 9.2
. 1956-1966, U.N. Commodity Survey, 1968, p. 95. 
1966-1972, The International Superphosphate and Compound 
Manufacturers Association, Phosphate Rock statistics.
From this table the growing importance of Jordan (despite the small 
share) is very clear, i.e., while world exports rose by nearly 8% 
between 1955-1966, its exports increased by almost 16%. Only Senegal
1. Some 80-85% of phosphate is used in manufacturing of phosphatic 
fertilisers, the rest being used for other minor applications such as 
matches, ammunitions, fireworks, ceramics and in the photographic 
industry.
2. This occurred when there was a drop of output of 5% duri 
period. This discrepancy is accounted for by stock changes. ng the same
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exceeded this rate of increase. The period 1967-1970, however, shows 
a paradoxical trend; Jordanian exports increased by a low rate compared 
with the world exports. Only Tunisia did not show any increase in its 
exports. The deterioration in the relative positions of Jordan and 
Tunisia during the period 1967-1972 reflects the differences in the 
development strategy and the export-policy in the two countries. The 
decline in Tunisia s share was mainly due to the new development policy 
adopted by the Tunisian government in 1963.1 The aim of this policy was 
to increase the export of manufactured phosphate fertilisers rather 
than the export of raw phosphate. The result of this policy was 
reflected in the increase of internal consumption of raw phosphate 
from 10% in 1956 to 30% in 1972.^
While the decline in the Tunisian world market share was due to 
planned development, the deterioration of Jordan's position was due to 
the failure of the phosphate company^ to expand its market. Since 
its inception, the objective of the company (JP) was to export its 
entire output. Thus to date \here has been no demand for this mineral 
internally beyond, a small tonnage which is mainly bagged for export 
Data for volumes and destinations of phosphate exports are presented in 
Table 2.18. From the table it_is clear that there were two groups of 
exports markets served by the Jordanian mines; these were a) the 
Mediterranean and Black Sea countries served by sea via Beirut (or
Aqaba before 1967) or by direct land routes from the mines to Turkey, and 
other Curopean countries. '
' "'" 1 " -  —
commodity Survey, U.N ¡1968^ ; New York. United Nations 
publication No. E691105, p. 95.
2. The International Superphosphateiand Compound Manufacturers 
Association Limited, London, (1972), .Phosphate Rock Statistics, 1956-1972.
3. Although plans were prepared to establish a fertilisers industry in
Jordan in 1973 and in 1976,. up to th^ present the implementation of these 
plans has^notgtaken place (Jordan Planning Council, The Five Year
Table 2.18: Destination of Jordan's phosphate exports, 1959-1975 (in 000 tons)
Country 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
i-----
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Syria - - - - - - - 2 1 1 1 1 1 - - - -
Lebanon 18 10 9 13 14 21 42 38 4 124 91 141 101 90 122 128 49
Turkey - - - - - 96 5 - 58 99 77 - 56 81 121 123 180
Romania - - - - - - - - - 5 - - 10 - - - 175
Italy 1 - 17 - 2 45 84 114 28 31 - - - - - - 81
France - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - 49
Czechoslovakia 46 47 64 81 61 78 69 59 60 36 43 47 31 51 41 49 71
Belgium - - - - - 25 30 - - - - - - - - 10 56
Yugoslavia 155 150 185 134 165 184 180 194 130 210 249 193 127 50 38 83 27
Poland 31 39 10 9 20 - - - - - - - - - - - 23
Spain - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Greece - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3
Pakistan - - - - - 8 6 - 12 24 - 29 - 21 22 43 -
India 15 71 107 129 96 119 139 303 353 479 368 62 249 392 343 599 Ill
Taiwan - - - - - - - - - - - 13 - 48 81 98 125
China - - - - - - - 32 27 55 67 10 - - - - -
Ceylon - - 2 - 11 9 7 12 12 22 2 2 8 3 6 2 16
Japan - - - 5 - 39 52 - 8 25 9 5 49 180 195 258 90
Others - - - - - - - - - - 14 154 20 36 120 126 40
Total 266 327 395 371 369 627 604 754 881 1116 928 657 651 952 1089 1469 m i
Source: Jordanian Phosphate Mining Company, The Annual Reports (1965), (1970) and (1975), Amman.
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b) Africa, Asia and the Far East served from Aqaba on the Red Sea.
Expansion in the Mediterranean and Black Sea countries was 
inhibited by increasing transportation costs and competition from Morocco 
and, to a lesser extent, from Israel. Jordan's relatively weak 
competitive position in this market is due to its lack of a port on 
the Mediterranean which has obliged the 0PM to convey its phosphate by 
road across Syria and the Lebanon to the port of Beirut. This tenuous 
link was liable to disruption when Jordan was in political disagreement 
with Syria, as occurred in 1971 when the border was closed by the 
Syrians. Consequently deliveries to the Mediterranean were stopped 
altogether and as a result total export of phosphate to these markets 
were the lowest since 1965. Although the border was re-opened in May 
1972, many of Jordan's traditional markets had by then committed them­
selves to supplies from elsewhere, 1 and exports to this area were to 
continue decreasing. These political factors together with the length 
of the road increased the cost of transportation to the extent that in 
some years it was more than the cost of production. 2 That limited 
expansion which did take place in the sixties was made possible by 
trade agreements with Yugoslavia in 1957 and with C2echosl0vakia in 1962.
On the other hand, Jordan's competitive position is especially 
strong in countries bordering on the Indian Ocean, as the other Red 
Sea suppliers - Israel and Egypt - are unable to deliver significant 
tonnage into this area. The competitive position of Jordan is clearly 
revealed, when we compare the freight costs from Aqaba into these 
markets with other suppliers as can be seen in Table 2.19.
1 . Phosphates and potassium, No. 65,[May-June 1973), London,'p. 26
2 . See the Jordan Phosphate Company Annual Report, Amman (1972),
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Table 2.19: Average cost of freight per ton in 1970 (Î USI
Japan China India
Kasser (Egypt) — 62 65
Casablanca 86 145 140
Florida 120 — 146
Aqaba 84 89 53
Source: The International Superphosphate and Compound Manufacturers 
Association Limited, Freight Bulletin (196Q/lQ7n),
In spite of this relatively strong competitive position, exports 
to these markets have not been expanding to meet the full export 
potential1 and the expansion that did take place was mainly due to the 
trade agreement with India. This agreement was concluded in 1965. As 
a result the exports to India increased from 15,000 tons in 1959 to 303,000 
tons in 1966. In 1970, however, political considerations intervened 
when Jordan supported the exclusion of India from an Islamic Conference. 2 
Consequently India cut trade relations with Jordan and reduced its 
import from 368,000 tons in 1969 to only 62,000 tons in 1970. Political 
factors were also to play a role in the exports to China. 3
1. Potential exports estimated by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(for Jordan) was 3.4 M tons in 1970^ vhile total export to these 
markets reached only 500 thousand tons in that year. Source: The
expansion of phosphate industry in Jordan, Part II: Market and Marketing, 
The Economic Intelligence Unit, London (1965).
2. The Islamic Conference of 1970 was held in Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
supported Pakistan against India.
3 . Exports to China, although they were small amounts, have grown 
since 1966. These exports stopped in 1960 when the trade was terminated 
by the Chinese as a gesture of protest against the Jordanian treatment 
of the Palestinian Movements in that year.
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In addition to these political constraints, expansion was further 
limited by the absence of an efficient marketing system. This put the 
Jordanian phosphate industry at a considerable competitive disadvantage, 
both because of the general state of the world market over the past 
two decades, and particularly in 1972 when there was a slight excess 
of supply over demand. Furthermore, although there was a listed price 
for each country, actual sales went beyond this price as the price 
depended largely on the grade of the phosphate as well as the level of 
demand. 1 The determination of the price realised at each transaction 
depended, therefore, mainly on the efficiency of the marketing departments 
of the supplying countries.
In Jordan, this department was extremely inadequate. In 1970 it 
comprised only three marketing officers, none of whom specialised in 
this field Consequently the decision makers in JPM were not provided 
with details of current prices, freight charges and the changes in 
requirements of the importing countries. The inefficiency of this 
marketing machinery is clearly illustrated in Table 2.20, which shows 
the' prices tendered by various suppliers to India, Morocco and Israel's prices 
were less than Jordan's price, despite the relatively low charges of 
freight from Aqaba to India compared with other suppliers.
Table 2.20: Phosphate Prices tendered to India, 1970 ($ US)
Exporting Price - Fob Price -Cif
"Country
Morocco
U.S.A.
Israel 
Algeri a 
Jordan
10.25
6.00
9.60
10.50
10.20 16.45
16.25
23.75
16.10
Source: Phosphate Company, Jordan, unpublished data.
1. Phosphate and Potassium, No. 68 (Nov/Dec, 1973), pp. 3-5.
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Summary
Although international trade has played an important part in 
Jordan's economic development, the nature of its role is materially 
different in a number of respects from the one that usually obtains 
in developed and most other developing countries. First, visible 
exports earnings represent only a small fraction of total foreign 
exchange earnings - whereas they tend typically to be the predominant 
source of foreign exchange in less-developed countries. Secondly, 
while both export and import duties are the predominant source of 
__government revenues in most developing countries, Jordan is dependent 
on import duties alone. Thirdly, the effect of foreign trade has been 
merely to extend the range of commodities available domestically, yet 
with only a limited impact on the economic development.
The predominant importance of foreign trade in the Jordanian
economy has been illustrated by the trend of the ratio of trade to GDP.
This ratio increased from its already high level of 49.12 in 1954-1960
to over70% during 1973-1975. Although imports have been the main factor
determining this high and increasing level of foreign trade, exports
have, especially in the recent years, shown a notable increase (17.12
per annum), which exceeds the rates of growth in imports and GDP.
Indeed this remarkable rate of growth has had some impact on the growth
of GDP, but in terms of development, the export impact has been very
limited. The explanation lies in the phenomenon which has occurred in
Jordan, as well as other developing countries; that is, despite the
large increase in manufacturing exports, these are still confined to
a very few commodities, i.e. phosphate and agricultural exports. In
addition, concentration in exports has been shown to exist both, in commodities
and
in geographical distribution (over 60% of Jordan's exports are 
directed to Arab countries).
The impact of this concentration was shown to deter development 
through: i) large fluctuations 1n export prices, volume and overall 
earnings, and ii) lack or little secondary impact created by export 
performance. The cost of the high fluctuation in exports on a developing 
economy like Jordan's was seen to affect investment in both the govern­
ment and private sectors. Exports are mainly in the hands of the 
private sector, but the instability of exports has had its impact on 
government revenues from income tax and Its profit from investment 1n 
the export sector. Further, an additional burden was added to government 
expenditure by the increase in subsidies to certain exports such as 
phosphates. In the private sector, the main burden was borne by 
agriculture. Instability in exports was associated with fluctuating 
investment in this sector as well as movement from the productive 
sector to the services.
Because of the high concentration of Jordan's exports there has 
been very little secondary impact. This limited impact, as has been 
shown, is associated with concentration on phosphate and agricultural 
exports. Only manufacturing exports, despite their high dependence 
on imported inputs, manage to have a stimulus on other economic sectors.
One main reason for the limited impact of the export performance 
is that government policies have been so far concentrated on stimulating 
import substitution industries as the means for solving the chronic 
deficit in the balance of payments. Only recently, however, the Five 
Year Development Plan, 1936-1980, drew attention to the need for a shift 
in policy towards export promotion. Nevertheless, investment programmes 
proposed in the plan, continue to be concentrated on exploitation of
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natural resources rather than creating manufacturing exports, with Its 
high secondary impact.
In such circumstances and when a developing country falls to 
increase its exports in parallel with its developmental needs, there is 
a possibility that it will alter the import structure to suit this 
purpose. The following chapter will examine the role of imports in 
the process of development of a small developing country like Jordan.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PATTERN OF VISIBLE IMPORTS AND ITS ADVERSE 
CONSEQUENCES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
While visible exports had little impact on the economic development 
of Jordan during 1950-1975, despite their high rate of growth, visible 
imports played an important role in the economy through.their effect 
on domestic production and consumption. Two aspects of the problem 
will be examineed within this chapter - the effect of Jordan's high 
growth rate on the volume and structure of imports; and the converse 
influence of changes in Imports on the economic development process.
Orthodox theory of the inter-relationship between trade and 
development assumes a positive relationship between development and 
imports. The role which imports can play is basically related to the 
structural transformation of an economy. Through the enlargement of 
the range of commodities available, imports may help economic develop­
ment by diversifying economic activities and Increasing the share of 
manufacturing and/or processing industries. However, developing 
countries, in their efforts to catch up with advanced countries, are 
faced with balance of payments difficulties arising from structural 
constraints brought about by the development process itself. Given 
these constraints, it is essential for developing countries to Import 
those goods which are necessary for the diversification of economic 
activities.
To achieve this end a heavy reliance on imported capital goods is 
required which in itself permits this structural change. Therefore, 
unless the developing country adopts proper measures to ensure this 
inflow of capital goods, it is possible that the largest proportion
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of imports may consist of consumer goods. The effect of these on the
level of investment will be quite different from that which may occur
in a developed economy. In the developed economy the effect of this
group of imports may be to direct additional domestic resources towards
investment, given no serious negative effects on growth and development.
In a small developing economy, on the other hand, limited physical
resources and the disadvantages of the small size of the domestic market
may mean that the inflow of a large proportion of consumer goods will
further stimulate consumption, rather than the required investment.
However, imported consumer goods may stimulate manufacturing industry
by indicating the profit possibilities in the domestic markets for
these particular types of goods. On the other hand, the Impact of this
inflow of goods might not be large enough to bring about the required
expansion and diversification of economic activities. Furthermore,
while this may be a tendency that would not be resisted in the case of
heavily populated and relatively high per capita income countries, in
the case of a small developing country such as Jordan it cannot be
allowed to occur. This is not to suggest that Imported consumer goods
cannot play a role in economic development, in fact they may increase
investment, provided that the majority of these imports consist of
*
necessities which cannot be easily supplied domestically and without 
which development would be hindered.^ Naturally, the demand for 
imports in general will always be related to the stage of Industrial­
isation of the importing country. When economic activities are con-
1. Ignacy SachsrForeiqn Trade and Economic Development of Underdeveloped 
Countries, Asia Publishing House, India (196b), p. 99.
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centrated in traditional industries such as agriculture and handicrafts, 
the need for imports is low. As industrialisation Increases and 
division of labour becomes more highly specialised the need for more 
sophisticated capital goods also Increases. This need cannot be 
satisfied by domestic production alone and so the import level is 
likely to rise. However, the ability of a developing economy to import 
the needed capital goods may be Influenced by increasing imports of 
consumer goods which results from growth and development. Industrial­
isation inevitably leads to a rise in real income for individual 
consumers, and the domestic supply constraint means that the demand gap 
can only be closed by Increased importation. In theory, this situation 
should begin to rectify Itself as industry develops and the domestic 
supply situation improves, causing a decline in the need to import 
consumer goods. In practice, however, the type of goods available 
through domestic production always lags behind the changing demand 
generated by the increased sophistication implicit in the development 
process. As a result the level of consumer imports to a developing 
econoniy can be expected to increase. This serious impact of 'consumption 
sophistication' is further intensified by the fact that with the 
increase in income the consumption patterns in the developing countries 
are to a large extent influenced by consumption patterns 1n the 
developed countries, through a 'demonstration effect'. There is a 
further impact on production. Increasing sophistication of producers 
may sometimes lead to the importation of needlessly advanced 'luxury' 
capital goods, such as prestigious goods that tend to have a high 
development opportunity cost. Given these arguments/ imports of a 
developing country can only contribute to economic development 1f 
proper measures are taken to ensure that the pattern of this inflow
i
is capital goods biassed,rather than consumer goods biassed. This
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general point will be illustrated in a statistical analysis of imports
into Jordan. In this particular case the main effect of imports has
been to cause an increase in the supply of consumption goods. This
role in bridging the gap between supply and demand is clearly
demonstrated in Table 3.1, which demonstrates the Increasing Importance
of imports as a supplementary factor in enlarging supply. The table
Illustrates a number of points about the structure of supply and demand.
Firstly, despite the high growth of GNP (from 116.4 JD million 1n 1960/61 to
over 346.2 JD million in 1973/75) its share in the total available resources 
declined,
resulting in a consequent increase in the percentage share of imports 
which rose from 28.7% to about 38% In the same period.
The second important phenomenon revealed in the table is that 
spending on consumption alone was greater than GNP, while expenditure on 
investment remained stable and relatively small. In fact, the level of 
consumption In Jordan is exceptionally high, especially when compared 
with other countries with a similar per capita Income (see Table 3.2)
The lesson of the Jordanian experience over the past twenty-five 
years or so is clear. Jordan has depended heavily on an import 
surplus as the primary source for development, with a concomittant 
liberal trade policy ensuring a continuous inflow of goods into the 
economy. Little effort was made to depress domestic demand through 
fiscal and monetary measures. Yet Jordan has reaped little structural 
long term benefit from its continuous dependence on this import surplus.
This is clear from the continuous predominance of the consumption 
sector, a feature that will be further illustrated when an examination 
of the composition of imports is made. It may be argued that in some 
developing countries such as Jordan, where for historical and social
Table 3.1: Available Jordanian resources and their uses (values in JD million)
Sector 1960/1961 
Value S
1965/1966 
Value l
1967/1968 
Value %
1971/1972 
Value %
1973/1975 
Value %
GNP at market prices 116.4 71.3 183.1 72.3 202.4 71.8 244.4 71 .0 346.2 62.0
Import of goods and 
services 46.8 28.6 70.1 27.7 76.5 28.2 47.0 29 .0 208.5 38.0
Total available resources 163.2 100.0 253.2 100.0 278.9 100.0 341.4 100 .0 554.7 100.0
Expenditure on consumption 123.1 75.4 181.8 71.8 208.4 74.7 253.8 77 .0 353.0 69.0
Gross Domestic capital 
formation 18.0 11.0 27.0 10.7 31.7 11.4
•
47.2 15.0 75.8 14.0
Exports of goods and 
services 22.1 13.6 44.4 17.5 38.8 13.9 27.4 8.0 88.4 17.0
Total 163.2 100.0 253.2 100.0 278.9 100.0 327.4 100,.0 517.2 100.0
Source: Department of Statistics, National Accounts Statistics 1954-1966, Amman, n.d. 
Department of Statistics, National Accounts Statistics 1967-1972, Airman, n.d. 
Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978), Amman.
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Table 3.2: The importance of consumption and imports in various
■ m  ■'■■"■ s ’ — _____^ - " i a S a ""   —  1developing countries, T970
Country Per capita Income Ratio of consumption Import %
in U.S. $ to GNf3 GDP
Jordan 258 108 44
Honduras 276 85 34
Syria 269 88 24
El Salvador 291 86 25
Paraguay 249 86 16
Tunisia 270 82 27
Ecuador 269 87 22
Philippines 259 88 19
Morocco 216 87 20
Source: United Nations Year Book National Account Statistics, Voi. i1i
(1972) p.. 3, 17.
reasons the propensity to emulate developed countries consumption 
standard is likely to be high, then free trade policies tend to lead 
to low imports of investment goods compared with consumption goods.
In the absence of interventionist policy to correct this tendency, 
development tends to be hindered so that the gap between demand and 
supply is likely to remain large. It is clear that before this 
situation can change, the problem of the structural deficit in the 
balance of payments arising from a lack of control over imports, must 
be faced.
Before going into a detailed examination of the factors deter­
mining the level of composition of Jordan's imports one important 
question needs to be posed and answered. Given that an import surplus 
is usually a short term policy expedient to fill the demand/supply 
gap, how did the Jordanian economy manage to achieve this import 
surplus, and to run it for such a long period of time?
The ways and means which may enable a country to run an import
surplus depend on the particular Industrial structure of the country 
and the nature of the gap, and whether 1t 1s likely to be a temporary 
or permanent phenomenon. In the case of a short term import surplus, 
the country involved may borrow from,abroad, attract foreign investment, 
rely on short term credit from the money market, or run down its 
foreign reserve assets. In the long run, however, no country can 
afford to run an import surplus unless its capacity to import 1s 
supplemented by a continuous inflow of foreign grants (free imports). 
Jordan provides a perfect case study of the latter situation.
Aid has been the main source of the Jordanian capacity to import. 
This is made clear in Table 3.3 where two import capacity measures are 
applied. The first is the indigenous import capacity which is 
defined so as to include domestic exports plus net Income from invisible 
trade. The second is the actual import capacity, which includes in 
addition to exports the Inflow of aid and this provides a crucial 
constraint from the economic development point of view. However, 1n 
the Jordanian case, while her import capacity has grown it has not 
been sufficient to match the increasing volume of imports, as is 
demonstrated in fig. 3.1. Indigenous Import capacity accounts for 
only one third of the total volume imports. The difference has 
always been offset by grants, and long-term foreign capital. Actual 
import capacity derived from these sources as well as from indigenous 
sources has, 1n most years of the period, exceeded the volume of 
imports, thus allowing the government to accumulate some foreign 
reserves. > It could be concluded, therefore, that Jordan has never 
actually experienced a severe problem in its actual import capacity 
because of the continuous inflow of aid and long term loans. In this 
connection a recent study of imports in Jordan shows that Jordan is
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Table 3.3: Import Capacity in relation to total Imports (In JD million)
Import Capacity
Average for 
years
Derived from 
exports (1)
Derived from 
aid (2)
Total import 
capacity (3)
Actual 
Imports (4)
% 3/4
1950/1954 5.40 17.00 22.40 23.60 94
1960/1961 14.00 27.66 41.16 41.20 101
1963/1964 21.22 30.10. 51.32 51.51 99
1965/1966 30.30 35.75 66.05 61.50 107
1967/1968 19.65 57.65 77.30 55.75 138
1971/1972 23.01 59.86 82.96 85.50 97
1973/1975 •76.10 125.50 201.60 165.47 121
Average for
years
1950-1972
13.50, 31.20 44.75 43.65 102
Source: Based on Statistical Appendix 3, p. 363.
better off than most other developing countries 1n the sense that 
import capacity has never been a constraint on the inflow of imports.^ 
Most of the incoming capital to Jordan has taken the form of 
foreign aid and loans on concessional terms and grants. Loan repayments 
necessitate a surplus in the current account, unless of course loans 
are repaid by more borrowing from abroad. However, up to the present, 
loans have accounted for a very small proportion of foreign aid^ 
i/ilike most other countries when the converse 1s true. What is of 
interest here is the effect of grants, and the form they take, on the 
balance of payments in general and the import sector in particular.
1. C. MillhamiRationalisation of imports in Jordan, Royal Scientific 
Society, Amman (December 1977), p. 31.
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Fi g .3.1
Source: Computed from Appendix 3.
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So far as the recording and accounting of the balance of payments is 
concerned, grants have only one entry in the accounts as they do not 
generate an outflow of capital. This is a simple fact about balance 
of payments recording. However, it is their indirect and direct 
impact on the balance of payments that is of importance here. Grants 
tied to particular development projects have an immediate effect on 
the volume and composition of imports: they may increase the share of 
producer goods and reduce the imports of consumer goods. In fact, as 
will be shown later, the import of capital goods in the Jordanian 
economy has been found to be the function of some forms of foreign aid.
The effect of the untied grants on the other hand, depends on the 
way in which this aid is expended. In Jordan, over 60% of foreign 
aid received was in the form of budget support, the rest was in the 
form of technical and economic assistance and UNRWA transfers.1 There­
fore, in order to analyse the impact of aid on the imports it is 
important to refer briefly to the composition of government expenditure.
If all government expenditure wfere to take the form of salaries 
paid to public employees, then the main effect of these grants will be 
to increase the share of consumer goods in total imports. However, as 
can be seen in Table 3.4, although developmental expenditure has 
shown an increasing share during the period 1950-1972, the relative 
importance of current expenditure has not altered appreciably, and it still 
accounts for over two-thirds of total government expenditure. Further­
more, it is important to point out that not all recorded developmental 
expenditure is in actual fact of a developmental nature. Debt services,
University (lgrej/pV Vu?jM d  t0 J°rdar'’ unpub11shed Ph'D Thesis, Keele
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Table 3.4: Government expenditure (in JD million)
Year Recurring 
Value %
Developmental 
Value %
Total
1950-1956 10.99 82 2.28 18 13.28
1957-1960 21.84 82 4.49 18 26.33
1961-1964 29.50 82 6.16 18 35.66'
1964-1966 35.13 77 10.17 23 45.30
1967 44.66 65 23.50 35 68.15
1968 57.18 71 23.33 29 80.51
1969 65.23 73 23.17 27 88.50
1970 59.02 73 21.68 27 80.70
1971 60.73 73 22.41 27 83.14
1972 70.31 66 35.56 34 105.87
1973 78.61 65 40.90 35 119.51
1974 103.61* 71 43.01 29 146.62
1975 136.25* 65 73.18 35 209.43
1976 144.53* 65 78.39 35 222.92
* preliminary.
Source: Central Bank of Jordan: Jordan Fiscal Policy, (l970j, Table 3. 
1968-1972, Statistics pertaining to some aspects of the 
Jordanian economy, Central Bank of Jordan (October 1974), 
Table 20. For 1973-1976 see Central' Bank of Jordan, Monthly 
Bulletin, Amman (January 1978).
emergency expenditure, for instance, although they are of a recurring 
nature, nevertheless, are classified under capital expenditure.1 2
Given that current expenditure is mainly directed towards defence 
and takes the form of wages and salaries, it is likely that it will 
not have a positive effect on production. Therefore, the increase 
in personal income resulting from this expenditure will undoubtedly 
be directed again towards imports of consumer goods. Another important
1. Fiscal'Policy in Jordan. Central Bank of Jordan, 1970, Amman, p. 71.
2. Defence expenditure accounts on average for over 20% of the govern­
ment's budget. However, there was a sharp increase after the 1967 war 
and the 1970 civil war, so that the share of defence increased to 
reach 30% in 1970.
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implication of the budgetary aid is that grants become a substitute 
for taxes. Now it can be justifiably assumed that a fair proportion 
of government expenditure will be undertaken regardless of the avail­
ability of aid. Once this assumption is accepted, it is clear that 
the effect of budgetry aid is to lower taxes. Low taxes necessarily 
imply low savings, since the former is the main determinant of the 
latter. It is well known that in underdeveloped countries most of the 
tax revenue is collected in the form of indirect taxes. The tax base 
of indirect taxes is usually narrow and it is not possible, for 
political and economic reasons to increase indirect taxes beyond cer­
tain limits, consequently the enlargement of the tax base tends to 
necessitate the development of a system of direct taxes. The main 
barrier to the development of a comprehensive system of direct taxes 
is political rather than economic. In underdeveloped countries those 
who happen to lose from the introduction of direct taxes are also the 
ones who hold a certain level of political power. It is also necessary 
to point out that there are some economic obstacles. The idea of 
income being measurable is appropriate in industrial societies whose 
economic activities occur in the market, but in many cases in developing 
countries, expecially in the agricultural sector, it is not clear 
what income is since no accounts are kept and exchange often takes 
place on a barter rather than a monetary basis. Nevertheless, political 
rather than economic obstacles are the main concern. In the Jordanian 
case the easy availability of grants has led to a lack of momentum for 
the reform of the fiscal system. There has been no great pressure to 
lower the level of consumption or to boost the savings ratio. Clear 
evidence of this lies in the fact that in nearly all of these years
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under review, total consumption has exceeded the GDP. Given the low 
export ratio, the guaranteed result is the large import surplus which 
has characterised the Jordanian economy since it was created. The 
consequences of the large import surplus and the way it is financed 
was clearly shown to be reflected in the industrial structure of the 
economy. Chapter one has already outlined how the import surplus was 
one of the main causes in creating the services oriented economy.
Thus, it follows that a sudden reduction in the level of imports 
would severely retard the national income through the decline of 
imported capital and raw materials. Therefore, it is fair to argue 
that from an economic development point of view, import surplus can 
be used as a supplement or replacement for domestic resources for 
a short period of time only. In the long run it is essential that 
certain adjusting measures should be taken to reach a reasonable 
balance in international transactions.
The continuous dependence on the 'free imports' foreign support 
in the case of Jordan is best explained by political factors rather 
than economic. Briefly, the answer lies in the establishment of 
Jordan as a political entity whose resources were unable to meet the 
existing demand,1 23and whose foundation came as 'an attempt to find the 
best solution of war time pacts and pledges'. Great Britain thus 
found itself in a position where it had to finance the government it 
had created and over 50% of total government revenues between 1924 and 
1943 were in the form of grants, mainly representing a British treaty
3
contribution.
1. See chapter one, p. 1 to 3.
2. A. Konikoff: Transjordan, An Economic Surveyt Jerusalem fl946J
3. Ibid., p. 100.
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Given the lack of economic resources for exploitation, the motive
for British aid to Jordan during that period can be seen to have been
political.1 2 Furthermore, the country continued to depend on British
aid even when the part of Palestine which had remained in Arab hands
after the 1948 war was annexed to Jordan. The need for aid increased,
as a result of this war with the flood of refugees into the country
What was true for British aid was equally so for that from the United
States, which replaced it after the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian
treaty in 1957. U.S. government support is given for foreign countries
either making large military efforts of which the U.S. approves or
for those requiring funds for political reasons. Hamilton Armstrong
pointed out that American aid to Arab countries was aimed at securing
2
political stability in the Middle East. These political motives
cannot be examined in this study, but are mentioned here only to show
that without these motives, the economy could not have maintained the
continuous flow of foreign aid, without which its capacity to import
would have been reduced to one third its present level.
The continuous inflow of aid, therefore, has enabled the economy
to maintain a high level of imports surplus. Between 1950 and 1975 imports
showed a continuous increase which averaged 12.7% per annum. There ; '
*
was a decline in only three years, 1961, 1967 and 1970. The decline
t
of 1961 was mainly due to the large increase in GDP, resulting from • 
the agriculture sector, and the consequent decline in the demand for 
imported consumer goods. The 1967 fall was mainly due to the large; 
inflow of imports which went unrecorded, because it came in the form1
1. For detailed information on the motives behind foreign aid to 
Jordan see B. Saket: Ph.D. Thesis, Keele University, (1976^ , chapter 4'.
2. Hamilton F. Armstrong: Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, Report on U.S. ! 
Foreign Assistance Programs, Washington, U.S. Press Office (February!1957), 
pp. 1-7.? See also H. J. P. Arnold,'Aid for Development*, Apoliticall
and Economic Studies, London, (1966), p. 81. -------- -- f
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of aid in kind to support the flood of refugees of that year. The 
fall of 1970, however, unlike those of 1961 and 1967 was accompanied 
by a general decline in economic activities and GDP actually fell by 
5% compared with 1969. Naturally the civil war in that year was the 
main reason behind this decline in economic activity. However, the 
drop of 1970 was followed by a rapid increase and imports in 1970 
exceeded the pre 1970 level, recording the highest ever rate of increase.
To explain the movements and seemingly permanent increase in the 
import sector in relation to economic development it is important to 
break down these imports into groupings,without which it is difficult 
to draw general conclusions about their behaviour in a small developing 
country like Jordan.
They can be classified into three major groups: imports of 
consumer goods - defined here to include all imported goods which are 
consumed by households or the government; imports of capital goods - 
including all imported machinery and equipment for the use of capital 
formation; and raw materials or intermediate goods defined to include 
all imported goods for use in productive activities.
Data on import composition is available for most years in the 
period 1950-1975. The figures-which are presented in Table 3.5 and 
figure 3.2 show how consumer goods constitute the major part of total 
imports. During the above period they accounted for almost two-thirds 
of total imports. The>emaining one third is mainly intermediate 
goods with capital goods accounting for the smallest portion. The 
latter, however, despite their small share have shown the highest rate 
of growth, as their share increased from only 4% in 1950 to reach 1 U  
in 1975.
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Table 3.5; Imports according to final use (in JDmillion)
Year Consumer goods Capital goods Intermediate Total
Value % Value % Value %
1950 8.4 78 0.4 4 2.0 18 10.8
1951 12.5 80 0.5 3 2.7 17 15.7
1952 13.0 75 1.2 7 3.1 18 17.3
1955 20.6 76 2.5 10 3.9 14 27.1
1956 21.2 76 2.9 11 3.7 13 27.8
1958 24.7 73 4.2 12 5.1 15 34.0
1959 25.2 63 4.5 n 10.3 26 40.0
1961 27.5 66 4.4 10 9.4 24 41.9
1962 27.9 61 5.0 11 12.7 28 45.6
1963 32.9 65 3.1 6 14.9 29 50.9
1964 34.8 65 4.2 8 14.6 27 53.6
1965 34.6 62 3.9 7 17.6 31 56.1
1966 42.2 62 5.7 8 20.3 30 68.2
1967 29.6 54 5.4 9 20.0 36 55.0
1968 29.4 51 4.8 8 23.3 41 57.5
1969 36.6 54 7.5 11 33.6 35 67.7
1970 36.2 55 5.4 8 24.3 36 65.9
1971 44.4 58 10.9 15 21.3 26 76.6
1972 60.8 63 . 10.2 11 24.3 25 95.3
1973 85.3 78 5.9 5 17.5 16 108.7
1974 97.7 62 23.3 15 35.4 22 156.4
1975 135.0 67 23.0 11 45.0 22 203.0
Source: (1) Department of Statistics, Flow of Goods in the Jordanian-Economv. 
Amman, (April-1970). ^
(2) Jordan Development Board, The Five Year Development Plan, 1976-
1981. .
(3) Department of Statistics, unpublished data.
In contrast to this, consumer goods, despite an increase in their 
absolute value, have shown no consistent trend in their relative share. 
As can be seen in the table, between 1950 and 1968 they showed a 
slow but declining trend. From 1969 until 1975 however, this share of 
imports has been continuously increasing.
On the other hand, raw materials have shown a continuous rise so 
that by 1968 the share of this group increased to 412 compared with 
only 18£ on 1950. From 1969 onwards imports of raw materials declined 
while imports of consumer goods were rising.
JD
M
ill
io
n
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Fig.32
Source: Table 3.5.
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The factors behind these changes can best be understood by 
examining each group of imports and its corresponding demand. Generally, 
however, changes in the range of imported goods correspond to structural 
shifts in the economy. The dominant role played by import of consumer 
goods demonstrates the sectoral disproportions connected with failure 
of agriculture and lack of diversification in manufacturing output. The 
expansion in locally produced goods has affected imports in two 
directions. On the one hand, the increase in income resulting from an 
increase in production has led to an increase in demand, part of which 
has to be satisfied from abroad. On the other hand the increase in 
production has had the effect of eliminating certain items of imports 
but has increased the imported inputs needed for production purposes.
The large increase in imports was real and not merely the result 
of increasesin prices. This is not to deny the increase in import 
prices and its impact on the demand for imports, but simply to 
evaluate the increase in import policies. Until 1966, the price level 
in Jordan was relatively stable and there was no pressure on domestic 
prices. Given that imported goods constituted a large proportion of 
the total supply, it would be plausible to assume that import prices 
were stable during the period 1950-1966. From 1967 onwards domestic 
prices started to show an increase and accelerated in the post 1973 
period. Furthermore, during the fifties and early sixties, world 
prices were also stable. By 1971, however, they had increased by 20$ 
from the 1962 level and by 1972 they had recorded a 37% rise from the 
same base year. The 1973-1974 period witnessed the highest increase 
ever in world prices.^ 1
1. Bank for International Settlements', June 1977, Annual Report, pp. 31-2.
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These indicators of the movement of prices in Jordan and the 
rest of-the world are confirmed by the price index of imports. 
According to these indices, between 1957-1966 the price of imports 
showed an increase of only 2% per annum. From 1967 to 1972 they 
increased by an average of 4.7%. The highest increase, however, was 
witnessed in 1973 and 1974 when the price of imports increased by 10% 
and 22% respectively.1 Here it should be re-emphasised that the 
relatively slight changes in domestic prices and imports 
in the pre-1967 period should not lead to the conclusion that the 
price elasticity of demand for imports is low.
The most important point, from the long term point of view is to 
differentiate between the factors affecting imports, and the more 
precise question of the right composition of imports. Naturally total 
imports are sensitive to overall economic conditions rather than 
domestic or international prices. In the following paragraphs, the 
trend and the factors affecting each group of imports will be shown 
in discussing the structure of imports. It is intended here to examine 
the trend of this group and to examine whether it can be substituted 
by domestic production and to what extent.
The striking feature about,imports of consumer goods is that 
despite the decline in their share of the imports, their share in 
total consumption has shown an increasing trend. The ratio between 
these two variables increased from an average of 20% during 1959-1966 
to over 33% in 1973-1975. The only period where a decline was witnessed 
is the period 1967-1968. This, however, in actual fact does represent 1
1- Central. Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (October 1976).
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a miscalculation of the imports rather than a decline. In these years 
a large inflow of aid in the form of commodities went unrecorded and 
underestimated in the level of consumer imports. It can be argued,
therefore, that Jordan is becoming more dependent on imports to
satisfy its consumption requirements (see Table 3.6).
Table 3.6: Consumption in relation to imports of consumer goods (in
"JD million) ■
Year Consumption (1) Imports of consumer goods (2) Ratio 1/2 (3S)
1959 112.5 25.2 22.4
1961 130.9 26.6 21.1
1962 131.5 26.9 21.2
1963 141.8 32.9 21 ?1
1964 155.7 34.8 22.3
1965 174.8 34.5 20.0
1966 187.1 42.2 22.6
1967 204.9 29.6 14.5
1968 211.9 29.4 13.9
1970 226.9 36.2 15.0
1971 245.9 44.4 18.0
1972 261.7 60.8 23.3
1973 303.5 85.3 28.1
1974 357.6 97.7 27.3
1975 394.4 135.0 34.2
Source: (1) Appendix 4.
..- - .
(2) Table 3.5.
While this pattern was taking place in Jordan's imports, other 
developing countries in the Middle East and the rest of the world 1
1. See J. Bhagwati and. C. Wibulswasde, A Statistical Analysis of Shifts 
in Import Structure in LDCs, Bulletin of'"the Oxfo'rd University, Institute 
of Statistics, voi. 34 (1972), p. 229.
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have managed to reduce this rate of dependency on imported consumer 
goods. In fact the share and the value of consumer goods imported in 
most of these countries has declined.^
A breakdown of consumer goods imported into 'food' and 'non-food' 
items may outline the reasons behind the predominant consumer imports. 
As is to be expected, and can be seen clearly in Table 3.7, about 
502 of consumer imports consist of foodstuff and mainly raw food.
Annual
average
Food Imports
J 1 M  \ J U  i l l  I | |
Other consumer
u r i  )
Total
unprocessed 
value %
processed 
value %
■
total
value %
imports
value %
1951/56 5.5 33 1.9 11 7.4 44 9.1 56 16.5
1958/51 9.5 26 3.2 9 12.7 35 13.0 65 35.7
1962/56 8.4 24 5.3 15 14.1 39 20.3 61 34.4
1967/72 12.0 29 8.1 20 20.1 49 20.7 51 40.8
Source: Department of Statistics, Flow of Goods in the Jordanian fmnnmy 
Amman (Apnl 1570). For m ; - 1972. Dept, ot statistics, 
unpublished data. 5*
The continuous deficit in the domestic supply of food can be
explained not only by the shortage of agricultural supply but also by
the following reasons. Firstly, Jordan has experienced a relatively
high rate of natural increase in population. Secondly, the increase 
in population and its impact on overall demand was boosted by the large 
influx of refugees after the 1948 and 1957 wars. Thirdly, the increase 
in percapita income has played an important role in increasing the 1
1. Ibid., p. 229.
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demand for consumption.1 2 While the above mentioned reasons may be 
considered as a natural cause for the increase in consumption and 
imported consumer goods, the lack of proper import restriction and the 
liberal trade policy adopted by the government is to be considered the 
main source of increasing consumption and the demand for imports.
Domestic agricultural production has never been sufficient to 
meet the domestic demand for foodstuffs, and Jordan is completely 
dependent on imports of food such as sugar, rice, tea, coffee and all 
sorts of beverages and spices. Wheat, which is the staple food of 
the people, is also imported, although the amount of imports depends 
on weather conditions. This is in addition to the shortage of domestic 
supply of animal products which has been another important factor in 
increasing the imports of foodstuffs.
In Jordan as well as other Middle Eastern countries, efforts to 
increase agricultural production have been made. Nevertheless, the 
deficit in food supply remains the main problem of production in all 
these countries. The problem of Jordan, however, is that its capacity 
to import is subject to the availability of aid rather than to the 
level of its domestic exports. Obviously other oil producing countries, 
due to the vast amounts of oil reserves, can afford to continue 
importing needed foodstuffs, while Jordan needs to increase its own 
production to meet the growing demand. Here it could be argued that 
this continuous flow of imported food was mainly due to the lack of a
1. Between 1938 and 1948 the annual rate of increase in 
about 2.5*. In 1973 the population of the East S n k  reached
partly through natural increase at 3.2% and partlythroiSh thl’S / 111v0n’ 
from the West Bank. w y tnrou9h the refugees
2. See chapter one, page 17.
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clear food policy and the failure in development strategy in the
agricultural sector. The under-utilisation of agricultural potential
is widely recognised. For example:
'Although few, if any, countries can claim to make the 
best use of their resources, in the Middle East it is 
only too evident that low increases are largely due to 
failure (a) to make the best use of the limited natural 
resources of land and water (b) to apply scientific 
knowledge and (c) to invest sufficient capital*.
Jordan is no exception to this general case. Several studies have
indicated that it is possible for Jordan to increase its agricultural
2
production to meet its domestic demand. Clowson, for example, 
estimated potential productivity for rain fed wheat of 3 ton per 
hectare compared with the present level of only 0.7. Table 3.8 
illustrates this case clearly. Further, Aresvik has concluded in his
Table 3.8: Present and potential average yields (metric tons/hectare)
Wheat (rainfed)
Wheat (irrigated) 
Barley (rainfed) 
Tomatoes (irrigated) 
Tomatoes (rainfed) 
Egg plant (irrigated) 
Olive (rainfed)
Grapes (rainfed) 
Banana (irrigated)
Present Potential
0.7
1.5 
0-7
19.0
8.0
19.0
1.8
4.5
20.0
1.8
5.0
1.5
50.0
20.0
40.0
3.0
7.5
33.0
Source: Qidvar Aresvik: The Agricultural Development of Jordan. M Q 7fi). p. 337
1 . M. T. Marto, 'Food production in the Middle East1 23. Royal Scientific
Society, Amman (19/4), p. 12. “
2. Oddvar Aresvik: The Agricultural Development of Jordan. Puaeger, London, 
(1975), p. 335.
3. Ibid., p. 335.
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book on agriculture in Jordan that
'average yields remained, however, on a relatively low
level, even forthe best irrigated areas in the Jordan Valley
compared with similar areas in other countries, such as the' Nile Valley'
However, two important points regarding development policy should 
be emphasised here. First, although agricultural development has been 
of some importance in development planning, the fact remains that 
real reform and rationalisation policies have not been pursued. This 
is rather surprising especially when food imports are the main 
component of the import bill. Agricultural investment has shown a 
relative decline in successive development plans.2 Second, lack of 
specific recommendations for policy measures is one important phenomenon 
which characterises development plans in the agricultural sector. A H  
recommendations are normally put in general terms and this creates 
difficulties in implementing the recommendations. This is clear in 
the Three Year Development Plan, 1973-1975 and the Five Year Plan, 1976- 
1980. It could be concluded here, therefore, that the increase in 
imported foodstuffswas mainly due to the failure to increase'agricultural 
production to meet the demand. Potentially the agricultural sector 
is able to meet the domestic demand, provided a proper policy is 
implemented. In this respect Aresvik noted that
'through optimal programmes to exploit the agricultural possibilities 
. . Jordan could in future, supply a major part of its domestic 
food requirement and at the same time, increase its agricultural 
exports'. 123
1. Ibid., p. 35.
2. The ratio of agricultural investment declined 
Year Plan 1962-1967, to 27% in 1964-1970 plan, 15 
plan and to 14.6% in the 1976-1980 plan.
from 32% in the Five 
.5% in the 1973-1975
3. Aresvik: op. cit., p. 33.
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Non-food imports such as clothing,furniture and other durables 
have shown a continuous increase during the period 1954-1975, their 
relative share remaining at the high level of over 50% of total con­
sumer goods. It is an over-simplification to consider all these items 
as luxury items as they include important consumer goods. Nevertheless, 
it could be argued with justification that a large proportion of these 
imports consist of unnecessary luxury goods.
Indicators of luxury items can be seen in Table 3.9 which shows 
how the value of imported‘TV sets, road motor vehicles and perfume 
increased during the years 1965-1975.
Table 3.9: Imports of TVs, road motor vehicles and perfume (in JD thousands)
Year TVs Road motor vehicles Perfume
1965 - 2,588 400
1966 - 4,445 510
1970 1,161 9,996 n.a.
1971 748 9,967 n.a.
1972 1,161 10,028 2,026
1973 1,373 15,577 2,506
1974 2,437 25,299 4,310
1975 4,931 62,368 5,658
Source:
•
(1) U.N. Year Book of International 
New York (1973).
Trade Statistics, 1964-1970,
(2) U.N. 
New York,
Year Book of International 
(1974).
Trade Statistics, 1972-1973,
(3) U.N. Year Book of International 
New York (1977).
Trade Statistics, 1976, vol. 1,
Further, consumer luxury imports can be seen in the increase of 
private cars registered in Jordan from 16,101 in 1974 to 21,306 in 1975.1
1. Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1975, Amman n.d.
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Income is the first factor usually examined in explaining 
this trend in consumer behaviour in relation to luxury goods. Most 
studies have confirmed the income hypothesis advanced by Keynes: the 
immediate effect of an increase in income is arincrease in consumption. 
Further, as income increases, the demand for manufacturing and non­
food .imports increases,while the demand for food increases only very 
little. This has been confirmed in Jordan by the decline in the share of 
food consumption in the total expenditure of the private sector. Con­
sequently the demand for the luxury items increased, which of course 
will affect imports.
Therefore, income distribution can be considered as an important 
factor in determining the level of demand for consumer durables. In 
Jordan a lack of income distribution statistics inhibits any assessment 
of the impact of the high income group on these imports. Nevertheless 
there are indicators to suggest that as income increases' the demand 
for certain luxury imports increases. In this connection a study made 
by the Royal Scientific Society indicates that the higher income groups 
are the main consumers of these luxury items.1 As can be seen in Table 
3.10, which is based on the study, the higher the level of income the 
lower;the level of elasticity of demand for luxury items. In the low 
income group, income elasticity of demand is more than one except for 
food and clothing. This indicates that the higher income groups in
1 The study is based on a cross-sectional sample survey conducted by 
the Department of Statistics in 1968. It is limited, however, by the 
fact that it was selected by a stratified random sampling procedure 
from eight income strata relating to government employees in Amman. 
Therefore, results represent the average consumption behaviour of a 
limited group rather than the whole economy. See Dept, of Statistics, 
Familv.Expenditure and Cost of Living Index for Civil Servants, Amman, 
“(September I968J, p. l-b.
1
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Table 3.10: Income elasticity of different items at five income levels
Items Income levels in JD per year
301-450 451-600 601-750 751-900 901-1050
Health 1.211 0.369 0.900 1.690 ■ 0.459
Transport 2.181 5.484 1.484 2.191 1.187
Furniture 2.753 1.129 2.923 1.424 0.283
Recreation 1.536 0.797 1.386 1.875 0.759
Education 2.682 1.906 0.671 0.732 1.332
Cloth ing 0.440 1.035 0.858 0.727 0.538
Tobacco 1.247 0.951 0.504 0.518 1.145
Food 0.903 0.620 0.544 0.507 0.480
Total 1.414 1.152 1.079 0.761 0.797
Source: A. Steitih, Consumption Patterns of Wage Earners in Jordan, '
Royal Scientific Society, Amman ^19/4), p. 15.
Jordan are the major consumers of these luxury items.
A further factor contributing to the emphasis on luxury i terns,
may be found in the pattern of consumption. The change in the trad­
itional domestic forms of conspicuous consumption*from land ownership 
to the luxury durable goods may explain the increase of imported 
luxuries. This demonstration through imitation effect is made worse 
by the continuous appearance of new consumer commodities, (colour 
television for example) from the industrialised west, which sustain 
the general propensity to consume and, in turn import.
Reducing the share of such luxury imports could be possible, not 
only through governmental decree but mainly through long term economic 1
1 See R. Nurkse: Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped 
Countries, Blackwell, Oxford, (1953^ p. 68.
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and social planning. I.e. in addition to import controls the government 
can employ other policies which would adjust the level and composition 
of demand and supply and would indirectly affect the composition of 
imports.
Although all imports are subject to import and exchange licences, 
Jordan adheres to a basically literal policy in its trade and payment 
relationships. Import and exchange licences are granted freely for 
most items, although certain of these are subject to scrutiny by the 
Ministry of National Economy, whose prior approval is also required 
for imports of industrial machinery.and of all material needed for 
the establishment or expansion of industrial firms. Apart from this 
no administrative restrictions are made on the import of consumer 
goods.^
Import policy is, however, supposed to be formulated by a Special 
Import Committee, This committee includes a number of administrative 
officials in the Ministry of National Economy and representatives 
from other corresponding government departments. This committee, 
however, has so far shown no evidence of any attempt to formulate 
a clear policy for the restriction of imports of luxury goods. The 
sole function which is visibly served by this committee is the 
resolution of disputes between the Ministry of Economy and private 
traders.
The only operative restriction imposed upon the import of luxury 
goods is through tariff rates. The Royal Financial Committee* 2 stated that 
tariffs were to be used as'a method of pursuing economic and social
1 I.M.F. 23rd Annual Report on Exchange Restriction, IMF, Washington DC, 
(1972), p. 7W.
2. Royal Financial Committee, Report on Jordan's financial structure, 
Amman M 9 6 1 K
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objectives as well as procuring revenues for the government. This is 
not surprising as direct taxation makes only a small contribution to 
the government revenue in Jordan and the government has to rely on 
indirect taxation. Although the major objective of import duties is 
to levy taxes for the budget, the tariff tries to distinguish between 
two main categories of goods, basic necessities and manufactured con­
sumer goods. Necessities such as cheese, milk and canned goods are 
subject to low tax rates (2-6%), while goods in the second category 
such as beer, wine and cars are subject to tax rates as high as 200%.
Although import planning has taken place in Jordan, implementation 
has been far from effective. A policy of deliberate development 
planning was initiated in 1952 with the creation of the Jordan 
Development Board, which however has always been more an agency for 
administration of foreign aid than a research, planning and policy 
making body. Apart from a number of projects which have been under­
taken, its main activities have been in negotiation with the donors of aid.1 
The Development Board, however, did produce the Five Year Plan for
1962-1967, which was replaced soon after publication by the Seven Year 
Plan, covering the years 1964-1970. The first objective of this later 
plan was to reduce dependence gn foreign aid, and to increase the rate 
of domestic growth. Apart from a general recommendation to increase 
exports and curb imports of luxury items, foreign trade planning in the 12
1. Loven Fesdi11 :'Planning for Technical Assistance: Iraq and Jordan', 
Middle East Journal, Autumn, C]961/, pp. 389-902. '
2. Jordan Development Board, Sevèn Year Program for Economic Development, 
1964-1970, Jerusalem (1964), p. 325.
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formal sense (which includes among other things, foreign exchange budgets, 
and identification of key sectors) was not embodied in the Seven Year 
Programme. In short, the Seven Year Programme was only a set of 
projects and the numerous economic projections did not appear to be 
the result of a very extensive economic analysis.
The implementation of the plan under norma]_conditions lasted 
about two years, until the June war broke out. The war and its 
aftermath had drastic consequences on the plan, several projects 
being indefinitely suspended. Others v/ere re-examined but the 
situation of political instability had a generally negative effect 
on Jordan's planning. This situation necessitated a reassessment of 
priorities which, however, was not systematically carried out, most of 
the readjustments being made on an ad hoc basis, under the aegis of the 
Economic Security CommitteeJwhich was created after the war in 1967.
Thus, during the years 1967-1972, the government was trying to manage 
the economy on a year-to-year basis rather than pursuing a clear 
development policy embodied in a detailed documented plan. Hence, a 
critical analysis of the planning development and foreign trade sector 
in particular during 1960-1970 could, in practice, be of little value.
One example of the failure of the development plan in Jordan can be 
seen by comparing the objectives of the plan with its actual results.
i
In the two normal years of the implementation of'the plan, the plan
failed to achieve its objectives both in the level of imports and in 
altering the components of these imports, as can be seen in Table 3.11. *1
/
1. The Economic Security Committee is composed of the Ministers of 
Finance, Economy, Justice, Transport and the Governor of the Central 
Bank. The council operates under the terms of the Martial Law for 
Financial and Economic Affairs, No.2 of 1967. ;
i
Table 3.11: Imports: Planned and actual (in JD million)
Item
planned
1964
actual % planned
1965
actual % planned
1966
actual %
Private 
consumption
26.6 26.6 -- 27.0 27.1 — 27.5 31.9 +22
Capital
formation
9.9 4.2 -57 13.2 3.9 -70 17.6 5.7 -76
Intermediate and
government
consumption
12.9 22.8 +77 13.5 25.1 +85 14.5 30.6 +111
Total 49.4 53.6 +8 53.7 56.1 +41 59.6 68.2 +14.
Source: (1) Jordan Development Board, Seven Year Programme for Economic Development, 
Jerusalem, (1964).
(2) Table 3.5, p. 112 of this thesis.
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Imports of Intermediate Goods
The second important item in Jordan's imports is intermediate 
goods, which have shown a steady increase since the fifties. This is 
not surprising, given that one of the main features of the Jordanian 
economy is the absence of local raw materials in general, so that 
manufacturing industry has to rely, to a substantial extent, on 
the importation of these items from abroad. In the early fifties 
imported intermediate goods varied in value between 13% and 18% of 
total imports. Manufacturing activities during this period were both 
very limited and of predominantly traditional character, relying 
on whatever local raw materials were available. The reliance on 
Palestinian manufacturing industry under the mandate, and the 
restricted nature of the domestic market were the basic factors res­
ponsible for the extremely limited manufacturing activities. In the 
late fifties, with the setting up of modern import substitution 
industries, there occurred shifts from the import of manufactured 
produce to the import of raw materials or intermediate goods that go into 
the manufacture of finished goods. Industries such as vegetable canning, 
oil refining and pharmaceuticals rely heavily upon imported inputs.
The establishment and expansion of these and other manufacturing 
industries since the late fifties has accordingly led to a rapid 
growth in imported raw materials. They increased over three times 
from JD 5.1 million in 1958 to JD 17.6 million in 1963, thus doubling 
their relative share to nearly one third of total imports. The result 
is a heavy dependence bythe Jordanian economy on imported inputs. This 
can be seen clearly from the data in Table 3.12, which shows that 
during 1963-1966 about 40% of total intermediate inputs were imported.
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Table 3.12: Local and imported inputs, 1963-1966 in JD million
1963 1964 1965 1966
value % value % val ue % value %
Local inputs 18.7 55 24.4 62 25.7 59 27.7 58
Imported
inputs 14.9
45 14.7 38 17.6 41 20.3 42
Total 33.6 100 39.1 100 43.3 100 48.0 100
Source: Department of Statistics, Flow of_Goods into the'Jordanian 
Economy, Amman (April 1970), p. 85.
While the economy as a whole relies upon imported intermediate 
inputs to this extent, the largest proportion (about 60%) is absorbed 
by the manufacturing sector, as can be seen clearly in Table 3.13.
This shows the close relationship between the import of intermediate 
goods and activity in the manufacturing sector. In this respect, 
these trends must undoubtedly have had an effect on consumer 
goods. Although the expansion of import substitution industries and 
the resultant increase in imported intermediate goods have reduced 
the reliance on imported manufactured goods, the latter category of 
imports, however, continued to* increase at a very high rate especially 
during 1973-1975. This indicates the relatively limited extent to which 
import substitution has occurred. Such heavy reliance on imported raw 
materials for industry has weakened the linkages between these industries 
and other sectors, so heavy investment can only mean a substantial 
increase in imports.^
1. Regression analysis for imports of raw materials and manufacturing ' . 
industry during 1963-1972 showed that'the production of manufactured 
goods of the value of JD 2.6 mil lion-.requires the import of raw 
materials of value JD 1.0 million.
Table 3.13: Import of intermediate goods (1961-1972) ih JD million
Using sector 1961-62 1963--64 1965-66 1967-68 1969-70 1971-72
Agri culture 0.5 1.1 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.9
Mining and industry 5.9 9.6 11.7 13.1 12.6 12.2
Construction 1.4 1.5 2.3 3.3 3.1 2.9
Electricity 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.4
Transport 1.7 1.9 2.3 3.1 2.7 2.7
Trade 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.6 0.7
•
0.4
Total 9.9 14.8 18.9 21.6 20.1 19.5
Source: (1) Department of Statistics, Flow of Goods i nto thé Jordanian Economy (April 1970).
(2) Department of Statistics, unpublished data.
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Imports of Capital Goods
The development of home production, dependent largely on imported 
raw materials and imports of consumer goods, was undertaken mainly 
because of the unavoidable need to fill the gap which the domestic 
producing sector failed to meet. In the complete absence of capital 
goods industries, it was expected that the foreign trade sector and, 
in particular, imported capital goods, would be of special significance 
for the growth of investment. It is through these capital goods that 
economic development is related to imports. ^
It has already been shown that this group of imports have 
registered the highest rate of growth among other components of imports. 
Furthermore, their share rose from only 4% of total 1950 imports to 
more than 10% in 1961. Since 1961, however, they have shown a fluc­
tuating trend, their share varying between 5 and 10%. In 1971, however, 
they exceeded the 1961 level and increased to 15%. Nevertheless they 
declined again in 1973 to 5%. This fluctuating trend is shown by the 
share of these imports in total fixed capital formation. As can be 
seen in figure 3.3 the total of these imports has declined during the 
later periods of the study and the marginal propensity to import 
capital goods declined from 0.306 during 1959-1966 to 0.222 during the 
period 1959-1968. This decline in the marginal propensity to import 
capital goods is rather surprising when the capital goods imports should 
be expected to play a crucial role in future development.
Foreign Trade and Economic Development of an IlnHpr- 
developed country, Asia Publishing House, India (1965), p. 5.'------
• - 132 -
Fig. 3,3
Source: Appendix 1 and Table 3.5.
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An immediate explanation for such tendencies, can probably be found 
in the rising domestic production of certain capital goods. Statis­
tical information in this connection indicates that domestic production 
has always been generally small in relation to total requirements.1 
Although the small increase in the home manufacture of capital goods 
may well have permitted a greater increase in domestic investment than 
would otherwise have taken place, it has generally not been sufficient 
to cause any relaxation in dependence on imported goods.
The fact that most of Jordan's investment has gone into'social 
overhead capital' in sectors such as transportation and housing may 
suggest some explanation for the small share of capital goods imported. 
During the period 1954-1959 while the total GDP was rising by 10%, 
transportation and construction grew at an annual rate of 22% and 15% 
respectively. This high concentration in such investment depends 
mainly on locally produced raw materials rather than on capital goods. 
The peak of capital goods imported during the period 1959-1962 was 
connected with the peak’expenditure on manufacturing and transportation 
which occurred during the late fifties and in the early sixties (as 
has been demonstrated before). Most of these modern industries such 
as petroleum refining, vegetable oil processing and tanning were set 
up over a relatively short period, causing imports of capital goods to 
show an increase in their absolute value and their relative share of 
total imports (from 1% in 1952 to 11% in 1958-1959). Subsequently from
1. Total value of the home manufacture of capital goods amounted to only JC 
0.54 million in'1966. Only 1% of total manufactured production and 
only 0.42% of total fixed capital formation. In 1972 they amounted to 
JD 3.18 million, only 1.6% of total manufacturing industry and only 7% 
of total investment. Source: National Account Statistics- 1959-1966 and 
1969-1972.
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1962 until 1970 these imports showed, in their relative share, a 
declining trend; in some years the decline being in both absolute 
value and in relative share. During the same period, however, expansion 
in industrial production was continuing. The explanation of such con­
tradictory trends can be found in the fact that, whatever expansion 
had taken place during the period 1961-1970, was mainly an expansion 
within the already established industries, probably through fuller 
utilisation of the existing capacity or through expansion of capacity. 
The sudden rise in 1971-1972 however, is due to imports of aircraft by 
the Jordanian Airline (Alia). In a developing country, such imports 
should be considered as conspicuous consumption rather than as imports 
of capital goods.
In most developing countries imports of capital goods have been 
dppendent on three main factors; the trend of domestic demand, output 
of consumer goods and raw materials and the trend in the total import 
capacity.1 If the increase in import capacity was greater than the 
increase in domestic consumption, the proportion of capital goods in 
total imports would rise. This explanation might be applicable for 
those countries whose import capacity was mainly derived from indi­
genous sources, but in Jordan, where most of the capacity to import 
has been derived from foreign aid,2 the data available provides a 
different explanation. As can be seen from Table 3.14, while total 
import capacity, was growing faster than total consumption, the import 
content of this consumption was growing more slowly than the import
1. U.N., World Economic Survey (1968), p. 69.
2. See page 104 of this thesis.
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Table 3.14: Import of capital goods in relation to import capacity 
and consumption
Year Import capacity 
1959 = 100
Consumption 
1959 = 100
Import of consumption 
goods as % of total 
consumption
Import of 
capital goods 
as % of total 
imports
1959 100 100 31.5 11
1951 133 116 28.5 10
1962 149 117 30.8 n
1953 133 133 31.9 6
1964 185 138 32.9 8
1965 189 155 33.5 7
1966 221 167 33.1 8
1967 256 182 24.2 9
1968 225 188 25.0 ! 8
1969 174 205 26.0 11
1970 189 200 26.7 8
1971 194 217 26.7 15
1972 221 232 32.5 10 .
Source: ' (1) Appendix 3. 
‘(2) Appendix 4. 
(3) Table 3.5.
capacity, implying that themargin of foreign exthange available for 
imported capital goods was increasing.
The preceding analysis suggests that total import capacity does 
not appear to have had a direct effect on the trends of imported capital 
goods, it must be noted, however, that most development projects 
were carried out by the government and financed mainly by foreign loans. 
Projects like the Aqaba Port development, and the Hittieh Railway and
- 1 3 6 -
several other projects which required capital machinery were financed 
mainly by loans contracted with Germany. On the other hand, most 
of the transportation and irrigation projects were financed by American 
and I.D.A. loans. Thus, the capacity to supply these projects with 
foreign machinery was derived from the amount of capital inflow in 
the form of loans contracted.
One indicator of this relationship can be drawn from trends of ' 
net inflow of long term capital in relation to trends in total imports 
of capital goods. As can be seen in Table 3.15, the trends in both 
variables showed a strong relationship; the increase in capital inflowr 
was expressed as an increase in imported capital goods. In 1971, for 
example, import of capital goods almost reached double the value of 
1970. This peak was mainly due to the import of two American aircraft 
at a cost of around JD 64 million, financed by loans from the Export- 
Import Bank. Therefore, we can suggest that import capacity in the 
form of loans rather than grants, was the main factor in determining 
the trend of the import of capital goods.
Source of imports
In contrast to the exports which were directed mainly to the 
neighbouring Arab countries, imports came mainly from the
developed countries. This is to be expected, since the economic 
structure in all the Arab neighbouring countries is similar to that in 
Jordan; the share of industrial sectors is still very small in all 
these countries. Thus most of Jordan's needs of manufactured goods 
(50% of total imports) have to come from the industrialised west, 
while imported agricultural products have to be imported from the Arab
countries.
Table 3.15: Import of capital goods in relation to net capital inflow, 1959-1975 (in JD million)
1959 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Net capital inflow 0.61 1.25 6.0 1.4 6.2 2.6 5.2
ocsj 00• 5.3 0.3 6.7 6.3 6.4 10.8 44.1
Import of capital 
goods 4.5 4.4 5.0 3.1 4.2 3.9 5.7 5.4 4.8 7.5 5.4 10.9 10.2 5.9 23.3 23.0
Ratio of imported capital, 
goods to total imports 10 11 6 8 7 8 9 8 11 8 15 10 5 15 11
Source: (1) Appendix 3.
(2) Table 3.5 of this thesis.
Table 3.16: Source of Imports, 1954-1975 (in JD million)
1 1954-1956 1959-1967 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
value % value % value % value % value % value % value % value %
Arab
countries 5.39 21 9.87 19.0 13.1 19.0 16.76 21.0 16.38 17.1 16.76 15.5 26.44 16.9 46.33 19.7
a. Arab Common 
Market 3.29 13 4.71 9 5.96 9 7.06 9.2 7.9 8.2
7,06 8.7 14.4 9.2 14.11 6
3. Other 2.1 8 5.16 10 7.14 10 9.7 11.8 8.48 8.9 7.06 6.6 12.04 7.1 32.22 13.7
Western
Countries 11.8 47 25.78 50 29.54 44.8 37.11 48.0 43.88 46.0 41.78 38.6 63.21 40.61 101.1 43.2
a. EEC 5.07 20 10.76 20 13.34 20.2 12.20 15.9 18.35 19.3 21.49 19.8 33.59 21.5 55.09 23.5
b. UK 4.55 19 7.08 13 8.82 13.5 6.78 8.3 8.64 9.1 9*. 03 8.3 12.04 7.8 21.87 9.3
c. USA 2.19 8 7.94 17 7.38 11.2 18.13 23.3 16.89 17.6 11.26 10.5 17.5 11.3 24.18 10.4
India 0.23 1.1 0.72 1.3 1.63 2.5 1.07 1.3 1.39 1.4 1.41 1.3 2.97 1.9 4.4 1.8
Japan 0.68 3.1 1.09 2.1 3.87 5.8 4.19 5A 4.59 4.8 5.35 4.9 7.38 4.6 17.1 7.4
Communist
Bloc 1.44 6 5.24 10.1 9.19 13.9 5.2 6.7 8.24 8.6 7.73 7.2 14.3 9.1 18.75 8.6
Others 4.81 20 9.15 17.5 8.55 i ao 12.29 16.4 20.83 22.1 35.17 32.5 42.21 26.9 32.18 13.8
Total 24.90 100 51.85 100 65.88 100 76.62 100 95.31 100 108.2 100 156.5 100 234.01 100
i
Source: (1) Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1960, Amman, n.d.
(2) Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1966, Amman, n.d.
(3) Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics, 1968, Airman, n.d.
(4) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (March 1970} and (February 1978).
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Although more than half of Jordan's imports are still coming 
from developed countries, during the last two decades there have 
been changes in the sources of supply from the western countries.
Given that Jordan's import capacity is substantially derived 
from foreign aid, inevitably this aid was determinant of the supply 
source of imports. Being politically tied to the UK during the mandate 
period, Britain provided Jordan with the financial grants necessary 
to r.un the army. This relationship continued after political inde­
pendence was granted until 1957, when a breakdown in Jordanian/British 
relations occurred. Thereafter imports from Britain, which had been 
the sole source of industrial goods, and had accounted for more than 
20% of Jordan's total imports, fell to 12& in 1959. Given that 
Jordanian trade policy is relatively liberal, how did this change 
happen?
Since Jordan belongs to the sterling area, it has given certain 
priorities to imports from the United Kingdom* over those from other 
western countries, particularly the United States. Thus it was common 
practice not to grant import licences for imports from other countries 
when similar products could be obtained from the British market. After 
the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty in 1955, although Jordan 
nominally remained in the sterling area, in practice no priority was 
given to British goods.
While the share in UK's total Jordanian imports was showing a 
declining trend, imports from the United States showed a continuous 
increase, indicating a change in the emphasis of Jordanian imports. 1
1. IMF, 23rd Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, Washington D.C. 
p. 248.
(1972),
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increase of imports from the US started when the USA emerged as a 
major source of budget support and remained so in the following years. 
Expectedly then, aid was somewhat contingent on imports from the 
American market. In addition to the fact that, part of this aid was 
in the form of direct import under FL480, furthermore, it was 
reported in 1962 that 'the United States conveyed its desire to 
Jordan that not less than 50% of US budget support should be utilised 
in the US market'.1 This 'proposal' has since been reflected in the 
share of imports from the US in total Jordanian imports. These 
imports have increased from only 10% in 1958 to 22% in 1971, almost 
the same share of imports as from the UK in the early fifties. The 
increase in imports from America is rather confirmed by the switch 
from British military equipment for the army to American. Further­
more, since most of the American aid for economic purposes was spent 
on transportation projects, American road making machinery dominates
3
the Jordanian market.
While the Western countries dominate the Jordanian market, 
imports from Eastern communist countries, despite the increase they 
have shown in recent years, are still small compared to those from 
the West. One important factor behind this relatively small share, is 
the fact that the Jordanian government is considered to be strongly 
Western and anti-communist. Therefore, political and economic relations 
with those countries are not as strong as with the West. Diplomatic 123
1. From a report prepared by the Middle Eastern Dept, and the exchange 
restrictions dept, in the IMF, Washington D.C., March 28, 1962.
2. Out of the total US technical and economic assistance during 1955/66 
almost one fourth was spent on transportation projects, and one third on 
agricultural projects. See A. A. Malki: Foreign aid and its role in the 
economic Development of Jordan,Kuwait Institute for Economic and SociaT 
Planning in the Middle East, Kuwait (June 1969).
3. London Chamber of Commerce, Trade Mission to Jordan (1967), p. 2.
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Relations with most communist countries were not established until the 
mid-sixties. Accordingly it is to be expected that imports from these 
countries are small. Another contributing factor is that both Jordanian 
consumers and importers have a preference for Western rather than 
Eastern European manufactured goods on the grounds of familiarity and 
understanding procedures.
Summary
The role of imports in the Jordanian economy has been to enlarge 
the commodities available in the economy. Emphasis has been given to 
imports as an equilibriating factor, fluctuations in each category of 
imports was considered a reflection of changes in aggregate demand.
In the analysis of imports the usual classification into consumption 
goods and producer goods was adopted. The main reason for this adoption 
is to point out the relationship between the development requirement 
and imports.
The artificially high level of consumption, expressed by the 
fact that throughout the period under study total consumption exceeded 
GNP, has necessary consequences for the level and composition of 
imports. The high level of consumption shows in high ratios of 
consumption goods in total imports. Some of the consumption goods 
imported were classified as necessities while others were classed as 
luxuries. The division of necessities and luxuries is a relative one. 
However, the division is not theoretically ambiguous: income-elasticity 
of demand was used as the basis of the division. Obviously, the term 
luxuries carries with it normative implications, the whole point of
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distinguishing luxuries from necessities is to support the argument 
that import of consumption goods can be cut down without any serious 
effect on the average consumption. The import of necessities, especially 
food, cannot be curtailed without serious consequences. But it can be 
argued that the way in which the Jordanian imports have been financed 
has played a major role in the structure of imports. It has been 
shown that a large proportion of imports has been financed by foreign 
aid. Most of the grants received by Jordan have taken the form of 
budgetary support. Given that the government expenditure has taken 
the form of salaries and wages, then the main effect has been to 
increase personal incomes. This in turn has increased consumption, 
part of which has been directed towards imports. The short term effect 
of grants, therefore, has been to increase the level of imports and 
the share of consumer goods in these imports. In the long run, it can 
be argued that the easy access to grants, reduces the pressure on the 
government to help increase the production of necessities or reduce the 
import of luxuries. There is very little doubt that the Jordanian 
economy can adequately feed its population. The food deficit in 
Jordan does not necessarily mean that the country lacks comparative 
advantages in production of food, but it certainly represents the under- 
utilisation of the productive potential of agriculture.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVISIBLE SURPLUS
Whereas the two previous chapters have outlined and examined the 
origins and causes of Jordan's adverse visible balance of trade, this 
chapter and the next will deal with the invisible account, which, in 
contrast, has been in surplus for all but two of the past twenty-five 
years.
Clearly the most important aspect of Jordan's invisible trade 
surplus is the impact it has had on the overall balance of payments 
position and upon the economy's import capacity and development 
potential. Prior to a discussion of these macro-economic issues, a 
sectoral analysis of particular invisible transactions is attempted, 
together with an evaluation of the economic forces giving rise to the 
invisible surplus.
Theoretically, an invisible trade balance can for most purposes 
be defined as 'income from services rendered to non-residents, less 
payments to non-residents for services rendered by them, together 
with income from assets abroad'.^ (This includes the receipts and 
payments for services such as shipping, tourism, and investment income.) 
In practice, however, no universally accepted definition of this area 
of trade is at present in general use. 'British balance of payments
•i
statistics, for example, include private and governmental transfers 
as part of the invisible accounts, whereas IMF statistics exclude these 
items on the grounds that they are not strictly commercial transactions.
t
In this chapter, the IMF definition will be used because it is identical
1. A. F. Hollman: 'Invisible Earnings', Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 13, (1966), pp. 42-46. \ '
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to that employed by the Jordanian balance of payments compiler, and 
so makes comparisons more meaningful.
In addition to the definition problem, however, invisible trade 
poses a further difficulty to the analyst because of the lack of 
detailed information available about invisible transactions. The 
literature in general pays little attention to the analysis of this 
sector of foreign trade, tending to concentrate on visible rather 
than invisible trade for three basic reasons:
1. The unavailability of detailed information as mentioned by the 
IBRD Invisible Committee.^
2. The fact that for most economies invisible trade accounts for a
2
relatively small proportion of total trade transactions.
3. The assumption that the pattern of invisible trade is similar to
3
that of visible trade.
These points need to be commented upon in the particular case of 
Jordan.
With reference to point 1. a full assessment of this sector's 
contribution to the economic development of the country must await the 
introduction of certain reforms in the collection in data, although 
currently available data is nevertheless sufficient to indicate its
1. UN ÇTAD • Contribution of invisibles to the foreign exchange
market, (January, 1967^ , p. 10.
2. H. Peter Gray: 'On Measuring the Price Sensitivity of Invisible 
International Trade', Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 33,(1971), pp. 2Û/-I5.
3. Ibid., p. 205 and see also Ely Devons: 'World Trade in Invisibles', 
Lloyds Bank Review, (April 1951), No. .50, p. 37.
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importance to the economy. This is a technical matter, the main 
essence of which is outlined in the Appendix at the end of this 
chapter. (P. 172.)
With reference to point 2, Jordan, quite unlike most other 
developing countries, has a high ratio of invisible trade to total 
trade and this is of great importance for its economic development.
Thus, the British committee on invisible exports included Jordan among 
the first thirty-one countries in invisible transactions with the 
highest ratio of receipts over payments.^ Further, the UNCTAD report 
on world invisible trade shows Jordan to have the highest proportion . 
of invisibles in its exports among the 111 countries included in the 
survey.
The importance of invisibles is clearly revealed in Table 4.1,
which shows that invisible exports accounted for over Z4<iiTof total
¿62
Table 4-.1: Relation between invisibles transactions and merchandise 
trade (in JD million)
Average Invisible Total Invisible exports Invisible Total Invisible impo
exports export as % of total imports import as % of total
value exports value imports
1950/54 2.9 5.3 54.0 1.6 18.3 8.0
1955/60 7.6 11.7 64.0 3.5 35.9 10.0
1961/66 22.9 30.2 74.0 7.6 59.9 12.0
1967/72 29.3 42.7 68.0 26.2 93.9 28.0
1973/74 58.6 95.6 61.0 36.1 167.9 22.0
1975/76 200.3 259.1 77.3 82.2 367.8 22.0
Average
1950/74 53.5 74.1 66.3 26.2 124.2 21.0
Source: See Appendix 3.
1. Report of the Committee on Invisible Exports, Britain's Invisible 
Earnings, Director of the study Claric, W. M., Thomas Skinner & Co. Ltd., 
London (1968), p. 126.
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exports of goods and services during the period 1950-1976. On the 
other hand, total payments represented only 21% of total imports of 
goods and services indicating a large invisible surplus. The 
importance of invisible trade was intensified by its high rate of 
increase during the period under consideration, an increase far in 
excess of the growth in visible exports. While visible exports rose 
by 12.9% per annum during 1950-1974, invisibles recorded an average 
rate of 16.9%. The large increase in earnings during 1975-1976 
(averaging 12.5%) is yet another indicator of the growing importance 
of invisible trade to the Jordanian economy. This importance is 
tempered by the fact that invisible trade tends to be more sensitive 
to political instability than visible trade, especially in the Arab 
countries of the Middle East. This greater volatility was clearly 
demonstrated when the ratio of invisibles to total exports declined 
from the high level of 74% during 1961-1966 to 68% in 1967 and to 61% 
during 1973-1974. In 1975-1976 invisible earnings increased by over 
102%, forming more than 77% of total exports.
As far as point 3. is concerned, the abovementioned fluctuations 
confirm that the growth pattern in invisible trade does not vary 
precisely with that of visible .trade. This is further demonstrated in 
figure 4.1, which shows that, although the general trend of invisible 
earnings has been of a similar nature to that of the visible earnings, 
in years of political instability invisibles showed a higher degree of 
sensitivity to events.
A detailed examination of the main sources of the invisible surplus 
will demonstrate inter alia the impact of these fluctuations on Jordan's
economic development. As shown in Table 4.2, all invisible items with
Fig. 4.1
Source: Appendix 3.
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the exception of the 'government account' have been in surplus. By 
far the most significant item has been remittances from Jordanians 
working abroad which contributed about 80% of the net balance. Since 
this item is of over-riding importance as a source of invisible earnings 
it will be dealt with separately in chapter five. The two other 
important sources are tourism and investment income, as Table 4.2 
indicates, which will now be given detailed examination. The remaining 
sources include freight and insurance, transportation and other invisibles 
accounting respectively for 5%, 1% and 7%of the invisible surplus.
Since imports are recorded on a CIF basis, 'freight' does not 
include freight and insurance on all foreign trade, but does include 
payments for reinsurance of exports. Receipts from transit duties 
from Saudi Arabia on the oil pipelines which pass through Jordan to 
Syria and the Lebanon, are the most important component of this account. 
However, between October 1973 and 1976 Saudi Arabia suspended half of 
their payments, pending negotiations between the two countries.
Other items under the transportation account primarily include the
net international transactions of Alia, the Jordanian Airlines Company.
The account was in deficit until 1974, but subsequently there has been
an increase in revenue resulting in a surplus of JD 3.39 million on
*
average for the period 1975-1976.
The government invisible account has generally been in net deficit. 
Generally the government's payments and receipts for diplomatic missions 
are the only services which are usually considered in this account. 
However, in Jordan all government payments for imports of arms are 
included under this item, and this, with the increase in government 
purchase of arms, caused a net deficit in the account averaging about 
19% of the surplusJ
1. For a further examination of this account, see page 169 of this chapter.
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Table 4.2: The source of Jordan's invisible surplus, 1950-1976 fin .in
mi 11 inn ^ ~  — c--- — ---- - ----- i—ll o ) Il UL/
1950/54
Averages
1955/59 1960/66 1967/72 1973/74 1975/76 1960/76 %
Freight and 
insurance n.a. n.a. 1.15 1.45 1.87 0.43 1.26 5
Other transport n.a. n.a. -0.41 -0.39 -0.69 3.39 0.21 1
Travel 0.30 0.39 3.33 -2.45 -0.43 19.34 2.72 11
Investment 
income . -0.06 0.33 1.44 4.79 5.89 8.24 3.94 16
Government 0.61 0.48 -0.23 -4.68 -9.43 -15.33 -4.72 -19
Remittances from
Jordanians working 
abroad
n.a. n.a. 7.55 5.90 19.41 94.83 18.63 78
Other invisibles 0.57 1.39 1.02 -0.04 5.79 7.36 1.83 7
Invisible Balance 1.42 2.59 13.85 4.58 22.41 118.26 23.87 100
Source: See Appendix 3.
Tourism
The Christian as well as Moslem holy places in the cities of 
Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jericho, combined with their natural 
beauty and the Red Sea coastline, have provided Jordan with a real 
potential for a growing tourist industry as real income levels have 
risen considerably in the developed world. It is not surprising 
therefore, that tourist travel into the country has shown a considerable 
growth in recent years. Jordanian planners have consistently emphasised 
the fact that Jordan is endowed with resources for tourism which, if 
properly developed could become a major area of economic growth - a 
fact realised before the 1967 war and powerfully reiterated at the 
Arab/European Economic Symposium held in Montreaux, Switzerland in 1976 1
1. Galeb Barakat: 'Tourism in Jordan', a speech delivered in the Arab 
European Economic Symposium, (1976], p. 10.
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Tourism has flourished in Jordan ever since the 1950s and the 
number of foreign tourists visiting the country has increased 
dramatically. Between 1954 and 1955 the figure rose from 30,000 to 
about 80,000, whilst the 1956-1958 period of the Suez conflict and 
general political unrest depressed the figure to a level of 48,000 by 
1958. The period of relative stability thereafter and up to 1966 led 
to a level of 616,875 by the latter date (an overall rate of increase 
of 30%). However, the 1967 war and its aftermath brought about another 
decline to 425,633 and a continuous decline until 1971. From 1972 
onwards the numbers show an increase in each successive year, reaching 
a level of one million by 1976 (see figure 4.2, overleaf).
Income from tourism, as estimated in the balance of payments, 
has predictably followed the same trend. It can be seen from Table 
4.3 that it declined from a peak of JD 2.4 million in 1955 to 1.2 million 
in 1958, revived in 1964 and resumed its steady upward trend to reach 
a new peak in 1966. The period from 1967 to 1971 was characterised by 
a continuous decline, which turned the balance of tourist income into 
a net deficit. This source of net foreign exchange earnings again 
became significant during the years 1973-1976.
Underlying these swings in earnings is the fact that the industry 
is highly sensitive to changing political as well as economic conditions. 
It was depressed during times of disturbance, such as 1956 (Suez), 1958 
and 1967, and expanded in periods of peace and stability. Moreover,
Fig . £.2
Source: (1) Ministry of Tourism, Tourism in Jordan (1973). .
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
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Table 4.3: Receipts from tourism - growth and significance, 1954-1974 
(in JD million)
Year Receipts of 
Tourism
GDP Ratio of Tourism Receipts to:
GDP Total
invisibles
Exports of 
commodi ty
Deficit on 
visible trade
1954 2.2 47.7 4.5 49 72 1
1955 2.4 43.0 5.0 59 71 1
1956 1.5 61.4 2.4 29 29 1
1957 1.2 61.9 1.9 15 22 2
1958 1.2 69.1 1.7 14 35 4
1959 2.6 79.3 3.8 41 85 2
1960 3.2 85.1 3.7 24 81 2
1961 4.3 89.4
00• 28 82 3
1962 5.0 110.2 4.5 28 84 4
1963 6.0 108.5 5.5 33 91 2
1964 8.0 117.2 6.8 33 90 4
1965 9.8 135.5 7.2 36 98 6
1966 11.3 150.9 7.4 36 108 7
1967 6.8 149.6 4.5 26 66 10
1968 4.6 168.4 2.7 20 32 13
1969 4.5 198.3 2.2 16 30 8
1970 4.8 189.6 2.5 15 39 9
1971 6.3 202.6 3.1 21 55 9.7
1972 8.3 224.2 •
CO 23 48 1 0 . 6 ,
1973 10.7 239.7 4/5 20 44 12.7
1974 17.3 300.9 5.7 26 35 16.4
1975 35.7 319.9 11.2 26 73 19.3'.
Source: Statistical Appendices 1, 2 and 3 on pages 361., 362 and 363, 
respectively.
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the 1967 war not only depressed the traffic flow and income generally,^ 
but one of the specific outcomes of the war - the loss of the West
i
Bank territory - severely reduced the tourist attraction of Jordan, thus
bringing about an important structural alteration in its potential
foreign exchange earnings. A study made by the Ministry of Tourism
in 1967 revealed that the Holy places on the West Bank had in the
past attracted 51% of the total number of visitors. Archaeological
2
sites had attracted a further 30% of the total, with the East Bank 
probably taking only a share of the remainder.
Further, as a consequence of the war, Jordan was left without 
proper facilities to accommodate tourists, for these too had been 
concentrated on the West Bank, as Table 4.4 reveals.
Table 4.4: Distribution of tourist facilities between the East Bank 
“  and the West BanE
West Bank East Bank Total
Hotels 55 12 67
Beds 3999 810 4809
Rest Houses 1 6 7
Travel Agents 70 17 87
Antiquities Shops 240 10 250
Tourist Guides 200 12 212
Source: Ministry of Tourism, Tourism Industry, (June 1974), p. 7.
1. Apart from income and number, the war affected the quality and origins 
of tourists. The number of Arab tourists declined steadily after the war.
For example, the number of American tourists, who constituted 13% of the
total during 1954/66, dropped to only 6% in 1967 and only 1% in 1968.
The European tourists fell from 19% to 12% in 1967 and only 7% in 196$. 
(See Tourism in Jordan, Ministry of Tourism, 1974.) This decline was
Wntftfl1 *o T O f s J ,ketphoert5>1canrero0ufr & abInVju5sitl?vr,S[June 1974) p. 7.
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As a result of this situation, governments have, since 1967, 
stressed the need for new investment to create more facilities on the 
East Bank, and have tried to emphasise the potential of the East Bank 
as a major tourist attraction, as was stressed in the Three Year 
Development Plan (1973-1976), which was designed to reactivate the 
economy after the 1967 war. One of the main objectives of this plan 
was 'To diversify tourist activities and develop tourist sites in the 
East Bank'/ Consequently, certain projects were initiated to attract 
tourists to Aqaba and Petra. Thus the number of classified hotels 
was increased from 12 in 1967 to over 22 in 1975.2 This, together 
with the aforementioned increase in tourist traffic during 1975 and
3
1976 has gone some way to confirm the belief that tourism should be 
considered as one of the country's 'four top productive sectors'. The 
question now remains as to the particular impact of this growth on the 
economic development of Jordan as a whole.
In general the impact of tourism on economic development is widely 
recognised amdng economists and international development organisations/
1. Jordan Planning Council, The Three Year Development Plan, p. 91
— — ----- - '"a------- ■ ' " ' J  ' ■ cjo \ p. a/f
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They argue that as well as being a source of foreign exchange, tourist 
industries influence all aspects of the economic life of a country.
The UN Economic and Social Council commented in its report on inter­
national travel and tourism in August 1963 on 'the influence of tourism 
as a tertiary industry, creating prosperity through the development of 
communications, transportation, accommodation and other consumer 
services'.^ This report further states that: 'in some cases, the 
development of tourism may be the only means of promoting the economic 
development of less developed areas lacking in other resources'.^
What then has been the effect on aggregate income, and the possible 
creation of strong backward and forward linkages with other economic 
sectors?
The contribution of tourist income to GDP is clearly shown in 
Table 4.3 on page 152, where it is evident that despite a high rate of 
growth, the contribution to GDP remains small. Moreover there are 
weak linkages with other economic sectors due to the highly service- 
oriented nature of the industry. Thus the secondary effects on the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors which are important to an import 
surplus country like Jordan, tend to be small.
Statistical evidence for .the relationship between a country's 
growth rate and the increase of its revenue from tourism has not been 
established even in countries where the contribution of tourism to 
GDP is high. Young, in his test for this relationship in ten countries, 
found no conclusive answer to this question. Young’s analysis has 
further shown that development of a country's tourist industry tends
1. United Nations, Economic and Social Council Recommendati 
national Travel andTourism, (21 August 1963^ p. 22. on on Inter-
2. Ibid., p. 22.
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to lower the standard of living of its population.1 Domestic inputs 
required by the tourist industry are mostly derived from the construction, 
transport and other allied services, activities which are not necessarily 
desirable from the economic development point of view. Thus, the con­
struction sector is already large in Jordan, absorbing almost half of 
the aggregate capital formation between 1959 and 1973, and in 1974 the 
ratio increased to about 58% of total investment. Indeed far from 
wishing to have the construction sector stimulated, it is the present 
policy of the Jordanian government to reduce the sector in size. More­
over the important backward linkages of this industry, are import 
oriented. While this dependency may be justified in the case of most 
developing nations, in Jordan's case it is difficult to find a similar 
justification. It is often argued that a country always earns more 
than its outlay on tourist imports. It has been noted that 'Even when 
goods need to be imported for use by tourists, a country would earn 
considerable foreign exchange for their resale to tourists through 
services and profitable sales'.2 Indeed, the flourishing tourist 
industry in Jordan has naturally provided growth and prosperity for the 
consumer trades and for other similar services. It is possible that 
in developmental terms, the very success of the tourist industry acts 
as a disincentive to the growth of domestic producing sectors, and in 
the long term will have the effect of encouraging the development of an 
import-oriented service economy.
1. George Young, Tourism - Blessing or Blight. Penguin (1973), p. 142
2. See U.N. Economic and Social Council: 
tourism', (August 1963} p. 22. Recommendation on international
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There is no direct statistical evidence to support the above 
argument. However, tourism in Jordan is largely geographically con­
centrated in a limited number of urban areas, and it will be demon­
strated later that its impact on regional development in Jordan as a 
whole, has been minimal. It appears likely therefore that the effect 
of tourism is to yield short term benefits for the balance of payments 
at the cost of long term disbenefits in terms of the location and 
concentration of labour and of economic effort.
The tourist industry thus provides a good example of the dilemma 
facing Jordanian economic planners. The two policy objectives for 
the economy are the elimination of the balance of payments deficit and 
the reduction of the economy's service orientation. Tourism is a 
positive aid to the first of these objectives and a positive obstacle 
to the second, provided that the import content of tourism expenditure 
(in the form of substantial raw materials required for building the 
industry and consumer goods) is not overlooked. This aspect is part­
icularly important in Jordan due to the exceptionally high dependence 
of the economy on imports.
Tourism's forward linkages are not easy to assess for, in contrast 
to manufacturing and agricultural industries, it provides neither new 
material inputs nor intermediate products. However, the socio-economic 
impact of tourism can be seen in its influence on internal social 
values and on the morale of the peopleJ and insofar as servicing 
and other activities are generated to create facilities for tourists, 
may check internal migration flows. The implications for values 1
1. See Young: op. cit., p. 143.
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depends on the type of tourist industry, and the evaluation of this 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
As far as regional development is concerned, since the development 
of the tourist industry is diffused over many areas of the country, it 
should help in reducing migration from rural to urban areas. However, in 
the case of Jordan, tourism has had little impact on internal migration 
or on population distribution. There are no regional GDP statistics 
to provide evidence for the impact of tourism on the various regions 
of Jordan, but the distribution of population in each Governorate^ can 
be used as evidence for the extent to which regional development in 
Jordan has taken place. As may be seen in Table 4.5, Amman accounted 
for more than half of the population of Jordan in 1975. The share of 
each Governorate declined from 1961 onwards, indicating migration from 
rural areas to cities.
Table 4.5: Estimated population of the East Bank in 1975 and 1961
Number Number
Governorate T9TTI— % 1975“"" %
Amman 433,618 48 1,098,477 56
Balga 79,059 9 129,867 7
Irbid 273,976 30 563,990 28
Karak 67,211 8 108,037 6
Maon 46,914 5 51,597 3
Total 900,776 100 1,951,968 100
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1975, no. 26 
Amman, Table 1.
1. An administrative name equivalent to county in England.
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One possible explanation for the argument that the tourist
industry should be given priority in a country with tourist
potential like Jordan is that investment in this sector has a
relatively short gestation period, and therefore the development
of tourist income can be accomplished in a comparatively short
period of time. In addition to the fact that the Jordanian
economy lacks the most necessary factors for the development of
manufacturing, such as skills, capital and natural resources,^
tourism may be considered superior to any other economic sector
because of the high multiplier effect of tourist expenditure.
Several studies of tourism in Jordan have outlined this as a
major reason for promoting this sector. P. S. Sargant estimated
a tourism multiplier for Jordan of 3.3 compared with an average
2
of 2.4 for the economy as a whole.
While statistics tend to support this argument, it should 
be noted that the higher multiplier in an import surplus country 
like Jordan also means a large impact on imports, and the con­
sequences may be to further the trade deficit«
The above discussion of tourism confirms that the positive impact
1. See George S. Korash: A Tourism Plan of Action for Jordan, 
USOM, produced by Communication Media Centre, Lebanon (.1959).
2. P. Sargant: Ford Foundation, The tourist trade in Jordan. 
Jordan Development Board, (1971), p. .43.
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of the industry on the economic development of Jordan has been 
exaggerated by policy makers and sometimes by the Jordanian economists 
themselvesJ Being mainly a service industry with very weak linkages
T
with Jordan's small productive sectors, tourism has reinforced the 
service orientation of the economy. Further, the implications for the 
balance of payments cannot be~simply assessed on the basis of the 
increase in income. It is the industry's impact on import levels, 
serving in the long run to further widen the trade gap, which is of 
greatest importance.
Investment Income
Another main contribution to the invisible surplus has been net 
investment income, which includes payments and receipts of profits, 
dividends and interest. The net balances during the period 1950-1976 
are presented in Table 4.6 and show a continual increase. A large
Table 4.6: Investment account fin JD million)
Average Investment Account Ratio of income to:
receipts payments balance total invisible deficit on
_ receipts visible trade
1950/56 0.16 0.21 -0.05 3 2
1957/59 0.77 0.17 0.60 10 4
1960/66 1.75 0.31 1.44 9 4
1967/72 5.66 0.87 4.79 16 7
1973/74 7.57 1.68 ! 5.98 12 8
1975 11.33 3.10 ' 8.13 6 4
1976 12.99 4.74 8.25 5 3
Source:
i
Statistical Appendix 3, p. 363.
i
1 -
1. See M. H .Zaglhuel :
j
'Tourism in Jordan', unpublished M.A. Thecic
American University of Beirut (August 1967,1 p. 63.
.......ww « ^ j
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investment income surplus may sometimes be an indicator of a strong 
economy and 'net credit' position. However, the importance of this 
surplus in the economic development of a country depends on how this sur­
plus was achieved, and where it is spent. The first point is important 
because it explains whether the income was mainly due to the expansion 
of exports over imports - resulting in an increase in foreign exchange 
assets with a consequent increase in the interest paid on these assets - 
or whether it was the result of large-scale investment abroad. The 
second point is also important because the impact of a surplus on 
development depends on whether surpluses are directed towards financing 
consumption or towards investment and development. The following para­
graphs will attempt to demonstrate how the surplus accumulated in this 
account, represents an indicator of Jordan's economic problems. Further­
more it will show how these surpluses have been directed towards an 
expansion in consumption, which increased the balance of payments problem.
From the accounting point of view, the origin of the surplus 
results from a substantial difference between receipts and payments.
It can be seen from Table 4.7 below that the chief source of investment 
income is the net interest received on Jordanian foreign assets abroad. 
During 1960-1966, these were mainly the foreign assets of commercial 
banks and of the Currency Board. Since 1966, however, almost all foreign 
assets have been invested by the Central Bank of Jordan. It is important 
to note that these assets are not the result of trade transactions. As 
is demonstrated in Chapter Five the main source of these assets is the 
large inflow of aid. In this sense Jordan cannot be described as a 
net creditor - a term which can only be accurately applied to developed 
countries with large investments abroad. This raises the question as to
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Table 4.7; Investment Income (in JD million)
Averages Interest on Jordanian 
foreign assets abroad
% Total income
1960-1966
1967-1972
1973-1974
1975
1.41
4.40
6.66
10.92
10.29
80
77
88
96
79
1.75
5.66
7.57
11.33
12.991976
whether Jordan s foreign reserve policy has been consistent with its 
development needs. As is outlined in Chapter Five, the level of 
foreign exchange reserves in Jordan far exceeds that of its transactions, 
as well as of precautionary requirements.
As far as the allocation of income is concerned, most of it is 
used for government consumption. In accordance with rules of the Central 
Bank Law of 1966, 80% of Central Bank profits must be transferred to 
the government, which means that only the remaining 20% may be added 
to the capital of the Bank. Lately, however, the law has been amended 
so that all Central Bank profits must be transferred to the government.1 
Given that most government expenditure is directed towards consumption, 
usually in the form of salaries and wages, the expansionary effect of 
this policy cannot be underestimated.
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While the majority of the receipts from the investment income 
account constitutes interest on Jordanian foreign assets abroad, the 
outflow has been mainly in the form of interest on foreign loans 
received by Jordan. As can be seen in Table 4.8, during 1967-1974 
over 71% of the payments were of this form. The table further indiaates 
that large increases in interest payments occurred during periods in 
which profits and dividend payments for long term investment remained 
small and stable. This structure of investment payments indicates 
two important phenomena: first, the small size of private long-term 
foreign investment and second, the increase in the burden of government 
loans.
Table 4.8: Payments for investment income, 1967-1974 (in thousand JD)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Interest 0.25 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.76 0.84 0.77 1.50
Profits and dividends 0.57 0.58 0.46 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.49 0.61
Totals 0.82 0.90 0.81 0.65 0.98 1.05 1.26 2.11
Source: Royal Scientific Society, Economic Development of Jordan. 1967- 
1974, Amman (1974), p. 33 (arabic). ~ --------
Information on the level and composition of foreign investment in 
Jordan is not available. The low level of profit payments however, is 
evidence of the limited role which direct foreign investment has played 
in the Jordanian economy. This is not due to the lack of policy measures 
to encourage private foreign investors, but mainly to the lack of 
attractive investment opportunities. Apart from its general adherence 
to a liberal trade and economic policy, the government did offer generous
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privileges in its 1955 legislation and subsequently in 1967 and 1972, 
in order to attract private foreign investment.^ Despite these 
privileges the inflow of foreign investment has been very small 
indeed. Table 4.9 shows that the inflow of long term investment was 
tiny until 1975 and 1976, when a large increase occurred.
Table 4.9: The inflow of private foreign investment, 1964-1976 
fin JD mil lion 1
Year Value
1964 0.79
1965 0.25
1966 0.31
1967 0.10
1968 0.06
1969 0.80
1970 0.00
Year Value
1971 0.05
1972 0.00
1973 0.16
1974 0.96
1975 7.37
1976 5.19
Source:1 .Central Bank of Jordan,Some Statistics Pertaining to the Jordanian 
Economy (1974).
2.Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
The recent increase, however, does not reflect a change in the 
general trend. First, it is the result of the Lebanese civil war,
pwhich damaged Beirut as a regional commercial and banking centre.
Secondly, it is mostly concentrated in the financial and commercial 
sector, thus serving to increase the already over-large services sector ', 
in the economy. Thirdly, the increase is likely-to disappear given
f
relatively stable political conditions in Beirut, and is not likely^
tto repeat itself. ‘ 12
1. Y. Shekuara, The .Importance of Economic Incentivps -in , .
entlftc Scoeity. ftiii,an (July la/6), pp. 26-53 Royal Scl'
privileges have taken the form of taxfree imports6 i^nmp +Thes?,
and full rights to transfer the capital and profits co e ta* allowances2. In the first six months of 1976 about 50 comnan-Le _  . x
in Amman. - U C0mpanies registered offices
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Apart from a lack of current investment opportunities, the reason
for the small inflow of direct investment may be found in the nature of
international private investment in the post-war period.1 Direct
foreign investors have been shown to be interested in investment in
the developing countries chiefly when there are opportunities to
2
exploit natural or human resources. In addition to the degree of 
profitability, they tend to be influenced by the degree of political 
stability of the countries concerned. Given the lack of natural 
resources, coupled with the general political instability in the Middle 
East area, the inflow of private foreign investment may be expected to 
be small despite the prevailing liberal trade policy and the attractive 
benefits provided by successive government laws.
While the small share of profits and dividends can be explained 
by the low level of private direct investment, the increase in interest 
payments is the result of an increase in the humber of governmental 
loans contracted. The extent to which these payments can be described 
as a burden on the economy, depends on the way in which the original 
contractual loans were spent.
Although foreign aid has played an important role in determining 
the level and pattern of development in Jordan, foreign loans, being a 
small proportion of the overall aid, made only a limited contribution.
l Over 75$ of American investment abroad in 1975 was concentrated in 
the developed countries. Further, out of the 25$ invested in the dev- 
eloDinq countries, 57$ was in the oil producing countries. See R.David 
RelliV 'Capital expenditures by majority owned affiliates of U.S.
Snrvev of Current Business, March 1977. British foreign 
investment has shown the same patternT In 1975 out of £10,117,800 out­
ward investment, only 23$ was directed to the developing countries and 
+hP maior amount was concentrated in western Europe and North America. See 
Trade and Industry, February 1977 , _p. 528. . _ . _
T — See Xenophon' Zolotas: Monetary Equilibrium and Economic Development, 
Princeton University Press (1965), p. 132. See also P. Barran and P."-  
Sweezy: Monopoly Capital, Penguin, (1970), p. 110.
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However, the value of contracted loans increased from JD 10.8 million 
in 1960 to more than JD 64.5 million in 1972 and to JD 100.5 million 
in 1976. For political and economic reasons however, most of these loans 
have been used to finance transportation, communication and other 
service industries. Sakit's1 2 study of foreign loans in Jordan has 
shown that over 60% of the inflow of loans was absorbed by these 
services, while agriculture and manufacturing industries obtained 
only a very small share (5.3% and 1.8% respectively). Needless to say, 
such a distribution of foreign loans has not improved the country's 
trade deficit, for these loans were neither directed towards import 
substitution nor towards export promotion. Thus, despite the notable 
role they have played in improving Jordan's infrastructure, the net 
impact of loans on the economy has been to further the balance of 
payments burden.
Economists often measure this burden by relating the amortization
and interest payments to the total exports of a country. Using this
measure, Jordan's burden of debt does not seem to be high, especially
in comparison with other developing countries. Despite an increase from
one percent in 1965 to over.5.8% in 1974, this burden is still small
when compared with (for example) Israel (17), Syria (11.2) or Egypt 
2
(25.1). Although this ratio is useful as a convenient indicator of 
the actual pressure imposed on the balance of payments by contracted 
foreign loans, in the Jordanian case it does underestimate the actual 
and potential pressures of foreign debt on the economy. The reasons for
1. Bassam Saket: 'Foreign Aid to Jordan', unpublished Ph.D Thesis
University of Keele, 1976, p. 173. *
2. IBRD Annual Report, Washington DC (1972), p. 82.
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Table 4.10: Debt service as percentage of exports of goods and 
~ services, in Jordan, 1965-1976
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Debt service to 
total exports 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.8 3.0 3.5
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974
Debt service to 
total exports 7.8 7.3 6.3 5.8
Source: (1) World Bank, Annual Report, 1972, Washington DC (1972), p. 82.
(2) World Bank, Annual Report, 1976, Washington DC (1976), p. 105.
this belief are that most of Jordan's foreign loans were contracted in the 
1960s with an average maturity then of 26.7 years. Payments are therefore 
not yet due and this depressed the potential burden on the balance of pay­
ments as indicated by the present debt service level. Thus, although the 
problem of debt servicing has not arisen in the past, in the near future 
most of the contracted loans will fall due and foreign exchange will be 
required for repayments.
The second important point about the foreign loans figure is that they 
exclude foreign loans obtained from private enterprise in the form of pur­
chase of government bonds, and loans contracted by the Ministry of Defence. 
The classification of government bonds does not allow for any segregation of 
the figures between foreign owners and Jordanians. However, almost 40% of 
these bonds and securities are owned by foreign commercial banks and insur­
ance companies. This debt is regarded as domestic debt, although foreign 
banks are allowed to transfer their profits to their point of origin and 
hence the bonds held by these banks represent foreign liabilities on the 
balance of payments. It is therefore necessary to include these payments 
for amortization and interest on bonds held by non-residents in Jordan,
' as part of the debt services. Once again the impact of this on the
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economic development of the country and on the balance of payments, 
depends on the way in which they are utilised. It will become apparent 
in Chapter Seven that government bonds and securities are used as a 
source of finance for current government expenditure rather than as a 
monetary instrument for open market operations. The expansionary 
impact of such a process is further magnified by the fact that they 
represent a source of finance for consumption rather than for productive 
investment.
As for military loans: for obvious reasons data is not available. 
However, it is believed that these have increased considerably, esp­
ecially after 1967. This is evidenced by the increase in government 
payments abroad which are included in the item 'Government n.i.e.' in 
the balance of payments. This item usually includes government payments 
for its diplomatic missions abroad. In practice, however, payments for 
defence loans are included in this item and have inflated the figure 
from an average of JD 1.8 million in the period 1964-1967 to over JD 
13.8 million in 1968. Obviously this increase is larger than the 
normal payments for diplomatic missions abroad could account for and 
can only be explained as an increase in payments of military short and 
medium term loans.^
Although the above information does not provide an alternative 
real indicator, it does indicate that the debt service ratio under­
estimates the debt burden on the economy. In fact it could be argued 
that given the small level of Jordanian exports, coupled with the con­
sumption-encouraging nature of these loans, the debt burden on the
1. Vide Table 4.11 on page 169.
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Table 4.11: Government transactions as shown 
(in JD million] in the balance of. .payments 1964-197,
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Payments 1.49 1.62 2.06 1.80 13.81 29.2411.29 5.12 5.28 10.26
Receipts 1.11 1.94 1.74 4.50 6.34 10.0011.863.67 1.40 2.03
1974 1975 1976
Payments 12.65 14.68 27.57
Receipts 2.02 5.91 5.67
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pertaining to some aspects of 
the Jordanian economy (October 1974),.and.Central Bank of Jordan, 
Monthly Sul1etin (August 1977), Table 14.
economy is very high indeed, even when compared with other developing 
countries. Exports of agricultural commodities and phosphates are 
likely to fluctuate while debit payment obligations remain contractually 
fixed. Theoretically, the implication of this condition is that the 
country must either reduce its imports, or use its foreign exchange 
resources, or continue to borrow in order to finance the balance of 
payments deficit and the debt payments.
In Jordan the burden of debt servicing is furthered by the large 
inflow of imports, especially as industry and agriculture still con­
stitute only a small proportion of production. Import requirements 
such as food, fuel (or energy sources) and machinery cannot be drastic­
ally curtailed, but they can be decreased if optimal methods of production 
are adopted.
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Summary
Analysis of Jordan's invisible surplus has so far shown that 
despite the short term positive effect of invisibles on the balance 
of payments, their overall long term impact on economic development 
has been minimal. It is evident that there is an incompatibility 
between the impact of the surplus on economic development and the 
overall objectives of Jordanian planning. On the one hand, as planners 
have made clear, in successive development plans, Jordan's economic 
problem lies in the imbalanced structure of its industrial and trade 
patterns; on the other hand, the invisible surpluses essentially 
created by the tourist industry, investment income and spectacularly 
by remittances from Jordanians working abroad (to be discussed in 
Chapter Five), have indirectly reinforced this imbalanced structure 
and helped to further widen the trade gap.
In the tourist sector, despite the notable increase of foreign 
exchange earnings, the positive impact was reduced by the increase in 
imports generated by the industry itself. The widespread belief that 
tourism could be the leading economic sector and the answer to Jordan's 
economic problems has been discussed and rejected on the grounds of 
very weak sectoral linkages and the consequent negative impact on 
regional development. Despite the increase in money income from tourism, 
it has been shown that nevertheless the population continues to move 
from rural to urban centres.
Investment incane, although less volatile, has also grown markedly 
to represent an important part of total earnings. Orthodox analysis 
considers that a surplus of investment income has a beneficial influence 
on economic development and is a favourable indicator of economic
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performance. Nevertheless this chapter has shown that, although this 
may apply in the case of developed countries, it need not be the case 
for a small developing country like Jordan. Examination of the sources 
of this income, and the ways in which it has been used has shown how it 
has contributed to, and reinforced, serious weaknesses in the Jordanian
economy in the following ways:-
a) The investment surplus originated in the high level of interest 
receipts on Jordanian foreign assets. These, however, were the result 
of the aid inflow rather than domestic economic performance.
b) The low dividends paid on foreign investments simply represents the 
absence of long term private foreign investment in the country's 
economic development.
c) The debt burden in Jordan has been seriously under-estimated and the 
analysis clearly demonstrates that the actual debt burden is much 
higher than the balance of payments figures tend to indicate.
To complete the analysis of causes of the invisible surplus, 
remittances of Jordanians working abroad must now be fully examined.
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Appendix __
Reliability of the Information on Invisible Trade in Jordan
Up to the present there are no accurate estimates for the 
remittances of Jordanians working abroad, or for income from tourism.
The reason for the shortage of information on these important items of 
invisible trade lies in the methods used in compiling the balance of 
payments. As is the case in most countries, the Central Bank is res­
ponsible for the balance of payments calculation. However, the Bank 
depends for all its information on sources other than its own. While 
visible trade figures are obtained from the Department of Statistics, 
other items such as invisibles and long term capital are estimated from 
the foreign exchange record of the Central Bank. The latter, however, 
provides information only on those transactions which occur within the 
official financial system. Given that a large proportion of transactions 
are contracted outside the official market (i.e. through sarraffeen), 1 
certain adjustments to the foreign exchange records are necessary before 
including them in the balance of payments. In practice, however, these 
adjustments are subject to the value judgements of the balance of pay­
ments compilers rather than to a systematic estimate. The table over­
leaf shows how the figures presented in the foreign exchange record 
underestimate transactions in the visible and invisible trade. This 
table also reveals how balance of payments figures are not consistent 
when compared with foreign exchange records, so reflecting the lack of 
coherence in the methods of estimation. In some years the remittances 
figure is the same as in the foreign exchange record while in other years 
the balance of payments compilers have adjusted the figure. This problem of 
reliability of data as shown above, creates numerous difficulties in any 
assessment of the precise contribution of invisibles- to the'overall 
balance of Dayments.
1. Private foreign exchange dealers in Jordan, see Chapters 6 and 7.
Table - Appendix : Receipts of foreign exchange as shown_in the balance of payments and the foreign exchange
record (in JO Million)
Source 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
B E B E ..... .. B. . . E B E B E
Visible exports 12.2 5.9 11.4 3.0 17.1 4.9 18.9 9.6 49.7 29.4
Travel 4.8 2.4 6.3 0.6 88.3 0.2 10.6 0.5 17.2 0.5
Oil transit dues
cn•O 0.9 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.1 5.5 3.4 1.3 1.2
Investment income
00•10 00•CO 5.7 5.7 4.4 4.4 6.3 6J3 8.8 8.8
Remittances from 
Jordanians working 
abroad
5.5 4.7 4.9 4.5 10.9 7.4 14.7 14.7 24.2 19.7
Government 11.8 11.8 3.6 3.6 1.4 1.4 2.0 '‘ 1.5 2.0 2.0
Others 2.! 2.1 5.1 2.3 6.7 10.9 33.4 19.4 11.1 25.1
Totals 44.1 34.6 : 40.4 23.1 51.9 32.2 76.8 61.7 114.4 86.7
B = Balance of payments E = Foreign exchange record
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1973 and January 1976).
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CHAPTER FIVE; THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MIGRANTS* REMITTANCE
As has already been indicated in Chapter Four, the inflow of 
funds through repatriated earnings from Jordanian nationals working 
abroad is the most significant of all Jordan's invisible exports.
While Kindieberger1 argued that this source of export earnings is 
superior to ordinary exports on the grounds that there are no pre­
cedent payments to spill over to imports, the following analysis will 
show that remittances from Jordanians working abroad have recently 
been a phenomenon with serious domestic implications for both imports 
and economic development as a whole.
Between 1960 and 1976, as Table 5.1 reveals, remittances accounted 
for more than one third of invisible exports. Moreover, despite the 
decline which occurred during the political disturbances of 1967-1971, 
the rate of growth for the period 1961-1976 exceeded 21% per annum. 
Although this overall figure was influenced by the greater inflow 
during the closing period 1973-1976, when the per annum percentages 
were successively 98, 69, 120 and 115% this was due to the new economic 
and political conditions in Jordan, the host oil producing countries 
and in the international economy. After the political disturbances 
of 1967 and 1971, Jordan enjoyed a relatively stable economic and 
political climate. In the oil producing countries, the increase in
o
oil prices after 1973, reflected an increase in the revenues of these 
states and resulted in an economic boom. At the international level,
1. Kindleberger:'Emigration and Economic Growth' 
Rome, September 1965, p, 247. Banca Nazionale delLavoro,
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Table 5.1: Remittances of Jordanians working abroad (in JD million)
Year Value Percentage
change
Ratio
Exports
to:
Invisibles
I9601 6.24 158 47
1961 5.25 -16 100 34
1962 6.20 18 105 34
1963 6.17 -1 94 33
1964 9.30 49 106 38
1965 9.10 -2 99 38
1966 10.61 16 102 53
1967 6.60 -38 58 26
1968 4.10 -38 29 17
1969 6.90 78 47 22
1970 5.50 -20 45 17
1971 4.90 -11 42 17
1972 7.40 51 43 22
1973 14.70 98 61 28
1974 24.90 69 50 38
1975 53.25 120 n o 31
1976 114.41 115 172 50
Source: See Statistical Appendix 3 on p. 363.
inflation, reflected in unstable monetary conditions, resulted in a 
decline in the value of the main convertible currencies. All these 
factors interacted to produce a particularly high increase in the 
remittances of Jordanians working abroad during 1973-1976 (see Figure 
5.1).
The new conditions coupled with the above mentioned large increase 
in the remittances, have raised the possibility of this source of
1. No detailed information is available for the years before 1960.
JD
 M
ill
io
n
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Source: Appendix 3.
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income being a substitute for foreign aid.* 1 As Clark remarked in her 
report on migration 'economically Jordan has relied heavily upon 
external support in the past . . .  This pattern too, has radically 
changed since the volume of workers' remittances from abroad has 
become a new and major support for government financial stability'.2 
—  However, the balance of payments figures for 1976 show for the first 
time that in that year there was a remittance outflow of JD 4.8 million 
from non-Jordanian nationals who work in Jordan. This phenomenon
i
clearly necessitates a more detailed analysis of the remittances of
Jordanians working abroad, together with an analysis of migration
patterns and their domestic economic impact.
It is important to note at the outset that although the widespread
migration of labour has been one of the outstanding characteristics of
Middle Eastern economic development, it has not yet been subjected to
rigorous economic analysis, whereas elsewhere its importance is widely 
3recognized. In fact neither the host nor the labour exporting countries
have given this subject the attention it deserves.
So far as Jordan is concerned, accurate assessment of the impact of
migration on domestic economic development is hindered by lack of
I information. Information on who migrates, to which countries and their
.! occupations both before and after departure is not known. Such data 
| v 
would throw light upon the effect of migration on demographic structure
; and the labour force - its effect on the distribution of skills and
f 1. Balance of payments statistics in 1976 have shown that the amount of 
! remittances (136.41 million) has exceeded total inflow of aid (127.85 
million). See Central Bank, of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
! 2 . Joan Clark: Jordan a Labor Receiver - A Labor Supplier, Dept, of
i State Agency for“ International Development, Washington DC (;Sept. 1977), p.
; 3. C. Sinclair and J. S. Birks: Towards Planned Migration in the Middle 
! East, International Migration Project, uept. of Economics, UnivVs7ty"of~ 
"Durham, n.d., p. 3.
- 180 -
upon patterns of production and consumption. It would also indicate 
earnings levels of emigrants and their relation to repatriated earnings. 
In general, however, the wage level of the migrants' country of origin 
is lower than that of the country to which migrants .go. The destination 
of migrants is also important in determining whether migration is likely 
to be permanent or transitory, as the effects on the country of origin 
are different in each case. The jobs they go to and have come from 
are likely to be crucial information, as it indicates whether migrants 
are acquiring new training or are just unskilled workers abroad.
As direct information on these matters is not available, the 
following paragraphs will attempt to briefly outline the costs and the 
benefits of migration to the economic development of Jordan, using 
indirect data.
Emigration and immigration have been more or less a permanent
feature of the Jordanian economy since the second world war. The
creation of Israel in 1948 led to the influx of a large number of
refugees creating a situation of both underemployment and unemployment.
The incoming refugees created a reservoir of foot-loose labour, a
significant proportion of which were educated and skilled. With the
increase in the wealth of the neighbouring oil producing Arab countries
»
Jordan became a supplier of labour, both skilled and unskilled, to 
these countries. Historically during the course of economic develop­
ment it is the agricultural sector which has served as the reservoir of 
labour for the non-agricultural sector - a process which has been 
discussed by Lewis. However, all of the Arab oil-producing countries, 
with the exception of Iraq, are heavily under-populated. Iraq too is 
under-populated in relation to its resources. As a result, Jordan and
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other countries such as India, Pakistan and Egypt, are performing the 
same function vis-a-vis oil-producing countries which the agricultural 
sector did in other economies. There is, however, an important 
difference: labour exporting countries not only export unskilled labour 
like the agricultural sector but also skilled labour.
No comprehensive statistical information on this movement of 
labour is at present available. Nonetheless, there is some information 
which enables us to make statements about the pattern and the effect of 
the migration of labour.
The importance of migrant labour in the recipient countries varies 
from one country to another. One can, however- detect general features 
by looking at specific cases. In Kuwait for example, in 1975 over 522 
of the population of Kuwait were non-Kuwaitis, compared with 452 in 
1957. As can be seen in Table 5.2, the population during the period 
1957-1975 increased at an annual average rate of 20.12, the largest 
proportion of which.was accounted for by non-Kuwaitis.
Table 5.2: Population of Kuwait by nationality
Year Kuwaitis Non-Kuwaitis Total
Thousands 2 Thousands 2 Thousands
1957 114 55 92 45 206
1961 162 51 160 49 321
1965 220 47 247 53 467
1970 346 47 387 53 733
1975 472 47 523 53 995
Annual 
rate of
(16.5) (24.6) (20.1)
growth
1957-1975
Source: (T) Mu] lakh, 1
■i n Vllutai + Pan' Economic Development and Regional -
, ,, - --------- r — • -«.u u i b s , cmcago (1968)Table 13.
(2) Birkes, S. and Sinclair, Country Case sturivi Kuwait, Part 1, 
International Migration Project, bept. of Economics, Uni vers ilv"of 
Durham (July 1977), p; 3.
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The rate of increase in Kuwaiti citizens is clearly higher than 
can be accounted for by natural increase alone. This difference is 
explained by the fact that some migrants remained in Kuwait and obtained 
Kuwaiti citizenship. This pattern is similar to that in all* oil 
producing countries, and in some cases the weight of immigrant labour 
is even greater. In Abu Dhabi, for example, the total population 
reached 70,000 in 1972 compared with only 17,000 in 1961. Naturally, 
a very large part of this increase camefrom the inflow of migrants.1
In fact the figures which are given here underestimate the economic 
importance of immigrant labour in recipient countries. The reason is 
that the native population includes both those who participate in the 
labour market and those who do not or alternatively those who are 
economically active and those who are not. In contrast, the immigrant 
population, at least in the first instance, largely consists of the 
economically active. As a result, one would expect the ratio of 
economically active immigrant population to total economically active 
population to be significantly higher than the ratio of immigrants to 
total population.
What these figures indicate is that oil-producing Arab countries 
will remain dependent on immigrant labour. The reason being that the 
weight of immigrant labour is so great that it would be impossible for 
the native labour to ever replace immigrant labour. Furthermore, the 
present pace of economic activities in those countries makes it likely 
that their dependence on immigrant labour will tend to increase rather 
than decrease. In fact, development plans in these countries indicate 
an expansion of the demand for foreign labour. Saudi Arabian economic
1. Fred Hal 1iday: Arabia Without Sultans, Pelican, London (1975), p. 452.
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planners, for example, have predicted a need for half a million foreign
workers during the implementation of the Saudi Five Year Plan (1976-
1980). This is, of course, in addition to the national plans of other
oil producing countries.1 However, the attitude of labour importing
countries towards immigrant labour remains ambiguous. By and large the
import of labour is on an ad hoc basis and. subject to conflicting
factors rather than an organised and comprehensive policy. To some
extent importing countries unrealistically regard_the use of immigrant
labour as a temporary and transitory phenomenon, as is indicated by their
reluctance to grant citizenship to immigrants. In fact, a number of
countries, e.g. Kuwait, have in recent years made it even more difficult
for immigrants to acquire citizenship.
Not all Jordanians abroad are workers in the oil-producing Arab
countries. The Multipurpose Household Survey conducted in 1975 shows
that only about 34.5% of Jordanians abroad are working in oil producing
countries, the remainder being either migrants undergoing further
education in Egypt, Syria, England and Eastern Europe, or migrants in
countries like West Germany, Italy and the United States, where it
2
is possible to combine work and study. The respective impact on the 
Jordanian economy of these two groups is of course different. Those 
who migrate for education..purposes represent a long term investment
•I,
with.uncertain returns and may be, under certain assumptions, evaluated
in terms of the economics of education. The most important group as
!
I *2
1 C. Sinclair and J. S. Birks: An evaluation of patterns and process 
of■ labour movement. International Migration Project, Dept', of Economics, 
University oi Durhsm} n.i!.* P* o*
2. Department of Statistics, Household Multipurpose Survey. Amman (1976), 
p. 5, (arabic). .
\
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far as this thesis is concerned are those who are working in the oil
producing countries, since it is this group which is and which will
continue to be the main source of remittances.
The number of Jordanians working abroad is as yet unknown, and
speculative estimates vary widely. The Jordanian Ministry of Labour
estimated the number at between 200-250 thousands. The Department of
Statistics has also published an estimate for net outward emigration for
the period of 1965-1975 - 402.00oJ Other estimates go as high as
800,000. These figures reflect the lack of proper information about
the outflow of migrants and indicate the need for care in drawing any
specific and quantitative conclusion. The most recent estimate,
however, is the one which was presented by Prince Hassan at the
International Labour Conference, which put the number as equal to one
2
third of Jordan's labour force. This would make the number of workers
3
abroad only 114,000 at the end of 1975. The direct effect of migration 
in 1975 alone .has been to lower the labour force from 19 percent of 
the total population to 13.3 percent. Despite
their diversity, what is significant about these figures is the magnitude 
of migration from Jordan. Thus, emigration is not just one of the 
factors which has some effect on the structure and the development 
in the Jordanian economy, indeed it is arguably the most important 
factor. 1*3
1. Clark: op. cit..(September 1977), p. 10.
2 International Labou^  Conference Provisional Record, ILO, Geneva, 63rd
3. f^Isj?gu re can’be*reached from the.labour force of Jordan which was 
estimated in 1975 to be 384,000 out of 1.9 million total population.
- 185 -
In order to analyse the effect of the export of labour on the economy, 
one should distinguish between two kinds of effects, namely, i)the 
effect on the composition of the labour force and population and ii) 
the 'income effects' of the earnings of the exported labour on the 
exporting country. It is only the second set of effects which are 
registered in the balance of payment accounts and even that is restricted 
to registering the effects of repatriated earnings on foreign exchange 
reserves.
As far as the first set of effects is concerned the important 
point is that since international migration consists of the migration 
of the economically active, the immediate implication is that the export 
of labour decreases the ratio of economically active to total population 
in the exporting country and conversely it increases the ratio in the 
importing country. Apart from its impact on consumption (as will be 
seen later) migration not only effects the relative and absolute size 
of the labour force but also the composition of the labour force, 
because it is not evenly spread over the various categories of labour.
To start with,importing countries discriminate in favour of certain 
categories of labour, in particular skilled labour; and secondly skilled 
labour due to a number of factors, e.g. urbanisation, attitude towards 
migration, is relatively more mobile than unskilled labour. In general, 
one may argue that migration changes the composition of the labour 
force by increasing the relative weight of unskilled labour. This is 
borne out by the Multipurpose Household Survey of 1977 which revealed 
that over 50% of the Jordanians working abroad are highly skilled (see 
Table 5.3 below).
The educational level of workers abroad is another indicator for
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Tahlp 5.3: Occupational distribution of
%
Engineers 2.3
Doctors 1.1
Chemists 0.9
Medical nurses 0.9
Accountants 3.8
Teachers 10.8
Administrators 2.9
Tailors 1.5
Blacksmiths and metal workers 3.9
Workers with mechanical skills 14.5
Construction workers 2.4
Drivers 1.9
Other occupations 47.8
100.0
Source* Department of Statistics, The Multipurpose Household Survey, Amman, 
(1976).
the degree of migrants' skills. As shown in Table 5.4, most Jordanians 
working abroad have had some sort of high school education and a good 
proportion of them hold university degrees. The table reveals very 
interesting and important phenomena, namely that while the proportion 
of educated Jordanians abroad to the total number of workers abroad is 
very high, the proportion of educated people to the total population 
inside Jordan is very low indeed. This phenomenon not only indicates 
that Jordanians working abroad are mainly skilled labour but also 
indicates the nature of the educational system in Jordan. This subject 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is mentioned here because of its 
importance to the migration process. It raises the question of 
whether the education system in Jordan has been established to serve the
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Table 5.4: Percentage distribution, In and outside Jordan, according to 
educational qualification? " 2
Level of Education % of % of
Jordanians Jordanians
abroad inside Jordan
Less than elementary 8.3 70.2
Less than preparatory 15.1 17.9
Less than high school 7.1 6.1
High school 55.4 11.0
Diploma 3.7 0.7
BA, BSc 7.8 1.0
MA, MSc 1.6 0.01
Postgraduate diploma 0.2 0.05
Doctorate 0.1 0.02
Source: Household Survey, op. cit., (1976), p. 9.
needs of the oil-producing countries or to meet the requirements of 
the development of Jordan Itself.
Economists argue that migration may 1n the long run increase the 
labour force of the developing countries. The justification for this 1s 
that new attitudes to employment will be created and the rate of 
participation of female labour may increase to compensate for the 
reduction of migrated labour.^ There is no evidence for such a trend 
in Jordan. In fact It is possible that the ratio of participation 
has declined because some of the previously employed wives either stopped 
working and became dependent upon the remittances of their husbands, or 
joined them abroad after a period of time. In this connection the 1976 
survey estimated the participation rate as being 4.1% compared with 2.8% in 
1961. Although the percentage has increased, in absolute terms the 
incrèase is a fraction compared with the loss through migration.
1. S. Paine: Exporting Workers.The Turkish Case, Occasional PaDer 41, 
Cambridge University Press (l9?4), p. 39.
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It would seem that, given the present level of socio-economic 
development in Jordan, cultural rather than economic factors govern 
the participation of women in the labour force. In fact if it can be 
assumed that female labour participation is inversely related to the 
level of family income, then the export of labour from Jordan to the 
countries where wages are higher should lead to a decrease in the level 
of female participation. The level of female participation especially 
in urban areas will gradually increase over time, not because of the export 
of labour but due to an increase in the education of women and changes in 
attitudes towards the employment of women.
The extent to which migration has created bottlenecks in the labour 
market is not precisely known. However, it is the case that in the 
pre-1973 period there was little shortage of skilled labour and 
labour in general in Jordan. Migration was blessed by the government 
on the grounds that it would solve the unemployment problem and that 
remittances from workers abroad would help to finance development and 
reduce the balance of payments deficit.
The situation changed drastically after 1973 and migration's 
negative impact on the labour market was severely felt. The reasons 
for this can be summarised as follows:
(a) A large increase in government expenditure inside Jordan, aimed 
at reducing the rate of unemployment.
(b) The increase in the oil revenues of the oil producing countries at 
this time produced accelerated economic expansion in these countries and 
furthered the demand for skilled and unskilled labour.
(c) The period 1973-1976 witnessed a high rate of inflation in Jordan.
Of the causes of this inflation, as it will be shown later, remittances 
stand as one important factor.
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(d) As a result of the above factors, the rate of migration increased 
during this period and according to the Department of Statistics the 
number of people who left the country increased from 460,000 in 1973 
to reach 715,000 in 1976.
Jordan thus witnessed a severe shortage of labour from 1973 onwards.
This was made clear by the Jordanian planners when they stated in the
Five Year Development Plan (1976-1981) that 'the demand for skilled
labour has become more pressing in the last few years'J Evidence for
this shortage can be seen also from the increasing number of advertised 
o
jobs. Advertisements for jobs are an important index of labour shortages, 
as labour tends usually to be recruited on a casual and informal basis.
Indeed, the shortage of domestic labour has altered labour con­
ditions to the level that Jordan has in turn become one of the labour 
importing countries. Information on the inflow of labour is no easier 
to obtain that its outflow counterpart, and is when obtained 'particularly
3
unreliable'. However, Ministry of Labour figures show that there 
were about 25,000 foreign workers employed in Jordan in 1975 and the 
figure rose to 60,000 in 1976. It is believed that about 60% of these 
workers are employed in the construction sector, 30% in agriculture and
4
10% in industry. It is clear from the above information that immigrant 
labour in Jordan is restricted to a few sectors. Their concentration in
1. National Planning Council, Five Year Plan (1976-1981)»Amman, n.d. p. 341
2. A study made recently by the National Planning Council shows that 
the number of advertised jobs increased from 2,953 in 1974 to 4,930 in 
1975. Further over 80% of these advertised jobs can be classified as 
advertisements for skilled jobs. See National Planning Council " 
unpublished survey of advertised jobs (1976), arabic.
3. Joan Clark: op. cit., p. 9, some extreme and overestimated figures 
ranged between half a million and a million workers.
4. J. Annani, Recent development in Jordan, Arab report,'Middle East 
Moneyj Memo, Vol. 24, London and Paris (October 3, 1977), p. 13.'
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the construction sector, however, can be connected with the emigration 
of labour in the sense that it is the repatriated earnings which were 
partially responsible for the construction boom in Jordan. The extent 
to which this inflow of foreign workers satisfied the demand for labour 
is not clear. However, it is the case that Jordan still has a severe 
shortage of labour. This shortage of labour, however, is not evenly 
spread over different sectors. As far as manufacturing industry is 
concerned certain key 'industries are experiencing difficulties in 
obtaining sufficient workers despite the inflow of foreign labour. They 
have provided training and increased pay scales . . .  but they have 
not overcome the problem'.^
In the agricultural sector, despite the high level of under-t
employment, a labour shortage nevertheless occurs during the harvest
season. These shortages were caused not solely by emigration abroad,
but also by internal migration from rural to urban areas. However, it
would be wrong to under-estimate the indirect impact of external
emigration. In practice farmers may migrate to the cities as a first
stage before they migrate to the oil producing countries. Nevertheless,
the agricultural sector suffered less than manufacturing due to the
under-employment of farmers. Joan Clark's study noted that 'In
the agricultural sector, the government projections show shortages but
these, given the availability of foreign labour, may be overcome more 
2
readily'. Further the Five Year Plan predicted that this sector would
1. Ibid., p. 13
2. Joan Clark: op. cit., p. 5.
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take care of itself in the future because most of the demand is 
concentrated in the 'semi or unskilled jobs'.^
Thus, despite the new inflow of foreign workers, the Jordanian 
economy experienced a severemanpower shortage up to 1976. The main 
reason for this was the fact that substitution was not compatible. 
Jordanian migrants were mainly skilled labour while the inflow of 
foreign workers was mainly of unskilled -labour. Apart from the impli­
cations of this trend which may be reflected in a loss in output, 
there may be a waste of resources in providing training to these foreign 
immigrants. In practice, foreign migrants go to Jordan as a transitory 
stage before they remigrate to the oil producing countries. They 
obtain training in Jordan and wait for better opportunities in those 
countries. This is to be expected. Firstly due to the fact that 
wages in Jordan are much lower than wages in the oil-producing countries. 
Secondly, foreign labourers in Jordan in general receive much lower 
wages than their Jordanian counterparts. It has been estimated that 
the average level of wages for foreign labourers is half the average 
level of their Jordanian counterparts. This is not only due to the 
fact that they are unskilled, but also to the fact that a foreign 
worker receives a lower wage than a Jordanian for the same kind of work.
In analysing the effect on economic development of this continuous 
shortage of labour resulting from emigration, one may distinguish 
between short-term and long-term effects. The short-term effects 
are clear enough at least in qualitative terms; higher wage rates, 
shortages of skilled labour, migration from rural to urban areas, part­
icularly to Amman. The long-term effects will depend upon a number of
1. National Planning Council, Jordan Development Conference': 'Labour 
forces in Jordan', No. JDC 76/5 (1976), p. 15.
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other factors. In particular long-term effects will depend on how 
employers react to the shortage of labour in the sense of adopting 
more labour saving techniques and secondly, whether the emigration is 
permanent or transitory.
Whether emigration is permanent or transitory depends on two 
distinct sets of factors; socio-economic changes in Jordan and those in 
the countries which import labour. As far as the labour importing 
countries are concerned, it has already been mentioned that their 
attitudes towards foreign labour is far from clear. This is demonstrated 
by the fact that it is still difficult for foreign labour to acquire 
the nationality of the host countries even after a very long stay. 
Further, in recent years oil-producing Arab countries have made it 
even more difficult for foreign workers to acquire nationality. This 
means that Jordanians working abroad maintain strong emotional and 
family links with Jordan. It is the latter which is ultimately res­
ponsible for repatriation of earnings to Jordan. The unwillingness 
of the importing countries to socially and economically absorb foreign 
labour also implies that if wages in Jordan were comparable to those 
in the oil countries, a large number of Jordanians working abroad would 
return to the country. One may, therefore, argue that emigration 
remains transitory because labour importing countries have not so far 
been willing to absorb foreign labour as inhabitants of the country. 
Obviously, this situation may change in the future and a permanent 
migration substitute the previously transitory one.
Although Jordanians working abroad benefit individually, emigration 
results in a distinct disadvantage to the economy as a whole. This is 
because emigrants may ultimately sever their links with Jordan and 
there will be no reason for them to send part of their earnings back
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to Jordan. In that case repatriation of earnings will be no more than 
a short term phenomenon. The experience of migration from Europe to 
the U.S. is a good example. Migrants from Western European countries 
were fairly quickly absorbed into the U.S. and as a result, immigrants 
into the U.S. severed their economic and social links with their mother 
countries. There is, however, an important difference between the U.S. 
and the Arab oil producing countries. The socio-economic climate in 
the former favoured the absorption of immigrants while no such climate 
exists in the latter.
-ifv-the case where emigration is transitory, the long term effects 
not only depend on the volume of repatriation but also on the skills 
and experience which migrants abroad may acquire. Obviously, such 
skills and experience are only relevant if emigrants are going to 
return during the course of their working life. It is of primary 
importance, however, to ask whether the new training or skills which 
may be acquired by migrants are indeed relevant to the economic develop­
ment of their home country. This is especially important in analysing 
the impact of migration from a developing country like Jordan to another 
developing oil-producing country such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.
To start with, it is important to point out that Jordanians do 
indeed hold relatively skilled jobs in these countries and therefore 
they might be better placed than other migrants or local citizens in 
the host countries. As can be seen clearly from Table 5.5 about 80% of 
Jordanians employed in Kuwait were in skilled jobs in 1975. This may 
be compared with only 35% for the non-Kuwaitis and 65% for the Kuwaitis.
Table 5.5: Employment by occupational groups in Kuwait, 1975
Occupational group Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Jordanians Total
Number % of all Share of 
total
Number % of all Share of 
total
Number % of all Share of 
total
Number % 1
A Professional jobs 
requiring a science 1,050 1.2 10.4 9,001 4.3 89.6 2,545 6.0 25.2 10,061 3.4 '
degree
B Professional jobs
requiring an arts 5,114 5.4 53.9 4,371 2.1 46.1 1,083 3.0 11.4 9,485 3.2
degree
C Technicians requiring 
three years of post 10,234 11.8 28.6 25,522 12.1 71.4 6,838 17.5 19.1 35,761 12.0
secondary education
D Skilled and semi 
skilled office and 21,204 24.5 35.6 38,284 18.1 64.4 10,154 26.5 17.0 59,488 20.0
clerical occupations
E Skilled and semi
skilled manual 10,412 12.0 14.3 62,027 29.4 85.7 10,051 25.8 13.8 72,439 24.3
workers
F Unskilled occupations 38,602 44.6 35.0 71,694 34.0 65.0 8,204 21.2 7.4 110,296 37.1
Totals 86,621 100.0 29.1 210,909 100.0 70.9 38,935 100.0 13.0 297,530 100.
Source: Based on Table 29 in, Birks and Sinclair, Country Case Study: Kuwait, International Migration Project, Dept, of 
Economics, University of Durham (July 197777
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The economic importance of these skills to the Jordanian economy, 
however, depends on the type of economic activities that the migrants 
are engaged in in the host countries.
The economic activities which migrants may undertake stem from 
the economic conditions of their home country and those of the host 
country. In general, however, there is a tendency for the proportion 
of migrants involved in services activities to be higher than those 
involved in the primary sectorJ This is also supported by the employ­
ment pattern of migrants in the oil-producing countries.
The sectoral distribution of GDP and the employment structure in 
a country like Kuwait reveals the type of economic expansion that has 
taken place in the oil-producing countries. As may be seen from 
Table 5.6, the oil industry, which accounted for almost 70% of GDP 
in 1975 absorbs only 1.6% of total employment. On the other hand the 
share of agriculture and manufacturing is still small in relation to 
the GDP and total employment. The largest employer among the economic 
sectors is the services sector. Although there is no reliable inform­
ation on the industrial structure of other oil producing countries, it 
is likely that they are not much different from Kuwait.
If the patterns of employment of Jordanian workers in these 
countries were similar to the general employment structure in these 
countries, then their newly acquired skills may well be irrelevant to 
Jordan's economic development needs. Indeed,it is more likely that 
because of their high level of education and training, Jordanians 
working abroad are providing new skills for the citizens of their host
1. See Stilman Bradfield: 'Some occupational aspects of migration', 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, COctober 1965\ vol. XIV. d d . 
Bl-7'07
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Table 5.6 Sectoral distribution
Agriculture
GDP - 1975
KD % 
million 
4 0.2
Oil and other 
mi ni ng 1,447 68.6
Manufacturing 75 3.5
Construction 21 1.0
Servi ces 664 26.7
Totals 2,111 100.0
Source: Based on Table 11 , Birks
of GDP and employment In Kuwait
Employment 
Yota I - 1975
Non-Kuwaitis' 
- 1975
number share number share
7,514 2.1 3,531 1.7
4,859 1.6 3,080 1.5
24,467 8.2 22,209 10.5
32,256 10.9 30,500 14.4
229,319 76.8 152,124 71.9
298,415 100.0 211,444 100.0
and Si nel air: op. cit., Case Study: K
countries, rather than acquiring new ones. Apart from the small
proportion who are engaged in manufacturing industry and in the oil 
industry, the vast majority of Jordanians work in the services sector.
The over-enlargement of the services sector is, as has been demonstrated, 
the main problem facing Jordan's economic development and the economic 
planners aim to reduce the share of this sector in the GDP of Jordan. 
Furthermore, the very small proportion who are engaged in the oil 
industry are acquiring skills which at present are not relevant to a non­
oil producing country like Jordan, and even these are likely to be not 
directly engaged in the oil industry itself, but within the administration 
aspect of this industry. Indeed it has been noted that for political 
reasons most of the skilled jobs throughout the oil industry have been
confined to those migrants who come from the Western countries rather 
than to Arab migrants.^
1. Fred Halli day: Arabia Without Sultans. Pelican, Q 975), p. 421
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In respect of the question of skills, it is important also to 
note that the governments of the oil countries provide very little 
training for foreign immigrants. A study of the vocational training 
programmes in the Gulf area has shown that in general, access to the 
training centres is restricted to citizens of the Gulf states. In 
1975 only two out of the 55 training centres in the area accepted non­
citizens, the rest having laid down conditions of citizenship as one 
of their entry qualifications (see Table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Training institutions in the Gulf area, 1975
State No. of institutions No. of institutions 
which accept miqrants
Kuwait 25 2
U.A.F. 7 -
Oman 3 •
Bahrain 12 -
Qutar 8 -
Totals 55 2
Source: Based on James A. Suckmit, Human Resources Develonmpnf 
Area, Bahrain (February 19757": ^ ------ r*----- Soin the Gulf
So far it has been shown that althougha few Jordanians working 
abroad may acquire new skills, the jobs they hold are not particularly 
relevant to the Jordanian economy, and that the governments of the 
host countries provide no official training schemes for migrants.
Although there is no statistical evidence to show the incidence 
of Jordanian workers returning to their home country, the general belief 
is that their number is small. In this connection Joan Clark noted
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that 'the Government of Jordan is also looking at the possibility of 
re-absorbing returning Jordanian workers into the domestic labour 
force . . .  A small number have returned after saving enough money to 
build a house or open a business, but large scale return is a hope 
more than an expectation'.1 2 For social and economic reasons, emigrants 
to the oil producing countries tend to return home but only when they 
reach retirement age.
Furthermore, Sinclair and Birks describe migration in the Middle
Eastern countries as follows:
'Migration often begins with single men of prime working • 
age seeking jobs outside their home environment. After 
about a year's work, a return visit is made home before 
another period of work is embarked upon. After a time, the 
duration of stay at the place of work tends to lengthen and 
a reunion between husband and wife begins to take place, 
not in the home country, but in the nation which he works - 
and the transition from migrant to emigrant may follow.
The above pattern of migration is typical in most cases of Jordanian
migrants and the implication for the economy of the home country is not
confined to a shortage of labour and a consequent effect on output.
Migrants' remittances and the way they are spent inside Jordan has to
some extent accelerated the rate of expansion in consumption of imports
and more recently of inflation. The following paragraphs will attempt
to examine the income effect associated with migration.
For the reasons discussed in the preceding pages, remittances of
Jordanians working abroad increased during the period 1960-1976. However,
1. Joan Clark: Op. cit., p. 4.
2. C. Sinclair and J. Birks: 'An evaluation of patterns and processes 
of labour movement. Towards a planned migration in the Middle East', 
Dept, of Economics, University of Durham, undated, p. 6.
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it is important to note that the impact of those remittances on 
economic development depends on whether they are used for production 
or for consumption purposes. While lack of information again inhibits 
empirical verification, there is agreement among students of Jordanian 
economics and also recently among senior Jordanian officials, that the
use of these remittances has been largely for consumption rather than 
investment purposes.^
Given that one third of the labour force (or 6% of the population) 
lives outside Jordan, it is to be expected that migration has the effect 
of a direct reduction in domestic consumption in a proportion similar 
to the proportion of migrants abroad, However, those who are left 
behind increase their consumption because of the remittances of migrant 
workers; also taking into account the fact that the wage levels of 
migrants is higher than those employed in Jordan. Although there is 
no statistical evidence to support the existence of this pattern in 
Jordan, the experience of other countries has shown that the marginal 
propensity to consume from remittances, tends to be higher than that 
from domestically earned income, and it is very likely that this trend 
holds for Jordan. This is because migrants are mainly from among those 
who can be classified as 'low income’ group and for them the main 
purpose of migration is to save some money and repatriate home these 
savings to help in raising the standard of living of their families.3 123
1. Sinclair: 'Remittances are poor return for brain drain losses', The Times, 
11 August, 1977.
2. Paine: op. cit., p. 43. See also Samir Amin: Modern Migration in 
Western Africa, International African Seminar, Dakar, (April 1972) p ; T03.
3. It should be noted that the concept of family in the Arab countries 
includes father, mother, brothers, and sisters as well as husband and 
wife with children.
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It is therefore, to be expected that the remittances will be 
directed chiefly towards consumption. Furthermore, it is demonstrated 
later in this chapter that a large proportion of remittances in 
recent years have been directed towards speculation in land and 
commodities.
As Jordan's production of consumer goods is far below domestic 
demand, most of the newly generated demand will be met through 
imports. Furthermore, it may be argued that the marginal pro­
pensity to import consumer goods out of remittances is higher than 
from indigenous income. This assertion is supported by the fact 
that recepient families have more contact with foreign goods in 
the oil-producing countries; where most imports are almost tax 
free. Migrants, therefore, tend to send their families certain 
special commodities, specifically those which can be classified as 
luxuries. This point was made clear by Elmallak in his assessment 
of the Kuwaiti economy and its impact on the migrants. He mentioned 
that 'The Arabs in turn transmit to their countries of origin 
their recently acquired and diversified tastes, encouraged by 
Kuwait's international outlook and liberal trade policy'.* 1 While 
the 'newly acquired tastes' are blessed in Elmallak's assessment, 
they represent a serious problem to a labour exporting country like 
Jordan, where a large balance of payments deficit makes such tastes 
rather
1. Mullakh, op. cit., (1978), p. 174. '
i
!
l
i
i
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expensive to satisfy. In fact, it could be argued that the increase 
in luxury consumer imports to Jordan has been in part stimulated by 
the migrants' pattern of consumption.
In practice, these newly acquired tastes have transmitted the 
emigrants savings into durable consumption goods such as radios, tele­
visions, watches, etc. Since these goods are bought abroad and brought 
into the country, they do not have a direct effect on the balance of 
payments. However, they do have an indirect effect in the sense that 
these savings would have increased the invisible earnings had there not 
been this transformation described above. Nevertheless remittances may 
have the impact of increasing the overall level of consumption. Apart 
from the consumption pattern of families living on repatriated earnings, 
remittances have a more general effect on the pattern of consumption 
through what is termed a'demonstration effect*. This effect is very 
important, especially in a small developing country like Jordan. Migrants, 
during their annual visit to their home, tend to show their newly 
acquired taste in clothing, or a new type of car they own. They thus 
introduce new consumption habits to the native population. Ironically, 
this situation is promoted by legislation which was intended to encourage 
Jordanians working abroad to return home with their savings. Under this 
scheme, the government allows the importation of certain consumer goods, 
without previous import permission free of custom's duties. The fact 
that household imported commodities in these countries are much cheaper 
than in Jordan,1 encourages workers abroad to bring back with them as 
much as possible, it is not surprising, therefore, that imports from
!* „Thl?*1?+b?caus? th*y pay low ^stem's duties in the oil countries 
In Kuwait it is only 4%. 'a n e 5 .
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Kuwait for example have shown a large increase, especially during the 
period 1974-1975’(see Table 5.8), which is not obviously attributable 
to the number of returning workers, but rather to additional commodities 
which workers brought with them during their annual visitsJ
Table 5.8: Imports from Kuwait (in JD thousand!
1963 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Imports 5 19 122 198 187 446 698
Source: Department of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 1975, Amman, n.d,
In addition to the above described impact on consumption and 
imports, the role of migration in accelerating the recent phenomenon of 
inflation in Jordan cannot be ignored. Indeed it may be argued here 
that Jordan s experience demonstrates a relationship between migration 
and inflation. On one hand, shortage of labour resulting from migration 
as has already been explained, leads to increases in wages and this 
increase was not accompanied by an increase in productivity. On the 
other hand, the increase in remittances, has resulted in an increase in 
overall demand for consumption, Thus repatriated earnings have affected 
both the cost of production and accelerated demand.
The sources of inflationary pressure in Jordan are fully described 
in Chapter Six. It is important, however, to mention here that migration 
is one single factor among many others. While migration has been one 1
1. One indirect result of the differences in prices of luxury goods is 
the growing importance of smuggling trade from the oil countries to 
Jordan. A subject on which there is no information available.
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of Jordan's economic characteristics since its creation, inflation is 
only a recent phenomenon in the economy. It was only from 1973 
onwards that the rate of inflation accelerated at a very rapid pace 
which exceeded 18% per annum.1 How then has migration contributed to 
this recent inflationary pressure? So far as migration and overseas 
remittances create no bottleneck in the labour, commodity and money 
markets, their inflationary impact might be expected to be minimal. 
Jordan's experience has shown that migration has contributed to a dis­
equilibrium in each of these three factors. The remittances have had 
two effects: a) by contributing to the increase in liquidity and the 
expansion of domestic credit and money supply, at levels beyond the 
increase in national output; and b) by increasing the overall demand for 
consumer goods beyond their already high level and therefore further 
widening the gap in the goods market.
The shortage of labour simply means that full employment conditions 
exist in the economy and in these circumstances there is usually a 
tendency towards an increase in prices. Higher wages are inevitable 
in these conditions. In Jordan's case this tendency towards wage 
increases has been evident since 1973. The Under-Secretary of Labour 
mentioned in a recent article that 'there are certain key industries 
in Jordan which are experiencing difficulties obtaining sufficient 
workers. They have provided training and increased pay scales to their 
upper tolerable limits and even imported workers but they have not
1. The causes can be summed up as, the high increase in money supply, 
resulting from increase in foreign exchange and government expenditure. 
The increase in liquidity of commercial routes and the now defunct 
financing policy. This is in addition to the increase in world prices.
See Chapter Six. This is compared with only 2% during 1954-1966 and 7% 
during 1967-1972.
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overcome the problem'.^ In fact some manufacturing establishments 
increased their average wages during 1974-1975 by twice as much as in 
the pre-1973 period. Table 5.9 indicates clearly how wages for all 
sectors have risen from an annual increase of 2.7% during 1967-1972 to 
an average increase of 5.5% during 1967-1976. Obviously the major 
part of this rise occurred during 1973-1976. Further, the increase in 
wages of manual workers was twice as much as that for white collar 
workers, indicating the magnitude of the shortage of labour in the 
skilled manual jobs. Although this may be explained by the boom in 
the construction sector during this period, shortage of labour resulting 
from migration has played an important role.
Table 5.9: Average percentage changes in money wages in Jordan, 1967-1976
Sector White collar Manual 'work Total
1967/72 1967/76 1967/72 1967/76 1967/72 1967/76
Public sector 1.9 3.7 2.8 6.9 2.0 4.3
Public institutions 2.3 5.3 4.2 6.7 2.6 5.6
Private sector 2.7 5.2 4.8 10.1 3.4 6.7
Totals 2.3 4.7 3.9 7.9 2.7 5.5
Source: Royal Scientific Society, unpublished study on wages in Jordan, 
1977. Table 19, p. 44,- Amman, Jordan.
The wide gap between the standard of living of Jordanians working 
abroad and the general standard inside Jordan has aggravated the reaction 12
1. Anani: op. cit., Memo (October 1977}, p. 12.
2. a}. The Jordan.Refinery Company, Annual Report, Amman.09761.
b) Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company, Annual Report. Salt. 
Jordan (1976), p. 10 (arabic).
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of the trade unions. As a consequence, in the period 1973-1976 the 
labour unions in Jordan were involved in collective bargaining and in 
most cases they gained what they claimed.1
The extent to which the increase in wages and salaries described 
above contributed to the money supply in Jordan is not clear. There 
are, however, indicators that the increase in money income exceeded 
the output and productivity of the economy. The adverse effect of the 
resulting cost inflation on economic development and the competitive­
ness of the economy will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
While the migration may have stimulated an increase in salaries 
and wages, thereby accelerating the rate of inflation, the continuous 
increase in prices resulted in a further decline in the standard of 
living, and this in turn increased the migration rate. The decline in 
real wages strengthened the feeling of discontent among workers in 
Jordan, to the extent that they became more aware of the comparatively 
high wages in the oil-producing countries. As may be seen in Table 5.10 despite 
an annual average increase of 5.5% in money wages for the period 
1967-1976, real wages declined by over 3.5% Obviously unless and 
until the wage differences are reduced, the rational expected behaviour 
of Jordanian workers is migration. This in turn, will further aggravate 
inflationary pressures and their consequences for the economic development 
of the country.
1. There were in 1976 about 17 trade unions in Jordan. However ’k
Movement is restricted to the manufacturing industry and there a r / ™  L bour 
unions for government employees or workers in the private small enterprise 
Yet civil service salaries have increased notably for the period1Q7?PiJ5I* 
and salary incentive schemes were adopted. As for the professing?73" 9?6, 
workers like doctors and engineers, who were working on their own enter­
prise or employed by other companies, they have gained hioher w « « ! «  
than any of the other sectors. As one commentator noted in 1976 
an experienced engineer in Jordan can command $1500 a month b v j J d a n L n,eve1 can &arn
Table 5.10: % changes in money and real wages in Jordan during 1967-1976
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Sector Money wages Real wages
Government employees 4.3 -4.7
Other public sectors 5.6 -3.4
Private sector 6.7 -2.3
Total 5.5 -3.5
Source: Jordan Scientific Society. Unpublished study on wages in Jordan.
The other way in which migration contributes to inflationary 
pressure is through its impact on the demand for consumption. In theory 
this demand is desirable on the grounds that it stimulates output in 
agriculture and in manufacturing and thus contributes to the economic 
development of labour exporting countries.1 * However, the Jordanian 
case demonstrates how low supply elasticity prevented such a favourable 
impact.
This positive impact, if it has occurred in Jordan at all, has been 
on a very limited scale, owing to the acute shortage of skilled labour 
in agriculture and industry created by the migration process itself. 
Furthermore, because of the limited capacity of the economy, the majority 
of the extra demand that is generated is either directed towards imports 
or fuèls inflation, or both. In addition to the already described 
impact on imports and consumption, remittances have accelerated the rise in 
pricesof land and housing, especially during 1975-1976. The Central Bank
1. See Kindieberger: 'Emigration and economic qrowth' Banca nnJia
del Lavoro, (September 1965) p. 235. 9 * — c-a Naz1ona1e
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of Jordan has related the boom in land speculation witnessed during 
this period to migrant remittances.1
Apart from having a negative impact on the availability of land 
for agriculture and upon migration from the rural areas to the urban- 
centres,2 speculation created a wealthy section in the population with 
a new demand for consumer goods. It further increased inflationary 
pressure, and brought about yet another increase in the level of 
imports.
The monetary implications of the above trend are described 1n 
Chapter Six. It is important to explain here, however, how remittances 
have contributed to the large increase in money supply during recent 
years. The increase in money supply which was experienced during 1973- 
1976 was the chief cause of Jordan's inflation during these years, and 
therefore deserves further examination. The contribution of remittances 
to money supply expansion came directly, through their contribution to 
foreign exchange assets; and indirectly, through their impact on credit 
expansion. As the Jordanian monetary system is still based on the 1:1 
system, the direct impact of remittances is simply a corresponding 
increase in liabilities; that is in money supply. Table 5.11 shows how 
the importance of remittances to money supply increased from an average 
of only 5.2% during 1967-1972 to 8% in 1973 and continued to increase 
in the following years to reach about 38% in 1976. It is evident from 
the table that this increase in the magnitude and share of remittances 
was accompanied by a similar increase in the money supply. This effect 
raises the question of the importance of remittances as a factor which 
determines money supply. Conventionally this rftle is allocated to the
1. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, (1975 ), p. 63.
2. International Labour Conference, provisional record 14,63rd 
Geneva (1977), p. 14. session,.
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Table 5.11: Money supply and remittances, 1961-1976 (in JD million)
Year M2,
(1)
Remi ttances 
(2)
Ratio Annual
(1)
percentage chanqe 
(2)
1961 35.60 5.25 14.7 15.0 16.5
1962 43.04 6.20 14.4 20.0 18.0
1963 48.03 6.17 13.0 11.5 -
1964 53.57 9.30 17.4 11.5 50.7
1965 69.26 9.10 13.2 29.2 -2.0
1966 75.82 10.60 13.9 8.6 16.5
1967 83.50 6.60 7.9 10.1 -37.7
1968 108.82 4.10 5.8 30.3 37.8
1969 118.83 6.90 5.8 - 9.2 68.3 ..
1970 129.13 5.50 4.2 4.4 -20.2
1971 135.71 4.90 3.0 5.0 -10.9
1972 146.47 7.40 5.0 7.9 51.0
1973 176.07 14.70 8.3 20.2 98.0
1974 216.74 24.90 11.5 23.0 69.4
1975 277.74 53.25 19.2 28.1 113.8
1976 358.92 
M2 = Money supply
136.41 38.0 29.2 156.2
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, several issues.
aid programmes. The relative importance of remittances will depend 
upon whether or not the 1973-1976 pattern continues.
Remittances have also contributed to the increase in domestic 
credit expansion, which in turn serves as an important factor in the 
increase in money supply and in prices. The contribution of remittances 
to these phenomena occurs through both.demand and supply. On the 
demand side, concentration of the remittances on consumer expenditure 
in the way described above, stimulates traders to increase their demand
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for credit to enable them to import the needed consumer commodities. 
Furthermore, (although there is no statistical evidence to show this) 
in practice credit has increased for land purchases. In some cases 
speculators borrow from the commercial banks to buy certain pieces of 
land in the hope of reselling the land at a large profit, a practice 
encouraged by the establishment of the Housing Bank. The role of 
remittances in increasing the demand for consumer credit 1n Jordan was 
magnified by the high liquidity of the banking system itself. Remit­
tances have increased this liquidity,1 and have thus financed the consumer 
credit created by it.
It is not the intention here to relate inflation in Jordan during 
1973-1976 solely to migration; only to emphasise its importance in 
accentuating the inflationary process. It may indeed be argued that 
migration and remittances have been important characteristics of the 
Jordanian economy ever since its creation. Yet inflationary pressure 
began to appear only from 1973 onwards, and the magnitude of migration 
and of migrants' remittances after 1973 far exceeds the pattern before 
1973.
The negative impact of migration on output and consumption and
inflation in the way described above has only recently created aware-
«
ness among Jordanian officials of the cost and the benefits of migration. 
Before 1973, the process of migration was blessed and encouraged by 
the government and the outflow of labour was not regulated or planned 
in any way. A change in the official attitude is apparent in the speech 
of Prince Hassan to the 1977 ILO 63rd Annual Conference. 'The time has
1. For a detailed discussion of the liquidity problem, see Chapter Seven.
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come to give labour exports the same attention and consideration trad­
itionally accorded to capital transfers.'^ He went on to describe 
the consequences of migration and labour shortage on the economy as 
' not confined to higher wages . . . they are causing a massive
internal migration movement from rural to urban countries'.1 2
However, despite this awareness of the problem, up to the present, 
no serious measures have been taken to regulate or organise the out­
flow of Jordanian migrants to oil-producing countries. Despite the 
notable increase in money wages and salaries, described earlier, the 
high rate of inflation in Jordan coupled with a wide gap between the
level of wages in Jordan and the level outside, stimulated further
3
migration outside the country. Further, the agreements made by the 
Ministry of Education and its counterparts in some of the oil producing 
countries is aimed not at repressing the outflow of labour but rather 
at ensuring that the Jordanian education system would provide the
A
proper training needed by these countries.
The problem of attempting to limit the outflow of workers poses 
major difficulties for Jordanian policy makers. Most migrants go to 
neighbouring oil producing countries with which Jordan must keep 
friendly relations for many, reasons - not least the financial aid she 
receives from them. Moreover, in its general economic policy the
1. International Labour Conference, 
p. 14. • Provisional Record, op. cit.,
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. For professional civil servants, the salaries offered in the Gulf 
States and Saudi Arabia are about four times higher than the average 
wages in Jordan. y
4.
that
Agreements were made between the Ministry of Education in 
—  4 of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dabi during 1973^976 »¿3*2
agreements those countries would not employ Jordanian teacher« u.i5wSe* 
the prior approval of the Jordanian Ministry of Edition
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government of Jordan adheres to the principle of free trade and free 
movement of labour. Under these circumstances, and given the continuous 
high demand for labour in the oil-producing countries, the opportunities 
for reducing the rate of migration seem to be very limited. Some of 
those involved in policy-making in the labour field in Jordan have 
abandoned any hope of reducing migration and this is reflected in the 
words of the Minister of Labour, who took this pessimistic view: 'There 
is no way to stop this labour haemorrhage'However, attempts are
being made to find a solution to the problem, both on the international 
level as well as the domestic one.
At the international level, the government asked for help and 
understanding from the labour importing countries. The Jordanian 
delegation to the ILO meetings in 1977 proposed the creation of a 
compensation fund, similar to the compensatory financing facilities 
providedi by the IMF. This proposal of a fund was to channel resources 
from labour importing countries to labour exporting countries, on the 
basis of the estimated costs incurred by the loss of labour.^
This proposal, although justified by the fact that migration has 
proved to have a net negative effect on economic development, may be 
cirticised from the practical point of view. The difficulty arises 
from the problem of quantifying the social and economic cost of migration 
in general. Given the limited information available about migration in 
both exporting as well as importing countries, monitoring the cost is a 
difficult process. In addition, if the proposed fund is to follow the 12
1. Annani., op. ■ cit., Memo (October 3, 1977), p. 4 .
2. ILO Conference Provisional Record, op. cit., no. 14 (1977)
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example of the IMF facilities, it could be argued that it is only of 
short term value and can hardly compensate for the long term economic 
and social loss. In this connection Sinclair has said of the proposed 
fund: 'While such a facility would bring redress to some extent for 
losses incurred by exporting countries, it would scarcely ever be able 
to substitute for forgone economic development.'^
Although economists have considered direct contributions by labour 
importing countries to the less developed countries as a form of com- 
pensation for the loss of migrant labour/ more emphasis has been placed 
on the introduction of a 'Brain Drain Tax'. The proposed tax is based 
on past experience of the emigration of skilled labour from less developed 
countries to developed countries. However, Jordan's experience is as a 
developing country exporting labour to other developing but rich countries, 
and is different in many respects. Nevertheless, the proposed tax could 
still be used to compensate her for the loss of labour, and to control 
the level of emigration.
The proposal of taxing the export of labour was first put forward 
on moral grounds by Bhagwati in 1972, and the implications discussed 
by Bhagwati and Delfare in 1973. In 1974, however, the proposal was 
given a more comprehensive economic, political and social evaluation
3
by Hamada.
1. The Proposal
Bhagwati suggested the following:-
1. Sinclair: 'Remittances are poor return for brain drain losses', The 
Times, 11 August (1977).
2 . A committee was established in 1977 to study the ways and means that 
could reduce the migration rate.
3 Koichi Hamada: 'Taxing the Brain Drain', in J. Bhagwati (ed.): The 
ftew international Order, The MIT Bicentennial Studies (1977), p. 1257
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a) A supplementary income tax should be levied on the income of 
skilled workers who migrate from the LDC to the DC.
b) The authorities of the labour-receiving countries should collect 
the proposed tax and route it to the developing countries via U.N. 
agencies.
c) The tax is levied-jon the actual income of emigrants after leaving 
their home country and commencing work elsewhere.
d) It is based on the net earned income in the form of a surtax.
Hamada developed this proposal from being only a surtax into an 
extension of the income tax system of the labour exporting countries to 
include all income of its citizens, wherever they are. To avoid 
double taxation, a relief scheme was proposed whereby migrants of LDC 
pay tax to their home countries at a rate equal to the excess of the 
effective LDC rate over the effective DC rate.
2. The Rationale
a) In extending 'tax jurisdiction' over income of its non-resident 
citizens, developing countries can influence the distribution of income, 
especially the gap between the migrants and those who are left behind. 
Furthermore the revenues from this tax might contribute to the develop­
ment of the labour exporting country.
b) Given that the emigration of skilled labour is believed to result in 
foregone economic development for the LDC, the tax is a moral obligation 
on migrants to compensate for the loss ensuring from their departure.
c) The economic argument developed by Hamada is based on the Income
t
gains of the DC and thè loss to the LDC; and the potential of such a 
tax in optimising the level of migration.
i) Unlike the Welfare Effect of the movement of capital between DC 
and LDC, which is’¡distributed between the two, the welfare effect
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of the migration of labour was found to be concentrated in the 
developed countries. Furthermore, using a global system under 
full employment conditions, developing countries were found to 
suffer a net loss as a result of this migration, 
ii) While some authorities imply that a Brain Drain Tax might 
disrupt the efficient distribution of labour, Hamada's analysis 
has demonstrated that the introduction of this tax would help 1n 
promoting an optimal level of migration, thus making a more 
efficient use of labour resources. Post-tax income abroad would 
then be considered by potential migrants and would be compared 
with post-tax income at home. When post-tax income abroad is 
higher, the rate of migration might increase, and vice-versa.
3. Problems
Although Hamada's analysis has succeeded in providing an outline 
of the economic benefits of the proposed tax, the introduction of such 
a tax might well face constitutional as well as social problems. For 
example, the constitution of the United States clearly specifies the 
equal treatment of all U.S. citizens; it might violate concepts of 
human rights laid down in U.N. documents; its implementation might be 
considered racially discriminating in Britain.
4. The Brain Drain Tax and Jordan
Despite these problems, adopting a Brain Drain Tax in Jordan 
might reduce the degree of the negative impact resulting from migration.
Income, it has been clearly demonstrated, is the major factor 
behind the large outflow of migrants from Jordan to the oil rich 
countries. The main assumption made in Hamada's analysis is that 
potential migrants consider post-tax income at home and abroad before
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they decide to migrate. Thus, a Brain Drain Tax, apart from its impact 
on the balance of payments and on the government budget, may indirectly 
influence individual decisions regarding migration.
Although income tax rates in Jordan are progressive (ranging from 
5 to 50%) the effective rate is low as enforcement is lax. Neverthe­
less, lack of any income tax in the oil countries makes the effective 
rate in Jordan relatively high. This fulfills an important assumption 
in Hamada's analysis. Additionally, the extension of Jordan's tax 
jurisdiction beyond the political borders to include its citizens abroad, 
might stimulate further measures to improve the method of collection and 
raise the effective rate.
The novelty of the proposed tax, is that it is based on the mutual 
benefits of all parties concerned; the labour-exporting and the labour- 
importing countries, the migrants and those who are left behind. The 
sympathy, generosity and understanding of the labour-importing countries, 
although important, is no longer adequate compensation for migration.
The basic problem which may face the implementation of this tax on 
Jordanians working in the oil countries is lack of 'tax legislation' 
in some of these countries like Saudi Arabia. However, such problems 
may be solved through bilateral agreements between Jordan and these 
countries.
At the domestic level, a newly established committee studying the 
problem has made some recommendations as to how to improve labour 
conditions in Jordan, but they are still in the form of recommendations 
and are not yet approved. In addition, the Five Year Plan although 
recognising the problem of migration, makes no clear proposals for the 
reduction of the level of migration or for the redirection of remittances 
to the productive sector; confining its remarks simply to the need to
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improve labour conditions in Jordan. The only way in which the govern­
ment has actively tried to attract remittances towards development 
has been through encouraging Jordanians to invest their savings in 
government bonds. These, as described in Chapter Six, are mainly 
directed to the financing of recurring expenditure in the budget with 
all the impact on consumption and overall expansion that this implies.
In the long run the solution of the Jordanian migration problem 
lies in a faster rate of economic development within Jordan. It may 
be expected that the fruits of economic progress will be 1n the form 
of more stable domestic conditions for labour, better housing con­
ditions and a higher standard of living. This would reduce the attraction 
of migration. However, the continuous outflow of labour will continue 
to hinder the achievement of a higher rate of economic development and 
it is therefore essential that serious short term measures to contain 
the outflow be adopted, so that the negative impact of migration on the 
economic development process is reduced to a minimum. Obviously, given 
the prevailing economic policy of free movement of labour coupled with 
higher wages in the oil-producing Arab countries, it has to be accepted 
that, in the short term, Jordan can do very little to physically stop 
migration of labour. Indirect .inducements, such as the introduction of 
social security laws, improvements in housing conditions, proper indus­
trial relations, are indeed necessary but they are not alternatives to 
the necessary long term policy. If it is accepted that the principal 
reason for migration is the higher wages in the oil countries, then the 
long term policy should be designed to raise the level of wages in Jordan, 
through increases in productivity. Although the ways and means by which 
this could be achieved go beyond the scope of this study, some relevant
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points should be mentioned here. In general 1t could be argued that 
Jordan's resources are under-utilised. For example, at present only 10 
to 15% of the fertile land of the Jordan Valley 1s cultivated. Thus, 
improving agricultural production, through increasing irrigation and a 
judicious choice of crops, may raise agricultural output per head of 
the labour employed in agriculture.^ In the manufacturing sector, 
reference may be made to different policies: 1) concentrating on trad­
itional industries like textile and consumer goods manufacturing; 11) 
concentrating on industries where the value added per head is high, such 
as fertiliser and chemical manufacturing. Given the high level of 
income in the oil producing countries, the export potential for both 
types of products is very high. However, given the fact, outlined in 
the analysis, that Jordan is no longer a low wage country, it may be 
more appropriate to concentrate on the second type of manufacturing. 
Fertiliser and chemical Industries are a case 1n point. With large 
amounts of potash and phosphate reserves, Jordan has a strong basis 
for the establishment of these Industries.
Summary
The most important source of the invisible surplus has been • 
remittances from Jordanians working abroad. These remittances are
i
significant in providing an example of a new type of trade relationship 
which has grown up among developing countries. The Arab oil producing
j
developing countries are enjoying economic expansion resulting from 
oil revenues. The Arab non oil-producing countries on the other hand,
f
1. Aresvik: The Agricultural Development of Jordan, Praeger, New York 
(1976). ;
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are facing serious economic problems resulting from the migration of 
educated and skilled labour to the oil countries, thus contributing 
to the development of the latter.
This phenomenon has so far received little attention and this 
analysis has clearly shown that further research is needed to evaluate 
precisely the impact of labour migration on the economic development 
of Jordan. In fact, migration represents a vicious circle to Jordanian 
economic planners. The chain starts with the 'push factor' Inside 
Jordan that leads to the emigration of Its labour. This, coupled with 
high wages in the oil countries, stimulates the outflow. Given the 
direct loss of labour and production resulting from emigration, coupled 
with an increased demand for consumption created by remittances, pressure 
on the economy results 1n an increase 1n prices and in Imports, and this 
leads to further emigration.
Traditional experience leads to the expectation that emigration 
will have some positive impact on the economic development of the labour- 
exporting country, but Jordanian emigration, as it has been outlined in 
this chapter, has tended to hinder economic development of the economy. 
The European experience has been that migrant workers often obtain 
additional skills as well as accumulating savings which may be directed 
towards investment and production, both of which may go towards helping 
the economic development of their home country. Jordan has experienced 
the converse; emigrants have been providing skills to oil exporting 
countries rather than obtaining new ones. The small number who are 
engaged in the oil industry are in fact learning skills which are 
irrelevant to their own country's development. More important, however, 
is the fact that the probability of workers returning home while still 
of working age is low. Indeed they tend to return home only to retire;
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becoming then consumers rather than producers. The negative impact of 
emigration has also been demonstrated 1n the labour shortage witnessed 
during 1973-1976. This led to Jordan becoming at once a labour importing 
country as well as an exporting one. However, the fact that the new 
migrants into the country have been mostly unskilled workers means that 
they cannot be considered a substitute for the skilled Jordanian emigrants.
This chain of cause and effect raises a further series of Issues 
that suggest the following generalisations. Firstly, migration 1s 
Inevitable 1n a poor developing country, once relatively higher wages 
are available 1n accessible rich developing countries. Consequently, 
governments of the poorer countries should take short term measures,
Within the long term policy aiming at Increasing wages through Increases 
in productivity. Secondly, unless and until measures are taken, the 
export of labour, although It results 1n foreign exchanges* may still cause 
a negative Impact on economic development. In addition to con­
sumption and price effects, migration may accentuate Income Inequality 
between those who migrate or recleve remittances and those who do not. 
Thirdly, emigration Involves a high risk of making the labour exporting 
country too dependent on foreign exchange received from the labour 
importing country, which may delay the utilisation of available domestic 
resources necessary for economic development.
Having examined foreign trade transactions, the monetary aspects 
will now be considered together with the foreign reserve policy.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE PROBLEM OF EXCESS FOREIGN RESERVES
To complete the analysis of foreign trade, monetary aspects will 
now be considered. This chapter will deal with foreign reserves and 
their inter-relationship with Jordan's balance of payments. It will 
be devoted to answering three main inter-related questions. Firstly, 
what are the factors that determine the demand for foreign reserves 
in Jordan , secondly, why does Jordan tend to hold a relatively high level 
of reserves, and thirdly, what are the implications of such a policy 
for the Jordanian economy in general and for the balance of payments in 
particular. Within the context of these central issues a model will be 
constructed to measure the adequate level of foreign reserves in 
Jordan and to determine the cost, whether implicit or explicit, to 
Jordan's economic development, of maintaining its high foreign reserves 
holdings.
Before proceeding to point out what is meant by reserves as far 
as Jordan is concerned, it is worth examining the various definitions 
of reserves. Since its establishment, the IMF has been pre-occupied 
with the question of reserves particularly in the context of official 
determination of the level of foreign reserves adequacy: that is, the 
determination of the level of foreign reserves holdings which is needed 
to facilitate world trade. However, this problem cannot be divorced 
from the related question of formulating a definition of what reserves 
are, since a solution to the former problem depends on a solution to the 
latter.
Although there is no unique definition of international reserves 
which is satisfactory for all purposes and for all countries, the IMF 
offers this definition:
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'International liquidity in the broad sense consists 
of reserves available to monetary authorities for the 
purpose of financing balance of payments deficits.
Such liquidity ranges from assets that are readily 
available and freely usable to reserves potentially 
available subject to reconstitution and in the case 
of fund resources in the credit tranch also subject 
to conditions relating to the policies of drawing 
countries'.
From an accounting point of view, international reserves include 
official holdings of foreign exchange, gold and gold tranch position with 
the IMF. As of 1969 the IMF introduced special drawing rights (SDRS), 
which are not a direct payments medium, but they may, for the purpose 
of financing balance of payments deficits, be considered as part of an 
individual country's reserves. Furthermore, reserves may also include 
any other offical assets that can be liquidified and used to finance 
international payments. Other economists use a wider concept for 
reserves and include the capacity to borrow from abroad, as one of 
the components of countries' reserves.
Reierson offers a general definition which is reasonably compatible 
with that of the IMF:
'the international liquidity of a country may be 
broadly defined as all those assets of monetary 
authorities that can be used, directly or through 
assured convertibility into other assets, to support 
its rate of exchange when .its external payments are 
in deficit.'
Although there is no consensus on the definition of this term, for the 
purposes of this thesis, international reserves will be defined as 
official reserves reported by the Jordan Currency Board before 1964
1. IMF, Annual Report, .International Monetary Fund, Washington DC (1964).
2. R. N. Cooper: Liquidity and payment adjustment, International Reserves 
Need and Availability, Seminar at IMF, Washington DC, Q970^ p. 125.
3. R. L. Reierson: The Question of International Liquidity, New York, 
Barkers Trust Co. (1965), p. 9.
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and by the Jordan Central Bank thereafter. These include government 
holdings of gold and foreign exchange, gold tranch and SDRs, The 
volume of these reserves and their distribution among the different 
components are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Jordan's foreign reserves (in JD million)
Year Gold Foreign SDRS Total
exchange
1964 - 26.43 - 26.43
1965 1.22 17.74 - 48.96
1966 1.22 57.62 - 48.84
1967 2.34 92.13 - 94.53
1968 12.00 97.44 - 109.44
1969 12.00 87.48 - 99.48
1970 12.01 85.14 0.96 98.11
1971 12.01 7^.04 1.83 92.88
1972 13.04 84.91 2.93 100.88
1973 13.04 91.41 2.92 107.37 -
1974 13.04 102.49 2.86 118.39
1975 13.04 159.06 2.86 174.90
1976 28.44 180.73 2.86 212.03
Source:.1) Central Bank of Jordan,'Statistics pertaining to certain aspects of 
the Jordanian economy! Central Bank publications, Amman (1967).
2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
Although the above definition of reserves in Jordan is helpful, 
it has two important shortcomings. Firstly,it is very general, and 
thus can be interpreted in many ways, and secondly, and probably more 
importantly, it is too rigid in the sense that it is confined only to 
official foreign reserves and ignores private sector holdings. In other 
words, it is flexible in defining the components of reserves, but it 
is restrictivein determining the holders of these reserves. Private
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sector holdings of foreign reserves in Jordan are believed to be high, 
and the exclusion of this component may well be a serious limitation 
of the definition. This is because a good proportion of Jordan's 
foreign trade is financed outside the banking system, i.e. through the 
private sector. Therefore, an examination of the relationship between 
the level of reserves on one side and the balance of payments on the 
other, will clearly explain the implications of this phenomenon for 
Jordan's reserves problem. Analytical clarity requires that at this 
juncture the empirical relationship between recording of real and monetary 
transactions in Jordan's balance of payments be elucidated.
Given double-entry balance of payments accounting, above-the-line 
and below-the-line balances should reflect the same value and either 
can be used as an indicator of the balance of payments position. However, 
the value of these balances may not be equal and the difference is 
usually accounted for under 'net errors and omissions'.^ In the case 
of Jordan this latter item is relatively small when compared with other 
countries. Yet its'general trend over time is erratic. Its value 
went up and down drastically during the period 1965-1975 (see Table 6.2). 
However, with the exception of the years 1972, 1974, 1975 it showed 
consistency in appearing on the credit side over the same period. The 
appearance of net errors and omissions on the credit side over time may 
indicate a continuous inflow of capital into Jordan. This is rather a 
surprising trend, especially when viewed against economic circumstances, 
which should have pointed to a capital outflow, particularly in periods
1. W. Ledener: The Balance of Foreign Transactions: Problem and Definition, 
Special paper no. 5, Princeton University (1963), p. 57..
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Table 6 .2: Errors and omissions in Jordan's balance of payments (in
JD million)
Year Basic
balance
Monetary
sector
Errors and 
omissions
Ratio of errors and 
omissions to total 
trade transaction - %
1965 5.22 -6.21 0.99 0.071
1966 3.75 -8.87 5.03 2.60
1967 28.16 -33.19 5.03 2.60
1968 15.08 -16.33 1.25 0.07
1969 -12.90 10.92 1.98 0.09
1970 -4.71 1.52 3.19 - 1.80
1971 -13.65 11.82 1.83 0.094
1972 8.50 -6.71 -1.79 0.071
1973 10.25 -12.48 2.23 0.075
1974 13.82 -6.74 -7.08 1.70
1975 65.58 -50.74 -14.84 0.30
Source: Based on Statistical Appendix 3.
of political instability such as 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1971. Moreover, 
in periods of economic and political stability, the trend was in direct 
opposition to that which has been expected, particularly in the years 
1972 and 1974. During these years, Jordan witnessed a remarkable growth 
in investment which was encouraged by the implementation of the Three 
Year Plan 1973-1975. Yet the balance of payments surprisingly showed an 
outflow instead of an inflow of capital in those two years.
How can such a contradiction be explained? There are two aspects 
to the answer: the first definitional and the second institutional. It 
is worth reiterating at this juncture, however, that a balance of payments
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is a statistical record, in which certain items are the product of 
informed guesswork. This observation is important to the institutional 
aspects of the problem, as the difficulty in estimating certain items 
is magnified by legal as well as institutional problems. In the case 
of exports, proceeds are not properly evaluated for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the foreign exchange law requires that each exporter repatriates 
an amount of foreign exchange equivalent to the value of his exportsJ 
Since there exists the desire among many exporters to retain certain 
sums of their export proceeds in banks outside Jordan in order to 
meet unforeseen contingencies, there is a tendency to deliberately under­
estimate the actual value of exports. Secondly,in order to encourage 
agricultural output and exports, the foreign exchange control law does 
not require producers of agricultural products to repatriate any of 
their export earnings. Therefore, the recorded exports proceeds which 
appear in the debit entry below-the-line are far less than their 
counterpart credit entry above-the-line.
Imports, on the other hand, are under-estimated below-the-line.
In the entry above-the-line, the figures are estimated by customs 
officials who determine the value of imports by subjective assessment 
based on the accompanying bill of lading. The value of these imports is 
financed either through the banking sector or by other unofficial 
means, such as the money changers (Sarraffeen). The credit entry below- 
the-line consists only of banking sector payments for imports and thus 
is actually less than the debit entry above-the-line. Although these 
errors in estimating foreign exchange movements tend to cancel one
1 . International Monetary Fund, Exchange Restrictions,-22nd Annual 
Report, Washington DC (1971), p. 241.
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another out, the result is a net underestimation of foreign exchange 
outflows. Table 6.3 below clearly shows that during the years 1970- 
1975 reserves financed only 68.5% of total imports of goods and services. 
Furthermore,-over those years, this ratio has declined from 82% in 1970
Table 6.3: Banking system payments for visible and invisible imports 
(in JD million)
Year Banking sector 
(1)
Private sector 
(2)
Total imports 
(3)
Ratio 1:3 
(*)
1970 74.94 15.73 90.67 82.0
1971 79.17 20.13 99.30 79.9
1972 74.36 44.57 118.92 63.0
1973 95.89 41.73 137.62 69.9
1974 152.14 86.02 238.16 63.9
1975 203.67 103.80 307.47 66.0
Total 680.16 311.98 992.14 68.5
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, unpublished data.
to reach 66% in 1975. Such a declining trend, reflects the expansion 
and growing impact of the unofficial foreign exchange market on Jordan's 
trade.
The most important conclusion that emerges from the foregoing 
consideration of net errors and omissions in Jordan's balance of payments 
is the importance of private sector foreign exchange holdings. It is 
these holdings operated in parallel to-the official money market, and 
in direct competition with it, which make financial control in Jordan 
so difficult, to achieve.
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This unofficial market derives its foreign exchange receipts from 
a number of sources. These include export proceeds, income from tourism 
and most importantly, remittances from Jordanians working abroad (see 
Table 6.4 below).
(Sarraffeen) (iri JD mi 1 lion)
Source of income 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Exports 10.55 8.77 8.43 12.08 9.32 20.32 25.34
Tourism 4.20 4.12 2.53 8.10 10.17 16.74 33.40
Jordanians working 
abroad 6.90
3.63 4.48 7.41 14.70 19.68 46.86
Others 15.00 10.00 5.00 - - - -
Total 36.65 26.52 20.44 27.59 34.19 56.74 105.60
Source: Based òn Stati st1cal Appendi y 5.
This unofficial market is run by a minority of influential money 
changers who act as intermediaries between buyers and sellers. They 
are officially licenced to undertake direct dealings in foreign 
exchange and local currency. However, due to the bureaucratic proc­
edures adopted by commercial banks and to the import and foreign exchange 
control, money changers found ample opportunity to develop from small 
scale domestic financial .operations to larger scale international 
financial transactions. This has come to the notice of the monetary 
authorities, particularly because of the high profit margins involved
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and some attempts were , made to bring them under official control 
in 1967 and 1973 on the pretext that money changers engaged in illegal 
pursuits can often frustrate reserves policies. The sarraffeen, for 
their part, argue that their arbitrary activities act as an important 
balancing force in the foreign exchange market, added to that, they 
are able to mobilize a great deal of personal influence in the political 
system, in order to maintain the status quo. Yet even those who are 
wholly committed to the laissez-faire system, and with whom the 
sarraffeen find most support and sympathy are unable to offer any 
justification for the refusal of money changers to allow the monetary 
authorities to scrutinise their banks, other than that the monetary 
authorities might hand any information gained to the Income Tax 
Department.
A consideration of the reserve situation in Jordan makes clear 
that the standard theoretical literature on reserves provides an 
inadequate basis for analysis of the country's economic affairs. To 
try to superimpose a theoretical model constructed for developed 
western economies on a small less developed country like Jordan is 
unlikely to yield meaningful results. Models like those put forward 
by Kelly, Youssef and Couchreen, Kenen and Clark assume the existence 
of money changers uncritically, and are based on optimal conditions 
that are not prevalent in a country like Jordan.^ Moreover, all of 
these authors have adopted a comparative analysis between countries
1. H. G. Grubel_:'The Demand for International Reserves: A Critical 
Review of the Literature' Journal of Economic Literati,r. fn."SI“ 1 
197V, PP; 1148-66. See alsoTTb. Kelly: 'Uemand for International 
Reserves', American Economic Review, (September 1977} pp 655-67
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which may not be applicable to a single country study, without 
concealing some of the institutional elements involved. For this reason, 
the subsequent analysis of reserves in Jordan does not conform to 
the orthodox theoretical framework. It instead attempts to include 
in its examination of the most relevant factors which influence the 
market for reserves in Jordan, those institutional elements and 
industrial structures which are peculiar to the Jordan case.
It is imperative at this stage to consider the long term trends in 
total official reserves level, their composition and their distribution 
according to holders. The relevant institutional and policy conditions 
effecting the trend of such reserves will also be discussed.
Over the period 1952-1975, total reserves showed a persistent 
increase, as can be seen from the chart below. With the exception of 
the years 1959, 1963, 1969 and 1971 total reserves grew at an average 
rate of 12% per annum, thus increasing in absolute terms from JD 13 
million to JD 175 million. The curious phenomenon is that Jordan's 
reserves increased continuously regardless of the cyclical trend in 
economic activity. For instance, while the overall growth in nominal 
GDP was 10% over the period 1954-1975, reserves increased at the higher 
rate of 13%. Moreover, tohen GDP declined at various rates in the
years 1955, 1962, 1968 and 1970, reserves still showed substantial
■1
increases. In the years when reserves decreased, GDP as a proxy for 
economic activity increased noticeably. Two reasons may be offered for
this unexpected economic behaviour. Firstly,economic activity in Jordan
/
is; volatile owing to forces that are exogenous to the market system, 
such as poor harvests or outside political disturbances. Such factors
i
are a direct cause of an increase in the inflow of unrequited transfers 
ank remittances, in amounts sufficient to cover the widening trade
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Fig.6.1
Source: Statistical Appendix 3 and Table 6.7.
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deficit, clearly increasing reserves levels. Secondly there is a time 
lag of at least one year between the inflow of foreign reserves and 
the subsequent revitalisation of the economy. The fact that reserves 
increased at high percentage rates in the years 1964 and 1968 and were 
followed by high increases in GDP in the years 1965, 1969 respectively, 
is clear evidence in support of this observation. Thus a correlation 
between reserves in period (t) and GDP in period (t + 1) is positive 
and substantial (rr.0.96). (See figure 6.1.)
The years 1952-1975 may be divided into two periods namely, 1952- 
1963 and 1964-1975. In the first of these, Jordan's reserve policy 
was set by the Jordan Currency Boarcd. During the second, responsibility 
for Jordan's reserves policy was in the hands of the Central Bank. 
Between 1952-1963, reserves increased from JD 13 million to JD 35.1 
million or at an average annual growth rate of 15.4%. The reserves 
increased each year with the exception of very slight decreases. The 
movement of reserves, therefore, was stable and predictable as may be 
inferred from the small dispersion rate evidenced in the standard 
deviation of 8.3. Between 1964 and 1975, however, reserves increased 
from JD 52.9 million to JD 174.9 million or at an average growth rate 
of 21.3% annually. Although the direction was positive, growth was not 
steady as in the earlier period, as is shown by the s’tandard deviation 
of 30.8. This variation in the measure of dispersion between the two 
periods is attributable to a number of factors which will be considered 
below.
Besides the management of reserves, the only other task entrusted 
to the Jordanian Currency Board (1952-1964) was the issuing of domestic 
currency. Since Jordan was then a member of the sterling area, these
- 232 -
tasks were easy and automatic.^ The 'fixed rule' system which charact­
erised reserves policies in that period, required the board to maintain 
at all times a 1:1 relationship between reserves held and currency 
issued.
At that time sterling regulations required Jordan to maintain all
its foreign reserves in pounds sterling, and they were mainly invested
2
in U.K. government gilt-edged securities. A much smaller amount was 
in the form of deposits kept with British correspondent banks in London, 
in order to effect trade and other payments. Under these arrangements, 
management of reserves by the board became largely a matter of book­
keeping. The board did not have to worry about the intricacies of 
portfolio management nor about the vagaries of international financial 
markets. Switching the component financial assets within Jordan's 
reserves portfolio was a matter of substituting one sterling denominated 
asset for another and was completely in the hands of the Bank of 
England.
During the early fifties, the system seemed to work quite effect­
ively because most of Jordan's international transactions were effected 
in sterling; added to this, most of Jordan's foreign receipts, particularly 
aid and budget support, came from the British government, so that 
Jordan's need to maintain some of its reserves in currencies other than 
sterling was minimal. Moreover, the British economy at that time
3
was relatively better placed to ensure a sound sterling position.
1. Edward Nevin: Capital funds in under developed countries: The role 
of financial institutions, Macmillan, London,C1963L p. 5.
T. Temporary Law of Jordan currency, no. 35, 1949, translated in the 
Jordan Currency Board annual report, (1956) Appendix A, Article 7, Section d.
3. B. S. Karlstroem: 'How. did they become reserve currencies', Finance 
and Development, Vol. IV, (September 1967), p. 216.
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In addition the substantial devaluation of the pound which had taken 
place in 1949 equalised the pound’s par value with its market value 
and further devaluation was not expected. This stability minimised the 
possibility of incurring a capital loss on reserves and made possible 
the maintenance of a one to one relation with the pound sterling.
Internally, currency issued was regulated by similar fixed rules 
which tied the changes in the stock of money to the changes in the 
stock of reserves. In the absence of a fractional banking system, 
such, a rule worked smoothly. The Board did not exercise any control 
over commercial banks operating in Jordan, nor were these banks 
required to deposit any of their assets with the board. The only 
credit control instruments applied to bank credit consisted of their 
own institutional conventions and prudential measures. Of the four 
commercial banks operating in Jordan in this period, two were British.^ 
It is thus hardly surprising that British banking procedures were 
adhered to and that a fixed rates system was adopted.
By the late fifties and early sixties it became clear that the 
system could not go on without difficulty. Its automaticity lost its 
appeal in view of the growing complexity of the Jordanian economy and 
its widening international economic commitments. The old system was 
dependent for its continued operation on certain policy conditions. 
Firs^lythat Jordan's international payments continuedto be executed in
sterling; secondly^that Jordan's foreign exchange receipts be drawn
2 ...
from the British government) thirdly, that, pound sterling maintained
i___________________________ I ______,
1. The two British banks referred to were: T|ie Ottoman Bank and The 
British Bank for the Middle East.
2. At that time Jordan's need for foreign ai;d had proliferated while 
the British ability to pay had diminished. Jordan found itself forced 
to seek aid from other countries such as the U.S.A.
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its strength as an international reserve currency;^ and fourthly, that
the Jordanian public was forced to accept the existence of British
2
influence over its political and economic affairs. These conditions
are no longer operative in Jordan's financial structure; its institutions,
assets and diversity of assets has reached a stage that did not lend
themselves to automaticity. New developments not only jeopardised the
fixed rate arrangements but the existence of the Currency Board itself.
3
The stage was set for a Central Bank.
The ill-fated Currency Board System not only suffered from the 
drastic changes in the parameters and setting which surrounded it as 
well as inimical historical trends, but also from inherent weaknesses 
which affected Jordanian interests. It has been mentioned above that 
foreign currency dealings were concentrated in the hands of the British. 
Such control covered not only dealings in sterling but dealings in 
other currencies as well. Whenever Jordanians needed to buy or sell 
convertible currencies other than sterling, they had to go through 
their British bank correspondents. In effect, this gave British banks 
a monopolistic power over Jordanian financial transactions enabling 
them to impose monopolistic prices which may have been higher than 
prevailing market prices. This situation is eloquently described by a
1. Although the pound sterling was not devalued until November 1967, 
early indication of possible devaluation was already in evidence. See
, B. Kurlstrome; Finance and Development, IMF, Vol. IV'(September 1967), 
p. 376.
2. After General John Glubb was relieved from his duties as the Chief 
of Jordan Arab Legion (Jordan's Army) in 1956, public opinion changed 
radically. The dismissal of Glubb was taken as a sign of independence 
from foreign domination.
3. See IBRD, The Economic Development of Jordan, Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore (195/), p. 221. “
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British economist Dennis Robertson: 'It meant each country, as a 
country, agreed to hand over its surplus dollar earnings to mother 
in exchange for sterling, and to go to mother when it wanted extra 
dollars to spend. Naturally the degree of confidence with which it 
exercised or presented claims on the dollar pool depended on its 
political status'^ .
This somewhat detailed digression into the workings of the Jordan 
Currency Board was necessary in order to underline a major point. The 
regulation and institutional set-up is responsible for the smooth 
behaviour of reserves. Jordan's reserves originated from a single 
source and were expended through the same source and were regulated 
with the money stock on the basis of a simple and predictable fixed 
rule. Moreover, the exchange rate was fixed, and the purchasing 
power of money was not under the pressure of high rates of inflation. 
Under such circumstances, reserves were inevitably stable.
Although" the law establishing the Central Bank was enacted as
early as 1959, the Central Bank did not assume operations until 1964.
Thus it was clear long before this date that the Currency Board was
obsolescent. The Bank, when it finally came into operation,had
slightly broader powers entrusted to it for the carrying out of its
function. These were laid down in the Central Bank Act together with
2later amendments as follows:
(a) to regulate the issue of currency
(b) to keep international reserves with a view to maintaining
1. Sir Dennis Robertson: Britain in the World Economv. 1954. ritari in Rytan 
Johnson: The politics of rnJTiey, Butler and lonnrr, I nLnn lt*; 227.
2. Central Bank of Jordan: The Accomplishments of thp rpntrai RanU in
Ten Years (1964-1974), Amman~TT ^ T , (Arabic), p. 4j Bank, in
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monetary stability in Jordan and the external value of the Jordanian
dinar.
(c) to influence credit conditions to the country's advantage
(d) to act as a banker to the government
(e) to act as a banker's bank.
The first two of these objectives were exactly the same as those 
of the Jordan Currency Board; the last two were new objectives. The 
establishment of the bank, however, was a key factor in starting the 
separation of Jordan from the sterling area. It took over some of the 
functions which under the Currency Board were performed by British 
banks. For example, the bank was empowered with the authority to 
diversify foreign reserves without having to consult the British officials. 
This power, however, did not have an impact on the composition of 
foreign reserves until the end of 1965 (see Table 6.5). In that year, 
sterling constituted 83.4% of total reserves, the rest being composed 
of U.S. dollars (13.9%) and gold and other currencies (2.7%). The 
dollar share increased because Jordan began to receive aid from the 
United States which was then financing the government budget. The 
year 1966 witnessed a sharp decline in sterling holdings (63.9% of total 
reserves) and their replacement by dollar reserves.
By 1967, the basic one to one relation between the value of the 
Jordanian dinar and that of sterling was exposed to a severe test when 
the British government decided to devalue the pound by 14.3% in 
November of that yearJ The Jordanian government, however, opted to 
hold the value of the dinar at par vis-a-vis the dollar. This emphasised 
the move towards its independence from sterling because Jordan had not
1. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, (l967jl p. 39.
Table 6.5: Percentage distribution of Jordan's foreign assets according to currency
Year Gold SDRs f $ DM SF FF* BF** DFL*** Other Total
1952-1964 100 . 100.0
1965 2.5 - 83.4 13.9 - - - - 0.2 100.0
1966 2.0 - 63.9 32.9 1.2 - - - - - 100.0
a 1967 2.7 - 41.9 27.3 3.3 14.1 9.9 - - 0.8 100.0
CO 1968 11.9 - 36.2 20.9 13.8 12.5 4.7 - - 0.1 100.0CM
t 1969 12.8 - 34.2 22.7 12.5 14.3 1.4 - - 2.1 100.0
1970 13.2 1.0 36.7 19.3 13.9 13.8 1.3
•
- 0.8 100.0
1971 13.5 2.1 29.3 14.8 16.5 14.9 8.3 - - 0.6 100.0
1972 13.5 3.1 31.6 18.2 16.1 7.9 - - - 9.6 100.0
1973 13.1 2.9 25.3 11.2 25.0 10.1 8.9 - - 3.5 100.0
1974 11.9 2.6 14.0 19.5 26.9 12.7 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.0 100.0
1975 12.2 2.5 20.38 18.46 21.36 11.84 5.4 1.7 1.8 4.4 100.0
* French franc 
** Belgium franc 
***Dutch Marck
Source: See Appendix 6. *
i
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devalued despite strong arguments for doing so at that particular 
time. Jordan had lost its West Bank territories to Israeli occupying 
forces five months earlier. Economically, the loss of the West Bank 
meant a loss of 30% of Jordan's national income and an increase in 
the financial burden of the government. 1 In such a situation deval­
uation would have been necessary for strict conformity with conventional 
economic wisdom. Moreover the decision not to devalue meant a loss of
JD 6.3 million in the value of sterling holdings; i.e. 170% of Jordan's
2
total foreign investment income in 1966. It is clear, therefore, 
that the__decision was not purely economic.
; The years 1968-1970.witnessed a relatively stable movement in the
percentage of sterling in Jordan's foreign reserves. That percentage 
ranged between 34.6 and 36.7. Jordan thus fulfilled the condition of 
the agreement concluded between the U.K. and members of the sterling 
area to maintain a certain percentage of their foreign reserves in
3
sterling. The U.K. promised to compensate the signatories for what­
ever loss they might incur if the value of sterling depreciated. 4
In 1971, the international monetary system experienced a severe 
crisis, when in August of that year the United States decided to stop 
converting Euro-dollars into gold and to impose trade restrictions 
on its trade partners.. This decision, which was prompted by a
1. See Chapter One, page 11. E. Kanovsky: The Economic Tmnar*
Six Day War, Praeger Special Studies, (397oj, p7'41 y;-------- Ract of the
2. Central Bank of Jordan Annual Report, (l967j p. 39,
3. Jordanwas committed to keep 30% of its reserves in sterling 5
5. International Monetary Fund,-Annual Report. Washington DC (1972).
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declining U.S. balance of trade, distorted the operations of international 
monetary systems and created chaos therein. After the Smithsonian 
meeting was held in December 1971 by the Group of Ten, the dollar was 
devalued by 7.9% while sterling remained the same. When the dollar 
devaluation was officially ratified in April 1972, Jordan decided to 
follow withasimilar devaluation, signalling the new association of the 
Jordanian dinar with the U.S. dollar and the end of its association with 
sterling. By 1971 the sterling relative share had dropped to 26%, although 
it increased slightly the following year, to reach 30% immediately after 
the dollar devaluation. In 1973 the dollar was again devalued, this 
time by 10% but Jordan did not follow, on the grounds that such a de­
valuation would be highly inflationary and would expose the Jordan 
reserves to a severe test. Yet sterling, after it was floated in 1972, 
kept on declining vis-à-vis other major currencies such as the dollar, 
Deutschemark, Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. This naturally led to 
a continuing decline in the sterling element in Jordan's foreign 
reserves, until it reached a trough of 1.5% of its total reserves in mid-1976.
Two important points emerge from the above account. First, that 
under the Central Bank system, Jordan began to enjoy greater autonomy 
in its portfolio investment, and secondly, that the composition of foreign 
reserves has, under the same new system, become more diversified than 
the single reserve system adopted by the Currency Board.
In addition to diversifying the composition of the foreign reserves 
portfolio, the Central Bank adopted a greater degree of centralisation 
in the distribution of the ownership of reserves. This is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, below-the-line transactions in the balance of 
payments are treated on holder basis: they are categorised into Central
Bank, commercial banks, and net IMF position, and the balance of payments 
is thus mirrored in the holding distribution. Secondly,distribution of 
ownership gives a. clear indication of the degree of dominance by the 
central monetary authority over the movement of reserves. If for 
instance, all reserves were held by the private sector, the control of 
the central monetary authority over the movement of reserves would be 
minimal, and could only be exercised by indirect measures such as 
quotas, tariff restriction and other reserve-saving policies. If 
reserves on the other hand, were .held by commercial banks the degree of 
control would be greater depending on the level of control conferred by 
law on the central monetary authority. The degree of control would be 
greater if all reserves were held and managed directly by the central 
authorities. The basic advantage of complete centralisation is that 
it became possible to minimise the use of reserves. 1 Thus, the pattern 
of reserve distribution in Jordan since the 1950s has had two distinct 
phases. Over the period 1951-1963 reserves Were mainly held by the 
Jordan Currency Board and the Central Bank. The commercial banks were 
allowed to hold reserves in whatever quantities they could muster and, 
therefore, their total percentage holdings'ranged between 30% and 50%.
It has been explained above that this distribution befitted the prevailing 
conditions of minimum control exercised by the Board over the commercial 
banks. On the other hand, in the period 1964-1975 a change occurred 
in the distribution of reserves. When the Central Bank commenced 
operations in 1964, a decree was issued limiting the banks' holdings of 
reserves to the equivalent of their total foreign liabilities plus
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1. See M. Flanders: 'The demand for international reserves', Princeton 
Studies in International Finance,.no. 27, Princeton University press,Hew 
Jersey (19/1), p-
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the equivalent of one hundred thousand Jordanian dinarJ This shift 
in policy caused a commensurate shift in the distribution of reserves 
Commercial bank holdings of foreign reserves averaged 5% of total 
official reserves while the Central Bank holdings averaged 94% (see 
Table 6 .6 ).
Table 6 .6 : Jordan foreign reserves (in JD million)
Average C - Board (1) 
Central Bank
C - Banks (2) G (3) Total
Value % Value % Value %
1951-1956 11.5 67 . 5,8 33 17.3
1957-1962 17.3 53 15.2 46 0.5 1 32.8
1963-1967 49.3 77 11.9 18 3.0 5 64.2
1968-1975 105.7 94 6.3 '5 0.6 1 112.6
(1) Currency Board (1951-1963) - Central Bank (1964-1975).
(2) Commercial banks.
(3) Government.
Source: Computed from:
(1) Central Bank of Jordan, The accomplishments of the Central 
Bank in ten years, Amman (1974).
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
(June 1976).
The conclusion which can be reached from the change in ownership 
under the Central Bank is that, the Bank had greater dominance over 
official reserves than the Currency Board, which is compatible with 
the broader authority it had. 1 2 *
1. Central Bank of Jordan, Commercial Bank instruction mpmn? hq&k iq£7 i
2. The third holder of reserves is the central n o w ™  memos (1965, 1967).
1950-1959 the government held no reserves at all9 Durin^th °V6r —  Penod
period however (1963-1975) the government holdings Sër^ ?eÎÎ smaîî’Snd9
showed a declining trend from a 1964 Deak Gnvprnm««! u Tj - sma
not be subject to rational analysis fSr tiey ^ a ^ ? " *  h°ldl"3S C°Uld
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The other notable recent change, is the abandonment of the one to 
one relationship between the stock of reserves and the stock of money.
The law of the Central Bank of Jordan does not include an article 
specifically determining the relationship between these two aggregates. 
Instead, the bank is required to manage foreign reserves in such a manner 
as to ensure convertibility of the Jordanian dinar and economic stability.1 
The exact procedures for achieving these goals are left to the dis­
cretion of the Central Bank. The statistical examination of shifts in 
policy will take the relationship between the stock of reserves and 
currency issued on the one hand, and the relationship between the stock 
of reserves and money supply, narrowly defined, on the other.
A comparison of the data for reserves and currency issued over the 
period 1952-1975, does not reveal any structural shift, indicating 
that the Central Bank did not in fact change its policies from those 
of the Currency Board. A computation of the ratio of foreign reserves 
over currency issued, for the entire period under study discloses that 
it almost invariably exceeded 100%, the ratio ranging between 100.4% and 
220%. In the early years of the Central Bank the ratio exceeded 200%, 
indicating that the Bank was still adopting the same conservative 
reserve policy as the Board.
A comparison between the stock of reserves and the money supply, 
however, yields a different picture. The ratio of reserves over money 
supply showed slight variations after the establishment of the Central 
Bank. It consistently exceeded 100% during the Currency Board period, 
but began to show a declining trend during the Central Bank period, 
especially after 1968. The reason for this variation lies in the
L a n h(e19C!6n)tr(aaraBMck)?f J°rda"- " "  Ce"tral Ba"k no. 93.
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widened scope of the Bank's functions and the enhanced confidence in 
the system. The Central Bank began to exercise some of the stablisation 
tools at its disposal. The factors affecting changes in money supply 
became wider. Factors such as commercial bank credit and public borrow­
ing began to influence changes in money supply as strongly as changes in 
reserves did. However, a change in reserves level was not emphasised as a 
policy alternative for achieving a more stable economy. To elaborate 
this pointj the money supply showed a high rate of expansion over the 
period 1973-1975.1 This expansion inter alia resulted in an increase 
in prices which led the Central Bank to direct Its attention to con­
taining the growth in money supply by limiting credit, not by altering 
reserves levels.
In summary, the procedures followed by the Central Bank of Jordan 
differed from its predecessor's in two main respects. Firstly, the 
Central Bank adopted a more liberal policy of portfolio diversification 
econdly, it has had a greater autonony in managing and investing 
foreign reserves in a manner which would ensure both stability, con- 
vertability and profitability. The Bank made only slight changes to the 
Board's policy of linking the size of money stock to reserves. The 
following analysis will try to. assess the extent of the success of the 
Central Bank in managing reserves, and attempt to determine whether 
under the bank, Jordan's reserves holdings have been maintained at • 
an adequate level.
Demand for reserves is usually determined by a country's need to
1,. National Planning Council, Jordan Development Conference* Mobilisation
of domestic resources and amelioration of inf 1 ationàfv o r e s ^ r T ^ G 1211
sa"e ?n
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Table,6^ 7: Foreign reserves in relation to the money suoniv and money 
issue (in OP million) --------— ---  *
Year Reserves
(1)
Money supply 
(2)
Money issue
(3)
Ratio
1/2
Ratio
1/3
1952 13.01 12.63 8.76 103.0 148.5
1953 14.86 13.63 9.32 108.9 159.3
1954 17.43 16.74 12.00 104.1 145.2
1955 21.46 17.49 12.93 122.6 165.9
1956 25.18 20.24 16.78 124.4 150.0
1957 26.85 22.20 15.63 120.0 171.7
1958 30.77 24.33 16.33 126.4 188.4
1959 30.30 24.24. 15.98 125.0 189.6
1960 30.84 26.09 16.40 118.2 188.0
1961 34.38 28.92 17.96 118.8 191.4
1962 41.02 33.47 20.23 122.5 202.7
1963 35.06 36.85 21.75 95.1 161.1
1964 52.93 39.85 24.39 132.8 217.0
1965 60.95 47.27 27.63 128.9 220.0
1966 68.22 56.03 31.88 121.7 214.0
1967 93.57 75.24 53.02 124'3 176.5
1968 109.33 87.98 65.31 124.3 167.4
1969 95.19 96.22 73.14 98.9 130.1
1970 98.11 105.46 84.41 93.0 116.2
1971 92.88 107.98 84.59 86.0 109.8
1972 100.69 115.02 83.38 87.5 120.8
1973 107.37 139.25 99.54 77.1 107.9
1974 118.39 170.22 117.97 69.5 100.4
1975 174.90 218.50 141.92 80.0 123.2
CAurrp: HI Central Bank of Jordan,Statistics pertaining to some
* -aspects of the Jordan economy, (October iy/^ j, iaoie i. “ T “
f2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (June 1976}. 
(r3) Jordan Currency Board, Annual Reports (1956, .1960 and 1963).
- 245 -
finance its external payments.1 Relatively poor countries like Jordan 
must tailor the size of their reserves holdings to both, viz. the 
demand for goods and services and to the precautionary demand. If the 
size of the reserves is sufficient to meet both of these aspects of 
demand, then the reserves level may be considered adequate.
As has been previusly mentioned, the International Monetary Fund 
applies its own criteria of reserve adequacy. Notable amongst these is 
the reserves/import ratio, where total stock of reserves in any given 
year is divided by the value of imports for that year. Should the ratio 
be 70% for example, the level of reserves held would be sufficient to 
finance the imports of that country for a period of 0.7 years or roughly 
8.5 months. This ratio can be enlarged in order to meet the specific 
requirements of the individual country. If the economy is considered 
strong, then the precautionary demand is suppressed by shortening the 
period in which imports must be financed by the adequate reserves and 
vice versa. Table 6,8 contains data on Jordan's total reserves, total 
merchandise imports and the reserve import ratio. The graph of the 
ratio trend is shaped like an inverted 'U', the ratio starting relatively low 
and going up until it reaches a peak in 1968 and then declining consist­
ently. This does not mean that^reserves were not increasing all the 
time, rather it indicates that imports tended to increase faster than 
reserves, especially over the period 1972-1975.
This table reveals that from 1964 to 1966 the ratio barely exceeded 
100%, indicating that in normal economic conditions, reserves were just 
sufficient to finance imports for one year. Following the war of 1967
1. Flanderi;op. cit., (April 1971), p. 2.
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Table 6.8: Reserves/imports ratio in Jordan, 1964-1975 (in JD million)
Year Total reserves Total imports Reserves/imports (%)
1964 52.93 49.38 107.19
1965 60.95 55.77 109.29
1966 68.22 67.26 101.43
1967 93.52 54.23 172.54
1968 109.33 57.30 190.80
1969 95.19 67.46 141.11
1970 98.11 65.53 149.72
1971 92.88 76.19 121.91
1972 100.69 94.88 106.12
1973 107.37 107.80 99.60
1974 118.39 155.68 76.05
1975 174.90 232.94 75.08
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pertaining to some aspects of 
the Jordan economy (October 1974) and Central Bank of Jordan, 
Monthly Bulletin (July 1976).
and until the end of 1971, Jordan maintained a level of reserves high 
enough to finance imports for a period of 14 to 23 months. During the 
years 1972-1975, the level of reserves declined and was hardly sufficient 
to finance imports for more than a year. This decline to 75% in 1975 
was not the outcome of a deliberate policy but was rather imposed by 
international inflationary pressures and so does not reflect an improve­
ment in Jordan's economy, which pari passu was the cause of the decline in 
the ratio over the period 1972-1975. Despite this decline, comparison 
of Jordan's ratio with that of the rest of the world reveals that Jordan 
maintained her reserves at a relatively high level (see Table 6.9). If
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Table 6.9: Comparative reserve/import ratios for Jordan and other 
countries
Year Jordan World Industrial Oil 
countries exporters
Other less
developed
countries
1966 101 37 40 43 27
1967 172 36 38 46 28
1968 190 33 34 45 28
1969 , 141 30 30 43 28
1970 149 29 28 43 29
1971 121 32 33 52 28
1972 106 33 37 __ 6.3 32
1973 99 34 31 59 • 34
1974 76 26 21 78 25
1975 75 28 22 93 23
Source: IMF Annual Report, 1976 , p. 40. For Jordan see Table 6 J3, p. 246
of this thesis.
this adequacy measure is sound the conclusion cannot be avoided that the
current level of reserves involves risk, and that Jordan should adopt
reserves-saving policies.
It is clear, however, that the adequacy measure can only be valid
if the simple reserves/import ratio is to be relied upon as accurate.
In this connection, Machi up argues that 'there is neither theoretical
or statistical support for attaching apy real significance to the ratio 
of reserves to imports'J Machlup's study of the statistics of various
countries has indicated that the variations of the ratios between 
countries have been large. It may be noted, moreover, that certain
1. F. Machi up: 'The need for monetary reserves', Banca Nazaional de L 
Lavoro, vol. CIC, no. 78, (l966), p. 185.
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countries such as Egypt and India have reserves/import ratios which
are relatively much lower than other countries, while maintaining a .
•»
better economic performance than those other countries. Moreover, it 
is influenced by a diversity of factors which affect the reserves and 
import functions. Clearly then the ratio is a poor indicator of 
adequacy, because it describes what the reserve ratio is and not what 
it should be.
In the light of the point made above, a simple model will now be 
developed to measure the demand for reserves based on the assumption 
that in equilibrium, reserves supply will equal reserve demand. This 
will provide a more accurate and realistic measure of reserve adequacy 
than the simple reserve/import ratio. This theoretical determination 
of the supply of reserves will give a clear measure of the level of 
reserve holdings that may be considered as adequate for the Jordanian 
economy.
The model is based on the Keynesian paradigm which includes 
demand and Supply formation for money. The demand for money in this 
paradigm is a function of real income and the interest rates on govern­
ment bonds. Keynes discussed the transactionary demand for money 
and the interest rate the speculative demand for money. Demand for re­
serves, may be broken down in a similar fashion, with the exception 
that precautionary, instead of speculative,, demand will be taken into 
consideration. Transactionary demand for reserves is that component 
which is required to finance the country's foreign payments in a given 
period and includes merchandise imports, services and payments of foreign
1. In 1974 reserves /imports ratio for India was only 27% and for Egypt 
29%. See IFS, vol. 5, (May 1976)
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debts. Such comprehensiveness is necessary in order to take account 
of all foreign obligations, because Jordan's imports of services and 
capital are constantly growing and constitute an amount too large to be 
neglected. The transactionary demand for reserves, therefore, will 
be the function of total foreign obligations.
°TR ' f! <P> <’)
where:
DyR is the transactionary demand for reserves and 
P is the total foreign payments.
The precautionary demand for reserves is that element in total 
reserves holdings which*covers the country's need to maintain a hedge 
against future unforeseen contingencies. The size of this demand 
depends on the amount of fluctuation in the level of reserves over time. 
The greater the variation in reserves, the larger the precautionary 
demand for reserves and vice versa. Therefore,
°PR = f2 < VR> <2>
where:
DpR is the precautionary demand for reserves, and 
VR is the variation in reserves.
The total demand for reserves is, thus, equal to the transactionary 
as well as the precautionary demand.
°R = °TR + °PR
* f,(P) + f 2(VR) (3)
where
Dr is the total demand for reserves.
If we assume that (P) and (V^) are exogenously determined, then the 
values for the two unknown dependent variables can be determined from
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the two equations. To complete the system, a market equilibrium 
equation is needed. This equation is:
Dr = SR (4)
where
SR is the supply or the theoretically adequate reserves level.
The above can be transformed into an empirically tested formula.
For this purpose each equation will be transformed as indicated b61ow.
(1) The Precautionary Demand for Reserves .
^Since the precautionary demand for reserves is dependent on their 
degree of variation, a measure of that variation is essential. The con­
ventional statistical measure used is the standard deviation. It 
cannot alone determine the precautionary demand for reserves without 
behavioural assumptions. For this analysis, two such assumptions will 
be made . Firstly,that in normal conditions, Jordan will maintain a level 
of reserves greater than the required amount for any given year, and secondly, 
that in abnormal circumstances Jordan would maintain a level of reserves 
greater than that required for any two years. Two periods will be 
examined here. First, 1964-1966 or the pre-1967 war years, when Jordan 
enjoyed relatively stable economic growth. Second, 1967-1975, or the 
post war years which include the 1967 war itself, as well as the 1970- 
1971 civil disturbances and the upheaval in world economic and monetary
•i.
system in the years 1973 onwards.
Given a 'normal' distribution,’the amount of reserves required in 
order to prevent exhaustion of reserves holdings in one year with a
i
i
i
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95% probability, is equal to the standard deviation multiplied by 
1.65J Hence, the magnitude of the precautionary demand for reserves 
can be found. After computation, the relevant standard deviation is 
30.01 for the period 1964-1975. Precautionary demand for the years 
1964-1966 is computed on the first behavioural assumption, while the 
demand in the remaining years is based on the second. Table 6.10 
shows the results of the computations.
Table 6.10: Estimated precautionary demand for reserves, 1964-1975
Year Standard
deviation
(1)
Probability
co-factor
(2)
DPR
(3) = ( 1 x 2 )
1964 30.01 1.65 49.16
1965 30.01 1.65 49.16
1966 30.01 1.65 49.16.
1967 30.01 2.33 69.92
1968 30.01 2.33 69.92
1969 30.01 2.33 69.92
1970 30.01 2.33 69.92
1971 30.01 2.33 69.92
1972 30.01 2.33 69.92
1973 30.01 2.33 69.92
1974 30.01 2.33 69.92
1975 30.01 2.33 69.92
»
1. This figure is derived from the statistically normal distribution 
table corresponding to 4500 using one trial test. To prevent 
exhaustion in two years the appropriate figure equals 1.65 multiplied 
by square root of 2 = 2.33.
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2. The Transactionary Demand for Reserves
The definition of the precautionary demand for reserves analysed 
above was considered as an integral part of the transactionary demand 
for reserves in the IMF, Kelly and Wadva modelsJ In
these models, both transactionary demand and precautionary demand 
are lumped together in the fashion of the Keynesian demand for money.
The total demand for reserves is a function of the variability of the 
reserves themselves. All models referred to above implicitly assume 
that the policy target of monetary authorities is to prevent the 
exhausion of reserves within a given period of time. Therefore, the 
total demand for reserves in these models may be expressed as follows:
DR = f(VR) (5)
DR = a + bvr + e (6)
Here, e is an error item which has commonly been neglected in previous 
models. It is proposed here that e is especially important to countries 
which are aware of the trend in their total foreign payments. The 
transactionary demand then, is here interpreted in a new way. It means 
the demand for reserves which are required in the current period in order 
to cover the increase in total foreign payment in the previous period.
The year to year variation in payments is what e signifies in equation 
(6) above.
It follows that the sum of (a) and (bvr) constitutes the precautionary 
demand for reserves. The importance of this interpretation stems from 
two factors, each of which relies on slightly different behavioural 
assumptions. First that countries which are vulnerable to extreme and
1. C. D. Wadva: 'Reserve pooling in Asia and the Far Facf ■ *. 
Development Review, IX, no. 3, Autumn 1969, p. 327. EaSt ’ — 1stan
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internal variables do not determine the need for reserves solely on the 
variation in reserves, and secondly, that the same countries .are anxious 
about developments in the payments on which reserves are expended.
The proposed transactionary demand for reserves is:
dtr = fi
or, in order to be consistent with the above analysis,
Dtr = f, (OP) (7)
The change in payments (<6P) may be expressed as the difference 
from the previous period or,
^  P - Pt - Pt-1 (8)
However, when P was computed for Jordan over the period 1964-
t
1975, it was found that it had an erratic trend. To smooth out the 
sharp fluctuations, a moving average of three years ending with the 
current year was used, as follows:
A  p = (Pt-2 - Pt-3> + ipt-l - Pt-2> + <Pt-1 - Pt> <9>
3
Consequently, a time series of P  ^computed for the period 1964-1975 
(see Table 6.11) where i = 1, 2, 3 . . .12. The values obtained are 
equal to e in equation (6) above or equal to the transactionary demand 
for reserves.
The Total Demand for Reserves
From equation 3, total demand is equated to the sum of transaction­
ary and precautionary demands for reserves. This total demand is equal 
to the supply of reserves given the assumption of equilibrium which in 
turn determines the theoretically adequate level of reserves. Therefore 
a comparison between the estimated reserve level and the actual level 
of reserves can be made. Table 6.12 below indicates that Jordan
maintains a higher level of reserves than that warranted by its demand
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Table 6.11: Estimated transactionary demand for reserves, 1964-1975 
(in JD million)
Year Actual P A  P Moving average
1961 46.08
1962 50.74
1963 61.35
1964 57.93
1965 66.76
1966 78.30
1967 65.58
1968 82.58
1969 110.43
1970 92.04
1971 100.04
1972 123.10
1973 142.82
1974 203.35
1975 315.12
am
10.60 «■
-3.42 3.95
8.83 5.33
5.54 3.65
-12.77 0.53
17.05 3.27
27.85 10.71
-18.39 8.57
8.00 5.82
23.06 4.22
19.72 16.74
60.53 34.43
111.77 64.00
P = total payment for goods, services, and repayment of foreign loans.
Source: Central Bank of Jordan: Statistics pertaining to some aspects 
of the Jordan economy, (October 1974), Table 15. Central 
Bank of Jordan, Month-ly Bulletin (June 1976), Table 14.
conditions. On average the excess reserves maintained are almost 
equal to 20%
The above analysis suggests that Jordan's monetary authorities 
tend to hold 'excessive' foreign reserves. Why does Jordan, a developing 
country with relatively limited resources, large imports and few exports, 
hold such a high level of reserves?
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Table 5.12: Estimated and actual stock of reserves, 1964-1975 (in 
OP million) ~ *
Year DR - Estimated 
reserves
TH---
TR PR Total
^ tua1 Excess Ratio
reserves reserves (31 7T77T
TZ) T^TT)
1964 3.95 49.16 53.11
1965 5.33 49.16 54.54
1966 3.65 49.16 52.81
1967 0.53 69.92 70.45
1968 3.27 69.92 73.19
— 1969 10.71 69.92 80.63
1970 8.57 69.92 78.49
1971 5.82 69.92 78.74
1972 4.22 69.92 74.14
1973 16.74 69.92 86.66
1974 34.43 69.92 104.35
1975 64.00 69.92 133.92
52.93 -0.18 -
60.95 6.46 10.6
68.22 15.41 22.5
93.53 23.08 24.7
104.33 31.14 29.8
95.19 14.56 15.3
98.11 19.62 20.0
92.88 ' 17.14 18.4
100.69 26.55 26.3
107.37 20.71 19.3
118.34 13.99 11.8
174.93 30.01 23.4
Total 161.22 776.76 937.98 1167.47 229.47 19.6
The answer to this question lies in the fact that Jordan's 
policy makers appear to be convinced that large reserve holdings promote 
Jordan's economic development by creating confidence in the economy 
and this in turn induces an inflow of foreign capital into Jordan.
The Central Bank made this belief quite explicit in its 1969 
Annual Report:
Comfortable reserves of gold and foreign currencies serve three 
major purposes (i} securing the convertability of the national 
currency and the stability of its value internally and 
externally;(ii) financing foreign trade transactions particularly 
imports and invisibles; ( m )  soliciting foreign loans, reserves 
being a fundamental aspect of a sound national economy and its
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ability to meet external obligations.11 
Thus, the excessive level of reserve holdings is a deliberate policy 
aimed at enhancing the economic development of the country. It is 
the contention here that such a policy is a gamble based on unrealistic 
assumptions.
During the past twenty years it has become established economic 
wisdom that the holding of 'excessive' reserves is undesirable, 
particularly by developing countries. It has been pointed out that 
the maintenance of 100% currency backing is based on the assumption 
that all outstanding currency notes might be submitted to the monetary 
authority for conversion into other foreign currencies, and that 
stability therefore depends on 100% currency backing. This assumption 
is, to say the least, over-cautious and has the effect of preventing 
the use of reserves to finance economic development. In fact, exper­
ience has shown that the stability of the value of the Jordan dinar (in 
ternally and externally) has in the past been associated with political 
conditions in Jordan rather than with its level of reserves.^
The argument that high reserve holdings may serve as a basis 
upon which foreign loans may be obtained is a weak one. Indeed, it 
may reasonably lead to the assertion that countries with large reserve 
holdings are not in need of foreign loans in the first place. In this 
connection, it is worth mentioning two important facts. Firstly, that
1. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 1969, p. 42.
2. -TiLe°ry_ of Economic Growth, George Allen & Unwin, London (1970),
3. In 1967 and 1970 despite the fact that reserves exceeded money
issues, the market value of the Jordanian dinar dropped drastically 
in the Beirut market and other Arab countries. y
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foreign capital received by Jordan is mainly in the form of grants and not 
loans, and secondly, that loans from foreign governments are not 
granted on purely economic grounds alone. More often than not pol­
itical considerations play the major role in determining the foreign 
loans. The size of reserves, thus, only marginally affects the ability 
to borrow. Furthermore, creditworthiness is assessed more accurately 
by the debt/service ratio rather than by the reserves stock. It has 
been shown, in Chapter Four, that Jordan's debt/service ratio is small 
which minimises the need for a large stock of reserves to cover foreign 
debt.
The strongest argument advanced in favour of holding large 
reserves is that in a poor country such as Jordan the growth of these 
reserves depends mainly on an inflow of aid, and that since this source 
is particularly vulnerable to political circumstances, it is inevitable 
that reserve levels will be high, in order to ensure availability for 
the finance of the inflow of imports. However, the counter-argument 
can be advanced that: 'The poorer, more slowly growing countries are 
likely to receive a high proportion of grant aid and to use it to 
increase consumption'.^ This has in fact been the case in Jordan ever 
since the country was established. What is more, aid flows have 
usually increased in times of crisis. The clearest example of this is 
the 1967 crisis, when the inflow of aid became almost twice that of the 
1966 level. While it is true that in 1970-1971 the level of aid dropped 
compared with the 1969 level, this decline has to be viewed against
1. A. P.Thirlwall, Inflation, Saving and Growth in Developing Countries, 
Macmillan, London (1974), p. 193. '
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the general background of the domestic political situation in 1970, 
when the very existence of the State was threatened.
Excessive reserves in Jordan can be considered as one of the 
outcomes of the bias of the internal industrial structure and its 
development. During the period 1959-1974 GNP grew at an annual rate 
of 8% while consumption only grew at 7% per annum, but the latter 
continued to exceed production in most of the years (see Table 6.13). 
Only in 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1968 was the economy able to produce 
a small excess over consumption to support development. The disequil- 
ibirum between domestic supply and domestic demand had to be supple­
mented by a large inflow of imports, which in turn contributed to the 
expansion of services. Thus, on the one hand, expansion of consumption 
has led to an increase in imports and a consequent increase in tertiary 
activities, on the other hand, the increase in the tertiary sector, 
coupled with increased urbanisation, has played an important role 
in further enhancing consumption, particularly of durable consumer 
goods. The inevitable result has been a continuous increase in the 
demand for imports. The analysis of imports made in Chapter Three 
demonstrated that over 60% of total imports consisted of consumption
goods. Of these,non-essential items accounted for over 50%. Such a«
consumption level could not have been maintained without foreign aid. 
Hence, as a precautionary measure the government opted to hold large 
reserves to maintain the consumption level.
It is clear, therefore, that the reserve level and economic 
policy interacted with each other. The important economic effect of 
the high level of reserves was that it encouraged more expansionary 
financial policies, less severe restrictions on trade, and, on the 
whole, consumption which, in turn, affected imports. This sequence,
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Table 6.13: Consumption and GNP (in JD million)
RatiYear Consumption (1) GNP (2)
1959 112.5 99.2 113
1960 115.5 105.7 109
1961 130.8 127.2 102
1962 122.5 130.8 93
1963 149.9 .137.6 109
1964 155.8 160.6 96
1965 174.7 180.5 96
1966 188.6 185.6 101
1967 204.8 205.9 99
1968 212.0 ' 197.3 107
1969 231.5 233,7 99
1970 226.9 222.5 102
1971 247.7 236.6 104
1972 265.7 263.0 101
1973 293.8 286.6 102
1974 357.6 341.9 104
1975 399.5 394.9 101
Source: See Statistical Appendix 4.
in its turn, affects the balance of payments and consequently reserves.
Excessive foreign reserves have provided policy makers with a 
cushion enabling them to adopt liberal trade policy that has resulted 
in a large inflow of imported consumer goods. This has prevented, or 
at least delayed, the introduction of measures necessary for long term 
development.
Long term planning in Jordan has, in the past, considered this 
problem, but appropriate measures to reduce domestic consumption, the
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trade deficit, and the requirement of foreign aid, have not been 
adopted. In 1964, a Seven Year Plan for Economic Development was 
initiated. The Plan aimed at a major increase in production as well 
as reducing the level of unemployment, and bringing about a major 
reduction in the trade deficit and in the foreign assistance. However, 
as has been shown in Chapter Three, this Plan was only a set of unco­
ordinated projects many of which did not seem to be based upon extensive 
analysis. Moreover, the implementation of the Plan under normal 
conditions lasted only two years until the 1967 war. The disruption of 
_the Plan at that point necessitated a reassessment of priorities, but 
this, however, was not carried out systematically. This ad hoc 
approach to the economic policy persisted until 1973, when the Three 
Year Plan (1973-1975) was introduced. The aim of this Plan was not 
structural economic reform,but 'revitalising economic activities and
resuming the development momentum disrupted by the 1967 June war'J
o
It was not until the Five Year Plan (1976-198/) was introduced 
that Jordan's structural problem, and the need to change the predominantly 
services economy, was directly faced. The main objective of this plan 
is
'The achievement of changes in the Jordanian economy through 
developing the commodity-producing sectors, increasing their 
share in GDP, strengthening the movement towards a self- 
sustained economy and expanding its productive capacity'.2
Accordingly the plan anticipates that the contribution of the services
sector to the gross domestic product will decline from 64.8% in 1974 to
55.9% in 1980. It is anticipated that the services sector will grow
1. National Planning Council, Report of the Jordan Development Conference, 
November 1972] JDC/72/2.
'2. National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980, Amman (unpublished),
p. 28.
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at an average annual rate of 8.6%, while the material output sectors . 
will grow at a rate of 21.1% per annumJ Howevey, the distribution of the 
Plan's investment programme reveals that the share of the services 
sectors is JD 355.7 million (46.5%) and the material output only JD 
409.3 million (53.5%). Such a distribution is not compatible with 
the claim that the contribution of services will decline to 55.9%.
Further, given the current liberal economic policy, coupled with the 
possibility that Amman may become a regional financial and commercial 
centre, growth will certainly be biassed towards services. Private 
sector investment (estimated to be JD 383 million , or 50.1% of 
total investment of the plan) will concentrate on offices, restaurants, 
trade, banking, insurance. This will clearly cause services to grow at 
a rate higher than envisaged by the plan.
In such circumstances, the monetary authorities in Jordan have 
been tempted to rely on foreign reserves and have consequently over­
looked and/or deferred necessary economic adjustment, i.e. mobilisation 
of domestic resources through monetary measures.
Although the high level of reserves seems to be associated with 
the problem of Jordan's industrial structure, it may still be 
argued, with some justification, that part of the reserve holdings 
could be rationally utilised to finance development projects. The 
return on such investments would be much higher than the return from 
holding these assets abroad. In fact, it is rather a luxury for a 
country like Jordan to hold such a high level of reserves, given that 
development is the primary policy objective. Accumulation of these 1
1. Ibid., p. 32.
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holdings is not necessarily equivalent to the accumulation of capital 
- on the contrary such a process may entail a capital loss.1
In order to estimate the total cost incurred by holding large 
reserves, a simple model based on Keynesian liquidity preference 
theory will be used. However, the different variables employed will 
have other values. Two types of cost are considered here. The first 
type, direct cost, refers to the cost incurred as a result of the 
decline in the purchasing power of reserves. In other words, it is 
assumed that the reserve holdings of a given reserve currency will 
be used in purchasing commodities from the country which issues that 
currency. If the currency-issuing country suffers from inflation, 
which spills over to its exports, the holding country will suffer a 
comparable loss.
The second type of cost, implicit cost, refers to the opportunity 
cost which is incurred by opting to hold reserves as a currency cover 
rather than investing them in development projects inside the country. 
Therefore,
ct = Cd + C1
where:
0 )
Ct is total cost; is direct cost; and C. is implicit cost.
Direct cost
The direct cost will be computed by the following formula
Cd ( 2 ) 1
1. W. A. Lewis, Theory of Economic Growth, George Allen & Unwin (1970), 
ninth impression, p. 246.
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where:
Y.j = is the annual average holdings of a given reserve currency.
P = is the present value of currency holdings in the base year. 
The present value can be obtained by using the following formula:
1 (3)
P = (1 + r)1 (1 + r)2 (1 + r)3 (1 + r)n
where (Y-j) is the average annual holdings of a given currency in 
Year i (i = 1, 2, 3 . . . n). r is a discount rate.
For the purposes of making the measurement more exact, two basic 
operations were employed. Firstly, r was used to denote the percentage 
annual increase in the export prices of the country issuing the reserve 
currency. Therefore
rl =
Pt - Pt-1 (4)
t-1
where r-j is the annual percentage increase in the prices of the 
exports of the country issuing the currency under consideration.
Pt _1 is the export price index of the country which issues the reserve 
currency in the period preceding the current period.
Pt is the export price index of the same country in the current period.
The reserve currencies which have been included in the analysis 
are five, namely, sterling, U.S. dollars, Swiss francs, French francs 
and Deutsche marks, r represents the discount rate for each one of 
these currencies on the basis of the export price indices of the U.K., 
U.S.A., Switzerland, France and Germany respectively. Table 6.14 gives 
the export price indices of the five countries over the period 1970- 
1975 (1970 = 100). The data therein were used to compute the value 
r^  for each currency.
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Table 6 .14: Export price indices for the major reserve countries,
1970--1975
Year U.K. U.S.A. Switzerland France Germany
1970 aoo.o 100.0 100.0 ‘ 100.0 100.0
1971 107.1 103.3 107.0 106.1 106.3
1972 115.2 106.2 125.0 117.6 118.4
1973 128.9 124.1 155.0 146.6 146.3
1974 157.2 157.6 186.0 171.1 173.4
1975 182.8 . 177.3 222.0 202.8 195.4
Source: (1) International Monetary Fund , International Financial\ * J 1 M  V w l  I I Q  t  i  U I I Q  J I I v l l C  v Q  l  J r  I  U I I U ) i  Jr  t v
Statistics, Voi. XXIX (November 1976).
(2) International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, Vol. XXIX (April 1976).
Secondly, the value of or the average annual holdings of a 
given reserve currency was computed in the following manner. It is 
known that Jordan usually diversifies its portfolio of currency 
holdings to include different types of investments such as current 
accounts, time deposits, securities and bonds. A single currency may 
be dispersed over 30 different investments. The balance of each 
deposit, security or bond was taken on a bi-weekly basis. Thus a year 
was divided into 26 sub-periods, and the balance of each investment 
was summed up accordingly. The total of these investments was calculated 
for 26 sub-periods constituting a year. The grand total of the total 
investment.of these periods was then divided by 26 to give the average 
annual holdings of each currency in every year during 1970-1975. The 
justification for this process lies in the fact that end of the year 
figures do not accurately represent the holding for the whole year. 
Moreover, seasonably adjusted data would not properly reflect the short 
period changes in each currency holdings.
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Having found Y-j, Yg, Y^. . . Yn for each currency, and r^, r^ 
. . . rn for each currency, it was possible to measure the value of 
each currency at the 1970 export price of each respective country.
Yet equation (3) cannot be used immediately because (r) is not the 
same for every year, therefore, the equation was modified as follows:
The present value was computed, in this way, for the five currencies 
under consideration. The results are in Table (7) in the Appendix.
It was next necessary to compute the percentage loss which was incurred 
by holding reserves in an inflationary export situation. Since the 
period under consideration witnessed a high increase in the world export 
pricesT the magnitude of the loss was very great.
The percentage direct cost obtained from equation (2), however, 
is measured on a gross and not a net basis. Reserves do earn an 
interest rate when they are invested. It therefore became necessary 
to adjust the gross cost by .introducing interest earnings in order to 
obtain the net cost. The net cost obtained is treated here in a 
similar fashion to the treatment of any financial investment in a stock 
market.
To measure the percentage interest earnings on each currency, the 
total earnings of that currency was obtained and divided by the relevant 
Y-j. The net direct cost may, therefore, be expressed as follows:
(1 + r ^ d  + r2) + +
Y
Net C . = —  
d Y
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where Y is the interest earnings on a certain currency in year i. The 
ratio obtained for net Cd for each currency in every year is shown in 
Table 6.15 below:
Table 6¡.15: Net capital gain or loss for Jordan's foreign reserves 11)
Year £ - U.K. $ - U.S. Swiss francs French francs Deutsche
mark
1970 • • - - -
1971 4.01 4.08 2.97 1.52 4.72
1972 -7.99 -2.91 -8.15 -5.97 -0.31
1973 -27.96 -19.81 -17.02 -17.89 -5.98
1974 -45.05 -42.64 -30.81 -36.59 -22.31
1975 -65.33 -65.31 -44.87 -57.07 -35.54
Source: Statistical Appendix 7.
The table shows that Jordan has been incurring a high loss from 
excessive holdings of all types of reserves. The data in Table 6.15 shows 
that the purchasing power of the different reserve currencies declined 
steadily over the period 1971-1975, taking 1970 as a base year.
The highest loss was incurred from holding sterling assets, followed by 
the U.S. dollars and the French francs. Although the loss incurred from 
holding Deutsche marks was the lowest, its magnitude is still high in 
absolute terms.
In the above table - P is cumulative over five years, while
~Tr
figures for interest received are for one year. This may lead to confusion 
because the total holdings of each reserve currency vary. A simple
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indicator might be based on a calculation of the loss using price 
changes minus interest earned, for the case where one unit of each 
currency has been kept in reserves over the whole period. The annual 
percentage gain or loss may be obtained using the export prices indices 
for the major reserve countries (Table 6.14, p. 264) together with the 
average interest rates received by Jordan for holding these reserves 
(Appendix 7, p. 369). The results are presented in Table 6.15a below.
Table 6.15a: Percentage capital gain or loss for each unit of Jordan's 
reserves
Year £ - U.K. $ - U.S. Swiss francs French francs Deutsche
mark
1970 • - - - -
1971 2.2 3.9 -0.2 0.1 0.8
1972 -0.8 3.1 -7.6 -4.5 -6.2
1973 -1.7 -9.4 -19.5 -17.9 -18.0
1974 -9.7 -16.15 -12.8 -4.5 -12.9
1975 -2.0 -4.4 -10.8 -7.7 -3.5
Source: Computed from Table 6.14, p. 264 and from Appendix 7, p. 369.
The important policy implication which may be inferred here, is thatI
the income earned from interest from holding any single reserve 
currency should not necessarily be the only criterion for determining 
the investment or the size of currency holdings. More importantly, in
i
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an unstable international monetary market, attention should be given 
to the expected capital gain or loss.
Having shown that Jordan's loss was very high relative to its 
financial resources, it is important to point out the opportunity 
cost of holding such excessive reserves. Heller, in his thesis 
dealing with the factors which determine the level of reserves, mentioned 
that while countries tend to hold reserves to hedge themselves against 
future contingencies they incur a cost in income and welfare.simultaneously.^ 
Opportunity cost here, therefore, is the marginal rate of return (r) 
foregone by not transforming reserves into physical capital. The higher 
the cost of holding reserves, the smaller the demand for such reserves.
Heller has estimated the cost at only 5% annually for the 60 countries 
included in his paper. Flanders, on the other hand, assumes that it 
can be determined for each country by the marginal utility of forgone 
imports.^
Although most of the studies on this subject have agreed on the 
concept of the cost of reserves, there has been a confusion about which 
proxy should be used to measure this cost. For example, marginal 
utility of foregone imports is a rather misleading proxy because imports 
include both capital and consumer goods. As a result other proxies 
have been used, such as interest rates, increases in per capita income 
and capital-output ratio. These may be appropriate when applied to 
the developed countries, but less so in a developing economy like Jordan's. 
Interest rate, for example,is an unsatisfactory variable and does not
1. H. R. Heller: 'Optimal international reserves', Economic Journal,
76 (302), (June, 1966^ pp. 296-311.
2. Flanders:op. cit., (1971), p. 47.
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reflect productivity of capital in Jordan. Interest rates in Jordan 
are rigid and do not change in either the money or capital markets, 
which are small and fragmented. Moreover, interest rates are kept 
more rigid by the fact that the teachings of Islam consider any form 
of interest as usury. Quick profit is the major factor which deter­
mines the shape of the investment function, not interest.^
Incremental capital-output ratios (ICOR) may be thought of as an 
alternative proxy. Nevertheless, incremental capital-output ratio can 
bnly be used if it is segregated according to each productive sector. 
Such a sectoral distribution for investment is not available for Jordan.
To make the computation useful, the fact that a high proportion 
of Jordan's GDP is dominated by the service sector has been taken into 
consideration. To estimate the ICOR, therefore, the following assump­
tion was made, viz. that 87% of total capital formation is directed 
toward the physically producing sectors. This assumption was based on
the estimated investment programme in the Five Year Plan for Economic,
2
Development, 1976-1980. The estimations were made on the simple 
known formula where K is the ICOR, Y is the GDP of the physical 
producing sector and I is the total capital formation in each year 
(which equals 87% of total capital formation).
The computation revealed expected results. During the period
1. Jawad Anani: 'A comparison between the effects of fiscal and 
monetary action on economic activity, the case of Jordan'. Unpublished 
thesis, University of Georgia (1975). See a further analysis of 
usury in Chapter Seven.
2. National Planning Council, Five Year Plan, 1976-1980, Table 3, Amman, 
n.d., p. 35.
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1959-1974 average ICOR was 1.81. When the computation was amended on 
constant prices, using the cost of living index as a deflater, it 
reached 2.78. When the period was divided into pre-war and post-war 
periods, the ICOR was higher in the pre-war period (2.68) than the post­
war period (1.43). This decline in the ICOR during the latter period 
may reflect an increase in the productivity of the Jordanian economy and 
better use of capital. This decline in the ratio may be explained by 
the preponderance of social overhead investments during the pre-war 
period, whose yield takes a long time to materialize, while in the 
early seventies a large proportion of investments were directed into 
directly productive sectors.
Table 6.16 compares the average of excess reserves with the 
actual total of investment used for production purposes. It is 
evident from the table that the rate of growth would then have increased 
by ratios varying from 19.2% to 69.1% according to the year selected 
if these excess reserves had been utilised domestically.
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Table 6.16: Excess reserves, investment and income, 1971-1975 (in JD millinnl
Year
0)
Excess
reserves
(2)
Investment
(3)
Income
.(4).
1/2
1971 17.14 43.3 202 39.5
1972 26.55 38.3 224 69.1
1973 20.71 44.5 234 46.5
1974 13.99 72.5 308 19.2
1975 40.01 80.5 330 49.7
Source: (1) See Table 6.12, p. 255.
(2) See Appendix 4, p. 366. Investment is assumed to equal 87% 
of the figure presented in Table 4 of the Appendix.
(3) See Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, Amman (1975).
Summary
The central theme of this chapter has been that the stock of 
reserves held by Jordan has exceeded the demand for such holdings, and 
that the excess reserves so generated have involved an appreciable 
opportunity cost sacrifice by the Jordanian economy. 1 23
It has been shown that, in the particular case of Jordan, where 
a considerable proportion of trade is financed by the private sector/ 
private sector holdings cannot be ignored in the analysis. However, a
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parallel foreign exchange market, operated and run by private money 
changers, makes it difficult to accurately assess such holdings.
Under the aegis of the Currency Board and the Central Bank, foreign 
reserves have been held in excess of demand. On the one hand, the 
Board was unable to adopt a flexible reserve policy, because the par 
value of the Jordanian dinar was pegged against sterling, and its 
reserve holdings consisted solely of sterling and the reserves money/ 
stock ratio was fixed by the one to one rule. On the other hand, the 
Central Bank managed to diversify the portfolio composition of its 
holdings, and the money supply was allowed to be affected by factors 
other than foreign reserves. Although the Bank was given full auth­
ority to manage reserves, empirical analysis has demonstrated that it 
too tended to hold them at an excessive level. This policy of excessive 
holdings has been adopted on the assumption that a high reserve level 
is symbolic of profitable investment opportunities. When this was 
subjected to close analysis the assumption was not only shown to be 
wrong but also to indicate a failure to adopt necessary adjustment 
measures to correct Jordan's structural imbalances. The excessive 
level of domestic consumption in relation to limited domestic prod­
uction has required a high level of imports, particularly in non- 
essential consumer items. Jordan therefore tends to hold excessive 
amounts of reserves to maintain these high levels of consumption. As 
national reserves are excessive, policy makers are encouraged to 
adopt a more expansionary policy.
The high level of reserves has been shown to be very costly in 
two respects. Firstly, the direct cost attributable to the decline 
in the purchasing power of reserves, particularly under general
conditions of international inflation» and secondly, the implicit cost 
which is the cost of opportunities foregone by opting to hold such 
a high level of reserves.
The next step in examining the monetary aspects of Jordan's foreign 
trade is to consider money supply and domestic credit. Chapter Seven 
discusses their relationship with the balance of payments.
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CHAPTER SEVEN; MONETARY POLICY AND THE TRADE DEFICIT
In contrast to its industrial structure, which has remained 
basically services oriented, Jordan's financial structure has undergone 
radical changes since 1950. The economy has become substantially 
monetised as a result of institutional development within the banking 
system, namely the establishment of the Central Bank of Jordan in 
196 4 and the emergence of new commercial banks and specialised credit 
institutions in the money market. Concomitant with this, a number of 
new financial instruments including government bonds and securities 
and mechanisms of credit control have been created.
Despite these developments, however, the nature of the trade 
problem remains essentially as it was at the time of independence. 
Consequently, the need for financial aid to finance the domestic 
trade deficit has become even more crucial. In this chapter an attempt 
will be made to outline the relationship between the development of 
the financial system and the trade deficit, including an analysis of, 
money supply development and the factors affecting it. The impact of 
this expansion on the inflow and structure of imports will be 
particularly emphasised.
The considerations-arid relationships are many and very inter­
twined in cause and effect. The discussion that follows selects the 
following areas and considers each in the sequence as given below:
(a) - the statistics of monetary development
(b) - the components of money supply
(c) - domestic credit and monetary expansion and the government role
(d) - the domestic credit expansion and the private sector
(e) - the inflationary implication of the monetary expansion
(f) - the inflationary implication of the aid flow
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(g) - the limited impact of Central Bank credit control policy
(h) - the excess liquidity of the commercial banks
(i) - the implicationsof the fragmented financial structure
(j) - the need to allow interest rates to be market determined
(k) - the need for a more realistic exchange rate policy
(a) The statistics of monetary development
Experience of developed Western countries has shown that, when
development takes place the ratio of money (broadly defined) to GNP
(the inverse of income velocity) tends to increase and that rapidly
growing real cash balances contribute to the increase of investment
and total outputJ and consequently to more self-sustained economic
growth and a reduction in balance of payments deficit. Although
Jordan has witnessed such an increase in its real monetary balances
during the last twenty-five years, the magnitude of its trade deficit
problem remains substantially as it was during the 1950s.
2
Table 7.1 shows how the M2 money supply increased from the low 
1951 level of JD 15 million to reach JD 277.74 million in 1975 (an 
average annual increase of 11.87%). The highest increase however, 
was recorded during the closing period of this study (1973-1975) when
1. J. 6. Gurley and E. S. Shaw: 'Financial Development and Economic 
Development', Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 15, no. 3,
¿\pril 1967jt pp. 257-65.
2. The official published statistics in Jordan define the money supply 
as being demand deposits held by the private sector, and currency in 
circulation. Both time and saving deposits are excluded on the grounds that 
they are not conventionally used directly for transaction purposes.
However, for the purposes of this study, these deposits will be included 
for they are included in the computation of the liquidity ratio of the 
commercial banks. Furthermore, since individuals are free to hold their 
money balances in the form of cash and/or demand deposits, they are free
as well to switch their portfolio holdings between demand and time deposits. 
Thus, the exclusion of these balances would render an assessment of the 
impact of changes in aggregate money balances on the balance of payments 
incomplete. The money supply will be defined here to include currency in 
the hands of the public plus private sector deposits including time and 
savings deposits (M2).
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Table 7.'1 : M0 and GNP in Jordan, 1951 -1975 (in JD million)
Rati o 
(2/3)
Year
(?)
Trade deficit 
(2)
GNP
(3)
Ratio
(1/3)
1951 15.00
1952 13.41 15.04 49.2 27.0 30.6
1953 14.71 15.55 42.7 39.0 36.9
1954 18.22 15.54 52.5 34.0 29.9
1955 20.74 21.72 48.9 42.0 45.2
1956 22.95 19.50 68.1 33.0 28.6
1957 25.70 24.28 69.5 37.0 34.9
1958 27.97 30.49 76.3 37.0 40.1
1959 28.94 35.91 86.1 33.0 41.7
I960' 30.95 37.48 93.9 33.0 40.3
1961 35.60 35.66 127.1 28.0 27.5
1962 43.04 37.59 130.8 32.6 20.9
1963 48.03 47.07 137.6 35.6 34.3
1964 53.57 40.60 160.6 33.0 25.3
1965 64.26 45.90 180.4 36.0 25.9
1966 74.82 56.90 185.7 41.0 30.2
1967 83.50 42.90 206.0 41.0 23.2
1968 108.82 43.00 197.3 55.0 23.8
1969 118.83 52.70 233.7 51.0 32.9
1970 129.13 53.30 222.5 58.0 35.0
1971 135.71 64.80 236.6 57.0 27.0
1972 146.47 77.87 252.4 58.0 30.9
1973 176.07 83.65 291.3 60.0 29.0
1974 216.74 105.93 373.9 58.0 28.3
1975 277.74 183.06 394.9 60.0 46.0
Source: See Appendices 3 and 8.
\
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the money supply increased by an average of 23%. This increase in 
total money supply was reflected in the ratio of M2 to GNP, which by 
1975 had increased to more than twice its 1952 level, becoming one of 
the highest of all developing countries. Despite the high
relative level of money supply to GNP, the trade problem continued to 
worsen.
(b) The components of money supply
It is clear from figure 7.1 that despite the high rate of growth of 
M2, the share of each component remained basically'the same as it was in 
the 1950s. The ratio of money in circulation during the period shows 
a movement which reflects political events in the area. During periods 
of stability the ratio declined, while in periods of instability it 
rose. Between 1951 and 1958 Jordan witnessed a great deal of domestic 
political unrest and uncertainty. There were clashes on the border with 
Israel; a conflict between the government and other neighbouring Arab 
countries (Egypt and Syria); and of course the Suez war of 1956. During 
such periods of uncertainty, people tend to hold their financial assets 
in the form of cash because of the precautionary motive. Consequently 
these' balances accounted for over 50% of total M2 during this period.
From 1958 to 1966, Jordan and h'er neighbours enjoyed relative political 
stability, and sustained growth. The ratio, therefore, showed a 
declining tendency, reaching about 40% In 1966. However, the war of 1967 
reversed this trend and the ratio increased, reaching its highest ever 
level of 63% during the 1970 political unrest, after which it returned
- i'
to a downward trend, reaching 50% by 1975, almost the same level as 
in the 1950s.
- f
By contrast, the level of the money in circulation component shows
k *
an increase in
-  277 -
- 278 -
every year with the single exception of 1972 when it fell by JD 1.54mi11ion 
following only'a small increase of JD 0.6 million. This arose firstly, because 
foreign reserves declined in 1971 as a result of the balance of payments 
deficit; secondly, the sale of a large amount of government bonds in 1972 
absorbed some of the currency in public hands. This would seem to 
indicate that although the currency component of the money supply was 
not under the direct control of the Central Bank (as it is a function 
of the balance of payments position) the Bank is nevertheless able to 
influence this component of money supply indirectly, through the use of 
statutory instruments. This sort of indirect influence is, however, 
only effective in the short term, since the sale of government bonds is, 
in Jordan's case, used to finance recurring expenditure rather than 
development.^
The second main component of the money supply is time, saving and 
demand deposits. Time and saving deposits in Jordan play a distinctive 
role. They are another alternative to hoarding. Therefore", the develop­
ment of the banking system through the spread of commercial bank branches
and the increase in confidence in these banks creates a higher preference
2
for savings deposits over hoarding. Although time and saving deposits 
in Jordan rose faster than the^money supply (10.87% for money supply 
compared with 20.8% for time and saving deposits) they showed wide
1. The impact of the government debt will be discussed later in 
detail on p. 282.
2. E. L. Furness: Money and credit in developing Africa, Heinemann, 
London (1975), pp. T30.See also Jack Kattan: Jordan's Money Supply, 
unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Georgia (19/6), p. /$. rr 7
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fluctuations which affected their share in total Mg. In contrast to 
the movement of currency in the hands of the public, time and saving 
deposits decreased in times of political instability and increased 
when confidence was restored. Since 1959, when the political atmos­
phere seemed stable, the share of these deposits shows a continuous 
increase from the 1951-1958 level of 10%, reaching 25% in 1966. In 
1967 the ratio dropped to 9%. From then on the ratio recovered its up­
ward trend reaching 22% in 1975. Nevertheless, the ratio was still 
lower than the pre-1967 period.
(c) Domestic credit and monetary expansion and the government role 
Having considered the components, it is now necessary to examine 
the determinants of Jordan's money supply. As is the practice in other 
countries, money is created in Jordan by the mechanism of credit 
creation through the banking system. Deposits, as well as money in 
circulation, are part of the liabilities of the banking system which 
are created against various assets. These assets may be put into two 
categories: domestic and foreign. Figure 7.2 illustrates the relation­
ship between these two variables and money supply in Jordan. During 
the period 1951-1968, the money supply increased at an annual average 
rate of 10.7%, at the same time foreign assets^ were increasing at the 
relatively higher annual rate of growth of 13.5%. However, in the 
years 1969, 1970, 1971 foreign assets declined at an average rate«of 
5.3% as a consequence of a balance of payments deficit, thus exercising 
a negative influence on the rate of expansion of money supply. Never-
1. Foreign assets is defined here to include Central Bank foreign 
assets, commercial bank's and government's.
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Fig.72
Money supply & the fa c to rs  a ffecting  it 1951-75
Source: Statistical Appendix 9.
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theless money supply continued to increase at a rate of 7.7% annually, 
indicating that the expansion in domestic claims was large enough 
to compensate for the negative effect of foreign assets, during these 
three years. Since 1971, the impact of domestic claims has become 
more marked especially during 1973 and 1974. Indeed, although foreign 
reserves continue to have a powerful influence on money supply, they 
are now clearly no longer the only important factor.
It has been shown in Chapter Six, that since foreign assets are 
in practice the net accumulation of foreign aid, and since the Central 
Bank has unofficially continued to adopt the Currency Board's policy 
of 100% cover, the impact of foreign assets on the money supply has 
been difficult to control.^ In these conditions, it needs to be asked 
whether credit control can be regarded as a more viable instrument 
than the money supply for the purposes of monetary policy.
For the purposes of this study, credit expansion includes commercial 
bank credit to the private sector, and net claims on the government.^
In theoretical terms to concentrate upon domestic credit rather than 
upon the money supply leads to a self-correcting balance of payments. 
Insofar as the monetary authorities are able to check the increase in 
credit, changes in the money supply will be a function of the balance 
of payments only. Further, any deficit in the balance of payments will 
result in a decline in the money supply, and this in turn will cause 
a decline in the demand side and a fall in prices, thus increasing the 12
1. In 1975 foreign assets comprised over 75% of the Central 
assets. Sea Chapter Five, page 242. Bank total
2. Net claims is defined here to include credit for the 
less its deposits with the banking sector. government
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demand for domestic exports and adjusting the balance of payments
deficit.1 Although this theoretical account of the working of domestic
credit policy may apply in a developed economy, a developing country
like Jordan may lack the operational conditions necessary for its
successful implementation as control of the volume and direction of
both public and private credit is not in the hands of the monetary
authorities. Public credit in Jordan is determined by the budget
deficit consequent upon the amount of aid received in any given year.
Credit to the government is thus exogenously determined, while credit
to the private sector is a function of the monetary system. However,
Central Bank control over private sector credit has not, in Jordan's
recent past, been at all effective. Table 7.2 below shows that up
until 1970 the government was a net creditor to the banking system,
while credit to the private sector increased at a relatively high rate
(on average, 16.1% annually). The negative impact of the government
during this period is explained by its large deposits with the commercial
banks. The ratio of these deposits to total deposits was over 30%
during the Currency Board period. Following the establishment of the
Central Bank, which became the government bahker, the relative importance
2
of these deposits started to decline. (See Figure 7.3).
Since 1970, claims on the government have combined with those in the 
private sector to produce a positive effect on total credit. This new 12
1. See Victor Argy: Monetary variables and the balance of n a m n t c
IMF Staff Paper, vol .K YT,'(J%9)> pp. 267-271 . -------
2. Given that there was no monetary authority capable of exertino anv 
influence on the banking system during the Currency Board period it mav 
be argued that the government could have manipulated its deposits to 
influence the banks' activities. Although the government used to increase 
its deposits with the commercial banks in times of political instability 
(1967, 1970 for example), there seems to be no evidence that thill 
activities were part of a comprehensive credit and monetary policy.
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Table 7.2: Credit of the banking system, 1951-1975 (in JD mi
Year
Claims on -
Government Private sector Total
1951-1958 -5.24 7.14 1.90
1959 -10.37 13.15 2.78
1960 -12.26 16.78 4.52
1961 -12.28 18.64 6.36
1962 -15.09 21.05 5.96
1963 -6.63 25.78 19.16
1964 -17.46 29.49 12.03
1965 -17.80 33.71 17.91
1966 -16.23 39.78 23.53
1967 -27.23 39.80 12.57
1968 -28.64 2.00 13.36
1969 -10.28 46.40 36.12
1970 2.00 46.44 48.44
1971 20.02 48.18 68.20
1972 19.04 52.36 70.40
1973 32.85 65.15 98.00
1974 32.72 89.29 122.01
1975 22.54 127.09 149.63
Source: Appendix 9.
development underlines the growing importance of government borrowing 
from the banking system in Jordan, and dates back to 1969 when Treasury 
Bills were first introduced. The idea of issuing government bonds and 
bills was first mooted 1n the Seven Year Programme for Economic Develop­
ment (1963-1970). The planners at that time assumed that 'A modest 
national debt owed to the citizens of Jordan should not be regarded as 
undesirable, in fact it is much more desirable than having foreign debts
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Source: (1) F!jnd» ]972 suPPlement, Washington DC
C2) Central Bank of Jordan,-Monthly Bulletin (January 1978). '
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of similar size'.1 The objective in issuing these bonds was to attract 
funds from the private sector which might otherwise be spent on con­
sumption, thus providing funds for government investment and creating 
the 'money market' which is essential for effective monetary policy.2 
Although the programme was never implemented because of the 1957 war 
and its aftermath, the government, as stated earlier, did follow its 
recommendation regarding the issue of government bills. However, in so 
doing the government ignored the long term importance of these bonds 
and concentrated instead on financing its budget deficit, which was 
the result of the suspension of foreign aid. A close examination of 
Jordan's fiscal policy reveals that it was short term budgetary con­
siderations which led the government to borrow from the banking system.
The resultant expansion of credit was both expensive in monetary terms, 
and led to a sharp increase in the level of imports.. As Jordan is 
a small country lacking natural resources and; as Chapter Three has 
detailedjSuffers from an acute disequlibrium between supply and demand, 
it is to be expected that the government will play a major, role in economic 
activities during the early stages of development. In 1975 over 40% of 
the labour force was employed in government institutions.3 * Furthermore, 
government expenditure accounted for over 30%, on average, of total 
consumption and 50% of total capital formation. Developments in govern­
ment expenditure in relation to GNP can be seen in Figure 7.4, The
1. Jordan Development Board: op. c i t . .  The Seven Year Programme d 25
2. Ibid., p. 25. » F- •
3. Out of 87,486 employees in establishments enoaoinn q
in 1975, there were 51,741 employees in government9!'n«MtE+*S0nS/i£J!l0re
See Department of Statistics, Employment Survey. - L .n* n o V ^ V ^ ? 1 ~r
Ratios of Government Receipts and Expenditure to G.N.P
_____  Ratio of G Expenditure to G.N.P 1952-75
_____ Ratio of Domestic Revenues to G.N.P
...........  Ratio of Foreign Aid to G.NP
fig 74
- 287 -
ratio remained relatively stable during the fifties and the early 
sixties, but started to show a steady decline reaching 24% in 1966.
In 1967, however, this trend reversed showing a fluctuating upward
movement reaching 45.6% in 1975. This high share of government
/
expenditure was not matched by a similar ratio of domestic revenues.
The table shows that while this ratio of domestic revenues to GNP 
remained stable, the ratio of expenditure continued to increase, 
reflecting the disequilibrium in Jordan's fiscal structure. It 
must be noted that such a fiscal structure is unusual by the standards 
of both developing and indeed developed countries. Table 7.3 shows 
only two countries (from the 17 included in the table) with similar 
ratios of expenditure to Jordan - Israel and the United Kingdom. The 
high level of expenditure in Israel can be explained by military 
expenditure while in the case of the U.K., social policy provides a 
credible explanation for the high level of expenditure. However, 
whatever the causes of the high level of government expenditure in 
these two countries, the ratios of domestic revenues to GNP were, in both 
cases, relatively close to the ratios of government 
expenditure. Jordan's low ratio of domestic revenue is similar to 
that of other developing countries. However, considering the fact that 
Jordan's is largely a free enterprise economy, with a large share of 
foreign trade to GNP, it might be argued that domestic revenues are 
much lower than might reasonably be expected.1 This is partly explained 
by inefficient tax administration, and partly by smuggling from neigh­
bouring low tariff Arab countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
This analysis has therefore demonstrated that the initiation of
1. M. Mazur: op. cit., Economic Development jn Jordan, p. 276
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Table 7.3: Ratio of government expenditure and revenues to 6NP in 
various countries
Country Ratio of 
expenditure
Ratio of
domestic revenue
Year
Malaysia 25.6 21.4 1973
Korea 37.0 n.a. 1974
Greece 21.6 18.1 1973
Cyprus 17.4 17.7 1971
India 11.4 9.45 1971
Indonesia 17.0 12.8 1973
Morocco 21.9 17.6 1972
Pakistan 15.2 12.5 1973
Tansania 27.0 18.8 1972
Thailand 17.3 14.5 1973
Turkey 18.8 17.1 1972
Canada 17.2 17.6 1971
Japan 10.7 9.2 1973
The Netherlands 26.7 26.7 1973
United Kingdom 40.7 40.6 1973
Jordan 45.6 18.3 1975
Israel 52.6 41.0 > 1972
Source: Computed from, International Monetary Fund,International Finan 
cial Statistics, Vol. /XIX, Washington DC (1 August 1976).
government borrowing was mainly due to budgeting difficulties and the 
failure of the government to increase domestic revenue given the 
sharp increase in expenditure. As can be seen from Table 7.4 in the 
years preceding 1967 there was no fiscal pressure on the government to 
use a new source of finance for the budget. Foreign grants and loans 
were sufficient to finance deficits, and in some years there were 
small surpluses. These surpluses enabled the government to accumulate
Table 7,4: Sirrary of the government budget, 1960-1975 (In JD ai1’ion)
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966* 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Domestic revenues 13.84 14.68 21.11 19.38 22.18 26.73 23.31 25.50 26.27 32.52 30.26 35.74 42.60 45.52 63.48 84.21
Foreign grants 17.44 18.76 15.71 14.69 15.41 14.27 9.88 40.41 40.11 38.38 35.42 35.12 44.45 45.05 52.97 90.01
Foreign loans 0.50 0.50 2.04 0.70 6.18 1.89 0.90 3.29 3:11 3.85 1.45 3.58 7.40 7.86 11.14 18.98
Total receipts 31.89 33.94 38.86 35.77 43.77 43.89 34.09 - 69.20 69.49 74.75 67.13 74.44 94.45- 98.43 127.59 193.2
Total expenditure 32.85 32.83 37.38 38.74 41.18 46.30 37.40 66.94 80.52 88.40 80.71 85.96 101.45 114.67 158.33 209.43
Deficit or surplus -0.96 ♦1.11 +1.48 -2.97 +2.59 -2.41 -3.31 +2.26 -11.03 -13.65 -13.85 -11.52 -7.00 -16.24 -30.74 -16.24
Use of cash balance 
(increase -)
 ^ +0.96 -1.11 -1.48 ♦2.97 -2.59 +2.41 +3.31 -2.26 +11.03 +4.95 -8.25 5.38 -3.00 10.10 - 24.17— -4,24
Domestic borrowing - - - - - - - - - 8.70 5.60 16.90 10.00 15.23 6.57 12.00
* 1966 - 9 months only.
Source: (1) International Honentary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 1972 supplement, Washington DC, n.d
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Annan (July 1976).
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reserves,1 2which were used to finance small deficits in other years.
In 1968, however, government expenditure went up by over 20% compared 
with 1967. Total government receipts on the other hand showed an 
increase of only 0.4% and so did not match the large increase in 
expenditure. The budget in that year recorded the highest ever level 
of deficit, amounting to JD 11.03 million, compared with a surplus of 
JD 2.26 million in 1967. Obviously the magnitude of such a deficit 
depleted the accumulated budgetary reserves from previous years. The 
government was thus forced to make use of the terms and rules of 
public borrowing through the mechanism of public Debt Law no. 96 of 
1966, which permits government bond issues; the limit in any one year 
being set at a level of 15% of the average domestic revenue of the three 
preceding financial years. The government found it necessary to increase 
the amount of Treasury Bills issued, and therefore the limit was 
changed in 1969 to 15% of the currency in circulation or 15% of the 
average domestic revenue for the three previous years, whichever was 
the higher. Further, when the Public Debt Law of 1966 was replaced by 
a new one in 1971 this ratio was raised to 25%.2 Accordingly, the 
total issue of three month treasury bills increased from JD 8.40 million 
in 1969 to over JD 25 million (35% of domestic revenue) in 1975.
Despite the increase in the volume of outstanding Treasury Bills 
the budget continued to be in substantial deficit, especially after 
the civil disturbances of September 1970. The government therefore 
introduced special 'Reconstruction Bonds' the value of which the law
1. Comprehensive data on the government cash position is not available.
2. Central Bank of Jordan, 1971 Public Debt Law, article 4, item b.
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restricted to JD 32 million, in 1971. A first issue of OD 3 million 
was made in June 1971, with a maturity of four years, and an interest 
rate of 7%.
This amount, together with Treasury Bills and Advances from the 
banking system, was sufficient to finance the overall deficit and 
create an increase in government cash balances. In 1972 the deficit 
continued to increase, despite an increase in domestic revenue and in 
foreign grants and loans. Two additional issues were therefore intro­
duced carrying longer maturities of five and six years, but with 
interest rates of only 6%. Declared government policy is that bond'
issues are directed at the private sector. The 1972 bond issue, how­
ever, in increasing the maturity period, and decreasing the interest 
rate, tended to work contrary to this policy. Given that such
government bonds are a new phenomenon in Jordan, and that public con­
fidence is not high, owing to political instability in -the area as a 
whole, and to an exceptionally high rate of inflation, interest rates 
should at least have been comparable to the first issue. This lack of 
consistency in interest rates was reflected in the declining share of 
the private sector in these bonds, which dropped from 58% in 1971 to 
44% in 1972. In its recent bond issues the government has raised the 
interest rate to 7.5% and added a lottery feature which raised the 
effective rate to 8%J 1
1. To encourage subscription in government bills, 50% of the interest 
rates arising from such investment are deductable from income tax.
On the other hand government bond interest income was given full 
exemption from income tax.
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In addition to Treasury Bills and bonds, advances from the banking 
system, and especially from the Central Bank have become an increasingly 
important source of government borrowing. Temporary and ordinary 
advances from the Central Bank to the government were limited by the 
Central Bank Law of 1966 to a fixed ceiling of 10% of the average 
annual domestic revenue collected during the preceding three years. The 
first of these advances .amounted to JD 2 million in 1968. This has 
since increased reaching JD 13.37 million on 15.9% of total domestic 
revenue (1975). The increase was made possible because of an 
amendment to the 1965 law which raised the level of advances that the 
government can obtain, from 10% of the average domestic revenue for 
the previous three years to 20% of the domestic revenue for the current 
year. In addition to the ordinary advances, extraordinary advances 
are given to the government, in accordance with the decisions of the 
Economic Security Committee.1 The first of these was given in 1971 
(JDl million). In 1972 the committee decided that JD 6.3 million of 
balances held in a special account with the Central Bank, representing 
the profit from the re-evaluation of foreign reserves of 1971, should 
be transferred to the government as an extraordinary advance. This 
advance however, was later written-off by order of the Committee.
Table 7.5 shows the development of government borrowing. Thus 
borrowing from the banking system has now become a routine practice in 
Jordanian public finance. The government, in formulating the budget
1. After the 1967 war with Israel, the existing legislation was not 
enough to solve economic problems resulting from the war. For example, 
deposits from the public held in the closed Jordanian banks in the 
West bank of Jordan. Therefore a special committee under . ,
this name was established. The committee is chaired by the 
Minister of Finance and has four other ministers as members.
Table 7.5: Internal Public Debt, 1969-1975 (in JD million)
Source: (1) Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pertaining to some Aspects of the Jordanian Economy (1974). 
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 19/B).
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assumes that any revenue shortfall should be financed from the banking 
system. The latter for its part is excepted to make the required 
funds available either through the purchase of Bills and bonds, or 
directly by means of credit advances. Moreover, it is assumed that 
legislative amendments will make these operations possible.
The extent of the impact of government borrowing on economic 
activities depends on whether this process involves a reactivation of 
borrowed money into investment channels or merely increases the money 
supply. Borrowing from the Central Bank and the banking system directly 
increases the money supply and constitutes a net addition to the income 
stream, thereby exerting an expansionary influence on aggregate demand. 
Borrowing from the public on the other hand, does not lead to an increase 
in the aggregate demand. The theoretical assumption made here is that 
such borrowing represents a withdrawal of funds which would otherwise 
have been spent on consumption. Jordan's fiscal policy has to date 
involved the most expansionary type of borrowing, viz. borrowing 
from the Central Bank and the commercial banks. The inflationary 
impact of such borrowing is magnified by the inability of the government 
instruments to reduce the liquidity level of the commercial banks, so 
that credit to the private sector (and consequently, consumption by the 
private sector) has remained largely unaltered by the government's use 
of the fiscal measures at its disposal. On the contrary, these measures, 
because they are guaranteed by the Central Bank, have served to maintain 
the liquidity levels of the commercial banks and thus stimulated them to 
provide more rather than fewer credit facilities to the private sector. 
Furthermore, it would seem that state borrowing from the private sector 
ha% in the context of Jordan, expansionary implications, as bonds issued
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by the Jordanian government, and held by the public, are convertible 
at any time, without loss. They, therefore, do not restrict private 
sector liquidity in any way, functioning in the manner of interest- 
bearing current accounts rather as a means of encouraging savings. 
Although there is no direct statistical evidence to support the expan­
sionary effect of this argument it is usually assumed that there is a 
negative relationship between consumption and the level of domestic 
borrowing. Private consumption should, therefore, be reduced by an 
amount equivalent to that of public borrowing. Information on con­
sumption in Jordan indicates that during the years 1970-1975 consumption 
showed a higher rate of increase in the period when the private sector 
holdings of government bonds increased (see Table 7.6). In fact, the 
bonds may have an expansionary effect by stimulating idle-money to 
become active through financing the recurring expenditure of the 
government rather than the developmental.
Table 7.6: Public debt and cons umption , 1969-■1975 (in JD million)
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Private consumption 
Percentage change in
164.0 165.0 183.0 193.0 220.0 256.0 280.0
consumption 
Government bonds with
0.6 +10.0 +5.0 +13.0 +16.0 +9.0
the public • 1.7 3.6 5.4 10.3 14.8
Source: (1) Central Bank of Jordan, Statistical Monthly Bulletin (March 
1973).
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Statistical Monthly Bulletin 
(January 1978).
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(d) Domestic credit expansion and the private sector
The second major factor which contributed to the money and 
credit expansion in Jordan is credit to the private sector. During 
the period under review credit grew by a higher average rate (15.8%) 
than the rate of increase in Mg (11.87). However, the real impact of 
credit to the private sector occurred after 1973 when credit increased 
by 34.1% between 1973-1975 compared with only 12% during 1968-1972.
It is clear, therefore, that more than 45% of the increase in Mg in 
the recent period (1973-1975) was made possible by the increase in 
credit to the private sector (see Table 7.7). This is compared with 
only 22% during the years 1968-1972.
Table 7.7: The impact of credit expansion in the private sector
Average
(in JD million)
1 2 
A  Private Credit
3
/\ Other factors
4
£  M2
Value 1/4 3/4
1951-1964 25.80 67% 12.77 33 38.57
1964-1968 12.51 24% 38.29 76 50.80
1968-1972 5.96 22% 21.72 78 27.68
1972-1975 61.94 47% 59.06 53 121.00
1951-1975 123.40 47%. 139.34 53 262.74
Source: See Statistical Appendix 9.
The impact of the expansion of credit was magnified by its dis­
tribution. Despite the higher rate of increase in total credit during 
the period 1964-1975, its sectoral distribution has not changed. 
Commerce and trade have consistently accounted for over 40% of the bank 
credit.. The construction and building sector has had the second
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highest amount with industry and agriculture coming third (see Table 
7.8). Given Jordan's industrial structure, it is only to be expected 
that credit will be distributed in this way. The large scale of Jordan's 
imports in relation to domestic production means that service industries 
predominate in the economy. As the services sector offer short term 
return on credit, the commercial banks prefer this sort of investment 
to more long term industrial and agricultural projects. As a result 
of this sectoral distribution of the commercial bank credit, respon­
sibilities for agriculture and industry have been assumed by special 
credit institutions created for the purpose.
Although an evaluation of the lending activities of these insti­
tutions is not within the scope of this thesis, they need to be briefly 
discussed here for two reasons. Firstly, they form an alternative 
source of finance for the productive sectors which the commercial 
banks seem reluctant to finance. Secondly, these institutions can 
play an important role in increasing the level of savings and in 
channelling resources from the import sector to the domestic production 
sectors. Therefore, potentially, their financial activities may have 
a positive impact on the balance of payments by stimulating the self- 
finance process.
*
Jordanian specialised credit institutions have so far played only 
a passive role in increasing the level of savings and consequently 
credit to the productive sector. This is evident from the small and 
stable ratio between commercial bank credit and the credit of these 
institutions. Table 7.9 shows that despite the increase in the overall 
credit of these institutions (from JD 10.38 million in 1966 to JD 53 
million in 1976), the ratio of their credit to commercial bank credit
Table 7.8; Sectorial distribution of outstanding bank credit (in JD thousands)
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970. 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Agriculture 0.86 0.67 0.61 0.77 0.65 0.71 0.58 0.79 0.80 2.06 3.74 3.61 5.16
Mining 0.22 0.12 0.30 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.72 0.67 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.33
Industry 3.30 4.32 4.72 4.23 4.01 4.05 4.03 3.92 4.35 5.87 10.08 14.83 21.81
Commerce and trade 14.41 17.07 20.33 1 17.35 17.07 19.06 16.89 18.96 21.45 25.07 30.30 51.37 81.61
Construction 1.81 1.71 2.37 4.06 5.08 6.08 10.33 10.51 10.67 14.42 18.83 26.28 30.85
Transport 2.59 2.32 2.14 1.77 1.78 1.55 2.42 2.61 2.42 2.19 5.29 3.69 7.78
Tourism 0.82 0.95 0.94 1.60 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.88 0.92 1.38 1.53 1.78 2.52
Financial institutions 0.23 0.14 0.33 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.50 0.74 0.34 0.55
Professional 1.47 1.70 2.24 2.14 2.46 3.07 4.14 3.28 3.89 4.55 5.47 7.40 11.36
Land and building* 0.43 0.74 0.89 0.96 1.00 1.01 0.89 - - - - - -
Municipalities 1.61 2.05 2.58 2.92 3.68 2.93 2.83 - - - - 7.18 8.09
Other 1.51 1.58 1.73 3.40 4.04 5.56 1.53 2.01 1.83 1.58 2.56 4.55 13.65
Total 29.27 33.30 38.99 38.88 40.99 45.34 
, 1
45.54 46.92 50.59 61.82 83.98 121.43 183.73
Afterl971 Land and building was included under construction.
Source: (1) Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pertaining to Some Aspects of the Jordanian Economy (October
1974), Table 11. -------------------- --------------------- ---------
(2) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (October 1977) Table 12.
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remained the same. Further, if the activities of the newly established 
Housing Bank are excluded from the analysis, this ratio would decline 
to about 16.6% in 1976 compared with 27% in 1966. Although the 
declining share in the lending activities of these insitutions (other 
than the Housing Bank) may be related to the large expansion in com­
mercial bank's credit, it may be argued that their limited role is 
chiefly a consequence of the limited sources of funds available to 
these institutions. Except for the Housing Bank the Specialised Credit 
Institutions (SCIs) do not accept deposits, and their resources have 
been limited to the government, Central Bank and foreign borrowing.
In addition to its expansionary impact on money supply, this concentration 
on government finance prevented these institutions from utilising 
available domestic resources and increasing the level of savings.
Foreign borrowing on the other hand, is likely to result in a 
further monetary expansion and in a further increase in imports and 
consequently in a balance of payments disturbance. It is not suggested 
here that SCIs borrowing from official sources is undesirable in 
itself. Indeed, in a developing country like Jordan, government 
backing of these institutions is to be expected, especially in the 
years immediately following their creation, but it should not continue to 
be the only source of finance, thus redirecting resources from the 
import sector to the domestic sector. Despite the creation of the SCIs, 
however, overall credit direction remains concentrated in trade and 
other services sectors, so that redirection of resources from imports to 
domestic sectors has been minimal. In addition the way in which SCIs have 
financed their operations has furthered monetary expansion, which in 
turn has had a negative impact on the balance of payments. Furthermore, 
one of these SCIs has directly contributed to the speculation in land
Table 7.9: Outstanding claims of Specialised Credit Institutions, 1966-1976 (in JD million)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1 . Municipal and village 
loans fund 2.39 3.46 3.94 395 4.21 4.64 4.95 5.22 5.59 6.46 7.60
2. Industrial development 
bank 0.97 1.36 1.60 1.83 2.31 2.51 2.73 3.04 3.98 5.53 7.86
3. Housing agency 0.19 0.52 0.?9 0.80 0.84 1.03 1.28 1.16 2.84 2.44 2.25
4. Agricultural credit 6.05 5.96 6.40 5.95 5.92 5.92 6.41 7.23 7.97 8.87 9.72
5. Jordan co-operative 0.76 0.75 0.68 0.83 0.8Q 0.77 0.86 0.82 1.13 1.76 3.07
6. Housing bank - - - - - - - 0.97 5.31 23.35
7. Total SCIs 10.38 12.08 13.42 13.37 14.08 14.86 16.23 17.52 22.49 30.36 53.86
8. Commercial bank credit 38.98 38.88 40.99 45.39 45.54 46.92 50.59 61.82 83.98 121.43 183.73
9. Ratio of 7/8 - % 27 31 32 29 31 32 32 28 27 25 29
Source:1 .Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pertaining to Some Aspect of the Jordanian Economy, (October 
1974), Table 12. :
2.Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (October 1977) Table 16.
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and housing which has had an important implication on Jordan's balance 
of payments and economic development as a whole. The Housing Bank 
was established in 1973 to serve that 'part of the population which 
does not need the concessionary terms of the Housing Corporation lending 
but could not be reached by commercial banks, because of the short term 
nature of the latter's credit'J Nevertheless, it can be criticised 
on two grounds. Firstly, the establishment of the Bank came at a time 
when the construction sector was already large; and secondly, that the 
level of its activities has far exceeded those of the other SCIs, thus 
furthering the unbalanced structure in overall credit.
(e) The inflationary implication of the monetary expansion
The important implication of the monetary expansion that took 
place between 1973 and 1976 was that it further augmented the inflation­
ary pressures already prevalent in Jordan (previously discussed in 
Chapter One), which had resulted from credit creation and the consequent 
increased demand for consumption and imports. This necessarily 
stimulated the demand for credit thereby worsening the trade balance 
(see Figure 7.5). The graph shows how the unprecedented increase of 
JD 69.8 million in credit during 1969-1976 was accompanied by a high 
rate of increase in imports (43.7%). This increase was greater than 
the increase in both M2 (25.2%) and the price level (12%).1 2 It is, 
therefore, important here to explain how the chain of relationships
1. See Gerard de la Fortelle: Financial Intermediation in Jordan,
draft paper, IFC, (1976), p. 31T ' -----
2. The rate of inflation as presented by the cost of living index is 
believed to be underestimated.
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Source: ( 1 )
( 2 )
Statistical Appendices 3 and 9. „„_0 ,
Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (March 1972 and
January 1978).
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between credit, prices and imports took place in Jordan.
Jordanian domestic inflation may be considered as both a cause 
and a consequence of this monetary expansion. When prices increase 
at a high rate, individuals tend to reconsider their cash holdings 
and substitute durable consumer goods for them. This is clearly shown 
in the period 1973-1975 with building up of stock on a large scale, 
as a hedging process against high inflation.
In addition to the increased acquisition of durable goods, 
speculation in land became one of the new features of the Jordanian 
economy. The peak of this type of speculation was reached in 1975 
when land became virtually equivalent to any other liquid asset. One 
Jordanian economist described this situation as 'a market enjoying all 
the characteristics of a feasible financial market - namely breadth, 
width and liquidity'.^ Although the causes of this boom are not 
merely monetary,^ its impact on credit expansion and balance of payments 
cannot be underemphasised.
The direct result of the land speculation was that credit extended 
by commercial banks for the use of “construction and purchase of land" 
increased from only 8.5% of their total credit in 1956 to over 21.7% in 
1975. What is important, however, is its indirect impact which was 
reflected in further credit for the trade sector and increased aggregate 
imports. As is to be expected, the increase in land speculation had
1. Memo, Middle East Money, London, Paris (November 1976), p. 12.
2. The cause of the land boom dates back to 1971, following the 1970/71 
civil disturbances, when the government started reconstruction programmes. 
Since then land prices increased rapidly and incoherently. The speculation 
was further increased after 1973 when the Jordanians working abroad were 
faced by the instability of the world money market. This led them away 
from cash investment into land speculation in Jordan. In addition, the 
establishment of the Housing Bank increased the demand on land for 
housing projects.
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the effect of creating a hew additional dominant wealthy group, whose pattern 
of consumption produced a significant demonstration effect on the other 
income groups who sought to emulate their consumption standards. This 
led to an increase in the demand for imported manufactured consumer 
goods, the production of which was financed by commercial banks.
The above development demonstrates how the monetary expansion 
resulting from the increase in credit has aggravated the inflationary 
pressures in Jordan, especially during 1973-1976. Inflation, through 
its impact on expectations and by increasing speculation, intensified 
the already high level of demand for consumption goods and, given 
Jordan's high propensity to import, this necessarily had an adverse 
effect on the balance of payments position.
(f) Inflationary implications of the aid flow
Theoretically, an adverse balance of payments is likely to have 
a deflationary effect on the economy, which may be reflected in an 
overall decline in demand and a consequent reduction in credit and the 
money supply, leading to a decline in imports and an improvement in the 
trade balance.
In Jordan, however, as the balance of payments deficit is mainly 
financed by the continuous inflow of aid, the above mentioned deflation­
ary implication is yet to be witnessed. Thus, the aid inflow permitted 
the continuous expansion with the consequent adverse effect on the trade 
deficit. The precise way in which this aid inflow accommodated and 
affected Jordan's banking system will now be outlined.
On the receipt of the aid by the government as part of its 
budgetary support, it is either directly deposited with the Central 
Bank or the commercial banks, or deposited abroad. However, as
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Chapter Five has shown, the government keeps only a small fraction of its 
deposits in the form of foreign assets abroad, the rest being deposited 
mainly in the Central Bank and in the commercial banking system.
The Central Bank credits the government's account by the amount 
of aid received, thus increasing its liabilities to match the new 
increase in its foreign assets. Government deposits with the Central 
Bank will decline with Treasury expenditure. The decline will be met 
by an increase in the deposits of the commercial banks and in money in 
circulation. However, part of the increase in the money in public 
hands will spill over into commercial bank deposits, thus increasing 
the ability of commercial banks to provide credit to finance the import 
sector.
In the case when the government deposits its foreign aid received 
with the commercial banks, this effect is more direct through increasing 
government deposits and consequently increasing the level of commercial 
bank reserves and their ability to create new credit.
It may be concluded here, therefore, that while credit expansion, 
through its positive impact on money supply, has led to an expansion 
in imports and deterioration in the balance of payments, the availability 
of foreign aid in the form of grants and loans, as a source of finance, 
has prevented the deflationary consequences of these deficits. Further, 
the aid has been large enough to create a further monetary expansion 
and further import surplus.
Having shown that the interaction between the balance of payments 
and monetary expansion is directly related to aid inflow and the 
finance of imports through the banking system, it is important to 
clarify the monetary implications of foreign trade in the general 
context of Central Bank policy objectives.
1. M. Marto: A money supply model: Jordan, Central Bank of Jordan, Amman, 
(October 1974), p. 62.
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(g) The limited impact of Central Bank credit control policy
Since its establishment in 1964 the Central Bank has indicated
its dissatisfaction with the credit policy of the commercial banks.
During the period upto 1973, the complaint was that the commercial
banks were very conservative in their credit policy and that a greater
contribution should be made-by them to the economic development of the
country.^ This, dissatisfaction did not go beyond open general criticism.
In 1973, however, the Central Bank required the banks to apply 'a
differential interest rate structure under which development projects
would be charged preferential interest rates', and further instructed
them 'to check the operations of importing luxury goods and purely
consumer goods by means of raising interest rates to the maximum
.3limit possible'.
During 1974, however, the Central Bank reversed its policy, when 
the inflationary pressure first witnessed in 1969 intensified. In 
its 1974 Annual Report, the Central Bank made it clear that the large 
expansion of credit facilities, especially in the first half of 1974, 
played a major role in effecting the increase in money supply ' a 
fact which prompted the Central Bank to intervene with the purpose of
4
restricting the expansion and thus alleviating the inflationary pressure.' 
The Bank, therefore, instructed the commercial banks to limit the 
increase in credit facilities over a six month period to only 5% of 
its total outstanding credit at the end of 1973. To encourage credit
1. As early as 1963 the Jordanian planners, indicated in the Seven Year 
Programme, that commercial banks should redirect their operations from 
financing foreign trade to the industrial and construction sector. See 
The Seven Year Programme for Economic Development, (l963j p. 34.
2. Central Bank of Jordan Annual Report, (1974J, p. 111.
3. Ibid., p. 111. i
4. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report (1975), p. 19.
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for industry and agriculture, these sectors were excluded from the 
credit restrictions. In addition, legal reserve requirements in that 
year were raised from 10% to 12%. In 1975 the Central Bank limited 
their credit increase during the first six months to 10% excluding 
credit extended to the above mentioned productive sectors. However, 
this exclusion of the productive sector was limited to only 5% when 
the Central Bank reiterated its 10% limit for the second half of 1975.
A close examination of commercial bank credit during these two 
years reveals that neither the object of limiting the overall value of 
credit nor the redistribution of credit were achieved. Table 7.10 
shows how credit increased irrespective of the monetary targets set 
by the Central Bank. The high increase in credit to the agricultural 
and industrial sectors was not enough to bring about a noticeable 
change in the credit structure. Although these measures failed to 
fulfil their objectives, it may be argued that credit expansion would 
have been larger had the Central Bank not intervened by setting credit 
ceilings.
In trying to explain the causes of the rather limited impact of 
the Central Bank credit policy, two important factors stand out. The 
first is the high liquidity of the commercial banks and the second is 
the lack of conditions necessary for open market operations. The
following section will concentrate on how these factors interacted to 
prevent the Central Bank from adopting successful measures to limit 
credit;and consequently any measures to correct the balance of payments 
deficit.
Table 7.10: Commercial bank credit in relation to Central Bank objectives (in JD thousands)
Peri od Total credit Credit for agriculture Rate of increase in overall credit: The share of
and industry
Actual Central Bank objective
industry and 
agriculture ii 
total credit
December 1973 61.81 8.31 13.6
June 1974 78.31 11.07 26.0 5 14.20
1 December 1974 83.97 14.20 7.2 10 16.90
o
CO June 1975 101.09 15.35 20.4 10 15.19
December 1975 121.43 18.62 20.1 10
•
15.40
June 1976 149.31 22.04 22.9 10 14.70
Source: Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, Amman (December 1974). 
Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, Amman (December 1975). 
Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, Amman (December 1976).
I
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(h) The excess liquidity of the commercial banks
In its definition of liquid assets, the Central Bank Lawsof 1966 and 
1976 include the following: (a) Jordanian notes and coins; (b) balances 
held with the Central Bank; (c) net credit balances with other commercial 
banks; (d) net balances in convertible currencies with banks abroad;
v
(e) government and government-guaranteed securities, maturing in not 
more than three months; and (f) marketable foreign securities'with a 
maturity of not more than three monthsJ It is clear that this defin­
ition does not include other assets, such as government bonds, which 
were considered illiquid because of their long maturity period. How­
ever, given that the Central Bank provides an unconditional and 
irrevocable guarantee to repurchase these bonds, their liquidity is 
in effect high. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, 'liquidity' 
will include the Bank definition together with the above mentioned 
assets.
The development of commercial bank liquidity is shown in 
Figure 7.6, from which it is clear that these banks have,during the 
years 1950-1975, maintained a high liquidity ratio. Furthermore, 
liquid assets have shown an upward trend parallel to the trend in 
deposits. However, the year 1963 witnessed a decline in both total 
deposits and liquid assets. This decline is explained by the fact 
that a large proportion of government deposits were transferred to 
the newly established Central Bank.
One explanation for the excessive liquidity during the Currency 
Board period, 1951-1963, is the absence of any obligation on the
1. Central Bank of Jordan: Banking Law no. 99 of 1966, article 11 and 
Banking Law no. 24, article 17, (1971).
Source: Statistical Appendix 10.
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commercial banks to maintain a high liquidity ratio to meet any un­
foreseen circumstances. However, as the figure shows, despite the 
creation of the Central Bank, commercial banks continued to maintain 
a high liquidity level far exceeding the legal ratio imposed by the 
Central Bank.
In both periods, the liquidity ratio of the commercial banking 
system was chiefly determined by the balance of payments position.
This can be seen in two inter-related factors: firstly, the fact that 
the commercial banks' main activity is to finance imports, induces 
them to concentrate on short-term liquid assets to balance any 
pressure on their short-term liabilities. Secondly, a large prop­
ortion of the liquid assets in the banking system are a direct 
product of the balance of payments situation. In principle the 
Central Bank is obliged to buy all foreign exchange offered to it, 
irrespective of its monetary policy objective. This convention was 
established during the Currency Board period and was continued by 
the Central Bank but with one modification: the centralisation of 
foreign reserves.^ Thus, by increasing its foreign assets, the 
Central Bank has been forced to increase the currency in circulation, 
a substantial amount of which spills over into the commercial banks 
in the form of liquid assets. Further, the fact that these reserves 
were accumulated because of the inflow of aid, rather than as the 
result of domestic activity, has meant that the excess of liquidity 
is substantial. This effect was increased by the way in which aid 
expenditure occurred in Jordan and by its timing. Because government 
expenditure is of a recurring nature in Jordan, the type of credit 
demand created is mainly of a short term sort. On the other hand,
1. See Chapter Five, page 236.
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the fact that aid to Jordan is directly expended, means that the 
liquid assets available to the commercial banking sector exceeds 
demand for credit. Taking the volume of reserves as a proxy of the 
balance of payments condition, it can be seen (figure 7.7, p. 312a) that the 
liquid assets of the commercial banks were, during 1950-1975, moving 
roughly in parallel with the movement of reserves. The period 1967- 
1971, however, witnessed some deviation from this trend, owing mainly 
to the fact that government expenditure during this period was subject 
to severe fluctuations caused by an unsettled flow of aid. Specifically, 
in 1967 and 1968, Jordan received an amount of aid greater than its 
expenditure. Therefore, bank liquidity did not increase by as much 
as the increase in reserves.
The high liquidity of the commercial banks rendered ineffective 
the use of traditional, monetary policy techniques adopted by Jordan.
The high liquidity meant that the Central Bank could not exercise its 
power as a lender of last resort. Indeed, the commercial banks did 
revert to the discount window of the Central Bank, but only when they 
experienced financial difficulties, and in these cases the Central 
Bank did not use discount operations as an element of monetary policy, 
but rather as a prudent measure designed to support confidence in the 
banking system. Despite the numerous attempts made by the Central 
Bank during the period 1965-1972 (when credit expansion was blessed 
by the Bank) to induce the commercial banks to use the discount facility,1 
the level of commercial bank borrowing from the Central Bank continued 
to account for only a small fraction of their total liabilities. This 
was mainly because they enjoyed at this time a high liquidity ratio
1. Central Bank of Jordan, Accomplishments of the Central Bank in Ten 
Years, Amman (1974), p. 20 (arable). '
in
 J
D 
mi
ll
io
n
Source: Obtained from Tables 6 and 10 in the statistical appendices.
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and because they did not want to come under the close supervision of 
what they regarded as a young and inexperienced Central Bank. Table 
7.11 shows how the commercial banks started to borrow under the discount 
arrangements only from 1970 onwards, and that even then the amounts 
borrowed represented only a small fraction of their total sources of 
income.
Table 7.11: Liabilities of the commercial bank, 1967-1973 (in JD million)
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Deposits 42.4 44.9 47.3 46.4 51.5 64.6 77.5
Foreign liabilities 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.5 2.5 2.4 2.6
Government deposit 8.8 7.4 7.5 8.7 6.1 6.2 6.1
Credit from C.B.* - - - 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.2
Capital 6.2 7.1 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Others 10.8 9.3 8.5 9.5 13.4 13.9 17.2
Total 70.8 71.3 74.6 76.4 82.2 92.5 lll.i
* Central Bank
Source: Central Bank of Jorda-n, Monthly Bulletin, Amman (March. 1970).
Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, Amman (December 1973).
In addition to the unfavourable conditions under which the 
Central Bank operated its discount facilities, the terms'and conditions 
for direct intervention by the’.Central Bank through open,market 
operations were almost completely absent. The excess liquidity in 
the commercial banking sector may be seen as both the cause and the 
effect of this state of affairs. The banks did not need to refinance
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their loan operations through the open market, because of their 
excess liquidity and this in turn inhibited the development of open 
markets.
In theory, open market operations may be used as a tool for
adjusting the balance of payments. When the Central Bank's objective
is to contract aggregate demand in a time of balance of payments
difficulties, it is able to increase its selling of Treasury Bills
and securities to the commercial banks and to the public. This will
bring about a decline both in the bank deposits and in the bank cash
ratio, and this in turn will lead to a decline in the money supply and
in total demand.^ However, the success of such operations depends
on the following conditions: firstly, a well developed financial
2system which includes a wide range of financial instruments; and 
secondly, a stable cash reserve ratio in the commercial banking sector.
(i} The implications of the fragmented financial structure
Jordan's experience has shown that despite its institutional and 
instrumental development during recent years, the financial structure 
remains fragmented and lacks the main constituents of a developed 
money market. The three money markets which exist in Jordan neither 
complement each other nor compete with each other. Interest rates 
are still administratively fixed and lack economic rationality. The 
commercial banks charge an interest rate of between 8% and 9% while the 
specialised credit institutions charge a rate of between %% and 8%,^
1. Furness: op. cit., (1975), p. 218.
2. , A. Crockett, Moneys theory, policy and institutions, Nelson, London 
part 'fr<$m &  Housing Bank which charges an interest rate of S%.3.
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but the gap in interest rates between these two markets is small 
compared with charges in the unorganised money market, which can 
exceed the other two rates reaching at least 15%J The fragmentation 
of the total money market is increased by the fact that the consti­
tuent markets are independent of one another. Although there is a 
kind of financial relationship between the markets, it is confined 
to the traditional sectors (i.e. money lenders) and to the commercial 
banks. The money lenders, because of their credit 'worthiness', can 
obtain cheap credit from the commercial banks and lend it at an 
inflated rate to the less credit worthy. The clear implication here 
is that whatever developments occur in the financial market, and however 
sophisticated the organised banking system becomes in Jordan, open 
market operationscan never be successful until the problem of unofficial 
money lending is dealt with by the integration of the three sectors of 
the money market to create a high level of interdependence throughout 
the financial system. The high liquidity ratios of the commercial banks 
result in reserve ratios which are high and unstable. Table 7.12 shows 
how the actual cash reserve ratio during the period 1955-1975 continued 
to exceed the minimum ratio laid down by the Central Bank.' In addition, 
the ratio has fluctuated widely (34.5 in 1972 and 22.1 in 1974), 
indicating the absence of the stable ratio which is an essential con­
dition for the success of open market operations.
Table 7.12: Minimum legal and actual reserve cash ratio of Jordan's 
commercial banks, 1965-1975 '
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Actual ratio 23.1 28.7 35.2 33.0 25.0 25.7 25.3 34.5 21.0 22.1 23.5
Minimum - % 7 7 7 7 7 7 10 10 10 10 0
Source: Computed from Statistical Appendices 8 and 10. 1
1. Said Hammami: Monetary policy in the changing financial structure 
of Jordan, 1969-1976, MA dissertation, University ot Bangor, 197b, p. 60.
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In 1976, the government approved the 'Amman Financial Market' law.
This will involve the market in buying and selling shares, bills and
government bondsJ The assumption here is that once established, it
will increase the available financial instruments and enhance their
2
effectiveness in the mobilization of savings. This step represents 
an attempt to create a 'supply leading' phenomenon for financial 
development. In theory, however, the 'supply leading' concept assumes 
that the establishment of new institutions will be helpful in generating 
a demand for various types of assets provided that interest rates are 
determined by the market, and that there is a response to the stimulus
3 ......... - -
of high interest rates. Given the rigidity of interest rates in 
Jordan, however, it is difficult to see how the proposed financial 
market, lacking the major condition of a free market, can be successful 
in increasing the savings level. Doubts over the future of the 
financial market were expressed in the 1976 Jordan Development Conference, 
which stated clearly that 'its utility as a stabilizing medium may 
take some time to reach full fruition, because it may lack depth, width 
and resilience'.4 There may, at present, be sufficient marketable
5
financial debt for dealings in the market to commence. A substantial 
amount of this, however, (JD 52 million) represents government bonds 12345
1. Amman Financial Market Law, (l970)
2. National Planning Council „ Five Year Development Plan, P- 70.
3. Diana Khatkhate: Analytic Basis of the Working of Monetary Policy
in Less Developed Countries, IMF Staff Paper, November 1972, pp. 533, 557.
4. Jordan Development Conference, Amman, paper no. 3 (1976), p, 24.
5. In 1975, it1 is estimated that the total bonds and securities reached
roughly JD 100 million, out of which JD 29 million were Treasury Bills 
and 23 million government bonds. See G. de la^Fortalle: Financial 
Intermediation in Jordan, IFC, Washington DC, (August 1976J ~----
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and bills. As both Treasury Bills and government bonds are mainly 
held by the banking system, and as the commercial banks have a very 
high liquidity ratio, dealings in the proposed market will be restricted 
to securities and equity shares of the private sector. Thus, it 
may be argued that the establishment of the market is not expected, 
under present conditions, to help the Central Bank in commencing its 
open market operations. For these operations to be successful, an 
amendment to the law is required, abolishing the artificial ceiling on 
interest rates^ and the Central Bank guarantee of government paper. This 
may help in reducing the liquidity of the commercial banks, and may__ 
help to put . market conditions into force, especially with regard 
to interest rates. This in turn may provide an opportunity for the 
Central Bank to intervene directly in the money market through open 
market opinions.
One explanation for the introduction of the Financial Market Law 
at this particular time is to support the general speculation that 
Amman can become a regional financial centre for the Middle East, 
instead of Beirut which was severely damaged during the Lebanese 
Civil WarJ The government, as well as the Central Bank, has announced 
through the press, its willingness to welcome new companies from 
Beirut. Further, it has tried to attract foreign companies by issuing 
in 1975 a decree in which certain privileges were offered to any 
company deciding to move to Amman.^ All this is in addition to the 12
1. Rami G. Khouri: 'Amman Emergence', The Financial Times. 2l(Anril.
1976), p. 14. - ---------
2. The following measures were taken to encourage companies to 
settle in Amman: a) full exemption from custom duties and fees of reg­
istration; b) full exemption from income tax and social services on 
gains and profits derived from business outside Jordan; c) exemption for 
foreign personnel from income tax. Further, withina week a decision by 
the Industry and Trade Ministry could be made on the company's applic­
ation to settle in Airman.
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proclamation in the media of the 1972 Encouragement of Investment Law, 
which provided for foreign firms the freedom to repatriate capital 
and profits. Further, these profits are fully exempted from income 
tax-for at least the first six years of commencing business;' ....
Only 70 foreign companies moved their regional offices from
Beirut to Amman during the period 1975 to June of 1976.^ This movement
was reflected in the figures for long term foreign investment, which
increased from JD 0.96 million in 1974 to 0D 7.37 million in 1975 and
2
to 0D 5.19 million in 1976. Non-residents' deposits increased during 
the period from JD 3.6 million in 1974 to JD 8.6 million in 1975.
Despite this success, the development of Amman as a regional financial 
centre has been limited. This may be related to its lack of sound 
infrastructure, which causes delays in accommodating large companies.
In addition, the rigidity of interest rates removes from Jordan one 
of the important prerequisites of a regional or international financial 
centre. These limitations have put other Middle Eastern countries, 
such as Bahrain and Kuwait in a better comparative position, indeed 
Bahrain has been the most successful country in attracting foreign 
banks and money brokers. Whatever the degree of success that has been 
accomplished by Jordan in this matter, its monetary implications 
have contrasted with the announced policy of the Central Bank: i.e. the 
reduction of the liquidity of the commercial banking sector. For the 
purposes of attracting foreign financial institutions to come to Jordan,
1. Middle East Currency Reports: Jordanian Dinar, vol. 3, (January 1977?,
p. 17. '
2. Central Bank of Jordan Monthly Bulletin,(December 1976).
3. Over 30 banks were registered in Bahrain during 1975 including 
Midland Bank,xNational Westminster and Lloyds Bank. See The Times, (l8th 
February 1977/ p. vii.
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the Central Bank excluded the non-resident deposits from the 12% reserve 
requirement condition. The impact of this is an increase in an already 
excess liquidity and consequent increase in credit.
The conclusion from the above discussion is that, despite the 
establishment of the Amman Financial Market and the availability of 
money instruments, open market operations in Jordan are not likely to 
be successful. The key factor here is the failure to bring commercial 
bank liquidity under the control of the monetary authorities. This 
failure may be rectified by the liberalisation of the monetary system 
in a fundamental way. What is meant by liberalisation here is simply 
to allow demand and supply to determine the price of the various 
monetary instruments, and to abolish the prevailing administrative 
forces which determine the interest rates on these instruments.
Q) The need to allow interest rates to be market determined
While outstanding credit and the rate of inflation grew rapidly 
during this period, interest rates remained artificially low and 
stable.
Although no detailed information about interest rates on loans 
and deposits is available, there is evidence that prevalent interest 
rates in the fifties were not substantially different from Jordan's 
present interest rates. Table 7.13 shows that during the period 1972- 
1975 there was no structural change in the interest rate. The slight 
increase which was recently imposed on commercial bank credit was much 
less than the inflation rate. The table clearly demonstrates the lack 
of coherence in the interest rate structure. While interest paid on 
government bonds reached 8% (tax exempted) time and savings deposits 
did not exceed 6%. Further, there was a wide variation in interest
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Table 7.13: Interest rates on deposits and credit in banking sector and 
Jordan's Treasury Bonds and Bills
1969 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Central Bank of Jordan
Bank rate 5.25 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Long term advances 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Short term advances 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Deposits subject to notice 4.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Time 4.0. 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Commercial Banks
Overdrafts 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 8.25
Loans 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Demand deposits 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.5
Saving and time deposits 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.6
Time and subject to notice deposits 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 6.6
Specialised Credit Institutions
A Agricultural Credit Corporation 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 7.0
B Industrial Development Bank 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
C Housing Corporation 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
D Jordan Co-operatives Organisation 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
E Municipalities and Village
Loan Fund Oin« 4-5.5 4-5.5 4-5.5
0
 
iniom1
F Housing Bank
F-j - Deposits - - - 5-5.2 4-5.7 cn i cn vl
?2 ~ Loans - - - 7.5-9 7.5-9 7.5-9
Jordan Treasury Bills 5.16 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Government Bonds - 6.0 7.5* 7.5* 7.5* 7.5*
* With 10,000 lottery prize each six months.
Source: Central Bank of Jordan Annual Reports of 1970, 1972 and 1975.
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rates among Specialised Credit Institutions, which provide long and . 
medium term credit. Such a structure contradicts the economic con­
vention that interest rates should reflect market prices, as determined 
by supply and demand.
Interest rate ceilings were imposed under Islamic Law as a matter 
of anti-i-usury philosophy aimed at protecting the poor from exploitation 
by businessmen - an attitude taken also by Lord Keynes: 'the rate of 
interest is not ¿elf adjusting at a level best suited to the social 
advantage, but constantly tends to rise too high, so that a wise 
government is concerned to curb it by statute and custom and even by 
invoking the sanctions of moral law'J In addition to their social 
impact, excessive interest rates may lead to inflationary conditions.
The high cost of capital may be reflected in output through the 'cost 
push' effect. In recent years the Central Bank would not pass recom­
mendations for easing the control on interest rates because of the fear
that such a step might induce more inflationary pressures and bring
2
another destabilising element into the fragile Jordanian economy.
While this moral and economic motivation for an interest rate ceiling 
can be accepted during a period of price stability, a case might be 
made'for,!its removal when general price levels increase. Shaw dis­
tinguishes between nominal and real rates of interest and between
i
explicit'and real ceilings; a low explicit ceiling which is less than the
inflation rate being the real ceiling. Thus, the real ceiling when
!
it is low and negative may inhibit the development of savings and prevent
jI
I
1. John Maynard Keynes: General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, 
cited in | Edward S. Shaw: Financial Deepening in Economic Development, 
Oxford Press, (1973), p. 92.
2. Middle East Currency Report: op. cit., p. 17.
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their redirection towards the more productive sectors of the economy. 
Further the fear that high interest rates may lead to inflation is 
not necessarily well founded, because high interest rates may attract 
more savings permitting additional increases in income and lower price 
levels. High interest rates may in addition bring full utilisation of 
capital and reduce the wastage of capacity inducing more use of avail­
able resources.^ Therefore, neither the moral argument nor the economic 
one regarding the pegging of interest ratescan be accepted in the 
inflationary conditions prevailing currently in Jordan.
(k) The need for a more realistic exchange rate policy
Despite the monetary disequlibrium between 1973 and 1975 and 
the accompanying high increase in trade deficit, the foreign exchange 
rate of the Jordanian dinar remained stable and even showed signs of 
upward movement.
Because of its potential importance to monetary stability and to 
the adjustment process in the balance of payments, Jordan's foreign 
exchange rate policy in recent years warrants study. The principal 
feature of Jordan's foreign exchange policy since it was established, 
is that minimum restrictions have been imposed on transactions in the 
current account in the balance'of payments. As shown in Chapter 
Three licences of imports and payments are granted freely under a 
unified foreign exchange rate. However, the period 1956-1961 witnessed 
a multiple,foreign exchange rate practice. The 1956 foreign exchange 
regulations introduced two foreign exchange rates: a 'free' one for 
imports from Arab League countries and for non-essential imports^and an
1. Shaw: op. cit., (1973), p. 94.
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'official' exchange rate for imports from the rest of the world, and 
essential imports. In 1959, the only Arab countries to which the free 
rate applied were Syria and the Lebanon.
In December of 1961 the government announced that the rate for 
imports from Lebanon would be fixed at the official rate and that 
exchange at the official rate would apply to invisible payments to 
Syria and Lebanon. Thus the unification in the exchange rate was a 
gradual achievement.^ Since then and until 1970, the Jordanian dinar 
remained stable and there was only one instance when the Central Bank 
had to strongly support the exchange rate. In 1970, however, there 
was strong pressure on the dinar in the neighbouring Beirut market.
This sudden pressure was the result of uncertain economic and political 
conditions created by the civil war of that year. The excess supply 
of the Jordanian dinar was not only generated by anticipation of a 
depreciation in the exchange rate, but was also the result of a size­
able flight of capital. The Central Bank, in order to support its 
value, requested the Jordanian banks in Beirut to intervene in the 
market and buy the Jordanian dinar, thus keeping the foreign exchange 
rate very close to par value.
Among the various objectives of the Central Bank, the achieve- 
ment of stability for the Jordanian dinar at home and abroad may be 
regarded as the most important. This was made very clear when the 
Jordanian authorities decided not to follow the pound sterling when it 
was devalued by 14.3% in 1967. The official explanation for the 
Central Bank's decision, set out in its 1967 Annual Report, can be
1. Central Bank of Jordan, unpublished papers.
2. Central Bank Law, 1966, 1971.
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summarised as follows:
a) devaluing the Dinar would weaken confidence, and demonstrate 
complete dependence on the London money market;
b) devaluation would discourage private investment and destabilise 
the price level;
c) the high ratio of imports to exports in Jordan indicated that 
devaluation would do very little to reduce the trade gap.
Devaluation would, however, have brought with it an increase in the cost 
of imports and a consequent reduction in consumption. In 1966,72% of 
total imports originated from outside the sterling area. Thus in the 
case of devaluation the prices of these imports in terms of local 
currency would have risen in terms of Jordan's currency by a higher 
percentage than devaluation.
On the exports side, total export value in 1966 amounted to JD 
818 million, 35% of which was phosphates.Given that the main markets 
for phosphates are outside the sterling area, the prices for foreign 
importers would have decreased if the Jordanian dinar had been devalued. 
Devaluation therefore, would have helped phosphates to become more 
competitive at a time when there were difficulties in marketing 
them J
In theory, the factors.that determine the exchange rate of any 
currency are those which determine its supply and demand. Conventional 
exchange rate theory, in determining these factors, does not allow for 
non-traded transactions to be treated as a determinant factor. Hence 
'the supply of foreign exchange resulting from capital imports, gifts,
1. Information on exports and imports derived from Chapters Two and 
Three.
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etc.'^ must be considered as a non-determining factor. On the other 
hand the theory assumes that if the authorities have enough reserves 
of foreign exchange the rate of exchange may be maintained by them at 
any level.
Given the low export/import ratio in Jordan, foreign aid is the 
main factor that determines the supply of foreign exchange. An equil­
ibrium in the supply and demand of foreign exchange, like that in Jordan, 
does not imply that the balance of payments is in equilibrium. Jordan, 
in fact^ has a basic disequilibrium in her balance of payments and it could 
be argued that the government could have used the opportunity of the 
sterling devaluation to bring down the already over-valued rate of the 
Jordanian dinar. In 1971, however, when the first devaluation of the 
US dollar was declared, the monetary authorities decided to follow, and 
announced the first and only devaluation of the Jordanian dinar in its 
history. This devaluation is an indicator that the monetary authorities 
believed that the Jordanian dinar was over-valued. Nevertheless, when 
in 1973 the US dollar was devalued for the second time, the Jordanian 
Central Bank decided not to follow and maintained the par value of the
dinar against gold. In addition to its 1957 justification of the
]
'no devaluation* decision, the-Central Bank added that 'devaluation of
the currency would have undermined internal price stability by raising 
3import prices.'
Since then, the Central Bank has stressed the objective of a stable
1. S. A. Ozga: The Rate of Exchange and the Terms of Trade, London, 0967^ 
p. 50.
2. In 1971 the US dollar was devalued by 8.2% and in 1973 by 11%.
3. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 0973).
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exchange rate for the dinar. To ensure this stability the dinar was 
linked in 1974 to the International Monetary Fund, Special Drawing 
Rights. However, in determining the daily exchange rate, the Central 
Bank tried to adjust the exchange rate in line with the confirmed 
long term trends of major currencies, rather than following daily 
fluctuations of the SDRs. The Central Bank declared the purpose of this 
to be: 'to protect the local market against daily fluctuations in the 
international money market'J
In summary, the external trade deficit has not discouraged the 
monetary authorities from maintaining the high exchange rate. In fact, 
the monetary authorities were convinced that, since Jordan is largely 
an importing country, any changes in the exchange rate could not affect 
the level of imports and exports. It was, therefore, necessary to 
maintain an exchange rate which may have been over-valued to keep the 
cost of imports down. This attitude was reflected in the value of the 
dinar during the years 1972-1976, when it strengthened against the US 
dollar and the depreciating pound sterling, and declined against the 
appreciating Deutsche mark and the Swiss franc (see Table 7.14 below).
The trend clearly reflects the realignments of international currencies, 
which have occurred in recent years, as well as the Central Bank's 
policy of support for the over-valuation of the dinar. It has been 
shown in Chapter One that in addition to the balance of payments pressure, 
the economy recorded a low rate of growth in its real output during the 
period 1969-1975. This fact coupled with the high rate of growth in 
money supply should,in terms of conventional economic wisdom, have led 1
1. Central Bank of Jordan, Annual Report, 1975, p. 67.
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Table 7.14; Exchange rate of major currencies against the Jordanian dinar
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
US dollar 0.358 0.328 0.322 0.319 0.330
Pound sterling 0.894 0.812 0.757 0.713 0.603
Deutsche mark 0.112 0.123 0.124 0.130 0.131
Swiss franc 0.093 0.103 0.107 0.125 0.132
French franc 0.070 0.074 0.060 0.074 0.069
Italian lira 0.061 0.055 0.050 0.049 0.040
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, January 1977.
to a fall in the rate of exchange rather than the maintained high rate 
which in fact prevailed. This suggests that an opportunity to take one 
important measure that could have helped in correcting the economic and trade 
imbalances was missed. In this respect economists distinguish between 
two sorts of balance of payments deficits: 'stock1 and 'flow*. While 
'stock' deficits are the result of a change of the countries' assets by 
substitution of other assets for their money, the 'flow' deficit is the 
result of excess spending relative to the total receipts.^ A 'stock' 
deficit indicates a change in the composition of a country's assets.
It is therefore, of a short term nature and implies perhaps a positive 
sign of the country's economic performance. A 'flow' deficit on the 
other hand, results from excessive expenditure and is an indicator of a 
long run disequlibrium and is likely to be permanent unless the proper 1
1. H. Johnson: 'International Trade and Economic Growth', Studies in 
Pure Theory, London, Q 959/, p. 159.
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corrective policies are adopted.^
The fact that Jordan's balance of payments problem has been con­
centrated in the goods and services account, shows clearly the 'flow' and 
consequently the long run nature of the deficit. This type of dis­
equilibrium is difficult to terminate without a drastic change in
2
economic policy regarding income and expenditure. Jordan has, to date, 
maintained its excessive expansionary policy, without generating a 
corresponding expansion in receipts. Over-valuation of the Jordanian 
dinar, coupled with low interest rates has facilitated a big increase 
in imports. This is in addition to the government policy aimed at 
increasing current expenditure by borrowing from the banking system. To 
deal with the trade deficit, interest rates as well as exchange rates 
should be used in the correcting process. A gradual devaluation of the 
Jordanian dinar may lead to a reduction in real income and may switch 
expenditure towards home production. Interest rates which are artificially 
low need an upward adjustment, in order to match the present inflationary 
pressure. This may bring the liquidity of the commercial banks under the 
control of the Central Bank, as well as the control over the credits which 
in turn will be reflected in the level of imports.
Summary
This chapter has demonstrated that although financial institutional 
development in Jordan did not establish itself until some ten years or 
so after independence, the monetary structure has, nevertheless, under­
gone considerable changes since 1964. These changes, however, have had 12
1. Ibid., p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 160.
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no perceptible positive impact in reducing the trade gap and improving 
the balance of payments.
Despite the increase in the cash ratio (money supply/GNP) money 
in circulation continued to account for the largest proportion of the 
money supply so that the system remained essentially underdeveloped in 
nature.
The main conclusion to be derived from the analysis is that the 
changes in the money supply and domestic credit that did occur were 
irrelevant to the targets set by the monetary authorities. During 
the Currency Board period, because of the convention of maintaining 
an automatic relationship between the total money supply and foreign 
assets holdings, no independent domestic monetary policy was pursued. 
After 1964, however, although the Central Bank still continued to try 
to maintain the aforementioned relationship, it did attempt, for the 
first time, some control over the level and distribution of domestic 
credit.
Two distinct periods of different Central Bank credit control 
policies were identified. The first, from 1964 to 1973 was one in 
which the Bank encouraged and facilitated the increase in domestic 
credit. The second, from 1974onwards was one in which the Bank tried 
to curb domestic credit expansion. In the implementation of both 
policies priority was given to the agricultural and manufacturing 
sectors.
Traditional monetary weapons, such as the discount rate, the 
interest rate, the liquidity ratio, credit ceilings and moral persuasion 
were employed by the Bank to achieve the credit targets it had specified. 
Yet, credit, expecially during the second period, continued to increase 
despite the fact that the prime objectives of the Central Bank were to
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both check the expansion and correct the trade bias of the former 
pattern of credit distribution.
Two major reasons were outlined for the continued expansion in 
credit and the limited impact thereon of Bank policies. The first 
was the level and nature of government borrowing that was promoted by 
the Central Bank, although it was at odds with the latter's overall 
monetary targets. Government borrowing, determined mainly by budgetary 
considerations, has increased the liquidity of the commercial banks 
and overall liquidity through government consumption expenditure.
Somewhat perversely, the government bonds thereby created have further 
added to the total liquidity of the financial system.
Secondly, monetary measures were frustrated by factors operating 
within the banking system itself. These include the high liquidity of 
the commercial banks, the stickiness of the interest rate and the 
general fragmentation of the financial market. In these circumstances, 
the operation of traditional policy instruments was rendered ineffective. 
It has been demonstrated that although credit to the agricultural and 
industrial sectors did increase, trade credit continued to account for 
by far the largest proportion of commercial banks' credit.
Although monetary expansion has had an important impact on the 
inflationary pressures experienced since 1973, together with the low 
interest rates, this has stimulated further excessive increases in 
domestic credit and the money supply, thus reinforcing the high level 
of consumption demand and the balance of payments deficit. Thus, by 1975 
the import/GDP ratio reached a record level of 65% (compared with 36% in 
1964).
Although the basic causes of the trade problem lie in the nature of
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the industrial structure of the economy, monetary policy during the 
1970s has failed to apply measures to correct and gradually reduce the 
trade gap, as the persistent over-valuation of the Jordanian dinar 
would seem to indicate.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION'
Although Jordan was only one of many political states created 
after the first World War, it had and has continued to have, several 
unique distinguishing features which are manifested in two particular 
aspects closely related to its subsequent economic development and 
trade pattern. The first is the repeated changes in its political 
allegiance and boundaries. At the turn of this century Jordan was 
part of Syria's Ottoman Governorate, and its economy and trade formed 
a part of Syria's and Palestine's. These economic and trade ties con­
tinued even when Transjordan was proclaimed a political entity in 1921, 
albeit under British control. Furthermore, the strong traditional 
trade and economic relations with Syria and Palestine remained, despite 
the changes in Jordan's status in 1946 when the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
was officially proclaimed. Dramatic changes, however,.occurred 
after the 1948 war with the unification of the West and East Banks of 
the River Jordan in 1950. In 1967, the West Bank was occupied by 
Israel thereby confining Jordan to its pre-1950 boundaries. These 
dramatic shifts in its resource base resulted not only in a great 
influx of refugees, but also in-fundamental changes in the economy and 
trade.
Added to these volatile political constraints, Jordan, unlike 
most of her neighbours, was endowed with limited natural resources, the 
only major resource available for utilisation being phosphate. Due to 
the limited demand both domestically and internationally, this mineral 
did not play a significant role in the economic development of the 
country and exports of it remained relatively small.
This thesis has examined the role of trade in the economic 
development of Jordan and has involved an assessment of exports, imports 
and invisible earnings. It has also examined the foreign reserves 
and monetary development in relation to the trade and balance of payments 
problem. Several themes have been considered and particular conclusions 
have already been established. This chapter, however, will be devoted 
to outlining some of the general issues which have emerged from this 
particular case-study of the Jordanian trade experience.
[~A~I In the long run, the balance of payments structure 
and problems of small developing economies tend to 
be closely related to their industrial structure.
The interesting feature of the economic development of Jordan is 
that, despite a relatively high rate of growth achieved during the 
period 1954-1976, the economy remained basically service-oriented. 
Manufacturing industry, which was in its infancy in the late fifties has, 
despite expansion and development through import substitution, con­
tinued to account for only a relatively small, although increasing, 
share of the GDP. Conversely, agriculture's share continued to 
fluctuate about a declining trend. The particular climatic circum­
stances during the past 30 years or so, and the absence of a clear 
agricultural policy, have lead'to a vicious circle, whereby falling 
output resulted in a decline in investment which led to a further 
decline: in output.
The continued dominance of the service sector was explained as 
the result of a set of inter-related factors:
a. limited natural resources which could be used as a base for 
industrial development;
b. the liberal trade policy;
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c. the large inflow of imports;
d. the invisible earnings,* and,
e. the expansionary budgetary and monetary policy.
Liberal trade policy coupled with a high level of government
expenditure has led to a large inflow of imports, which, in turn, have 
promoted the large service sector necessary to accommodate these 
imports, as was demonstrated in Chapter One.
|~B~| The unbalanced industrial structure has been manifest 
in a uniquely import-biassed trade pattern.
Like other small developing countries, the trade/GDP_ratio is 
high in Jordan, accounting for an average of over 90%;between 1954 and 
1975. However, Jordan is unusual in two respects; firstly, imports 
predominate at a high level of almost 60% of GDP; and secondly, within 
the export sector, invisible trade accounts for some 22% of GDP (and 
66.3% of total exports), whilst visibles account for less than 10% 
of GDP (33.7% of total exports).
While conventional wisdom derived from the experience of developed 
Western economies presumes that the ratio will tend to decline as GDP 
grows, the Jordanian experience would seem to be an exception to this 
rule, for despite growth of GDP, the trade ratio has continued to 
increase. Only in periods of stagnation has the ratio actually declined.
[Cl The small size of the visible export sector (asmeasured by 
the trade/GDP ratio) has provided a constraint on the 
development of the economy that has been further 
reinforced by a lack of industrial diversification both 
immediately prior to independence and since.
During the period 1954-1976, despite a high rate of growth of 17.1%, 
exports had little impact on the economic development of Jordan. Unlike 
most developing countries, particularly those in the Middle East, Jordan
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has no natural resources in high international demand. Phosphates, the 
largest single item of Jordan's exports have faced problems of marketing 
and transport, and the growth of exports of this commodity has been 
inhibited by their high production cost, coupled with low demand.
Despite these differences Jordan is similar to the case of most 
developing countries in that exports are concentrated in primary products, 
with manufacturing exports contributing only a very small proportion of 
the total. This concentration is closely associated with limited 
developmental linkages and a high degree of income volatility. Imports 
account for over-50% of the input necessary for the production of 
exported commodities. The only industrial export group which has 
created some secondary impact has been manufacturing, yet this sector 
depends for over 50% of its inputs on imports. Phosphates have had little 
linkage effect on the domestic economic sectors, with the exception of 
construction. This is also the case with agricultural exports.
The high degree of industrial export concentration is typical of 
many other developing countries, with the usual implication of vulner­
ability to foreign exchange earnings fluctuations. In Jordan's part­
icular case this has meantthat in general an increased financial 
burden has been placed on the government budget as a result of subsidies 
paid to certain export industries. This has led to a concomitant' loss 
of revenue that might otherwise be derived from tax on profits and 
dividends. This has had two consequences:
a the economic impact of the fluctuations has been severely felt 
in the agricultural sectors, where farmers are not financially 
protected against fluctuations; and 
b the level of investment expenditure in the exports sector has 
closely reflected the instability profile.
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fp~[ Positive export promotion policies are a necessary 
condition for steady growth.
Jordanian trade policies have in the past concentrated development 
efforts on import substitution^ without any positive intervention through 
direct or indirect measures particularly designed for export promotion. 
The potential benefits from foreign exchange control and/or the use of 
particular monetary instruments have been ignored. Trade strategy 
has only been concentrated on bilateral and multilateral trade agree­
ments, but even these have had little impact on export promotion, 
essentially because they have been concluded on political rather than 
economic grounds. Increases in exports havebeen the result of a natural 
increase in demand in foreign markets rather than the impact of such 
trade agreements. The only exception to this trend has been the 
phosphate agreements with India and Yugoslavia and the recently.concluded 
agreement with Syria.
jO Jordanian trade policy has been too passive and 
has not attempted to explore the advantages of 
the high income effect of other developing countries 
that might have promoted positive export diversi­
fication.
Neighbouring Arab countries represent the main markets for Jordan's 
exports. Indeed, with the rise in demand, exports to these markets 
increased notably between 1954 and 1966. However, such an increase 
was relatively small when compared with the much greater demand in the 
oil producing countries. Jordan's share in this market did in fact 
decline between 1972 and 1975, despite a substantial increase in the 
value of exports. This was mainly due to the lack of any national 
export promotion policy rather than competition from the manufacturing 
products of developed countries. The focus of policy has been biassed 
by (i) the large inflow of aid made available to the country, which
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constitutedthe most important part of foreign exchange receipts and
(ii) the large amount of imports which has directed government policies 
to import substitution, ignoring export promotion as an alternative/ 
compensatory method of industrialisation and reducing the trade deficit.
If] The trade gap has not been corrected but on the 
contrary.reinforced by the policy measures 
adopted/
On the one hand, due to the wide gap between domestic supply and 
domestic demand, imports have made available resources necessary to 
increase per capita income and achieve sustained growth. On the other 
hand, free access to the inflow of imports, through a liberal trade 
policy and the maintenance of the inflow of foreign aid, have played 
an important role in the continuing prevalence of the domestic gap, 
and in furthering the need for more imports.
|Gl The direct positive short-term effect of invisible 
earnings on the balance of payments has been 
largely outweighed by the long-term effect on 
economic development.
Unlike visible trade, invisible trade has always been (with the 
exception of 1968 and 1969) in surplus. Yet this surplus has not been 
enough to finance the visible trade gap, and Jordan's need for foreign 
aid has continued to increase.' Remittances, investment income and 
tourism have all tended to reinforce the service orientation of the 
economy and have increased the pressure on domestic resources, thus 
furthering the need for imports and widening the trade gap. Analysis 
of each main source revealed the following issues.
a) Tourism - Although severely disrupted during the political instability 
of 1967-1971, tourism has shown a rapid growth. The number of tourists 
arriving in the country, and the income deriving from them, has notably
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increased, This study rejects the argument put forward by some officials, 
that tourism can be a leading sector in Jordan. This rejection is 
based on the following: limited linkages with other economic sectors; 
its small contribution to GNP; and the high level of import content in 
tourist expenditure. The high multiplier effect of tourist expenditure 
__js considerably reduced once imports are included. Clearly the exclusion 
of the import costs has considerably over-exaggerated the benefits 
from expenditure of this sector.
b) Investment income - The impact,of the surplus derived from invest­
ment income account is determined by the sources and uses of this surplus.
The source of Jordan's investment surplus was shown to be the 
result of a large inflow of interest on foreign assets abroad, relative 
to the small payments for foreign loans and foreign investment inside 
Jordan.
Unlike other developed and developing countries, Jordan's foreign 
assets are not the result of indigenous economic performance, but of 
the inflow of foreign aid. This inflow has been largely misallocated 
by the government sector being directed to finance government current 
rather than capital expenditure*. Furthermore, it has been shown that 
'with the help of the Central Bank, the government has been using this 
source of income to obtain short term credit from the Central Bank,
I thus furthering both monetary expansion and the expansion of govern­
ment consumption, which has led to negative effects on the balance of
f
payments.
i The low dividend payments for private long term foreign investment 
were explained simply by the limited amount of this investment in Jordan.
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The reason for this was shown to be an interaction of Jordan's lack 
of domestic resources.with the political instability in the area, 
given the general characteristics of private foreign investment. Des­
pite several legislative and administrative efforts which started in 
1953, private foreign investment in Jordan has remained negligible and 
is unlikely to play a major role in the economy in the foreseeable future. 
Even though a considerable amount • . of new private foreign investment
was transferred to Jordan between 1974 and 1976, this was a temporary 
inflow caused by political disturbances in the Lebanon. The fact that 
this inflow was concentrated in the banking, insurance and service 
sectors, must raise the question of whether this form of foreign 
investment is desirable for Jordan.
Analysis of foreign debt repayments has shown that although the 
debt ratio in Jordan is relatively small, the actual debt burden of the 
country is high and similar to other developing countries. The exclusion 
of payments for military loans and of interest on government bills and 
securities held by non-residents, and the fact that most of the foreign 
loans were taken up in the sixties, are the main reasons for the low 
figure of payments in the investment income account. The increase in 
the amount of foreign loans received between 1970 and 1976 will put 
extra pressure on the balance of payments in the future. This pressure 
will be magnified in Jordan because these loans have not been directed 
either towards export promotion or towards import substitution.
m  The national benefits from remittances of workers abroad 
not only represent insufficient compensation for the loss 
incurred by labour migration, but the way in which these 
remittances have been used has inhibited economic development.
Although these remittances would normally have been considered in a dis 
cussion of theinvisible surplus, their growing importance, particularly
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in the closing period of this study, demanded not only a micro- 
economic analysis of remittances but also consideration of the general 
macro impact of migration. This subject, despite its importance in 
the Middle East,has received little attention in either labour exporting 
or labour importing countries and this is reflected in the fragmentary 
information which is all that is available. However, the analysis of 
the available data has shown some of the gains and losses which 
Jordan has experienced originating from migration and remittances. The 
following general conclusions are often made:
(i) Migration is part of a widespread movement of labour from 
non-oil producing countries to oil-producing ones.
The economic expansion, resulting from a sudden increase in oil 
revenues, created in oil-producing countries a demand for both skilled 
and unskilled labour, which was met by an inflow of migrants mainly 
from neighbouring Arab countries. Although the number of Jordanians 
responding to this increased demand is not precisely known, it was 
estimated in 1976 that one third of Jordan's labour force was working 
outside the country. Most of these are skilled workers, or professional 
and educated labour. Thus, Jordan provides an example of a type of 
migration which economic analysts have so far ignored. Consequently, 
the impact of migration on Jordan's economic development has been shown 
to be materially different in a number of ways from the impact which 
conventional analysis assumes.
(ii) Emigration may help the development of a labour supplying 
economy, by assisting the spread of new methods and skills.
In the oil-producing countries, Jordanians are providing skills 
rather than acquiring new ones. The fact that in terms of employment^ 
the services sector in those countries is the largest one and consequently
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absorbs the bulk of migrants, means that few new skills can be 
acquired there which are not obtainable in Jordan. The small proportion 
of migrants who are working in the oil industry are, in fact, learning skills 
which are irrelevant to Jordan's economic needs. In addition, it has 
been shown that among mi grants,those with relatively higher wages tend 
to stay for the length of their working lives, and again, the question 
of skills becomes irrelevant. Indeed it has been shown that workers abroad 
will onlyn- return home for social and political reasons, but there 
they will be consumer rather than producer units.
(iii) Emigration may help economic development through balancing the 
labour market.
While the labour outflow may have lessened the unemployment problem 
in Jordan during the fifties and the sixties, this has since reinforced the 
shortage of skilled and unskilled labour. This is evident in the 
increase in wages and in the increasing number of foreign workers 
coming into Jordan. The economic consequences of this labour shortage 
were felt in the agricultural as well as manufacturing sectors and in 
some cases in the civil service. This has been reflected not only in 
forgone production but also in increasing costs, thus accelerating 
inflationary pressures.
(iv) Emigration may assist development, through the domestic 
impact of remittances on investment.
Jordan's experience is that the remittances have contributed to 
the consumption orientation of the economy and consequently this has 
increased pressure on domestic resources, thus further increasing both 
prices and imports.
In addition to increasing consumption by migrants' families, 
remittances have also contributed to the increase of consumption / in
general, through a 'demonstration effect'. This was. very, clear during 
1973-1976, when land speculation fed by remittances became a major 
characteristic of the Jordanian economy. The effect was to create 
new patterns of conspicuous consumption amongst land-owners which were 
directly reflected in imports of luxury goods. It was also seen to 
have had an expansionary impact on the money supply, directly through 
increasing the level of liquidity of the commercial banks, and indirectly 
through short term credit for the trade sector.
From the above-mentioned points it is clear that, while migration 
of labour is the result of interaction between 'push' factors in the 
labour exporting country and 'puli' factors (higher wages) in the host 
oil countries, the economic impact on the former countries may be to further 
increase emigration by reinforcing the 'push' factors.
m  Excessive foreign reserves can negatively influence 
economic development by preventing or postponing the 
implementation of necessary measures to correct an 
imbalanced trade and industrial structure.
Reform of Jordan's colonial financial and monetary system began
in 1963 with the establishment of the Central Bank and the adoption of
new foreign reserves policies. Foreign reserves holdings have been
diversified to include convertible currencies other than sterling, the
only previous component of Jordan's reserves during the Currency Board
!
system. While commercial banks used to hold over 30% of Jordan's total 
official reserves,this ratio declined to only 5% during 1968-1975, due
i
to the new centralisation policy of the Bank. However, despite insti-
i
tutional development, Jordan continued to hold excessive reserves in 
relation to the level needed for its transactions and as a precautionary
measure. This was demonstrated by calculating the conventional
j
reserve/import ratio and using a simple model to estimate Jordan's needs.
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The reserve/import ratio was shown to be higher than that for similar 
less developed countries and higher than the more fortunate developed 
countries. A model based on the Keynesian paradigm was used to 
estimate the precautionary and transactionary demand for reserves in 
Jordan, and 'implied that the average level for foreign reserves in 
Jordan might exceed demand by over 20%.
This analysis led to the refutation of official arguments justifying 
the high level of reserves as essential for ensuring the convertibility 
of the Jordanian Dinar and attracting foreign loans and investment.
The main reason for such a high level of reserves was shown to lie in 
the relationship between the industrial structure of the economy and 
the financing of reserves through aid. Maintaining the high level of 
Consumption through a large inflow of imports has been the prime 
objective of policy makers. The analysis concluded that the high level 
of reserves was necessary to maintain the level of imports needed to 
satisfy consumption.
The receipt of high interest on foreign exchange reserves 
is small compensation for the direct and indirect loss 
resulting from holding excessive reserves.
Depreciation in the purchasing power of the major reserve currencies, 
especially during the period 1973-1975, has resulted in a large capital 
loss to Jordan's reserves. The greatest loss was found in the holdings 
of sterling, followed by the loss in the holdings of US dollars. In 
addition to the direct cost, the holding of excess reserves involved 
a high element of opportunity cost. The high implicit cost of holding 
excess reserves was quantitatively indicated.
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K The basic feature of an underdeveloped monetary 
system is that money in circulation with the 
general public is the major component of money 
supply.
The analysis has shown that although the evaluation of Jordan's 
financial system has, to a large extent, followed a similar path to 
that of developed countries, the basic nature of the system remains 
underdeveloped. The monetisation of the economy began with the est­
ablishment of new financial institutions and the introduction of new 
financial instruments. This was reflected in the increase in the cash 
ratio (ratio of money to GNP) from the low level of 27% in 1952 to over 
60% in 1976. Nevertheless, for political, economic and financial 
reasons stemming from the underdeveloped state of the system, the pro­
portion of money held by the public remains remarkably high, and 
similar to that found in other developing countries.
The money supply has always been determined by factors which go 
beyond the control of the monetary authorities. The chief factors 
determining the level of money supply during the Currency Board period 
was shown to be the condition of the balance of payments. The increase 
in the level of reserves created by the inflow of aid to finance the 
balance of payments permitted the money supply to increase automatically. 
Although this policy of a one to one relationship between foreign 
reserves and the money supply continued to operate once the Central 
Bank was established, nevertheless for the first time some attempt was 
made to control the money supply by means of a credit policy.
Since its inception, the Central Bank has emphasised that credit 
should be related to the needs of the economy as a whole. Several 
measures have been adopted to encourage the commercial banks to both 
increase credit and correct their past trade-biassed preferences. It
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was shown that this particular credit policy lacked an overall 
developmental objective, resulting in purely monetary expansion which 
intensified the pressure on domestic resources, thereby increasing 
both imports and prices. Chapter Six indicated that in practice, 
neither private sector credit nor public sector credit was actually 
under the control of the Central Bank.
Government borrowing, a recent phenomenon in Jordan's fiscal and 
monetary development, has been solely determined by budgetary considerations. 
The monetary authorities facilitated such credit availability on the 
assumption that it would increase the government's role in promoting 
development of the physical productive sectors. However, it has been 
shown that all forms of government borrowing since 1970 have been 
directed towards current, rather than developmental, expenditure.
[~L~| The high liquidity element of Treasury Bills as well 
as government development bonds has contributed to 
the liquidity of the banking system at a time when 
the prime objective of monetary policy was to reduce 
this liquidity and bring it under control.
Due to the inability of the Central Bank to control commercial bank 
credit, trade continued to account for the largest proportion (over 
50%) of total credit whilst the share of manufacturing industry and 
agriculture remained relatively low. Even when the Central Bank used 
direct credit ceilings, credit nevertheless continued to expand unrelated 
to the precise targets set by the Bank.
Given the trade bias in the commercial bank credit structure, the 
alternative sources of finance for the productive sector have been 
assumed to be through the establishment of specialised credit institutions. 
Despite the increase in the number of these institutions and the increasing 
volume of their credit they have so far played a limited role in both
- 346 -
increasing the level of savings and channelling the available resources 
to the agricultural and manufacturing industries. The expansion in 
credit activities of these has been small in relation to the expansion 
of the commercial banks' trade credit. Apart from the Housing Bank, 
which has played a key role in the expansion of an already large 
construction sector, the ratio of the specialised credit institutions 
to overall credit has in fact declined from 27% in 1966 to only 16.6% 
in 1976. Obviously this declining ratio resulted from the large 
increase in commercial bank credit, rather than from the decline in the 
activities of specialised institutions.
From this analysis we can conclude that credit control in a 
small developing country will not necessarily lead to the originally 
intended objectives, unless financial markets are established and the 
liquidity of the commercial banks is brought under control.
The basic problem facing the monetary authorities has been the 
excessive liquidity of the banking system. The commercial banks, for 
important historical reasons, tend to maintain a high level of liquidity. 
This has been magnified in the particular case of Middle Eastern 
economics where political and economic instability has been a basic, 
and almost permanent, feature. In addition, the Central Bank, by 
adhering to the one to one ratio and together with the expansion of 
highly liquid financial instruments, has also contributed to the problem.
ill The rigidity of interest rates may render 
monetary policy ineffective.
Despite an annual inflation rate of 20% since 1973, no significant
change has taken place in the official interest rate level, and the
constitutionally laid down rate has a maximum limit of 9% which has not
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been revised to take into account the new monetary circumstances. The 
consequent fall in the real monetary value of interest rate payments 
has played a major role in contributing to the overall expansion in 
credit. Thus, although traditional attitudes towards interest rates, 
as embodied in Jordanian financial legislation, reflects Islamic moral 
values, economic considerations would seem to question their continued 
application, if present monetary conditions persist.
N The need for a realistic foreign exchange 
rate policy.
Although in general an unchanging exchange rate value can be 
considered an indicator of the strength and stability of an economy, 
in the particular case of Jordan this is not the case as it arises from 
an over-valued currency which, although artificially supported by a 
persistent aid inflow, nevertheless applies to an economy that is 
inherently failing to correct its real structural position (as Chapters 
Six and Seven show).
Naturally, certain aspects of these conclusions, especially those 
regarding the role of invisible trade and foreign exchange policies, 
were of necessity tentative in their quantitative significance. This 
could be seen in the analysis of the role of remittances of Jordanians 
working abroad and the role of the foreign exchange market. Full 
assessment of these roles would need detailed statistics.
This study has given special significance to, inter alia, the role 
of remittances of Jordanians working abroad and the role of the foreign 
exchange market. In the absence of comprehensive official statistics 
in the case of the former, and full information and knowledge on the 
latter, it has not been possible to quantitatively assess these aspects
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of the Jordanian monetary and trade position. Consequently the 
analysis has had of necessity to be impressionistic and tentative 
in certain aspects. This is, however, a general problem facing the 
researcher in these areas in most countries. For instance, even the 
full statistical services and expertise of an advanced country such 
as the United Kingdom, did not make possible a full examination of 
the workings of the British monetary system by the Radcliffe Committee 
in the 1950s. It would seem, from the arguments presented in this 
thesis, that such research is essential in the aforementioned areas, 
in order to fully assess the adverse effects present policies are 
having on the developmental achievements and future potential of the 
Jordanian economy.
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Appendix 1: Industrial origin of Gross Domestic Product, 1954-1959 
—  (in JD mi 11 ion)
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
1. Agriculture and 
forestry 14.2 6.2 19.0 12.8 12.9 10.5
2. Mining, manufacturing 
and electricity 4.2 5.2 6.3 6.8 7.6 7.9
3. Construction 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.4 3.7
4. Transport 4.4 5.5 6.8 8.3 9.0 9.7
5. Trade and banking 9.3 9.3 10.5 12.0 14.4 16.2
6. Ownership of dwellings 2.3 2.3 2.9 3.1 3.3 4.2
7. Public administration 
and defence 9.1 9-7 11.5 13.3 15.6 16.1
8. Other services 3.0 3.3 2.7 3.7 3.9 6.0
Gross Domestic Product 
at factor cost (GDP) 47.7 43.0 61.4 61.9 69.1 73.3
Source: R. S. Porter, Economic Trends in Jordan. 1954—1 q ^q Rû-î»,,+ 
Middle East Division, (JulyHVfal). • Beirut
Appendix 2: Industrial Origin of Gross Domestic Product. 1960-1975 (1n JD million)
Agriculture, forestry and livestock 
Manufacturing and Wining 
Construction
Electricity and water supply
Transportation
Wholesale and retail trade
Banking and finance
Ownership of dwellings
Public administration and defence
Services
GDP at factor cost 
Indirect taxes 
GDP at market price
1960 1961 1962 1963
14.62 25.30 20.90 22.08
6.89 8.83 8.06 10.62
4.50 4.50 6.15 6.12
0/69 0.67 0.74 0.93
11.12 12.64 12.53 12.77
19.57 24.28 23.63 26.43
0.87 1.27 1.46 1.35
7.13 8.01 8.58 9.39
15.79 16.74 17.06 17.61
8.26 8.63 9.51 10.37
89.44 110.87 108.62 117.67
8.86 9.27 10.28 11.39
98.30 120.14 118.90 129.06
1964 1965 1966 1967
34.14 34.11 27.65 38.74
12.53 16.22 17.27 17.50
5.45 7.87 9.28 8.69
1.03 1.68 2.26 1.78
12.03 12.60 14.42 14.84
28.01 31.43 28.92 39.08
1.51 2.11 2.77 3.40
9.93 10.69 11.20 11.90
19.70 21.41 22.03' 26.01
11.19 12.83 13.94 15.17
135.52 150.95 149.74 177.11
13.43 16.66 20.89 17.60
148.95 167.61 171.63 194.71
1968 1969 1970 1971
27.53 36.34 28.66 37.81
20.05 23.12 19.77 20.56
9.83 10.89 7.79 7.50
2.27 2.09 2.35 2.73
14.55 16.01 15.91 16.20
29.07 38.36 38.00 39.00
2.97 4.20 4.19 3.37
12.33 12.78 13.61 14.41
33.25 36.28 37.94 39.00
16.64 18.27 21.34 22.00
168.49 198.34 189.56 202.58
18.42 21.35 20.30 20.84
186.91 219.69 209.86 223.42
1972 1973 1974 1975*
42.45 31.92 54.48 26.00
25.23 28.60 49.11 48.80
9.67 15.30 17.00 16.10
2.90 3.47' 3.66 3.10
18.09 19.95 25.29 24.90
42.50 45.00 52.00 43.90
3.38 3.36 3.80 4.30
15.19 16.00 17.40 15.70
41.00 49.57 54.76 56.10
23.75 26.14 31.00 30.60
224.16 239.31 308.60 269.50
25.00 29.20 33.36 37.00
249.16 268.51 341.96 306.50
* East Bank only.
Source: Pertaining the years 1960-1970, see The Dept, of Statistics, National Income Accounts, Amman (May 1973).
Pertaining the years 1970-1975, see Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (February 1978).
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Appendi» 3 : Jordan Balance of Payacnts, 1950-1976 (ln JO «11 Hon)
1950 1951 1952 1953
Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit
A. Goods and Sendees 4.01 14.71 4.22 17.57 4.97 18.78 5.99 19.98
1. 1.9S 13.48 2.00 16.18 2.11 17.15 2.66 18.21
2 . 0.63 0.83 1.08 0.98 1.29 1.17 1.68 1.32
3. 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.09 - 0.12
4. Government, n.I.e. 0.57 0.22 0.7J 0.19 0.89 0.2S 1.06 0.21
5. Receipt from Jordanians Abroad - • - - - * * “
6. Other sendees 0.59 0.06 0.36 0.13 0.63 0.12 0.59 0.12Net goods and services . 10.70 - 13.35 - 13.81 - 13.99
Net eierchandtse - 11.53 - 14.18 - 16.04 * 15.55
Net services (2 through 8) 0.83 * 0.83 1.23 * 1.56 *
B. Unrequited Transfers 6.92 •- 6.94 11,75 « 14.60 -
7. Private 1.56 - 2.03 2.30 - 2.34
8. Central Government 5.36 - 6.91 9.45 * 12.26 *
c. Allocation of SDRs - - - * * *
D. Capital and Monetary Gold 4.59 3.60 1.31 - » 0.84
1. Nonmonetary sector 1.00 - 0.78 1.89 * 1.02 -9. Private" “ i - 17725’ - 0777 - OTTO •
9.1 liabilities - - 0.25 0.12 * 0.10 •
9.2 Assets - - ' ~ - -10. local Govt, liabilities - • - - - - •
11. Central Govt. n.I.e. 1.00 - 0.53 1.77 - 0.92 -
11.1 liabilities 1.00 - - 1.05 - 0.72 -11.2 Assets - - 0.53 0.72 * 0.20
11. Monetary sector 3.59 - 2.82 - 0.58 * 1.86
Net errors and Missions - 0.81 0.81 0.75 - 0.23 -
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Year-book, Washington DC, n.d. For 1950-54, vol. 8; for 1955-59, 
vol. 12; for 1960-63, vol ."16;" for' 1564-68, vol ."21“7nd for 1968-76.Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pert­
aining to some aspects of the Jordanian Economy (October 1974), Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin (June 1977).
a
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit
7,56 20,44 8,48 27.03 10.18 26.63 13.56 36.78 11.82 9.38 42.63
3.05 18.59 3.54 25.26 5.11 24.61 5.48 29.76 3.43 33.92 3.35 39.262.21 1.33 2.45 1.12 1.49 0.90 1.22 1.68 1.22 1.61 2.85 1.83
0.15 0.15 0.31 0.25 0.43 0.48 0.93 0.22 0.73 0.12 0.67 0.18
0.71 0.21 1.34 0.30 1.17 0.42 2.82 4.82 2.89 0.27 1.05 0.82
• •» • • « • «» • • - - -
1.44 0.16 0.84 0.09 1.98 0.22 3.11 0.30 3.55 0.71 1.46 0.44
- 12.88 18.55 - 16.45 23.22 - • w - n - 33.25
- 15.54 - 21.72 - 19.50 - 24.28 - 30.49 - 35.91
2.66 - 3.17 - 3.05 » 1.06 - 5.68 2.66 “
14.27 - 15.43 - 14.80 - 16.89 - 23.91 - 25.52 -
1.65 • n.a. . n .a . • n .a . - n .a . - n .a . -
12.62 - 15.43 - 14.80 16.89 - 23.91 « 25.52 “
- - - - - - - - - * -
- 1.55 - 0.73 - 2.67 1.72 - - 1.96 1.70 -
2.44 • 1.99 • 2.19 • 3.63 • 1.58 - 0.61 •
- . O? • 0.30 - 5751T - onr
• • - - 0.25 - 0.30 - 0.58 - 0.11 -
- • - • - - - - - - - •
• _ - - • • • • - -
2.44 . 1.99 . 1.94 . 3.33 • 1.00 . 0.50 -
1.30 • 1.29 - 1.86 - 4.63 1.30 1.13 0.13 0.50 •
1.14 - 0.70 0.06 - - - - « - * *
- 3.99 - 2:72 - • 4.86 • 1.91 3.54 0,59 -
0.16
l—'
3.85 « 4.32 - 4.61 - 2.86 « 6.53 *
Appendix 3 : continued
mo 2M1 WH 1963
Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit
A. Goods and Services 17. U1 45.83 20.55 46.08 23.89 50,75 25.17 61,35
1. Merchandise 3.95 41.43 5.27 40.93 5.92 43.51 6.56 53.632. Travel 3.23 2.22 4.34 2.44 5.05 3.42 6.00 3.203. Investment Income 0.6Z 0.10 1.19 0.20 1.37 0.30 i.ii 0.234. Government, n.I.e. 1.29 1.05 1.06 0.99 1.30 1.39 1.19 2.53$. Receipt from Jordanians Abroad 6.24 • 5.25 . 6.20 (.176. Other services 1.68 1.03 3.44 1.52 4.05 2.13 4.14 1.76Net goods and services - 28.82 - 25.53 - 26.86 36.IBNet merchandise - 37.48 . 35.66 . 37.59 47.07Net services (2 throuflh 8) 8.66 - 10.13 » 10.73 - 10.89
B. Unrequited Transfers 26.88 - 26.28 - 25,21 - 24.14 -
7. Private 1.39 . 1.72 • 1.74 _ 1.62B. Central Government 25.49 24.56 - « * 23.47 - 22.52 _
c. Allocation of SDRs - • - - - • •
D. Capital and Monetary Gold 0,83 - - 1.64 2.81 - Jill •4. Nonmonetary sector 0.90 • 1,25 6.03 1 369. Private o r . otrr • 06 . o f9.1 liabilities 0.50 0.08 0.54 0.08 1.30 0.03 1.S0 0.029.2 Assets • 0.01 • 0.15 0.71 n 1610. Local Govt, liabilities .ii. Central Govt. n.I.e. 0.49 . 0.94 5.47 0.0311.1 liabilities 1.50 . 0.50 _ 1.26 3.82 0 5811.2 Assets 1.01 0.47 0.03 4.21 - 3.21it.Monetary sector - 0.07 - L89 - hm' L li -
Net errors and omissions 1.11 - ‘-«.89 '1 ' - . 1.16 2.53 _
1964 196$ 1966 1967 1968 1969
Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Oeblt
32.70 57.10 37.20 64.10 41.60 77.10 36.80 64.60 37.20 81.60 46.01 108.63
8.80 49.40 9.90 55.80 10.40 67.30 11.30 54.20 14.30 57.30 14.75 67.548.00 3.60 9.B0 4.30 11.30 5.20 6.80 5.30 4.60 7.00 4.53 7.981.70 0.40 2.60 0.50 3.70 0.50 4.40 0.80 5.80 0.90 6.85 o.8i ;1.10 1.50 1.90 1.70 1.70 2.00 4.50 1.80 6.30 13.80 10.69 29.249.30 - 9.10 - 10.60 - 6.60 • 4.10 . 6.92 •3.80 2.20 3.90 1.80 3.90 2.10 3.20 2.50 2.10 2.60 2.27 4.06- 24.40 - 26.90 - 35.50 - 27.80 . 44.40 63.62- 40.60 - 45.90 - 56.90 • 42.90 • 43.00 - 52.7916.20 * 19.00 21.40. « 15.10 - ( - 1.40 - 10.83
28,50 - 29.50 - 34.10 - 53,90 - 54.50 47.34 -
1.90 - 2.70 • 2.70 . 2.30 . 1.40 • 1.55 .26.60 26.80 31.40 « 51.60 53.10 * 45.79 -
- - * - - - > - * - .
- 10.90 - 3.60 - 3.70 - 31.20 - 11.40 16.26 -
6.20 - Lia - 5.20 2.00 . 4.90 . Lil .0.30 0.30 • 0.30 • . . 0.10 0.80 _0.40 0.50 - - - 0.10 0.10 - r- . e.Bo0.40 • 0.30 0.30 - r. 0.10
- - 0.10 .. 0.10 0.30 • . . 0.04 .5.90 - 2.20 - 4.80 1.70 - 5.00 . 4;so .7.00 0.80 2.60 0,70 5.40 1.20 2.20 1.00 . 5,50 1.00 4.67 0.80
* 0.30 0.30 - 0.60 0.40 O.S0 - 0.63 -
17.10 - 6.20 - 8.90 33.20 -! . 16.30 10.92 -
(.80 - 1.00 - 5.10 - 5.10 - 1.30 . 0.02 •
kAppendix 3 : continued
1970 1971
Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit
A. Goods and Services 44.09 90.67 40.42 98.30 51.94
1. Merchandise 12.17 65.53 11.44 76.19 17.01
2. Travel 4.85 9.43 6.35 9.69 8.30
3. Inve'lment income 6.77 0.65 5.75 0.98 4.39
4. Government, n.i.e. 11.86 11.29 3.67 5.12 1.40
5. Receipt from Jordanians Abroad 5.54 4.97 - 7.41
6. Other services 2.9 3.86 8.24 6.32 13.43
Net goods and services - 46.58 - - -
Net merchandise - 53.36 - -
Net services (2 through 8) 6.78 6.87 -
B. Unrequited Transfers 40.65 - 36.61 - 68.29
7. Private 1.57 - 1.12 - 2.33
8. Central Government 39.68 * 35.49 65.96
C. Allocation of SDRs 0.96 - 0.88 - 0.88
D. Capital and Monetary Gold 1,78 - 18.56 - -
i.
9.
Nonmonetary sector 
Private
0.26
1.35
6.74
1.28
6.31
9.1 Liabilities - 0.20 0.05 1.22 3.50
9.2 Assets - 1.15 - 0.11 0.61
10. local Govt, liabilities 0.19 - 0.22 0.04 0.02
11. Central Govt. n.I.e. 1.42 - 7.84 - 6.71
11.1 liabilities 2.95 1.37 9.41 1.74 10.76
11.2 Assets - 0.16 0.17 - 0.13
11. Monetary sector 1.52 - 11.82 - -
3.19 - 1.83Net errors and omissions
1973 1974 1975 1976
Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit Credi t Debi t Credit Debit
118.92 76.82 137.62 114.36 198.16 185.84 304.17 332.34 431.55
94.88 18.98 107.80 49.75 155.68 48.38 232.94 68.71 338.74
11.27 10.71 11.28 17.29 17.43 35.72 33.76 68.86 32.14
1.05 6.34 1.26 8.81 2.11 11.33 3.10 12.99 4.74
5.28 2.03 10.26 2.02 12.65 5.91 14.68 5.67 27.57
- 14.70 - 24.13 - 53.25 - 136.46 41.80
6.44 24.06 7.02 - - - - - -
66.98 - 60.80 - 83.80 - 118.33 - 99.21
77.87 - 83.63 105.93 184.06 - 270.03
- 64.60 - 86.85 0.11 140.36 0.56 127.85 1.30
- 3.51 - 2.42 0.11 2.35 0.56 5.10 1.30
* 61.09 “ 84.43 138.01 122.75 “
0.40 6.03 4 J A - ' - 6.63 - 28.85
. 6.45 - 10.88 - ' 4-4.11 . • 31.19
0.38 - 1.14 1.04 - 6.30 - 3.40 •
0.12 0.67 - 2.16 0.03 4.18 0.14 6.81 9.30
- - 1.81 0.10 1.17 - 1.98 - 0.94
0.04 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.06 0.41 0.06 0.13 0.04
- 7.60 . 9.47 - 37.42 - - 27.88
4.18 7.60 - 14.45 5.19 49.01 10.94 25.09 53.02
- 0.06 - 0.21 - 0.64 0.05 -
6.71 - 12.48 - 6.74 - 50.74 2.34 -
1.79 2.23 . - 7.08 - 14.84 1.51 -
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Appendi
Vcar
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974 
1975*
* East
Source:
x 4: Resources and their uses at domestic prices, 1954-1975 
(in JD million)
GOP
Resources
'Imports
Total resources Consumption
Uses
Invefftient Exports
51.3 19.8 71.10
47.3 26.8 74.10
66.6 26.2 92.80
67.4 32.4 99.80
75.2 36.4 111.90
93.53 43.3 136.90
98.30 47.05 145.30
120.14 46.63 166.77
118.90 51.80 170.70
129.06 61.06 190.12
148.95 56.65 205.60
167.61 63.55 231.16
170.63 76.60 247.23
194.71 63.68 258.39
186.91 90.98 277.89
219.69 _ 108.69 328.38
209.86 89.89 299.75
223.42 93.01 316.43
239.50 101.01 340.51
268.51 136.36 404.87
341.96 184.63 526.59
306.50 304.36 620.30
59.1 5.9 6.1
61.7 6.1 7.3
69.7 13.7 9.4
79.8 9.3 10.7
92.8 8.2 9.9
112.6 12.6 11.8
115.5 17.1 12.8
130.9 19.0 17.0
131.4 20.2 19.1
149.8 20.0 20.3
155.8 25.3 24.6
174.8 27.8 28.5
187.71 28.1 32.1
205.0 25.6 27.7
212.0 37.5 28.3
231.6 64.4 32.3
227.1 40.1 32.2
245.9 49.8 20.8
262.0 44.1 34.2
303.41 51.17 50.29
357.64 83.44 85.51
398.15 92.65 129.50
Bank only.
(1) R. S. Porter: Economic Trends In Jordan, Middle East 
Development Publication, Beirut (July 1961).
(2) Jordan Dept, of Statistics, The National Accounts, 1959-1966 
(Amman: Dept, of Statistics, passls); and 1967-1972 (Amman: Dept, 
of Statistics, May 1973).
(3) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
Appendix 5: Receipts and the estimated Inflow of foreign exchange In Jordan (In JD million)
t
!
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Estimate Banking
System
Estimate Banking
System
Estimate Banking
System
Estimate Banking
System
Estimate Banking
System
Estimate Banking
System
Estimate
~
Bankln
System
1 . Export proceeds 14.75 4.20 12.17 3.40 11.44 3.01 4.93 17.01 9.66 18.98 29.43 49.75 48.88 23.54
2. Tourism 4.50 0.30 4.22 0.10 3.10 0.57 0.20 3.30 0.54 10.71 0.55 17.29 35.72 2.32
3. Jordanians working abroad 13.82 6.92 7.26 3.63 8.96 4.48 7.41 14.32 14.70 29.40 19.68 39.36 93.72 46.86 t
4. Others 15.00 — 10.00 — 5.00 — — — — — — — -- -
Total 48.10 11.52 33.65 7.13 28.50 8.06 12.24 40.13 24.90 59.09 49.61 106.40 178.32 72.72
1. Exports from balance of payments estimates.
2. Tourism from balance of payments.
3. Income from Jordanians working abroad was estimated to be twice as much as the receipts of the banking system.
4. Others represents transfers for the Palestinian movements.
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, unpublished data.
Append! a 6: Jordan's Cold ind rorelço tac'a-»;.; Assets During the Period 1965-1975 (In JD »11110»!)
Assets 1964 19« 196« 1967 196«
Value Ratio
I
Value Ratio
I
Value Ratio
X
Value Ratio
X
Value Ratio
X
Gold • 1.72 2.S 1.216 2.0 2.342 2.7 12.002 11.»
Special Craving tights - - - - - - - ■ - -
Pound Sterling 76.06 40.«] 63.4 37.S85 63.9 36.532 41.9 36.600 36.2
U.S. Dollar - 6.B2 13.9 19.330 32.9 23.829 27.3 21.117 20.9
Deutsche K*rfc - - - 0.699 1.2 2.930 3.3 13.914 13.8
S-Iss Trane - - - - - 12.271 14.1 12.663 12.4
French franc - - - 1.000 0.0 8.668 9.9 4.789 4.7
Belgian Franc - - - - - - - - -
Netherland Guilder - - - - - - - - •
others - 0.09 0.2 2.0 0.0 0.664 0.8 0.068 0.1
Total 76.06 42.66 100 S8.83S 100 87.736 100 101.153 100
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Central Accounting Division, Unpublished table on Jordan's foreign assets.
1969 1 970 1 971 1972 1973 »7 «  1975 j*
Value Ratio
X
Value Ratto
X
Value Ratio
X«
Value Ratio
l
Value Ratio
I
Value Ratio
X
Value Rat
f
12.008 12.8 12.011 13.2 12.014 13.5 13.045 13.5 13.04« 13.1 13.045 11.» 13.046 8.1
- - omo 1.0 1.831 2.1 2.932 3.1 29.70 2.9 2.868 2.« 2.864 1.1
32.069 34.2 33.549 36.7 26.048 29.3 30.485 41.6 25.270 25.3 15.317 14.0 2.721 l.t
21.269 22.7 17.601 19.3 13.180 14.* 17.532 18.2 11.199 11.2 21.277 19.5 47.353 29.
11.72S 12.5 12.721 13.9 14.697 16.4 15.493 16.1 24.924 25.0 29.381 26.9 35.754 22
13.362 14.3 12.557 13.8 13.220 14.9 7.637 7.9 10.032 10.1 13.874 12.7 21.800 Ilf
1.288 1.4 1.214 1.3 7.343 t «.3 - - 8.887 8.9 3.957 3.« 10.144 «.:
- - • - - - - - - - 2.936 2.7 9.340 M
• - - - - - - - - 3.366 3.1 9.343 s.r
2.005 2.1 0.689 0.80 0.520 0.60 9.756 9.60 3.489 3.50 3.339 3.0 ' 8.178 ».
93.726 100 91.302 100 88.853 100 96.380 100 99.767 100 109.35« 100 160.493 10f
1
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Appendix 7 : Capital Gain or Loss for Jordan Foreign Reserves 
of the currency unit concerned)
Year
1
Average
Balance
2
Present
Value
3
Balance 
2 - 1
4
Average
Interest
Rate
5
Ratio
3/1
STERLING
1970 31 ,796 : - - 9.74 -
1971 31,615 29,939 1,676 9.31 5.30
1972 27,394 23,371 4,023 6.70 14.69
1973 32,323 21,973 10,350 10.05 32.02
1974 30,349 12,838 17,511 12.65 57.70
1975 9,461 1,937 7,524 14.2 79.53
U.S. DOLLAR --
1970 64,536: - • 7.09 -
1971 50,056: 48,457 1,599 7.26 3.19
1972 38,313 34,924 3,389 5.94 8.85
1973 43,494 31,948 11,456 7.37 26.55
1974 50,450 23,513 26,937 10.75 53.39
1975 132,272 35,167 97,105 8.10 73.41
SWISS FRANC
1970 168,180 . . • 6.58 -
1971 153,584 147,677 5,907 6.82 3.85
1972 88,739 78,281 10,458 3.64 11.79
1973 88,824 69,690 19,134 4.52 21.54
1974 106,485 66,040 40,445 7.17 37.98
1975 162,677 75,856 86,821 8.50 53.37
FRENCH FRANC
1970 9,607 » « 17.25
1971 36,027 34,085 1,942 6.91 5.39
1972 115,315 102,150 13,165 5.45 11.42
1973 113,884 85,784 28,100 6.78 24.67
1974 83,736 42,908 40,828 12.17 48.76
1975 103,432 33,230 70,202 10.80 67.87
DEUTSCHE MARK
1970 56,446 - » 16.55 •
1971 128,205 125,078 3,127 7.16 2.44
1972 133,408 126,118 7,290 5*. 15 5.46
1973 173,525 153,599 19,926 5.50 11.48
1974 202,039 145,634 54,405 5.61 27.92
1975 289,734 160,404 129,330 9.10 44.64
(in thousands
6
Gain or loss 
(5-4)
+4.01
-7.99
-21.97
-45.05
-65.33
+4.08
-2.91
-19.18
-42.64
-65.31
+2.97
-8.15
-17.02
-30.81
-44.87
+1.52
-5.97
-17.89
-36.59
-57.07
+4.72
-0.31
-5.98
-22.31
-35.54
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Appendix 8 ; Money supply and GNP, 1951-1975 (in JD million)
Year GNP
0)
Currency in 
circulation 
(2)
Demand
deposits
(3)
Time
deposits
(4)
Money supply 
(5)
(2 + 3 + 4 )
1951 8.36 5.91 0.73 15.00
1952 49.2 7.72 4.91 0.78 13.41
1953 42.7 8.55 5.08 i.n 14.71
1954 52.5 10.66 6.10 1.48 18.22
1955 48.9 11.13 6.36 3.08 20.57
1956 68.1 14.56 5.68 2.71 22.95
1957 69.5 14.71 7.49 3.50 25.70
1958 26.3 15.16 9.17 3.64 27.97
1959 86.1 15.27 8.97 4.70 28.94
1960 93.9 15.36 . 10.46 5.13 30.95
1961 127.1 16.97 11.95 6.68 35.60
1962 130.8 19.04 14.43 9.57 43.04
1963 137.6 20.40 16.45 11.18 48.03
1964 160.6 23.12 16.73 13.72 53.57
1965 180.4 26.50 20.77 16.99 64.26
1966 185.6 30.33 25.70 19.79 75.82
1967 206.0 51.52 23.72 8.26 83.50
1968 197.3. 63.55 24.43 20.84 108.82
1969 233.7 71.29 24.93 22.61 118.83
1970 222.5 82.43 23.03 23.67 129.13
1971 236.6 83.01 24.97 27.73 135.71
1972 252.4 81.47 33.50 31.50 146.47
1973 291.3 97.48 50.86 27.73 176.07
1974 273.9 115.49 53.94 47.31 216.74
1975 394.9 134.03 79.48 64.23 277.74
Source: (1) International Monetary Fund, 
DC, n.d.
IFS Supplement 1972, Washington
(2) International Monetary Fund, IFS, vol. XXIX, Washington 
DC, IMF (September 1976).
(3) Central Bank of Jordan, Statistics pertaining to some 
aspects of the Jordanian economy (October, 1974).
(4) Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin (January 1978).
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Appendix 9: Money supply and factors affecting 1t, 
1951-1975 (in JD million)
Ycar Money supply 
Value X A
Fordqn
Value
assets
X A
Domestic
Value
credit 
X A
Other
Value
factors
1951 15.00 . 12.01 2.90 0.9 .
1952 13.41 -10.6 13.01 8.3 1.67 -43.0 1.27 41.1
1953 14.71 9.0 14.85 14.1 1.26 -24.6 1.40 10.2
1954 18.22 23.8 17.43 17.3 2.48 19.4 1.69 20.7
1955 20.57 12.0 21.46 23.1 2.28 -8.1 3.17 87.5
1956 22.95 11.0 25.18 17.3 0.99 -56.5 3.22 1.5
1957 25.70 11.9 26.84 3.8 2.32 134.3 34.6 7.4
1958 27.97 8.8 30.76 14.6 1.33 -42.6 4.12 19.0
1959 28.94 3.4 30.30 -2.0 2.78 109.0 4.14 -
1960 30.95 6.9 30.84 1.0 4.52 62.5 4.40 6.2
1961 35.60 15.0 34.38 11.4 6.36 40.7 5.12 16.3
1962 43.04 2.1 41.02 19.3 5.97 -6.1 3.94 -23.2
1963 48.03 11.6 34.43 -16.0 19.16 220.9 5.56 41.0
1964 53.57 11.5 49.32 44.1 12.03 -37.2 7.80 40.2
1965 65.26 19.0 56.65 14.2 17.91 48.8 10.31 32.0
1966 74.82 18.2 64.26 13.4 23.55 31.4 12.00 16.3
1967 83.50 10.2 89.74 39.1 12.57 -46.6 8.26 -68.8
1968 108.82 30.5 105.26 17.9 13.36 6.2 9.83 19.0
1969 118.83 9.3 95.19 -9.6 36.12 170.3 12.46 27.0
1970 129.13 8.6 93.69 -2.7 48.44 34.1 13.01 4.3
1971 135.71 S.l 89.08 -5.0 68.20 40.7 22.17 70.0
1972 146.47 8.0 95.89 6.7 70.40 3.2 20.82 -6.1
1973 176.07 20.3 103.36 8.4 98.00 39.2 25.29 21.4
1974 216.74 23.1 113.35 9.7 122.0 24.4 18.60 -26.0
1975 277.74 28.1 163.87 44.2 149.63 22.6 35.76 93.0
Source: (1) International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, 1972 supplement, Washington 
DC, n.d.
(2) International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, vol. XXIX, Washington DC 
(September, 1976).
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Appendix 10: Liquid assets of commercial banks (in JD million)
Year Cash Deposits with 
Central Bank
Foreign
assets
Government
bonds
Total
1951 0.98 2.67 3.65
1952 1.04 - 4.21 - 5.25
1953 0.77 -  . 5.49 - 6.26
1954 1.36 - 5.39 6.75
1955 1.80 - 8.49. - 10.29
1956 2.22 - 8.36 - 10.59
1957 0.92 - 11.17 - 12.09
1958 1.17 - 14.40 - 15.57
1959 0.71 - 14.28 - 14.99
1960 0.77 - 14.27 - 15.04
1961 1.00 - 16.08 - 17.08
1962 1.19 - 20.31 - 21.50
1963 1.36 - 12.04 - 13.40
1964 1.27 0.34 24.73 -  - • 26.34
1965 1.13 7.80 10.05 - 18.98
1966 1.55 13.28 7.26 - 22.09
1967 1.50 16.94 5.30 - 23.74
1968 1.76 15.69 6.32 - 23.77
1969 1.85 12.59 4.82 3.77 23.04
1970 1.98 12.86 6.07 3.34 24.25
1971 1.58 14.86 3.07 8.55 28.07
1972 1.91 17.27 3.39 16.18 38.74
1973 2.07 16.76 6.56 16.94 42.33
1974 2.48 21.97 7.96 14.88 47.29
1975 2.89 32.91 12.45 24.48 72.73
Source: (1) International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, 1972 supplement, Washington DC, n.d.
(2) International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, vol. XXIX, Washington DC (September, 1976).
